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ABSTRACT 
This study explores the mediation of ethno-religious conflicts by the press and investigates 
their potential for escalating or minimising such conflicts. Undertaken in the context of the 
protracted sectarian conflicts plaguing the Nigerian nation since return to democratic 
governance in 1999, the study focuses particular attention on the Nigerian press and seeks to 
locate the press within these conflicts. It addresses the wider debates around the reporting of 
war and conflict, particularly the contentious issues of the relationship between media and 
conflict and explores the implications of this relationship on the course of violent intra-state 
sectarian conflicts. Research on news culture confirms that media representations generally 
tend to glamorise war, violence and propaganda with negative implications for the resolution 
of such situations. This has raised critical issues about mainstream journalistic practices in the 
coverage of violence and scholarly arguments as to whether journalism is a participant or a 
detached observer in the conflict cycle. This study engages these difficult and much contested 
issues within the context of emerging alternative strategies for conflict reportage, focusing 
particular attention on the concept of peace journalism and its applicability to routine 
journalistic practice. 
The research utilises a repertoire of quantitative and qualitative methods of data collection, 
including content analysis, framing and critical discourse analyses and semi-structured 
interviews. The data collected is interrogated using a theoretical framework that incorporates 
ideas from ethnicity, media and ethnic conflicts, critical political economy as well as debates 
about alternative approaches to conflict coverage and reportage. The objective is to 
understand the intricate relationship between conflict dynamics, conflict analysis and the 
reportage of ethno-religious conflicts.  
 The research reveals significant flaws in the quality of coverage and with the framing and 
representational patterns of the conflicts. These flaws are located within the historical 
development of the Nigerian press, the commercialisation of its operations as well as weak 
institutional structures. It further engages the context of news production with specific focus 
on the issues of professionalism, training and media regulation and how these affect content. 
It argues for the adoption of journalistic practice patterns and styles that will make the press 
less predisposed to aiding conflict escalation. This has implications for both teaching and 
research in the field as well as for news practices by the press.  
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INTRODUCTION 
This study sets out to explore the mediation of ethno-religious conflicts by the press and 
investigates their potential for escalating or minimising such conflicts. Undertaken in the 
context of the protracted sectarian conflicts plaguing the Nigerian nation since return to 
democratic governance in 1999, the study focuses particular attention on the Nigerian press 
and seeks to locate the press within these conflicts, as to whether they are a part of the 
problem or a part of the solution. It addresses the wider debates around the reporting of war 
and conflict, particularly the contentious issues of the relationship between media and 
conflict and explores the implications of this relationship on the course of violent intra-state 
sectarian conflicts. Empirical data was sourced through a combination of quantitative and 
qualitative methods involving the analysis of text as well as the context of news production. 
The study finds significant flaws with the quality of coverage and the framing and patterns of 
representation of the conflicts by the press. Age-old issues of partisanship, ethnicity, 
sensationalism, exaggeration, over-simplification and a critical lack of depth and analysis are 
evident and pronounced in the media coverage under analysis in this study. Regional and 
primordial tendencies appear to shape coverage while the reportorial style and general news 
culture tend to obfuscate rather than clarify issues. The dissertation therefore argues for the 
adoption of conflict responsive journalism, patterned on peace journalism principles, as a 
measure to re-orientate the press towards professional and ethical practices that would not aid 
escalation of conflicts. Central to this effort is the role of training and education in enshrining 
professional principles and re-orientation of journalists towards new paradigms of practice in 
conflict reporting. It also canvasses the strengthening of the institutional platforms of 
journalism practice and press regulation to secure better professional output in media content.  
The idea for this study emerged from my own personal experiences and involvement with the 
Nigerian print media. As a young graduate of mass communication from the University of 
Lagos, Nigeria’s leading centre for journalism training, I was employed by a faith-based 
news magazine, Today’s Challenge, whose focus was to report current affairs from a 
Christian perspective. The period of my service with this publication, the mid-1980s to early 
1990s, were also very turbulent years in Nigeria in terms of Christian-Muslim relations, 
largely on account of ill-informed political strategies by the then military government. In 
particular, the controversy surrounding Nigeria’s membership of the Organisation of the 
Islamic Conference (OIC) sharply polarized opinions along religious lines and heightened 
sectarian tensions. This, coupled with the debates surrounding the introduction of Sharia 
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Islamic law into the country’s jurisprudence, heated up the polity and resulted in series of 
religious riots between Muslims and Christians - the two dominant religious groups in 
Nigeria. As a reporter, and later editor, of this news magazine, I was actively involved in the 
coverage of major incidents of religious crises during that era, such as the Kafanchan-
Kaduna-Zaria riots of 1987 and the Reinhard Bonke Crusade riots of Kano in 1989. 
Some of the experiences I had covering those riots remain indelible: panic and fear from 
sudden eruptions in a conflict area we were covering; gory scenes and pathetic narrations of 
victims; tales of atrocities, injustice and cruelty; humanitarian disasters and personal brushes 
with security agencies in the course of journalistic assignments. One particular incident 
which set me thinking about investigating the media was when a reporter from a popular 
northern-based national newspaper approached our magazine to allege, with evidence, unfair 
editing and doctoring of his report of an incident which significantly altered the meaning of 
the story with serious religious connotations. That particular incident provoked in me a 
curiosity to explore media practices in conflict coverage beyond routine journalistic work.  
Years later when Jos, the scenic and hitherto serene city on the Plateau where I have lived 
most of my adult life, was conflagrated in sectarian and ethnic conflicts, the latent interest to 
research media coverage of such conflicts was re-awakened and became compelling for me. 
Although I took particular interest in how the press was reporting the Jos conflicts, my 
concern however transcended Jos, as Nigeria’s return to civilian governance in 1999 after 
protracted military rule seemed ironically to open up a floodgate of unremitting contestations 
and violence. And, like Ogoh Alubo (2011) has observed, the print media has fed readership 
screaming headlines on exploding bouts of civil disturbances as a result of these conflicts. 
Simultaneously, there was also an outcry by members of the public that the press was 
exacerbating the conflicts by the style of reportage (Galadima, 2010; Daily Trust, 5 August 
2010). All of these set the context for the subject that I set to explore in my doctorate 
research. 
The issue of the relationship between the press and conflict is a broad and often times 
controversial subject of debate and enquiry (Frere, 2007; Geelen, 2002). Established 
knowledge in media research on news culture however confirms that media representations 
generally tend to glamorize war, violence and propaganda with negative consequences for the 
resolution of such conflicts (Galtung, 1998; Starkey, 2007; Lynch and McGoldrick, 2005). 
This has raised critical concerns about mainstream journalistic practices in the coverage of 
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conflicts. Indeed, a main criticism of mainstream journalism is its apparent preoccupation 
with war and violence and a relative lack of interest in processes of non-violent conflict 
resolution and reconciliation (Cottle, 2006:100). Hyde-Clarke (2011:14) has noted the 
growing belief that “the media have sometimes fanned the flames of discord by taking sides, 
reinforcing prejudices, muddling the facts and peddling half-truths.” And for Galtung (1993: 
xi), the media “amplify the sounds of guns rather than muting them.”  
In response to this criticism, there has emerged a journalistic genre which positions itself 
against established, traditional forms of journalism, challenging foundational news values, 
dominant agendas, privileged elite access and existing professional journalistic practices 
(Cottle, 2006; Lynch and McGoldrick, 2005; Lynch, Hackett and Shaw, 2011; Mogekwu, 
2011; Hackett, 2011). Imbued with a normative agenda, these new genres seek to redress the 
perceived deficiencies of mainline news representations and better align journalism to 
projects of social responsibility, economic development, political participation and cultural 
democracy (Cottle, 2006). These “corrective journalisms,” in Cottle’s perception, share a 
common concern to move beyond traditional news values, routinised journalistic practices, 
elite source dependencies and institutionalized ideals of professionalism. Among these new 
forms of journalism are peace journalism, development journalism, alternative journalism on-
line, public journalism, among others (Cottle, 2006: 102). 
This research focuses particular attention on peace journalism which “offers a form of critical 
analysis of existing ‘war reporting’ and a set of practical plans and options for journalists” 
(Lynch and McGoldrick, 2005: 248). Developed by Galtung (1991) and operationalized by 
Lynch and McGoldrick (2005), among others, the model proposes an alternative strategy for 
covering conflicts (Ottosen & Mudhai, 2009) and contrasts conventional or “war journalism” 
with “peace journalism.” The assertions of peace journalism have been the subject of sharp 
debate particularly in western journalistic circles. Scholars such as Hanitzsch (2007) and 
practitioners like Loyn (2007) argue that peace journalism exaggerates the influence of 
journalists and the media on political decision making and that, as defined, it is naïve and 
impracticable. It is also capable of eroding cherished traditions of journalism, such as 
objectivity and neutrality. 
While the debate about journalists’ relationship to conflict is healthy, it is not going to be 
resolved easily. Within the context of Nigeria’s experience, however, I share Howard’s 
(2009) position that “the news media in many societies can be a powerful force to reduce the 
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causes of conflict and to enable a conflict-stressed society to better pursue conflict 
resolution” (Howard, 2009: 5). My research aims to make a tangible contribution to this 
debate by providing empirical data on Nigerian press coverage of ethno-religious conflicts as 
well as examining the perspectives of media practitioners and media academics on the 
contending issues.  
I have organised the research around exploring the overarching question:  
How has the Nigerian press reported ethno-religious conflicts in the country and what are 
the implications of this for journalism practice within a democratic setting? 
To answer this question, I adopted a methodological approach combining quantitative and 
qualitative analyses, a strategy that enabled me to explore data extensively and rigorously. 
After an initial quantitative content analysis, I utilised more interpretive methods, including 
critical discourse analysis and framing analysis to discover latent meanings and perspectives 
of text. I also undertook semi-structured interviews to explore the context of news 
production. In order to interrogate the issues and questions thrown up by this enquiry, I 
utilised a theoretical framework incorporating ideas from ethnicity, media and ethnic 
conflicts, critical political economy as well as debates about alternative approaches to conflict 
coverage and reportage. Through these I am able to analyse professional practices of Nigerian 
journalism and their relationship with conflict and to canvass the argument for a re-
orientation in style and comportment leading to the adoption of a news culture which does 
not aid conflict escalation. 
In chapter one, I explore the theoretical foundations of the research in the form of a literature 
review structured under three thematic frameworks. The first framework provides a 
conceptual foundation for understanding the socio-economic and cultural terrain within 
which the Nigerian press operates. In this respect, it engages with discourses about ethnicity 
and ethnic conflicts in Africa, and their particular manifestation in Nigeria. This is with 
specific reference to Jos, a contested territory at the fault line of Nigeria’s Muslim-Christian, 
north-south geopolitical trajectory. The second framework focuses on media and ethnic 
conflicts and examines in particular the practices of the Nigerian press in this regards. The 
last framework is a discourse of alternative theories and approaches to conflict coverage and 
conflict reportage, exploring specifically the emerging concept of peace journalism and 
examines the critiques of the model as well as considering its relevance for the professional 
enhancement of media practice in conflict reportage in Nigeria.  
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Chapter two sets out the methodology for this study and outlines the framework within which 
data are gathered and evaluated. My approach employs a repertoire of quantitative and 
qualitative research methods in generating and analysing data. In constructing a suitable 
methodology, I was persuaded by Bertrand and Hughes’ (2005: 13) argument for flexibility 
in the choice of methodology as between quantitative and qualitative methods. They argue 
that in media research, the critical theorist may utilise any appropriate method “provided the 
results of the research can be directed towards improving the social word.” The plurality of 
methods enabled me to source data from divergent sources to ensure fair and adequate 
representation of conflicting views and opinions. The data were then converged to argue for 
professional and ethical re-orientation of the Nigerian press as a way of ensuring conflict 
responsive journalism. 
In chapter three, I employ quantitative content analysis to scope the patterns of coverage and 
the practices of the Nigerian press in the reportage of ethno-religious conflicts. This enabled 
me to grasp in broad outlines the approach of the Nigerian press and to identify areas of 
weakness with such news culture. This broad picture is then deepened through qualitative and 
interpretive endeavours in chapter four, specifically to determine the framing and 
representation of the issues in conflict. I observe, through this, that the pattern of 
representation coincides with existing social and political cleavages and thus tends to 
confuse, rather than clarify issues.  
Chapter five explores alternative perspectives to conflict reportage and conflict coverage. 
Here I examine current debates about the relationship between media and conflict, and the 
role of journalists in conflict. The chapter particularly dwells on the concept of peace 
journalism and the contentions as to its applicability in mainstream journalism. I find that the 
Nigerian press tends towards “war journalism” framing of conflict, a tendency which is 
capable of exacerbating such conflicts. I therefore argue for the adoption of conflict 
responsive journalism, a modified application of the peace journalism model.  
Chapter six discusses the context of journalism practice in Nigeria, through interviews with 
media practitioners and media academics. The chapter focuses particularly on issues of 
professionalism, training and education of journalists and media regulation, all of which 
impinge critically on content. I find that Nigerian media practitioners and media educators, 
while positively disposed to the principles about news making that do not aid escalation of 
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conflicts, also recognise structural issues which currently militate against such practices, 
chiefly issues related to training, work environment and commercial pressures. 
The dissertation concludes by calling for the adoption of conflict responsive journalism, 
involving practice patterns and styles that will make the press less predisposed to aiding 
escalation of conflict. This, I argue, has implications for both teaching and research in the 
field as well as news practices and news culture. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
1.1 Introduction 
In order to establish an integrated conceptual framework for the research, this chapter 
attempts to produce a critical reading of theoretical positions relevant to the subject of 
enquiry. This literature search is structured under three thematic constructs, namely: ethnic 
conflicts, ethnicity and nation building in Africa; media and ethnic conflicts in Nigeria; and 
alternative approaches to conflict coverage and conflict reportage.  
The first part provides a conceptual foundation for understanding the socio-economic and 
cultural terrain within which the Nigerian press operates. This is accomplished largely 
through engagement with discourses about ethnicity and ethnic conflicts in Africa, and their 
particular manifestation in Nigeria. With reference to Nigeria, the discussion probes the 
dimensions and complications religion brings to this theme, particularly within the 
democratic setting.  
The second part focuses on media and ethnic conflicts and how this connects with citizenship 
rights and nationalism within the framework of democratic governance. The review explores 
the discourses around the history of the Nigerian press and how this has shaped its world 
view and the resulting news culture. It dwells on the issues of ethics and professionalism. 
The last part of the review explores the  discourses on alternative theories and approaches  to 
conflict analysis and conflict reportage. It dwells particularly on the theory of peace 
journalism and considers its philosophical and conceptual frameworks. It also examines 
critiques of the model and explores its relevance for the professional enhancement of media 
practice in conflict reportage in Nigeria. 
 
 
The overarching objective of this review is to locate the Nigerian press within the wider 
struggles, concerns and contradictions of Nigeria's nation-building trajectory. The aim 
transcends a mere chronology as the narrative not only probes for gaps in understanding, but 
creates vital links with emerging trends in conflict reportage which challenge mainstream 
styles in "the attempt to impose ethical discipline" (Sharp, 2013: 35) on the process of news 
making that does not aid escalation of conflict.  
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1.2  Conceptual Clarifications  
Before proceeding to discuss the frameworks outlined above, it is important, for holistic 
understanding, to clarify central concepts and terms employed in this study. These include the 
concepts of nation/nationalism, ethnicity, ethno-religious conflicts and media. 
1.2.1  Nation/Nationalism 
Connor (1994: 91) observes that debates over definitions of terms such as “nation” and 
“nationalism” are shrouded in ambiguity due to their imprecise, inconsistent and often 
erroneous usage. The range of meanings associated with the concept of nation is very broad 
and encompasses notions derived from citizenship and other legal and democratic 
institutions, and the traditional culturally and ethnically connotated understanding of nation 
(De Cillia, Reisigl and Wodak, 1999: 169). Within these plethora of ideas however, Benedict 
Anderson’s concept of the nation as an “imagined community” (Anderson, 1983, 2006) 
stands out and is widely considered as a key contribution on the subject, or in Zimelis’ (2016) 
words, “the Bible of nationalism” and provides a major analytical framework for discourses 
on nations and nationalism. 
In his seminal work, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of 
Nationalism, Anderson (1983: 5) defines the nation as “an imagined political 
community…and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign”. He traces the cultural 
roots of nationalism to the “unselfconscious coherence” of medieval religious communities 
and the permeable political boundaries of preceding dynastic realms. He demonstrates that 
print capitalism, book publishing and the development of vernacular languages provided the 
tools people needed to imagine they were part of a much larger community of similar people. 
Those who belong to the nation conceive of it as a deep, horizontal comradeship, a fraternity 
that can inspire millions to give their lives for its cause. And even though the vast majority of 
members of this fraternity have never and will never meet each other, they all share the same 
feeling of overriding loyalty to it. 
In Anderson’s conception, the nation has three major characteristics. The first is that it is 
limited, in the sense that each nation has finite boundaries beyond which lie other nations. 
“No nation imagines itself coterminous with humanity,” he explains. This means that it 
excludes all those who do not belong to it. Secondly, it is sovereign because its people dream 
of being free from control by any other entity. Indeed, the very concept of nation-ness, 
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according to Anderson, was born in an age in which Enlightenment and the Revolution 
destroyed the legitimacy of the divinely-ordained hierarchical dynastic realm. What this 
means is that the national community supplants the earlier forms of community founded on 
royal, dynastic rights, religion or kinship. At its base, nationalism is thus similar to religion 
than to the rationalist institutions of democracy and bureaucracy which legitimise it. Thirdly, 
the nation is conceived or imagined as a community “because regardless of the actual 
inequality and exploitation that may prevail in each, the nation is always conceived as a deep, 
horizontal comradeship. Ultimately, it is this fraternity that makes it possible…for so many 
millions of people, not so much to kill, as willingly to die for such limited imaginings” 
(Anderson, 2006: 6).  
A clear argument of Anderson’s work is that nations are social constructs, existing only in the 
minds of those in the community. They are imagined as “the members of even the smallest 
nation will never know most of their fellow members, meet them, or hear of them. Yet in the 
minds of each lives the image of their communion” (Anderson, 2006: 17). Anderson’s theory 
therefore locates individuals within specific ordered communities as members of bonded 
communities whose members have common traits and concerns. All the individuals within 
this community have a horizontal relationship with one another, thus creating an identity. 
Such identity provides safety and security to members of the imagined community, offering a 
sense of belonging to a group of people who are on the same wavelength and have similar 
interests and motivations (UK Essays, 2013). As De Cillia, Reisigl and Wodak (1999: 153) 
emphasise, nations are to be understood as mental constructs, represented in the minds and 
memories of the nationalized subjects as sovereign and limited political units and can become 
very influential guiding ideas with sometimes tremendously serious and destructive 
consequences. 
This “imagination” within the community is made possible particularly by modern media 
which spreads or propagates knowledge of the same multivalent symbols throughout the 
nation, thus creating the basis for an emotional community. This point is of particular interest 
to this dissertation since the media is the key to creating these “imagined communities” 
through their mass reach and appeal. Higson (1998: 355) points out that national media and 
educational systems have a critical role in ensuring a nation imagines itself as a “coherent, 
meaningful and homogenous community.” And for De Cillia, Reisigl and Wodak (1999: 
153), the idea of a specific national community becomes reality in the realm of convictions 
and beliefs through reifying, figurative discourses continually launched by politicians, 
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intellectuals and media people and disseminated through the systems of education, mass 
communication, militarization and sports. Anderson’s main focus however is with the press 
(newspapers) which he recognises as a critical aspect of print-capitalism and the key 
commodity in the generation of new ideas and concepts (Anderson, 2006: 37). For him, 
newspapers allow shared experiences and therefore contribute greatly to the imagined 
communities that exist within nations both now and in the future. Anderson would therefore 
argue favourably for the role of the media in the public sphere as a positive vehicle for 
promoting public debate on issues. Furthermore, as scholars such as Bainer (2001: 3) argue, 
nation-building occurs not only through political and economic processes, but also through 
cultural and symbolic contexts. In this regard, arenas such as sport, and representations of 
sport and nation in the media are crucial sites for imagining and re-imagining the nation. 
This is not to suggest, however, that all nations or imagined communities are united or 
consensual on issues; quite the contrary. As Higson (1998: 356) argues, nations can be 
presented and represented as being in disarray. More fundamentally, Anderson’s postulations 
have been challenged as being limited in terms of their global relevance, particularly with 
respect to the realities of the African experience. For example, Ndi (2015), arguing from a 
critical perspective, insists that Anderson’s theoretical insights about nations as imagined 
communities are culturally reductionist. In his opinion, Anderson’s perspective is restricted to 
western experiences of religion, capitalism and the press and thus fails to throw sufficient 
light on the very complex situation of nationalistic identities and how they came out as 
processes in Africa. In Ndi’s (2015: 8) words, “while these theoretical insights about 
nationalism are impressive, they do not illuminate the transcending nature of ‘nationalism’ in 
Africa as a shared identitarian history.” This historical nature, he posits, has to do with, 
among other things, ambiguities in African nationalism, dichotomy between identity and 
nationhood, the connotative functions of the concept of ‘nation’ in different contexts and the 
determination of sociological conditions. For him, one vital question Anderson fails to 
address is “whose ‘imagined community’ is being referred to?” This question is critical when 
one considers that African nationalist elites fought against colonial rule with a dichotomous 
mind-set, that is, that their struggle was emancipatory in objective and the imperial powers 
that controlled them were oppressors. Ndi (2015: 9) therefore argues that the process of 
nation formation in Africa could not be collectively qualified as a nationalism “imagined” 
endogenously and constructed “from within” the dynamics of their indigenous histories.  
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The argument above denotes wider debates among scholars as to the origins and character of 
nations, nationalism and nationalists (Bainer, 2001; De Cillia, Reisigl and Wodak, 1999). 
Alan Bainer (2001: 3) offers a distinction between “ethnic” and “civic” nationalisms, both of 
which can provide the basis for the formation and maintenance of a nation-state. According 
to him, ethnic nationalist discourse is close to assumptions about the primordial and natural 
origins of the nation. It is also bound up with language and possibly race in some instances. 
Ethnic nationalism is regarded as unenlightened and exclusive in its political aspirations as 
either one belongs or does not belong. For Bainer, this “ethnic closure” is the chief basis of 
many of the current national conflicts that afflict the world. Civic nationalism, on the other 
hand, is reasoned to have emerged with the largely artificial creation of nations and nation-
states primarily during the 19
th
 Century. It celebrates citizenship within particular political 
entities as opposed to membership in supposedly natural human associations. As a 
consequence, civic nationalism is viewed as inclusive since anyone can belong once certain 
conditions are met. 
Bainer (2001), however, points out that it would be an error to draw water tight 
compartments in this argument as there is substantial overlap between these different 
nationalisms. For him, how the politics of particular nations is packaged is contingent more 
on specific circumstances than on some deep-rooted commitment to one or the other version 
of the ideology. Some exhibit a “separatist type” nationalism whose objective is the 
establishment of a new entity completely free from an existing state. Such aspirations are 
premised on a sense of ethnic or social national identity that can only find true political 
accommodation when freed from what is considered as an unacceptable set of political 
arrangements. In other instances, the nationality process seeks to create a nation-state by 
bringing together disparate regions, ethnic groups, and other premodern social or political 
arrangements. This frequently demands a civic approach to nationalism whereby the people 
become citizens of a new nation-state while often retaining a sense of identity located 
elsewhere.  
This position agrees with the assertion by De Cillia, Reisigl and Wodak (1999: 154) that there 
is no such thing as the one and only one national identity in an essentialising sense, but rather 
that different identities are discursively constructed according to context. For them, national 
identities are not completely consistent, stable or immutable but are to be understood as 
dynamic, fragile, vulnerable and often incoherent. Within the context of the debates outlined 
above, my dissertation defines nation as an independent political entity consisting of people 
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of diverse backgrounds and ethnicities existing in a single geographic territory and governed 
by one government. This definition is in line with the concept of “civic nationalism” 
espoused by Bainer (2001) and emphasises the constructed nature of the phenomenon as 
propounded by Anderson.  
1.2.2  Ethnicity 
The concept of the nation and nationalism discussed above also flows into the debates about 
ethnicity and ethnic conflicts which are equally contested. Scholars have proposed a variety 
of approaches to ethnicity, but two of these stand out, namely the “interpretivist” and 
“quantoid” approaches proposed by Fearon and Laitin (2000: 4). According to Green (2006), 
an interpretivist approach refers to the strategy of using a variety of situational definitions 
suitable to each study, an approach existent in much post-modern and post-Marxist work. 
Authors such as Stuart Hall, Etiene Balibar and Immanuel Wallerstein view ethnicity as a 
“plastic and malleable social construction, deriving its meaning from the particular situations 
of those who invoke it” (Green, 2006). In comparison, a quantoid approach attempts to 
impose precise definitions which are applicable to all situations. This is situated between two 
extremes of essentialism/primordialism and instrumentalism/constructivism. The former, 
prevalent in journalism and non-academic discourse, views ethnic groups as ancient and 
immemorial kinship groups. Constructivism, on the other hand, considers ethnic groups as 
artificial and constructed rather than as natural and eternal. Fearon and Laitin (2004: 6), 
basing their concept of ethnicity on what they term “ordinary language definition of terms” 
define it as “groups larger than a family for which membership is reckoned primarily by 
descent, is conceptually autonomous and has a conventionally recognised ‘natural history’ as 
a group.” For Green (2006), this ordinary language or “minimal” definition is more suitable 
for use in political economy than the interpretivist or quantoid approaches as it makes it 
easier to discuss with policy makers and non-academics not versed in ivory tower discourses 
of the concept. It also allows for conceptual clarity by eliminating the polysemy of 
interpretivist approach while avoiding the obscure and complicated terminology of the 
quantoid approach.  
Adopting this “ordinary language” approach, my research considers ethnicity as the self-
consciousness of a group of people who are related closely by shared customs and 
experiences including language, religion, history and common heritage. As explained above, 
ethnic groups are artificial and constructed rather than natural, and as Green (2006) explains, 
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just as they can be created, they can also be fragmented or deconstructed. By this definition, a 
nation could be composed of multiple ethnic nationalities historically constituted into a 
sovereign community with varying degrees of cohesiveness amongst these nationalities.  
A dimension of ethnicity is its propensity to generate conflicts between different ethnic 
groups. According to Osaghe (1991) ethnicity is the conscious behaviour of a group in 
competition to capture political power or scarce government resources. This definition 
emphasizes the conflict-generating nature of the phenomenon of ethnicity because, as Egwu 
(2004: 45) explains, it is essentially a tool of competition for individuals and groups for 
scarce public goods. This conflictual nature of ethnicity as presented here agrees with 
Stavenhagen’s (1990:15) definition of ethnic conflict as a confrontation, at any level, in 
which the contending parties or actors identify themselves or each other (or are so identified 
by outsiders) in ethnic terms, that is, using ethnic criteria such as language, religion, race and 
culture. Particularly in the context of the third world, ethnic conflicts are protracted and 
usually combine ethnicity with a demand for economic redistribution or involve a struggle 
against a dominant or hegemonic group (Irobi, 2005).  
1.2.3  Ethno-Religious Conflicts 
This brings me to the issue of ethno-religious conflicts. As used in this dissertation, ethno-
religious conflict is a variant of ethnic-based conflicts which have religious undertones (Ikpe, 
2009; Alemika, 2002; Ibrahim, 2002). These are disputes that are largely based on group 
identity as defined by religion and ethnic origin (Ochoche, 2002). As argued by Jinadu 
(2007), ethno-religious conflicts are best understood within the broader context of identity-
based conflicts since ethnicity is but one of a variety of markers which may occur singly or in 
concert with others such as religion or class in a given conflict situation. Such conflicts, 
Jinadu contends, entail the manipulation and mobilization of primordial identities like 
ethnicity and religion around shared political, economic, social and ideological goals. Fawole 
and Bello (2011) view ethno-religious conflicts as a situation in which the relationship 
between members of one ethnic or religious group and another of such group in a multi-
ethnic and multi-religious society is characterized by lack of cordiality, mutual suspicion and 
fear, and a tendency towards violent confrontation. 
 With respect to Nigeria, the focus of this research, Kuna (2005) locates the problem of 
ethnicity in the colonial structure of power that thrived on the reproduction of difference, the 
most dominant of which are ethnicity, religion and indigeneity, a structure which he argues 
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has become indispensable to the post-colonial state. For him, the conflicts in parts of northern 
Nigeria are “significantly related to the way in which othering is deployed in the reproduction 
of existing power arrangements.” Globally, he argues that ethnicity, religion and indigeneity 
have now replaced race as the major organizing principles of community. Struggles based on 
ethnicity, moreover, have intensified in Nigeria, as in many other developing countries, as a 
result of declining state capacity, evident not only in the provision of social services, but also 
in the inability to provide the most basic services states are traditionally known to monopolise 
– personal and public security. Kuna argues that in many cases, declining state capacities 
have reinforced othering processes by creating conditions that allowed sub-national and other 
primordial groups to take precedence over a broader, national and inclusive identity.  
Religion plays a central role in the ethnic contestations in Nigeria partly because the 
population is almost equally divided by the two dominant world religions – Christianity and 
Islam (Kuna, 2005). The dimension of religion both complicates and builds into ethnic 
conflicts a capacity to ignite wider crises in other parts of the country through retaliatory 
attacks by ethnic or religious compatriots especially as ethnic and religious affiliations 
overlap such that some ethnic groups predominantly share the same religion. Ethno-religious 
conflicts are particularly prevalent in Nigeria’s Middle Belt, the geo-political region which is 
the focus of this study, because ethnic and religious boundaries tend to coincide between the 
Hausa/Fulani and northern minorities (Imobighe, 2003). In Imobighe’s words, “the conflicts 
between these two groups often take on the posture of ethno-religious conflicts” (Imobighe, 
2003: 15). This emphasizes the conflict-generating propensity of the phenomenon in inter-
ethnic and inter-religious relationships, issues discussed more fully in the next section. 
1.2.4  Media  
Allen and Seaton (1999: 4) observe that media are not homogenous as is sometimes 
suggested by the use of the term. ‘Media’ is a plural form of ‘medium’ and refers to the 
mechanisms by which information is transmitted. Thus the media cannot in themselves make 
decisions and, while they are persistently manipulated, there is no big, underlying meta-
conspiracy. The media therefore have to be de-mythologised if we are to understand them. 
According to Long and Wall (2009: 3), media is a conventional term used to describe modern 
means of electronic communication. This encompasses the range of newspapers, the 
broadcast media (radio and television) and the internet in all its variety giving rise to the 
concept of new media. It also includes those practices that operate at the intersection of these 
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various media, such as advertising and public relations. Long and Wall further explain that 
the use of the term mass media reflects a concern with the manner in which various media 
forms send messages, from a single form to an anonymous mass of people who constitute the 
audience, consumer, listenership, readership, community, etc. 
Wimmer and Dominick (2013: x) however observe that categorising what a mass medium is 
has become complicated in view of recent technological developments. They therefore 
provide a traditional definition of the mass media and a revised definition. For them, the 
traditional definition of the mass media is any communication channel used to simultaneously 
reach a large number of people, including radio, television, newspapers, magazines, 
billboards, films, recording, books and the internet. In view of new high tech communication 
channels, they have added a new category called smart mass media, which include smart 
phones, smart TVs and tablets, three media that are essentially computers. As standalone 
devices, each of these media can function as individual mass medium. For example, using 
these smart devices, one person or one organisation can now communicate simultaneously 
with hundreds of thousands or even millions of people via tweets, text messages, social media 
posts and email. However, smart media can access the internet and additionally serve the 
function of all other mass media. For example, a person can watch television, listen to radio 
or read newspapers, magazines or books all using a smart media device. In order words, 
smart media represents another form of mass communication. Therefore, Wimmer and 
Dominick now define mass media as any communication channel used to simultaneously 
reach a large number of people, including radio, television, newspapers, magazines, 
billboards, film, recordings, books, the internet and smart media.  
My dissertation focuses on journalism, which Hackett (2007: 1) describes as the most 
important story-telling genre of the media. Within journalism, it is particularly concerned 
with the press or newspaper journalism. According to Long and Wall (2009: 141) the 
newspaper is the oldest of the non-electronic mass media, with industry and form affected, if 
not usurped, by once ‘new’ media such as radio, television and lately the internet. As 
explained in Chapter 1, the newspaper industry in Nigeria dates back to the nation’s 
precolonial history and is a key player in the political and social terrain.   
The complications associated with modern media have wide ranging ramifications, not only 
for professionals and owners, but also for audiences and consumers. In an age of multiple 
screens, and within the context of postmodern theorising about the fluidity of our identities, it 
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is even difficult to pinpoint when people become audiences (Press and Livingstone, 2006: 
176). The rapid changes also emphasise the need for a highly literate and discerning audience 
able to make meaning both of new technologies and myriad information.  
1.3  Ethnic Conflicts, Ethnicity and Nation Building in Africa: A Background 
Discourse 
Having clarified basic concepts as used in this dissertation, this section proceeds to examine 
and interrogate in greater detail the concept of ethnicity and explores its limitations as an 
analytical tool in explaining Africa’s conflicts. Allen (1999) observes that modern conflict 
brings with it complexities quite different from the classical warfare of the past. He notes, for 
example, that at the beginning of the 19
th
 century, ninety percent of all war casualties were 
military, whereas today, ninety percent are civilian. Also, unlike in the past, most current 
wars are not being fought between states but are intra-state. Wallenstein (2007) similarly 
notes that 21
st
 century armed conflicts have made significant shifts in nature, location and 
focus relative to previous warfare. Whereas previous conflicts were usually fought between 
recognised state entities and waged according to international conventions, post-World War 
Two conflicts are mostly intra-state, and tend to be more frequent and numerous. Within this 
reality, Seaton (1999) observes a phenomenon, which has been the eruption of peculiarly 
brutal, sub-national ethnic warfare as many modern conflicts are characterized by what he 
describes as unimaginable atrocities, including endless streams of wretched refugees fleeing 
violence, mayhem and starvation. 
The usual explanation for the ferocity of modern wars is ethnicity or inter-ethnic strife. 
Leading war analysts such as Keegan (1998), Moynihan (1993) and Kaplan (1993) are among 
authors who hold the view that numerous contemporary wars are the result of certain ethnic 
groups expressing their true qualities following the lifting of external controls, or as revealing 
atavistic drives existing in all of us, which are manifested the moment the rule of law is 
undermined (Allen, 1999: 27). Allen (1999) however challenges this popular notion, 
maintaining that ethnicity itself is not an explanation, but rather a product of social processes. 
He notes the creeping tendency to conflate ethnicity with the old meaning of race as social 
differentiation with a biological basis. This tendency suggests that natural divisions motivate 
action, and that some social groups are inherently predisposed to violence. Such 
“biologizing” of ethnicity, he argues, informs the imagery of a new “barbarism” which some 
authors have used to characterize the supposed irrationality of wars in parts of Africa. And 
for Seaton (1999), the problem is that reducing the social and economic realities, and the 
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complex historical causes, that underlie and prolong these conflicts to “ethnicity” 
depoliticizes them. Such explanations, he points out, collude with protagonists’ nationalistic, 
mythologized interpretations of history. Such characterizations not only obscure the role in 
such wars of national political struggles, but their relationships with post-Cold War global 
capitalist system.  
Atkinson (1999: 259) corroborates this assertion by explaining that the images presented of 
African conflicts as primitive and backward reinforce existing prejudices and limit further 
examination of their causes and impact. Using the Liberian civil war as an example, Atkinson 
contends that the lack of understanding of how national political struggles have been played 
out, with their local, regional and international dimensions, was a primary factor in the lack 
of effective early action in the crisis by the international community. According to her, the 
media presented the war as “ethnic conflict” with the horrific violence “understood as 
expression of primitive instincts and loyalties. The hidden implications, that Liberians are at 
some backward phase of their political development, forms part of the more general analysis 
of the African situation.” Her conclusion is obvious: “If conflicts are seen as caused by 
factors unique to…African history and culture, then it becomes difficult to see how the West 
could intervene effectively” (p.264). Such analytical deficiency, she argues, obscures the 
activities in the international sphere which have a direct bearing on the development of the 
war. In this respect, Atkinson points out the failure of the media to recognise early the role of 
Liberian illegal export economy as a driving force in the conflict, which involved leading 
members of the international economy contributing to the power of existing warlords and 
increasing the incentives of competing to aspiring fighters, warlords and politicians. Thus 
“media and other sources have almost always failed to analyse the economic aspects of 
African wars, which arguably form the crux of many conflicts, providing as they do both the 
motivation and the means for expressing or resolving competition through violent conflict.” 
Significantly, Atkinson also points out that the Liberian situation was effectively resolved 
only following serious attention by the international community to the issue of the illegal 
economy and its role in perpetuating the war.  
McNulty (1999: 275) also points out the flawed characterisation and misinterpretation by the 
media of the Rwandan crisis due to “oversimplification and the related racist tendency to 
label all conflicts in Africa as ‘tribalism,’ by means of which a unique set of political 
circumstances is ethnicised and thus explained away.” Quoting Pieterse (1997:71), McNulty 
observes this pattern of “distortion” in the coverage of Africa, insisting that “ethnicity, 
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although generally considered a cause of conflict, is not an explanation but rather that which 
is to be explained. The terminology of ethnicity is part of the conflict and cannot serve as a 
language of analysis.” He insists that swallowing the ethnic interpretation of conflict 
promoted by interested parties locally, reinforces and perpetuates a vicious circle which 
strengthens politically motivated propaganda and misinformation. 
The analysis above agrees with Allen and Seaton’s (1999: 4) argument that modern conflicts 
are political and have real histories and that it is therefore necessary to unravel them to 
counter ethnic mythologizing by protagonists and journalists and strip them of “fantastic 
emanations.” This, they contend, requires “unfashionable, accurate, balanced, old-fashioned, 
evidenced-based narratives” which explain in logical sequence how one event led to another 
as an anchor for investigating what is really going on. Arguing further, Allen and Seaton 
insist that ethnicity has no biological basis, but refers to socially constructed relationships 
between groups, often expressed in conflicted social boundaries. All definitions of war 
include the idea of organised violence against an enemy group. It follows that "there is no 
special category of ethnic war, but all war has an ethnic aspect." They however explain that 
ethnicity influences behaviour because once conflict commences, ethnic identities become 
social facts and people are labelled. The power of ethnicity lies in the acceptance by people 
generally that particular social divisions are natural and inevitable.  
The end of the Cold War witnessed an upsurge of identity politics which has transformed 
several African states such as Liberia, Sierra-Leone, Rwanda, Somalia, Sudan and Nigeria 
into massive theatres of violent conflict. These conflicts revolve around the manipulation of 
primordial identities, notably ethnicity and religion (Para-Mallam, 2012). It must however be 
noted that identity based conflicts associated with ethnicity and religion are not exclusive to 
Africa as the former Yugoslavia, Chechnya, Northern Ireland, etc. have shown. Bowen 
(1994: 34) also argues against the tendency by some scholars to baptise every conflict, 
particularly in Africa, with the toga of ethnicity. According to him, “ethnic conflicts misguide 
us. It has become a short hand way to speak about any and all confrontations between groups 
of people living in the same country.” And for Dragadze (2003), ethnic conflict could 
actually be a cover for human rights violations since the ethnicisation of conflicts distracts 
attention from the true causes of conflict between groups. It is therefore necessary, according 
to her, to look beyond the claims of interested parties in order to understand the true nature of 
conflicts.  
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Melone, et.al (2002: 6) notes that inter-ethnic conflict has become a central characteristic of 
the post-Cold War era as many groups and leaders around the world have turned to ethnicity 
as the answer to their dilemmas of identity. They identify three main causes of ethnic 
conflicts as structural factors, facilitating factors and triggering factors. Structural factors 
encompass economic, social and political issues relating to wealth distribution and inter-
ethnic relations; facilitating factors include “the degree of politicisation and ethnic 
consciousness” and triggering factors relate to issues such as a sharp economic shock, sudden 
escalation of inter-group tension or the collapse of central authority. This position refutes the 
characterization of the problem of ethnicity in Africa as a “tribal” phenomenon. Indeed, 
scholars have challenged the usage of the word “tribalism” as a derogatory colonial coinage, 
insisting that Africans are not primitives and tribalists who delight in killing one another on 
the basis of ethnic differentiation (Osaghe, 1990; Okwudiba, 1980; Vail, 1989; Mare, 1982). 
In the words of Chabal and Dalo (1999: 45), “Africans do not behave any less or any more, 
rationally than anyone else.” 
The above explanation notwithstanding, it is also noticeable that among numerous identity 
markers, ethnicity and religion constitute “the dominant axis” around which violent conflicts 
have revolved in Africa (Hagg and Kagwanja, 2007: 12). Irobi (2005) insists that irrespective 
of the validity of the arguments to the contrary, many of African conflicts have ethnic 
connotations, citing the case of Rwanda where killings were carried out along ethnic lines 
reproducing past animosities. Irobi further cites a study by Christian Sherrer (1999: 53), 
which reveals that two-thirds of all conflicts from 1985-1996, had a dominant or influential 
ethnic character. What is clear, according to Irobi, is that ethnicity does not exist in isolation, 
but often combines other cleavages such as religion, race, class and regionalism with each 
reinforcing the other. For Egwu (2004: 86) the tension and conflicts in inter-group relations 
are a consequence, not of natural divisions between ethnic and cultural groups, but the 
outcome of competition for power and resources in which elites of various ethnic groups 
engage in deliberate mobilisation and politicization of ethnic identities.  
Imobighe (2003) has however attempted to disentangle the word “ethnic” from the negative 
connotation popular in literature arising from definitions based on the dysfunctional ways 
ethnicity has been employed by some people. Tracing the root word “ethnic” to its classical 
meaning, Imobighe defined it as “the feeling of belonging to a distinctive cultural or 
linguistic group.” According to him, such a feeling of belonging to a distinctive socio-cultural 
group or a manifestation of ethnic consciousness cannot by itself be a bad thing just as the 
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manifestation of national consciousness is not regarded as a bad thing within the comity of 
nations. “The cultivation of that feeling to serve negative ends cannot be regarded as the 
essence of the word,” he emphasised.  
The political economy of ethnicity is therefore what gives rise to much of the “negative ends” 
referred to by Imobighe above and which fuels protracted and often gruesome conflicts 
described by Harris and Reilly (1998) as “deep-rooted conflicts.” According to them, deep-
rooted conflicts have two powerful elements. The first of these elements is identity, defined 
as “the mobilisation of people in communal identity groups based on race, religion, culture, 
language.” The second element is distribution, that is, “the means of sharing economic, social 
and political resources within a society.” Where perceived imbalance in distribution coincides 
with identity differences, this easily results in conflict. This combination of identity with 
wider perceptions of economic and social injustice is thus a critical factor that often fuels 
deep-rooted conflicts.  
Yusuf (2007) also identifies other characteristics of deep-rooted conflicts to include their 
persistence and scope. According to her, these conflicts have a tendency to recur because 
identity issues cover a wide range of elements that are at the core of a people’s sense of 
being, such as race, religion, culture, heritage, history and language. They are more complex, 
persistent and prolonged. And since the core issues appear difficult to negotiate or 
compromise, such conflicts are also much more difficult to resolve. In this regard, Yusuf 
further observes that deep-rooted conflicts have a scope that can be alarming because 
wherever people who share the same identity in race, language, religion, and culture exist, the 
conflict could spread to such areas. This is particularly difficult where such identity-related 
issues also combine with a sense of injustice and perceived marginalisation in the distribution 
of resources such as land, economic and political power, employment prospects, etc. Then the 
conflicts become prevalent, pervasive, durable and insoluble. The issues in the dispute are not 
only identity-driven, but people become emotionally charged over what gives them their 
sense of themselves, defining a person’s bond with their community and defining the level of 
satisfaction of their need for identity. 
Most of the modern conflicts with ethnic colouration occur in the poorer parts of the world, 
least equipped to recover quickly (Allen and Seaton, 1999). As early as 1994, UNDP’s 
Human Development Report had called for a profound transition from nuclear security to 
human security. It noted that of the 79 countries affected by political violence in 1993, 65 of 
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them, or 82 percent, were in the developing world. Africa, in particular, has presented an 
almost unmitigated picture of war, violence and political turmoil. Irobi (2005: 10) paints a 
grim picture of ethnic conflicts and their effects on Africa, noting that from the Horn of 
Africa to the Cape of Good Hope, there are flames of conflict, which produce poverty, 
hunger, refugees and agony. Ted Gurr (1991) notes that in the 1980s alone, conflict and 
ethnic violence claimed over three million lives in Africa while 160 million Africans lived in 
war-stricken areas. The United States Committee on Refugees estimates that within the same 
period, Africans accounted for 43 per cent of the global refugee population, most of them 
fleeing from the cataclysmic effect of ethnic conflicts (1990: 3032). More recent figures by 
the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organisation shows that the number of hungry 
people in sub-Saharan Africa stood at 239 million as at 2010, being the most recent estimates 
(FAO, 2010). Sub-Saharan Africa also has the largest proportion of its population 
undernourished, an estimated 30 percent in 2010 compared to 16 percent in Asia and the 
Pacific. This implies that in 2010, one in three persons in sub-Saharan Africa was hungry. 
According to the World Hunger Education Service and Hunger Notes (2015), conflict is a 
principal source of human misery including hunger and poverty. People living in countries 
affected by violence are twice as likely to be undernourished and 50 percent more likely to be 
impoverished. By 2011, Africa had an estimated 13.5 million refugees and internally 
displaced persons or 38 percent of the global refugee population, most of this resulting from 
violence and conflict. For Kofi Annan (2005), former UN Secretary General, the level of 
conflicts and their enduring nature made Africa a major challenge to the efforts to achieve 
global peace, prosperity and human rights (cited in Irobi, 2005). Given the foregoing 
accounts of wars and conflicts that continue to plague the African continent, it is clear that a 
more concerted effort to grapple with the problem of wars and conflicts, regardless of their 
origins, demands urgent intellectual and socio-political attention. 
Para-Mallam (2012), in reference to Hag and Kagwanja (2007), adduces three plausible 
reasons for the preponderance of identity-based conflicts in Africa. First among these is the 
colonial legacy which laid the defective social and political foundation that apparently makes 
these conflicts almost inevitable. The system of colonial administration, anchored on divide-
and-rule tactics, elevated one or a few ethnic groups and relegated and marginalized others. 
Such policies bred "political tribalism" in emerging states characterized by patrimonial client 
networks. This "ethnicisation" of politics owing to the construction of ethnicity as a legal 
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entity by various colonial administrations polarized many African societies along 
settler/migrant and native/indigene fault lines. 
Another reason for the preponderance of conflicts in Africa is the character of the African 
state which remains "weak, dysfunctional and predatory and formal institutions and processes 
of governance continue to rely on neo-patrimonial logic for resource allocation and upward 
mobility" (Para-Mallam, 2012: 8). Echoing scholars such as Egwu (2004), Alubo (2011), 
Ikpe (2007), Para-Mallam (2012: 8-9) notes that clientelism, a major feature of the 
patrimonial state, "entails that ethnicity or religion or a combination of both, constitutes a key 
eligibility criterion for access to socio-economic resources instead of the liberal democratic 
approach that relies mainly on citizenship." In this respect, the state itself becomes a partisan, 
rather than a neutral, player in the allocation of resources and by this perpetuates identity-
based conflicts. 
Para-Mallam's third explanation for Africa's conflicts is "globalisation and regional conflict 
complexes." She cites Appadurai (1998) and Hag and Kagwanja (2007) in their assertions 
that "ethnic violence is deeply rooted in the uncertainties, anxieties, disillusions and chaotic 
environments created by economic globalisation." This results in regional power conflicts 
and economic wars in the context of poverty and underdevelopment. According to Para-
Mallam, it is within this construct that (scholars) locate the instrumentalist conception of 
ethnicity “evident in the political manipulation of ethnic and religious identity by…elites 
struggling for power in order to gain access to globalized capital." 
This, however, is not to conclude that ethnic identity and diversity are inevitable recipes for 
violent conflict. On the contrary, cultural identity could indeed be an important asset in peace 
making, nation-building and social re-engineering (Hag and Kagwanja, 2007; Para-Mallam, 
2012). What makes the critical difference, according to Para-Mallam, is Lonsdale’s (2010) 
typology which differentiates between “moral ethnicity” and “political tribalism” where 
cultural differentiation serves as a basis for tolerance and mutual respect in the former and 
unhealthy rivalry in the latter. This, she explains, agrees with the cultural theory of 
democracy proposed by Jinadu (2007) which is anchored on traditional African values, 
methods and styles within the contemporary realities of modern democracy. According to 
Para-Mallam (2012) such a home-grown African system would aim at the pragmatic 
management rather than the resolution and removal of identity-related conflicts. It would also 
emphasise mutuality, reciprocity, effective redress, functional power decentralisation and 
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resource control as reflecting current wisdom in conflict analysis. Furthermore, she makes a 
case for "direct proportional representation" where ethnic groups are guaranteed, in an 
objective manner, representation in government proportional to their "numeric incidence" in 
the population. And most crucially, Para-Mallam (2012: 10) points out the need for:  
a critical interrogation of religious ideologies to the extent that they promote 
dogmas and behaviour codes at variance with the democratic principles of 
tolerance, equality and respect for the sanctity of life. In this regard, through 
consultation and consensus building, it should be possible to arrive at common 
norms and rules of engagement predicated on obedience to secular authority. 
 
What the foregoing analysis demonstrates is the inadequacy of “ethnicity” and/or “tribalism” 
as analytical tools in explaining or rationalizing the numerous conflicts taking place in Africa 
and the need to take cognizance of vital historical and socio-economic parameters in 
understanding the situation. Not only would such an approach guard against reinforcing 
existing prejudices, but is more productive and realistic in seeking effective solutions and 
remedial actions to the conflicts. With respect to Nigeria, this issue is taken up in more 
specific terms in the next session which explores the dimensions and challenges of ethnicity 
to nation-building in the country and its relationship to the professional practice of 
journalism. 
1.4  Ethnicity and Ethnic Conflicts in Nigeria 
Ethnicity and religion have historically constituted a challenge to the development of 
democracy, nation building and national integration in Nigeria (Olu-Adeyemi, 2004; Alubo, 
2011). Deeply rooted in its history (Oyovbaire, 2001; Ikpe, 2009; Imobighe, 2003; Alubo, 
2011), these issues assumed conflagratory dimensions during the prolonged military regime, 
particularly in the volatile debates regarding Nigeria’s membership of the Organization of the 
Islamic Conference (OIC) and the sharia controversy, which divided the polity sharply along 
religious lines (Alubo, 2005). 
Nigeria is a highly complex and pluralistic nation. It is multi-ethnic and multi-religious with 
Christianity and Islam dominating the landscape of the roughly 150 million people 
(Oyovbaire, 2001: 4). There are three major ethnic groups (Yoruba, Hausa-Fulani and Igbo) 
and over 370 smaller ethnic groups (Alubo, 2011: 1). By international standards, the levels of 
religious commitment, belief and practice in Nigeria are considered as extremely high in both 
the Muslim and Christian communities (Paden, 2005: 25; Ibrahim, 2002: xiv)). The growing 
level of religiosity in Nigeria is evident in the multiplication of religious authorities, texts, 
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discourses and identities (Ibrahim, 2002). There is also an intensity of belief and an 
expansion of the time, resources and efforts devoted to religion. This intense religiosity, 
coupled with the ethnic diversity, makes ethno-religious issues volatile. This is particularly so 
in view of the complexities associated with this growing religiosity, which Ibrahim (2002) 
associates with anti-democratic norms and practices evident in the religious denominations. 
Such practices include sectarianism and exclusiveness, intolerance, a propensity to making 
hate speeches, and undemocratic organisational practices. This is compounded by the intense 
rivalry and politicization of Muslim/Christian relations in the country.  
However, as scholars have also pointed out, the political class and the elite deliberately stoke 
and exploit ethnic and religious disharmony for political advantages (Ikpe, 2009: 683; Olu-
Adeyemi, 2004: 2; Egwu, 2004: 12). Indeed, in the opinion of the International Institute for 
Democracy and Electoral Assistance (2001), numerous actors have a stake in the promotion 
of ethno-religious conflicts in Nigeria because the associated arithmetic of numbers 
underpinning the conflicts translates into jobs, contracts, the creation of local governments 
and states as well as representation in the national assembly. This provides a good 
explanation for the “fetishisation” of ethnic identity (Egwu, 2004: 1), that is, the excessive 
tendency by groups and/or individuals to assert or play-up primordial identities in inter-group 
relations, a phenomenon that is prevalent in Nigeria’s body politic.  
Furthermore, the rising wave of ethno-religious conflicts has been exacerbated by the 
implementation of the Islamic Shari’a criminal code in many states of northern Nigeria soon 
after the return to civil rule in 1999. As narrated by Alubo (2011), about 10 northern states, 
led by Zamfara State, introduced the Shari’a law into their jurisprudence as from 1999. This 
generated heightened tension and suspicions within the populace and accounted for violence 
between Christians and Muslims in these states. The Shari'a question has been a long 
standing issue in Nigeria and has elicited very intensely emotional reactions from both the 
opponents and proponents of the idea (Yoroms, 2002; Ibrahim, 2002). 
1.4.1  Ethnicity and the Patrimonial State  
Ikpe (2009: 684) provides a basis for understanding ethnic conflicts in Nigeria by associating 
the phenomenon with the patrimonial state.  Patrimonialism, he notes, is clientelist rule in 
which public officers conduct the affairs of state as a private concern and dispense resources 
to clients in exchange for loyalty and service. The major features of a patrimonial system 
include the control of political power by a personal ruler or a cabal of patrons and the absence 
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of separation between public and private realms for state officials. Also political offices are 
regarded as rewards and benefits for officials while the exercise of public authority is utilised 
to serve rulers and officials. The whole system, moreover, is hinged on patron-client 
networks and relationships. As a tool for manipulation, the political elite mobilise ethnic 
sentiments and ethnic solidarity in order to capture power through which access to state 
resources is guaranteed. The subversion of political office for personal gain and as a means of 
rewarding or excluding access to state resources based on ethnic affiliation, is at the heart of 
inter-ethnic conflicts in Nigeria. His assertion that “the most destructive consequences of 
patrimonial politics in Nigeria are the local communal conflicts it generates in most of the 
states” aligns with the position of other scholars, such as Imobighe (2003) and Egwu (2004) 
who posit that ethno-religious conflicts are only symptomatic of the character of the nation-
state and have constituted a cog in the wheel of progress toward nationhood and 
democratisation. 
Elaborating on this issue of ethnic conflicts in Nigeria, Imobighe (2003: 6) links it with the 
over concentration of its rich oil resources at the central government. This concentration, he 
argues, means that any group that controls the centre determines how the nation’s resources 
can be utilized. Therefore, inter-ethnic rivalry to capture power at the centre progressively 
became a do-or-die game in which the three major ethnic groups became net beneficiaries.  
Imobighe points out that the measures devised to create a more ethnically balanced federal 
structure have only resulted in stiffer competition between the main ethnic groups and tearing 
apart of the different communities within the same ethnic group, all in a desperate struggle to 
secure social amenities for their respective communities. In his perception, these ethnic-
balancing measures, rather than solve problems, have ironically opened up a Pandora’s box 
of unending cry of marginalisation by virtually all Nigeria’s ethnic groups. While the 
minority groups struggle to win recognition, the big three ethnic groups, which no longer get 
as much of the federal plum like before, have now joined the queue of agitators who allege 
marginalisation in the scheme of affairs. According to Imobighe (2003: 10), there is a 
flourishing sub-ethnic consciousness which politicians are deliberately cultivating for their 
selfish ends and in some instances, have evolved, not even “sub-ethnic, but mini-ethnic 
identities,” around which they are mobilizing their villages and clans and carving out ethnic 
kingdoms for themselves. 
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From this perspective, he argues that most of the conflicts referred to as ethnic conflict in 
Nigeria have little to do with ethnicity and are grounded in other factors such as political, 
resource or migration issues. However, conflicts are classified as ethnic when the active 
protagonists are stratified along ethnic lines irrespective of causality. The problem with that is 
that in societies where occupational, professional, religious and ethnic boundaries coincide, 
there is often the tendency to see an ethnic finger intruding on conflicts between individuals 
and groups from different backgrounds. Imobighe concludes that ethnicity has become a 
convenient term for covering up the country’s societal inadequacies and the people’s 
individual and collective failings. This view resonates with that of Allen and Seaton (1999) 
who insist that “ethnic conflict” is often used as “lazy shorthand” to interpret or explain 
issues. Also, conflicts are being attenuated by the pattern of migration and settlement which 
tends to encourage ethnic compartmentalization, that is, the concentration of ethnic groups in 
different sections of the city.  
Abiodun (2009) corroborates this perspective as he notes the growing phenomenon in Nigeria 
of differentiation based on ethnicity. He observes particularly that there is a religious 
dimension to this phenomenon, in which the two major religions in the country, Christianity 
and Islam, are daggers drawn.  Because of the country’s configuration, however, the strand of 
religion is usually intertwined with that of ethnicity. Quoting Odiase-Alegimenlen (2001: 48), 
he explained that the two-pronged nature of the problem is compounded by the fact that while 
the majority of northerners are Muslims, a large number of southerners are Christians, thus 
ensuring that conflicts between any of these groups of people could easily degenerate into 
religious or sectarian strife.  
Ibrahim (2002: xiii) argues in a similar manner that the dynamics between ethnicity and 
political domination in Nigeria “is found in the crisis of the rentier economy.” He notes that 
the control of national resources, popularly termed “national cake” is concentrated at only 
one site, the Presidency and “that is why all the mad animals are fighting for it.” According to 
him, “the essence of neo-patrimonial systems such as Nigeria’s is that they cannot provide for 
a growing middle class. As political entrepreneurs continue to multiply, more and more of 
them will be excluded from the fruits of power. In their desperation, ethnicity and religious 
bigotry become useful tools for creating paths of access to power.” 
Alemika (2002: 7) is very clear in his analysis when he states categorically that economic 
interests are the root cause of most conflicts in Nigeria. He however points out that such 
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conflicts are often fought and rationalized on non-economic grounds usually religion and 
ethnicity. This situation, he explains, can be understood if one appreciates that in Nigeria, 
economic institutions and processes are best maximized with the control of state apparatus. 
This is because Nigeria is a rentier state, which depends on extraction of royalties from 
minerals and import charges rather than from production activities in manufacturing and 
taxation of citizens.  He observes that resources so extracted are distributed through a 
hierarchy of patron-client relationships involving a few elites from the constituent groups 
competing for scarce resources controlled by government. In this struggle, the elite patron 
seeks to maximize his personal interest, however “beclouding his selfish agenda by claiming 
to be fighting for fair treatment of his or her group” (p.7). When elites from an ethnic group 
fail to maximize their interests relative to those from other groups, they turn round to 
mobilise ethnic and religious sentiments in pursuit of their objectives. This process, according 
to Alemika, “masks the underlying class and economic interests, which give rise to ethnic and 
religious mobilization and conflicts.”  
Arguing in a similar fashion, Egwu (2004) points out that the resurgence of ethnic identity 
and the political mobilization this entails is part of the strategy for seeking power and 
authority and of attaining material and psychological survival. For him, primordial identities 
such as ethnicity, regionalism and religion constitute “the technology of power” for capturing 
or retaining power and control of state resources, which this implies. Ethnicity, he points out, 
represents a vast resource value in the struggle for power and resources. The key issue, he 
argues, revolves around which group should control state power and preside over its 
allocative and distributive functions.  
The point being made here is that ethnic conflicts in Nigeria are largely orchestrated by elite 
struggles to control state machinery for resource allocation through which they can access 
wealth mainly for personal use. In this respect, Olu-Adeyemi (2007: 4) blames the political 
class for subverting measures devised to safeguard the rights of citizens within democratic 
parameters. According to him Nigeria is not incapable of inventing such safeguards; “it is 
simply that the political class, nay the elites, are more concerned with capturing political 
power for their own use rather than for advancing the cause of majority of Nigerians.” This, 
he explains, is primarily attributable to the fact that “the political class in Nigeria lacks 
legitimacy, for it is unable to address the basic problems of national integration. Having 
failed to bring about genuine development and having also failed to come up with an 
appropriate integrative outlook for Nigeria, the elites have resorted to divide and rule 
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politics.” In this regard, the state not only loses capacity to provide the public good; gravely, 
its image as a neutral arbiter that guarantees the security of all sections of the society is 
eroded. As state capacity declines, fear of uncertainty heightens, predisposing citizens to 
resort to other levels of solidarity, including religious, ethnic, regional and other primordial 
loyalties with a view to getting guaranteed security. This results in constant social tension and 
political instability and promotes misunderstanding within the polity “as every ethnic group 
or religious inclination sees the other as a rival that must be out staged by all means.” For 
him, the concept of national integration has been replaced by the vice of segregation as 
consciousness is patterned in such a way that each group sees the other as rivals in contest 
rather than partners in progress.  
Olu-Adeyemi also observes that there have been several efforts and strategies by various 
administrations in Nigeria, military and civilian, at national integration. These efforts ranged 
from creation of additional states to the establishment of youth integrating programmes like 
the National Youth Service Corps and building of unity schools all over the country. Others 
included social mobilization and re-orientation programmes like war against indiscipline, 
MAMSER, Amnesty programme for ex-militants and constitutional conferences to address 
contentious issues within the polity. However, Olu-Adeyemi argues that such efforts were 
never implemented “in the interest of the country but of policy formulators and executors, 
who often smile to the bank after each moment of discourse on ‘the way forward.’” There is 
thus pent up anger based on accumulated deprivation, destruction, marginalization, anger and 
frustration manifesting in the violent explosions.  
What the discussion in this section emphasises is that ethnic conflicts in Nigeria are largely 
rooted in other factors, mainly elite competition for political power through which they can 
gain access to public resources for personal benefit. The conflicts are however rationalised on 
non-economic grounds, making efforts to tackle them ineffective. It is therefore reasonable to 
conclude that wittingly or unwittingly, the Nigerian elite both instigate and perpetuate ethnic 
conflicts in different parts of the country. This problem is amplified by the crisis of 
citizenship in Nigeria based partly on the ambivalence of the Nigerian constitution on the 
issue of ethnic group identity, an issue discussed in the next section of this chapter.  
1.4.2  Ethnicity and Citizenship Contestations  
A critical dimension of the problem of ethnicity in Nigeria is its relationship to the crisis of 
citizenship. As Egwu (2004) argues, at the core of the crisis of citizenship in Nigeria is the 
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central place of ethnic group identity in the definition of citizenship or, more aptly, the 
“differentiated citizenship” imposed by multi-ethnic existence. The 1999 Nigerian 
Constitution has officially provided for “layers of citizenship” in which one is both a citizen  
citizen but also an “indigene” of a particular state. This, Egwu explains, results in the binary 
discourse of “natives” and “settlers” or “indigenes” and “non-indigenes.” Unfortunately, 
measures designed by public policy to de-escalate ethnicity have ironically exacerbated the 
problem in the sense that policies such as the federal character principle in appointments and 
promotions tend to reinforce ethnicity. In the context of scarcity and competition and the 
readiness of “ethnic entrepreneurs” to resort to ethnic mobilization as well as the context 
offered by democratization, and political liberalization, communal conflicts and violence 
have been the consequence. This has fractured communal relationships and dealt a big blow 
to national integration.  
Alubo (2011: 3) notes that these eruptions are sensitively linked to contestations “over 
identity as a basis of determining who is included or excluded from participation or 
benefitting from opportunities in particular situations.” Nigerians, he observes, have been 
divided into two broad categories of settlers and indigenes and these are used as basis for 
inclusion or exclusion from certain benefits and opportunities. 
Ibrahim (2002: x-xiv) identifies three stages into which Nigeria's post-colonial history could 
be sub-divided. The first phase, 1958-1965, was characterized by the mobilization of ethno-
regional identities with the objective of gaining access to regional power. At this stage, the 
focus of power was in the regions and the struggle for the central government was minimal. 
The second phase, according to Ibrahim, was the civil war years, 1966-1970, in which efforts 
were mobilised to fight the war and maintain Nigeria's existence as one country. The third 
phase was the post-civil war era, "characterised by the rise of the unitary state and the 
subsequent weakening of regional bases of power." The sole question informing political 
mobilisation at this stage became the conquest of federal power at the centre. This tendency 
was further exacerbated by the structural adjustment programme "due to enhanced 
centralisation, concentration and reduction of resources available to be accessed even at the 
centre." He argues that the fierce struggle to control the central government has turned 
politics into a zero-sum game in which groups are obliged to block the access of others or 
displace those who already have access if they are to eat from the national cake. For him, this 
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“permanent strategy of blockage has amplified the expression of fissiparous tendencies 
because all those who are not inside are outside” (Ibrahim, 2002: xii). 
Alubo (2011) contends that the freer atmosphere created by civil rule seems to have provided 
a fertile ground for civil disturbances and the contestations for the broader issues of identity, 
participation, and citizenship. Many of Nigeria’s constituent groups, he points out, are now 
regrouping under regional and/or ethnic umbrella and Nigeria is threatened by the possibility 
of dissolving into ethnic kingdoms. Various ethnic associations now exist championing and 
campaigning for different sections of the country. For example, there is the Afenifere group 
campaigning for the Yoruba nation in the South-West while Ohaneze is doing a similar thing 
in the South-East for the Igbos. In the old North, there is the Arewa Consultative Forum while 
the Middle Belt Forum similarly is championing the cause of peoples of the Central region.  
This drift away from the center to ethnic and regional enclaves, according to Alubo (2011) is 
a huge movement. He cites one of Nigeria’s former leaders who expresses concern that: 
Ethnicity is currently a huge social movement and human investment across 
the country. It is not only nurtured around the structure and ideology of ethnic 
nationalities, it is also increasingly becoming a preferred mode of loyalty by 
Nigerians as opposed to loyalty to the Nigerian state. It is therefore an 
important subset of the national question (Babangida, 2002: 156). 
Alubo further notes that the campaigns for regional and ethnic agendas are so strident that 
virtually all issues including revenue sharing formulas, key appointments, location of 
projects, or even allegations of corruption against public office holders, are interpreted from 
the prism of these regional or ethnic agitations. He links the various civil disturbances and the 
contestations which lead to them to “the national question,” a term used to denote issues 
about citizenship, identity, and sense of belonging to, as well as self-determination in one 
Nigeria. The national question, according to him, thus seems to be a “a huge umbrella into 
which is folded a range of issues such as sense of belonging, participation in decision 
making, providing law and order and promoting welfare.” For him,  
Nigeria’s existence is not contested; what is less certain is the nature of 
nationhood. Hence a sense of belonging and participation are keenly debated 
issues that have remained largely unresolved and have become recurring 
decimals in the annals of Nigeria’s post-independence history. It could thus be 
argued that current outbreaks of civil disturbances are rooted in the historical 
(colonial) past and fuelled by the (mis)management of old structures by 
various post-independence governments (Alubo, 2011: 56). 
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Wale Adebanwi (2009) interrogates the citizen-deficit in Nigeria and the contradictions of 
reconciling indigenous rights with citizenship rights within a typical multi-ethnic postcolonial 
state like Nigeria. Writing within the context of the struggles of the ethnic minorities of 
Plateau State against their powerful Hausa/Fulani neighbours, Adebanwi observes how the 
struggle for political, economic and social values and rights in these communities often 
produce violent clashes between these indigenous communities and the settler Hausa/Fulani. 
He explained that the groups in Plateau State see claims to indigenous status as valid
1
 when 
based on (i) ‘prior’ and ‘permanent settlement’, making the people ‘traditional natives’ – in 
this case prior to the Fulani or any other who are thus ‘settlers’; (ii) ‘exclusive claims’ to 
territory ‘through historical and homogenous culture’ – a ‘culture’ that is impossible to 
practice on a different territory; (iii) the prior ownership is ‘inherited from one’s ancestors’; 
thus any such group that possesses the foregoing (iv) ‘have rights to their lands, their 
traditions and culture.’ This definition, he contends, highlights the critical issues at stake 
including the political, economic, social and religious dimensions of the crises that have 
engulfed the area and often resulted in violent and bloody feuds. 
Adebanwi notes the roots of this problem partly in the prevarications of the Nigerian 
constitution on the issue. Amongst other criteria, the constitution defines citizens of Nigeria 
by birth as “every person born in Nigeria before the date of independence or either of whose 
parents or any of whose grandparents belongs or belonged to a community indigenous to 
Nigeria” (chapter 3.25). Furthermore, the constitution, even though recognizes that the 
federating units in Nigeria are the 36 states and the Federal Capital Territory (Abuja), it also 
recognizes citizenship on the basis of membership of (ethnic) communities ‘indigenous to 
Nigeria.’ “By this constitutional provision therefore,” Adebanwi asserts, “it can be assumed 
that every citizen is a member of a ‘community’ first, and that only that membership 
guarantees his/her membership of the Nigerian community.” 
                                                          
1
 Following sustained and bloody clashes between the minority ethnic groups and Hausa/Fulani in southern parts 
of Plateau State in 2004, newspapers reported that the minorities adopted a 23-point resolution which would 
guarantee future peace. The resolution contained a description of who indigenous people are: ‘people who are 
the first to have settled permanently in a particular area and who are considered as traditional natives…People 
who have exclusive claims to a place through historical and homogenous culture without an alternative place to 
practice that culture. Such designation being inherited from one’s ancestors as opposed to their having bought 
the place of residence, or being given such places free by earlier settlers. Such persons have rights to their lands, 
their traditions and culture’ (Adebanwi, 2004b: 3). 
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Paradoxically, however, the same constitution prohibits discrimination against people ‘on the 
grounds of place of origin, sex, religion, status, ethnic or linguistic association or ties’ 
(Section 15 [2]) (Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999). The section further compels the state to 
‘secure full resident rights for every citizen in all parts of the Federation’ as well as 
encourages integrative practices such as inter-marriages between people of different ethnic 
groups and religions and further promotes the formation of associations cutting across ethnic 
and religious barriers (Section 15 [3b,c,d]). The significance of this section, Adebanwi 
argues, is that the constitution of Nigeria makes citizenship achievable on an individual basis 
with full residency rights while discrimination is prohibited. The reality is however very 
different. Despite the constitutional provisions for citizenship rights and prohibition of 
discrimination on ethnic or religious bases, in reality the rights and duties of citizens in 
Nigeria are mediated and largely dependent on their membership of specific gender, ethnic, 
religious and regional groups. Adebanwi locates this phenomenon in the wider political and 
economic framework, arguing that “the reality of ethno-regional and ethno-religious 
competition, several years of authoritarian rule, bad governance, mismanagement of natural 
resources, ethno-religious crises, political crises and economic hardship which, all combined, 
had limited the opportunities available to citizens and closed the civic space in general (and) 
also predisposed different communities towards constricting access to whatever limited 
opportunities existed in their localities through any means.” The easiest of such means, he 
explains, is identity-based constraints which is practiced everywhere in Nigeria. This agrees 
with Ibrahim’s (2007: xi) position that indigeneity has become a “potent instrument for the 
negative mobilization of peoples’ sentiments and feelings in ways that undermine the national 
political objectives of integration and the evolution of a harmonious political community.”  
The inability of the state to meet the citizen’s basic needs further derogates the worth of 
citizenship while placing worth on indigenship. The Citizen’s Forum for Constitutional 
Reform (CFCR) notes the ways in which indigenship has been used as a basis for 
emphasizing the ‘little worth’ of Nigerian citizenship given that millions of Nigerians who 
find themselves in effective residency in places other than where they can claim ‘indigeneity’ 
or where they can be accepted as ‘indigenes’ are labeled as ‘strangers and settlers’. Those 
who are so categorized, it observes, suffer all manners of deprivations and effectively are 
second class citizens in their areas of abode. It doesn’t matter for how long they or their 
forebears have been there.  
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Philip Ostein (2009:4), reflecting on this “pathology” of Nigerian citizenship, similarly 
emphasizes the root problem in the economics of the struggle. “In the end,” he asserts, “the 
fighting is about access to resources controlled by the federal, state, and local governments, 
through which 80% of Nigeria’s GDP flows.” Explaining further, Ostein observes that the 
resources to which access is gained by control of local governments include land, money, 
jobs, healthcare and more. Administration of these resources is by a system of indigene 
certificates issued by local governments to ethnic or sub-ethnic groups controlling the area. 
Other groups living there, even groups settled there for scores or hundreds of years, are 
excluded or are told to “go back where you came from” if they hope to enjoy benefits 
associated with indigeneship. Ostein (2009: 8) notes therefore that Nigeria is tending towards 
“disaggregation into its constituent ethnic and sub-ethnic groups.” A striking aspect of this 
tendency is the fact that some powers of sovereignty are moving, not towards the Nigerian 
nation run democratically by its citizens without regard to ethnicity or place of origin, but 
towards many little principalities run by their indigenes to suit themselves. In this equation, 
non-indigenes are denied not only access to resources, but also basic rights purportedly 
guaranteed under the constitution, beginning with basic civil and political rights. Every 
Nigerian has the full rights of indigenes in one small locality, and only the more partial rights 
of citizens in every other place.  
Ostein identifies certain critical factors which he argues complicate Nigeria’s indigene-settler 
problem as manifested particularly in Jos, Plateau, the area where this research is based. Six 
of these complicating factors, particularly relevant to the context of this research, include 
what he describes as “ethnic ties,” constitutional entrenchment of distinctions based on 
ethnicity, and the authority vested in the local councils as the sole determinants of who an 
indigene is. Others are historical contentions, the creation, in controversial circumstances, of 
Jos North Local Government by the military government and the political demands and 
posturing of the Hausa/Fulani community in Jos. These factors are briefly elaborated below:  
i. Ethnic ties are enduring and remain powerful in the lives of many Nigerians. Ethnic 
divisions, it would be recalled, were deliberate colonial policy of the British “indirect rule” 
system through the powers of the traditional rulers in various parts of the country and the 
administration of native law and custom specific to particular local groups. The emphasis of 
this policy was the differential treatment of indigenes and strangers, features which are still 
prevalent amongst the multitudes of ethnic groups. The failure of the Nigerian state to 
provide social safety nets for citizens perpetuates older support networks based on ethnicity. 
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On the other hand, increasing urbanization and other “modernizing tendencies” are eroding 
relationships based purely on old ethnic ties and identities. This trend results in frequent 
conflict with the claimed rights of indigenes.  
ii. The constitutional entrenchment of distinctions based on ethnicity perpetuates the 
indigene-settler problem because it gives legal teeth to discriminatory practices which negate 
the principle of citizenship. The 1979 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria gave 
birth to the word “indigene” in section 23(1a) where the phrase “belongs or belonged to a 
community indigenous to Nigeria” was used in the definition of citizenship. The same 
constitution introduced the “federal character” concept, a form of affirmative principle for 
minority-group inclusion in governance. There is also a Federal Character Commission 
(FCC) established to regulate and enforce federal character and indigenship provisions in 
appointments to government positions. While the detailed sharing of power and resources 
based on ethnic identification has helped to “prevent large scale polarization of Nigeria along 
its major ethnic or regional fault-lines…this has come at a cost of the country’s 
disaggregation into hundreds of tiny principalities run on the basis of indigene sovereignty” 
(Ostein, 2009: 4). Such official discrimination allowed by the constitution based on ethnicity 
and place of origin is a major contributor to ethnic and ethno-religious violence all over the 
country. As Egwu (2005) also notes, millions of Nigerians who live outside the socio-
political space within which they can affirm their indigeneity suffer exclusion and are 
exposed to all kinds of humiliation. While some have endured deprivations in passivity, 
others have contested their exclusion, leading to a spate of communal conflicts. In many 
instances, this has assumed the dimension of violent conflicts with dire consequences for 
development and national unity. 
iii. The authority to determine who an indigene is also complicates issues as this is the sole 
prerequisite of the local government through the issuance of “certificate of indigeneship” by 
whoever controls the local government. Therefore in contested territories like Jos, parties 
fight viciously for the political control of the local government in order to be able to issue 
their people indigenship certificates and ensure a generous share of the spoils of office to 
their particular communities. This is essentially what pits the Hausa/Fulani against the 
indigenous groups in Jos. To the indigenes, the Hausa/Fulani are settlers who presumably 
have the option of going back to wherever they originated from should they not like being 
denied rights in Jos. Political settlement of this issue usually is truncated by hardened 
positions which bastardize electoral processes resulting in more conflicts and violence. 
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iv. History comes into this fray to shape or reinforce perspectives and ideological framework 
in ways that complicate the issue. The indigenous ethnic groups on the Plateau successfully 
fought and defended their territories against the Hausa/Fulani Islamic Jihad of the 19
th
 
century. With the coming of British colonialism however, the Hausas gained peaceful access 
to Jos and the Plateau and have become a very well established community. In the perception 
of the Plateau indigenes, what the Hausa/Fulani Muslims could not achieve through jihadist 
force of the 19
th
 century, they got on a platter of gold through pax Britannica by which they 
were able to entrench themselves in Jos and now claim indigene rights. In a sense therefore, it 
is this well-remembered Plateau record of armed resistance to Hausa/Fulani jihadist 
incursions of the 19
th
 century, subsequently subverted by the British that is now being 
reasserted and re-enacted in the name of indigene rights (Ostein, 2009: 7). And whereas the 
Plateau people file out under the banner of Christianity, the Hausas have Islam as their 
propelling theme, thus putting religion, about the most divisive element in Nigeria’s fragile 
polity, at the centre-stage of the Jos crises. 
v. Creation of Jos North Local Government Area: The element of history as a complication 
links up with a more recent episode, that is, the creation of Jos North Local Government in 
1991 by the military government of General Ibrahim Babangida in controversial 
circumstances, an action which potentially gave the Hausa/Fulani a numeric advantage in the 
area as the basis for political control. This has unwittingly structured the struggle and turned 
the local government into a hotbed of political instability and violence. 
vi. The Hausas in Jos have their own strong arguments in support of claims over Jos North 
Local Government Area, primarily, “seeking a fair share of the benefits that should accrue to 
them by virtue of their citizenship of Nigeria and the long-standing existence of their 
community in Jos” (Ostein, 2008: 10). Having settled in Jos for possibly hundreds of years, 
they have now acquired their own cultural identity among other communities as “Jasawa” 
and it is impracticable for them to be recognized as indigenes of any other local government 
except Jos North. Therefore, if Jos North denies them indigenship, they must do without this 
vital status in Nigerian life, and as a corollary suffer many disadvantages and hardships. 
However to be also noted is the peculiarity in style and attitude of the Jasawa which tends to 
reinforce perceptions by indigenes of domination which further inspires resistance to the 
Hausa. This is in the sense that there are several other large ethnic groups such as the Yoruba 
and Igbo which have settled in Jos just as long as the Hausa, have as much economic interest 
and have contributed to the growth of the community. These other ethnic groups also suffer 
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discrimination on grounds of their settler status. However, the major difference is that these 
ethnic groups are not contesting with the indigenes for political control of Jos or the benefits 
of indigenship there. Unlike the Jasawa, they have no proprietary feelings toward the city and 
no ambition to rule. During incidents of violent conflicts, the Jasawa side associates even the 
Muslims among them with the indigenes. From this perspective, one is tempted to agree with 
Ostein (2009: 10) that in reality the Jos city’s settler problem is a Jasawa problem. 
The complicating factors discussed above are further exacerbated by the Nigerian political 
and economic environment which Ostein notes features widespread illiteracy, unemployment, 
poverty and large numbers of idle youth available to cause mayhem and destruction. Also 
compounding the problem of ethnicity in Nigeria are “the venal, petty-minded and short-
sighted politicians who never hesitate to stir up trouble by playing on ethnic and religious 
sentiments; pervasive and unchecked corruption of public office resulting in pervasive 
corruption of elections and widespread electoral violence; and the sheer incompetence of 
many public officials…compounded by ingrained habits of autocratic, arbitrary, secretive, 
and unaccountable rule” (Ostein, 2009: 11).  
The ethnic trajectory of Nigeria plotted above is important to this research as it provides a 
broad overview of the issues within the political economy of the country and this information 
serves as a backdrop to the enquiry. Beyond the general understanding it provides however, 
this analysis, as is evident from the discussion thus far, has specific applicability to the region 
of Nigeria where this research is focused, that is, North Central Nigeria which has witnessed 
most of the ethno-religious conflicts.  
This region, popularly referred to as the Middle Belt
2
, comprises Benue, Kogi, Kwara, 
Nasarawa, Plateau, Taraba, Southern Kaduna, and Southern Bauchi States and, as illustrated 
                                                          
2
 The conflict in this region is also noticeable in a “conflict of nomenclature” (IPCR, 2008) in which even the 
accurate description of the area is contested: is it the Middle Belt or North Central Nigeria? Those who associate 
the area with the historic North of Nigeria insist that it is part of the Northern Region. Many others, however, 
prefer to construct a different identity for the region and choose to call it the Middle Belt. In this respect, the 
Middle Belt is as much a political concept as it is a geographical description. The geopolitics of the Middle Belt 
links areas contiguous in land mass as well as people who share certain affinities of history, ethnicity and 
religion but which are not geographic neighbours. Thus, certain descriptions of the Middle Belt incorporate 
ethnic minorities in such places as Southern Borno and Yobe States as members of the zone on the basis of 
religious affinity as Christians. For Shilgba (2011), all non-Hausa Fulani in the geographical north and central 
north are Middle Belt people, “the oppressed people deceptively huddled up under the ‘One North’ of Sir 
Ahmadu Bello. However geographically, it is generally acceptable to many scholars from the region that the 
Middle Belt federation consists of people in the present Benue, Nasarawa, Taraba, Adamawa, Plateau, Southern 
Kebbi, Kogi, Kwara, Niger, Southern Kaduna, FCT, Southern Gombe and the two minority local government 
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in Appendix 12, has the largest number of ethnic groups in Nigeria (Alubo, 2011: 11).Unlike 
the far northern, western and eastern parts of the country which are predominantly Muslim or 
Christian, the north central has significant populations of both Christians and Muslims. The 
region has multitudes of ethnic minority groups most of which are Christian, and 
Hausa/Fulani groups which are Muslim (Yusuf, 2007:237). In addition, there are large 
numbers of Yoruba and Igbo in virtually all the cities and towns most of whom are Christian 
and have significant economic interests in the area. Thus conflicts at times begin as business 
or economic disputes but quickly assume ethnic and religious colouration with the potential 
to spread to other parts of the country in the form of backlashes and retaliatory attacks.  
The multiplicity of ethnic groups within the Middle Belt region, as well as the religious 
pluralism of the area, partly account for the fact that it has been “over-represented in the table 
of flashpoints” since return to civil rule in 1999 (Alubo, 2011: 11). The relative material 
poverty in the zone further makes political pursuit to be based on prebendal politics (Richard 
Joseph, 1991 in IPCR, 2011: 53), a phenomenon in which “politics and political victory 
become the password for accessing economic resources from the state by way of plunder and 
other forms of primitive accumulation.” Prebendalism, often manifested by excessive 
material inducement, political thuggery, settlement, and other undemocratic practices, further 
aggravate conflicts in the zone. 
Indeed, incessant, violent and bloody riots have become frequent in Nigeria, Africa’s largest 
democracy and OPEC’s sixth largest oil exporter and have indeed become a defining 
characteristic of the return to civil rule (Alubo, 2011; Egwu, 2004). Para-Mallam (2012) 
attributes this partly to the expanded political space afforded by democratization which 
opened up opportunity for voicing grievance and discontent expressed through identity-based 
communal conflicts particularly of the ethno-religious type. In a country where accurate 
figures and statistical information are scarce and often speculative, it is not easy to determine 
casualty levels in these riots. That the figures must be mind-numbing is however apparent 
from the numbers being hazarded or claimed. Alubo (2011) for example estimates over half a 
million deaths within the first few years of civil rule as a result of ethno-religious conflicts 
and likens the situation to a civil war to denote the gravity of the situation. In more specific 
terms, Alubo also quoted The Economist which reported more than 6000 deaths in civil 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Areas of Tafawa Balewa and Bogoro in southern Bauch State.” Both names are used inter-changeably in current 
political lexicon.  
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disturbances in two years between 1999 and 2001. According to The Economist (October 20, 
2001: 50): 
The Muslim-Christian divide has usually defined the combatants. More than 
2000 people died in clashes in Kaduna in February 2000, and hundreds more 
in Aba the following month. In June (2001) hundreds died in similar clashes in 
Bauchi state, and more than 500 died in Jos, a city in central Nigeria (in 
September 2001). 
As has been mentioned earlier in this chapter, ethnic and religious conflicts are not new in 
Nigeria, and indeed have probably been an enduring feature of the body politic since 
independence (Olu-Adeyemi, 2006; Abiodun, 2009). Again, as earlier noted, these conflicts 
were common during the prolonged military regime. However, with the outset of 
democratization in 1999, stakeholders presumed that the atmosphere of dialogue, negotiation 
and compromise, characteristic of democracy, would help diffuse tension and lead to 
amicable resolution of disputes (Ukiwo, 2003:115). The contrary, however, has been the 
experience particularly in the northern parts of the country which have witnessed frequent 
incidents of ethno-religious conflicts.  
The paradox of democracy co-existing side-by-side with violent ethnic and religious conflicts 
has thus become the unpleasant reality of the Nigerian polity since 1999. Scholars like Paden 
(2005), Alemika (2002), and Ibrahim (2002) have contended that ethno-religious conflicts in 
Nigeria are not only disruptive and distractive of national cohesion and development, but also 
hold serious and grave implications for international security as its oil wealth and military 
inventory would be available to destabilize the West African sub-region should the country 
become a failed state. This is particularly so, as notable groups in the fray, particularly Boko 
Haram, are now suspected to have strong links with international terror organisations (Nanna, 
2014). For this reason, the United States Government, on November 13, 2013, based on 
recommendations of the Bureau of Counter Terrorism, designated Boko Haram as a Foreign 
Terrorist Organisation (FTO) and frequently links the organization with the Al-Qaida 
network in Somalia, Mali, the Maghreb and Yemen (Nanna, 2014). 
 In summary, the foregoing discourse demonstrates not just the complexities associated with 
Nigeria’s multi-ethnic configuration, but more significantly, the deliberate and sustained 
exploitation of ethnicity for political ends by the country’s elite. Underlying this 
misappropriation of ethnic identity by the political class is the economics of the struggle, in 
which access to public office translates to passport to private material accumulation through 
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unrestrained looting of the public treasury. The struggle for political office becomes ferocious 
battles of survival with ethnicity a major tool for political mobilization. The factor of religion 
which “adds fuel to the fire” (Ostein, 2009: 3) complicates this situation by bringing into the 
fray the emotional commitment of the ordinary citizen which elevates the struggles into do-
or-die battles. This is reflected in the Jos conflicts which are the focus of this dissertation. To 
appreciate the complexity and depth of the issues thrown up by this research, it is important 
to understand in a logical sequence, the historical and political context of the struggle over 
Jos city and how these mirror wider national issues and conflicts. This is the focus of the next 
section.  
 
1.5  The Jos Conflicts: A Contextual Narrative 
The conflicts in Jos, the capital city of Plateau State, have their antecedents in the historical 
development of the city. Jos is a colonial creation, set up by the European tin miners who 
came to the Plateau in the early part of the 20
th
 century soon after the imposition of indirect 
rule by the British and sustained by the missionaries who established their headquarters in the 
State (Plotnicov, 1971: 1). The historical antecedents of the city as a reputable tin mining 
centre account for its cosmopolitan character, boasting of residents from all parts of the 
country, and from other parts of the world (Best, 2007:5).  
Traditionally, it is believed that Jos is founded on land belonging to three ethnic minority 
groups – Berom, Anaguta and Afizere (Ostein, 2009; Best, 2007; Gofwen, 2011). Plateau 
State, of which Jos is the capital, has a predominant Christian population and significant 
Muslim populations in three of its 17 local governments: Jos North, Kanam and Wase. But it 
is Jos North Local Government Area, hosting the city of Jos and the capital of Plateau State 
that has been the epicentre of conflicts and contestations. 
Jos used to be famed for its peace and tranquillity. But since the early 1990s, the city joined 
the infamous league of locations, particularly in northern Nigeria, in which violent conflicts 
have become endemic. The biggest conflict, and which altered in a radical manner communal 
relations within the city, occurred September 7, 2001 (Best, 2007:1). The bone of contention, 
primarily, is the ownership of Jos City. The Hausa-Fulani claim ownership by virtue of long 
and historical residency, having moved to the place in the early 20
th
 century in the wake of 
colonialism and the tin mining industry of Jos. But the minority ethnic groups, Berom, 
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Afizere and Anaguta, vehemently contest such claims, insisting that they instead are the 
rightful owners of the place, and therefore the indigenes, while the former are settlers
3
. 
As noted earlier in this chapter, the terms, indigene and settler, are not mere labels but have 
serious, sometimes life-changing, implications for those affected in Nigeria. As Best (2007:7-
8) observes, indigenship is not a mere status but a status that begets specific political, 
economic and psychological benefits. He explains that non-indigenes, as defined and 
understood locally, are not entitled to certain political rights and privileges, while indigenes 
are assumed to be. This is where the conflict is. The Hausas who migrated into Jos along with 
other Nigerians from other parts of the country in the early part of the 20
th
 century have 
insisted that they are indigenes of Jos. The indigenes of Jos (Berom, Anaguta and Afizere 
ethnic groups) maintain that the Hausa cannot be indigenes since they can trace where they or 
their parents came from. They conceded that the Hausa, like other residents of Jos, are 
citizens of Nigeria resident in Jos as permitted by the Nigerian Constitution.  
In articulating their claim to be owners of Jos, the Hausa/Fulani argue, amongst other things, 
that they founded the town as a ‘virgin land’ and nurtured it to a modern city. They claim to 
outnumber any other group in the city up to 1950 and presumably to date. Furthermore, they 
ruled the town traditionally and produced 11 chiefs up to 1947 when they were manoeuvred 
out of the stool. Significantly, they point out that they have no other place they can call home 
irrespective of wherever they or their fore-fathers may have originated from. Moreover, they 
have contributed to the economic growth of the city and control the economy to the envy of 
the indigenes (Dalyop, 2010: 34). The indigenes, in a counter narrative, trace their occupation 
of the area beyond living memory, and that they settled in small clans and villages. The 
Hausa who came first as a result of mining activities first settled in Naraguta and were later 
                                                          
3
 These identity-laden terms (indigene and settler) are at the centre of conflicts, not only in Jos, but all over 
Nigeria. In practice, indigene means “coming from a state or local government in Nigeria where your ancestors 
also came from, beyond living memory” (Best, 2007: 5). As explicated by Best (2007), every Nigerian is a 
citizen of Nigeria, but however long Nigerians reside in a place outside their ancestral home, they are assumed 
to be non-indigenes. In order words, there is no road map in Nigeria for transiting from a non-indigene to an 
indigene. This runs counter to the constitutional concept of universal citizenship as contained in the 1999 
Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, but the nation does not seem to have any answer to the 
challenges posed by this anomaly. As Best (2007: 5) further asserts, “there is hardly any communal conflict in 
Nigeria today that does not provoke the issue of indigeneity… those who are not considered indigenes or who 
migrated from other places before colonialism to date, for some much earlier, are said to be settlers or non-
indigenes.”  
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moved to the current city by the colonial masters as part of efforts to develop a Master Plan 
for the city (Dalyop, 2010:35). 
A Judicial Commission of Inquiry set up to investigate the 2001 Jos Civil Disturbances 
appears to support the claims of the indigenes, on the balance of historical probabilities. 
According to the Commission, there is “clear evidence that (the Hausa) came for tin mining 
labour and met the natives, the owners of the town” already settled there. Adopting what it 
calls “the test of valid and authentic history” devoid of “human manipulation,” the 
Commission observed that it would amount to re-writing history to support the claim by the 
Hausa over the ownership of Jos.  
Although the ethnic minorities appear to have won the battle of the “traditional history” of 
Jos, not necessarily so the war in respect of the fundamental political economy issues 
provoking the conflicts: control of the political and traditional institutions of the city, together 
with the economic benefits which flow from this control such as appointments and elections, 
access to government contracts, etc. And as Ostein (2009: 3) notes, religion enters into this 
issue because the Hausa/Fulani are predominantly Muslim while the indigenous ethnic 
groups are mostly Christians. According to him, besides the honour of ethnicity, the honour 
of religion is also there to be defended, if necessary by violent means.  
The competition for political power which simmered for many years constituted a major 
strain on the relationship between the Hausa/Fulani community and the indigenous people of 
Jos. This dispute however acquired fresh impetus with the creation in 1991 of the Jos North 
Local Government Area out of the former Jos Local Government. This development came as 
a complete surprise to the indigenous groups who maintain that they were neither consulted 
nor ever agreed to such an action. By this action, majority of the indigenous groups found 
themselves in Jos South Local Government Area while the Hausa/Fulani enjoyed pre-
eminence in Jos North. Furthermore, the traditional ruler of Jos, the Gbong Gwom Jos, was 
isolated in a predominantly Hausa/Fulani area. According to Gofwen (2010:14), the 
indigenous groups interpreted this as “a conspiracy to take Jos away from them.” These 
contestations were largely left unresolved and the creation of Jos North appeared to have 
boosted the Hausa/Fulani hegemonic control of political power in the new local government 
(Sha, 1998 in Gofwen, 2010). Matters came to a head in 1994 when the two groups openly 
engaged in violent confrontation over the appointment of a Hausa/Fulani candidate to chair 
Jos North Local Government and consequent opposition from the indigenes. This conflict 
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immediately acquired religious and ethnic coloration but was brought under control within 24 
hours and did not spread beyond the city of Jos (Best, 2007:7). 
A few incidents of violence took place in Jos after the 1994 incident. However, the first major 
outburst of ethno-religious conflict in Jos history came on 7 September 2001 (Gofwen 
2010:17). The proximate cause of the crisis was an altercation involving a Muslim 
congregation and a young woman following an attempt by her to pass through a road blocked 
by the Muslim congregation for their Juma’at prayer in a slum neighbourhood in Jos. The 
confrontation which soon degenerated into an orgy of violence between Christians and 
Muslims lasted for about one week.  
The Justice Niki Tobi Commission of Inquiry, set up to investigate the conflict traced the 
immediate cause of the crisis to the attempt by one Miss Rhoda Nyam to pass and the refusal 
of the Muslim congregation to allow her pass during the Juma’at prayers (Plateau State 
Government, 2009:12-13). However, political squabbles were antecedent to the crisis, chiefly 
the appointment of a Hausa/Fulani man as Co-ordinator of the National Poverty Eradication 
Programme (NAPEP) of the Federal Government in Jos North in July 2001. Like in 1994, 
this appointment was stoutly opposed by the indigenous groups, resulting in highly 
inflammatory and derogatory utterances and publications by both groups (Gofwen, 2010:18). 
Violence finally erupted on 7 September 2001, on a scale hitherto unprecedented both in 
terms of barbarity, length and the magnitude of devastation. From the Jos township areas, the 
violence spread to other parts of the metropolis and surrounding towns and villages. Human 
Rights Watch (2001) puts the death toll at more than 1000 persons in the week-long mayhem, 
while the Niki Tobi Commission cited an exact figure of 904 deaths. The Norwegian Refugee 
Council (2002) estimated more than 30,000 persons displaced without food, shelter or water. 
Reprisal attacks in other towns and cities of Nigeria also attended the 2001 Jos crisis. In Kano 
mobs attacked a church on September 10 and tension was high in other northern towns. In the 
South-East, mobs reportedly attacked the Hausa in Onitsha with about seven killed. There 
were attacks reported in other south-eastern towns and in Uyo, Akwa Ibom State (Gofwen, 
2010:19). 
The 2001 crisis seemed to open a floodgate of conflicts in Jos in general. Appendix 17 shows 
the major conflicts within this period. This research has focused on six incidents which it 
considers the major ones in Jos within the decade 2001-2011. The incidents are outlined 
below: 
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September 7, 2001 Crisis: As indicated above, this was the first major violent conflict in Jos 
since the return to democratic rule in 1999. Although the immediate trigger was a 
disagreement involving a Christian lady and a Muslim congregation, the eruption could be 
blamed on the charged atmosphere in the city, following opposition by the indigenes to the 
appointment of a Hausa/Fulani man to head a Federal Government post in the city. These 
protests were rooted in the unresolved dispute over the ownership of Jos city between the 
indigenous ethnic groups and the Hausa/Fulani.  
November 2008 Jos Crisis: The immediate cause of the November 2008 crisis in Jos was the 
local council elections of Thursday 27 November 2008. The elections held peacefully in all 
of Plateau State, including Jos North, this being the first elections in Jos North since the 
return to civil rule in 1999. The Hausa/Fulani community which had fielded a candidate 
through the ANPP party was convinced that the elections had been rigged to favour an 
indigene at a controversial collation centre. The Justice Ajibola Judicial Commission of 
Inquiry into the unrest was unambiguous as to who it held responsible for instigating the 
violence. In the opinion of the Commission, the Hausa/Fulani Muslim youths started the 
unrest in a violent attack on the people and property of those perceived as their enemies. It 
observed that the destruction of lives and property that took place during the crisis cannot be 
justified by a perceived attempt to rig an election. More worrisome, it noted was the pattern 
of attack in which places of worship rather than party offices were the targets of attack. 
Individuals were attacked based on their religious leanings rather than political leanings. The 
whole crisis took a religious dimension (pp.27-30).  
The January 2010 Crisis: On Sunday 17 January 2010, another major violent conflict broke 
out in Jos starting from one of the inner areas known as Dutse Uku. The crisis had direct 
linkages to the 2008 episode in that it revolved around a Muslim man said to be attempting to 
rebuild his house burned during that crisis in a district heavily populated by Christian 
indigenes. The man by name Mallam Kabiru was said to have been resisted by Christian 
neighbours, who were said to be suspicious of the large number of Muslim men he employed 
ostensibly in the rebuilding work. It is estimated that about 300 people lost their lives in this 
episode of the Jos conflicts (Gofwen, 2011) while a heavy presence of mercenaries from 
some northern states was also observed.  
Dogo-Nahawa Massacre of 7
th
 March 2010: Dogo-Nahawa is a little village in the Du 
District of Jos South populated by the Berom ethnic group. In the early hours of 7 March 
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2010, the village was raided by a group of armed men, widely believed to be Fulani militia, 
killing over 300 persons, mainly women and children. The immediate cause of the incident 
was alleged revenge attack by the Fulani for their kith and kin killed in the January 2010 
conflicts at Kuru Jenta and Tim Tim villages, also in Jos South Local Government Area 
(Newswatch, 2010). 
2010 Christmas Eve Bombing in Jos: On December 24 2010, just as residents of Jos were 
about last minute shopping and preparations for Christmas, two bombs went off 
simultaneously in Kabong and Angwa Rukuba, both neighbourhoods predominantly 
populated by Christian indigenes. Targeted at dense market areas, the bomb blasts, and the 
ensuing riots, claimed at least 80 lives (The Punch, 28 December, 2010).Boko Haram later 
claimed responsibility for the blasts in a web post, although this was never independently 
verified.  
2011 Eid-el Fitr Sallah Conflicts in Jos: This took place on Monday August 29, 2011 at the 
Rukuba Road Eid Prayer Ground when irate youth reportedly attacked Muslims who were 
celebrating the Sallah festival of Eid-el Fitr following the month-long Ramadan fasting. 
About 20 people were killed and many vehicles destroyed in the incident (Daily Trust, 
August 31, 2011: 3; Nigerian Tribune, 30 August 2011: 1). Newspaper reports attributed the 
violence to a clash between some Muslim youth and natives, “over the refusal of the latter to 
allow the Muslims access to the prayer ground in their area” (Nigerian Tribune, 30 August 
2011: 1). According to media reports, there had been rumours in the state that some people 
were planning to disrupt the Eid-el-Fitr celebration in the state, especially Jos, in revenge of 
the disruption of the previous year’s Christmas, which was marred by multiple bomb blasts. 
In response to the security threats, the police were said to have advised the Muslims not to 
use that particular prayer ground. However, the Izala sect allegedly ignored this advice, a 
claim denied by the sect (Daily Trust, August 31, 2011: 3).  
The conflicts in Jos, within the context of prevailing wider national challenges of ethnicity in 
Nigeria, pose critical questions on the depth, quality and direction of the country’s 
democratic experiment and on its capacity to attain national socio-economic objectives. The 
situation equally raises issues on the roles and responsibilities of various actors in escalating 
or minimizing these conflicts. The next section will explore the discourses around the 
mediation of these conflicts by the Nigerian press.  
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1.6  Media and Ethnic Conflicts: A Contextual Analysis 
The previous section has explored the challenges posed by ethnicity to nation-building in 
Nigeria. This is important as it creates understanding of the political and social terrain within 
which the Nigerian press operates. The review now examines the relationship between media 
and ethnic conflicts generally and how this applies to the practice of journalism in Nigeria.  
 Scholars have noted that media play an important, though complex, part in ethnic conflicts 
and are usually deeply implicated in the conflicts domestically and internationally (Cottle, 
2006; Seaton, 1999; Nasanga, 2006; Olayiwola, 2003; Frère, 2007; Yusuf, 2007). The media 
provide the first definition of the social groups involved in the conflicts, and are also the 
source of regular information on them. The media also act as agents of war as they have 
virtually become the institutions that accord wars legitimacy and judge their outcomes 
(Seaton, 1999). Cottle (2006) also notes that the media have become the primary means of 
assessing the effectiveness of military and humanitarian intervention by the outside world. 
Frère (2007) contends that information, through its dissemination, withholding and 
manipulation, has always been a powerful weapon in times of conflict. The appearance of the 
mass media, she argues, has multiplied this potential by making possible vast propaganda and 
indoctrination operations. Frère however points out that the media can also be used to 
strengthen democratic processes by awakening the consciences of citizens, developing a 
population’s ability to exert pressure on its leaders, thus facilitating control over public 
affairs, amongst other things.  
In her opinion the media constitute a two-edged sword. They can be the instruments of both 
destructive and constructive strategies, especially in societies undergoing change, destabilised 
by conflicts or in the throes of political liberalisation. History, she observes, is replete with 
abundant evidence that demonstrate the ability of  journalists, “from behind the shelter of 
their microphones or pens,” to incite hatred, provoke violent mass movements, voluntarily 
manipulate information in the service of war-mongering strategies, promote anti-democratic 
reflexes, and more or less consciously or perversely create the roots of deep divisions within 
society. Conversely, Frère points out that media professionals have also often contributed to 
taking the first step toward democracy, restoring peace in troubled regions, establishing 
respect and political dialogue between estranged groups and transforming the warriors of 
yesterday into negotiators in the process of reconciliation. Media, she insists, have capacity to 
both increase and decrease tensions within countries in conflicts.  
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Hamelink (2008) argues that while one may have doubts about the media’s deescalating or 
peacemaking potential, at the same time it can be demonstrated that news media can make 
matters a lot worse and can certainly contribute to the escalation of group conflicts into mass 
killings. This, he points out, is especially so when media workers become agents for the 
dissemination of the “elimination belief” and when media are intentionally used as weapons 
to incite people to commit crimes against humanity.  
This issue relates particularly to the role of internal or local media in conflicts which, as 
noted by Seaton (1999) plays a critical part in the internal mobilization of opinion that is 
required to move populations towards war with each other. This is done through elaborating 
and allocating characteristics to groups of people defined as the enemy and elaborating a 
view of them. As Robert Fisk (1992) argues, the local media in particular play a vital role in 
reiterating old grievances. In some instances national news media has had the effect of 
exacerbating conflict as a result of conscious political strategies by political activists. 
Ordinary people hitherto living harmoniously together as neighbours, friends or associates, 
suddenly come to perceive themselves as enemies. This "sudden breaking of the seemingly 
secure bonds of neighbourliness" is manifested in the equivocations of a Bosnian citizen, as 
recorded by Vulliamy (in Seaton, 1999: 46): "I never saw any difference between a Serb or a 
Muslim or anyone. But how could I never look at them or greet them or live with them again? 
We liked each other for 45 years and in the 46th we hate each other." What this indicates is 
that long standing social relationships can be ruptured through the conscious use and 
manipulation of the media by political leaders to sow and nurture discord and hate in the 
polity.  
Melone, et.al (2002) also observe the tendency of media in conflict-ridden countries to play a 
significant role in creating and furthering the “facilitating and triggering factors” in conflicts 
by, amongst others, utilising “oppositional metaphors” (us versus them) linked to internal and 
external issues or threats facing the nation. For Seaton (1999: 46), what is important in this 
process is the success of the media in “helping to make a monster out of the man you know 
personally, who has lived next door.” This process, he explains, depends on inter-locking 
factors like media structures, the existence of regional monopolies, the regulatory tradition or 
lack of it, the ownership of the media and how it is financed, and other issues such as biased 
content. Beyond the direct influence of the media, it also depends on the emergence of a 
willing-to-be persuaded audience. 
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Examples abound of the intense preoccupation of the media with conflicts, not only in Africa, 
but in other regions of the world including the Balkans, the Middle East and the Gulf. Sofos 
(1999) for instance, links the disintegration of Yugoslavia to the emergence of populist ethno-
nationalist discourses in the political spheres of former Yugoslav republics, which were 
vigorously propagated through the local media. He also cites the Rwandan genocide as a 
classic example of an incident in which the international press uncritically swallowed 
politically motivated disinformation that the conflict was ethnically driven and through this 
helped to legitimise such ethnic perspective which served to exacerbate the situation. This is 
apart from the activities of local media, notably, Radio Miles Collines which championed the 
cause of ethnic cleansing through its broadcasts. For Puddephatt (2006: 3), “the media palyed 
a pernicious role” in these two conflicts and he holds them as responsible for “directly 
inciting genocide (in Rwanda) and organising it in the case of Radio Mile Collines while 
acting as a vehicle for virulent nationalism in the former Yugoslavia.”  
Leopold (1999: 238) similarly focuses his analysis on the Ugandan press coverage of the war 
in northern Uganda, exploring the explanations for the root cause of the conflicts and relating 
them to a wider discourse on ethnicity in the Ugandan society. He demonstrates that the 
coverage of the conflict by the local newspapers was often misleading and frequently 
elaborated ethnic ideologies. Puddephatt (2006: 5) however reaches further into history as he 
observes that such negative role is not a modern phenomenon as both the Nazis and the 
Soviet Union “used the media to create a hegemonic climate in which they could easily 
exercise power.” He asserts that the media is an integral part of the strategy of combatants, 
and control over local media is an important objective of all parties in conflict.  
An important dimension of the media’s handling of ethnic conflict relates to the economic 
and commercial concerns of the media particularly as modern media organisations have 
evolved into fast-moving, profit-driven industries (Seaton, 1999; Atkinson, 1999). Critical 
issues in the political economy of media organisations, and the commercial pressures 
associated with their operations, therefore have important implications in the presentation and 
slanting of content. In their Propaganda Model, for example, Herman and Chomsky have 
noted how factors inherent in modern media structures, specifically issues related to 
production and profit, have conspired to subvert Habermas’ public sphere concept of the 
media, and thus give certain classes in society undue influence in media content (Herman and 
Chomsky, 2002). For Atkinson (1999), the evolving structures of the modern media as fast-
moving, profit-driven industries also work to hinder the development of informed and 
responsible reporting.  
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McChesney (1999: xviii) raises fundamental issues about  structural flaws in the western 
modern media system,  emphasising what he describes as the contradictions between a highly 
concentrated, advertising-saturated, corporate media system and the communication 
requirements of a democratic society. Writing in the context of the United States and the 
Western world, he discusses issues such as the concentration of media ownership, the 
"decline of journalism," the hyper commercialisation of culture, the globalisation of the 
corporate media system and its cosy relationship with neoliberal capitalist economy. In 
McChesney's view, a media system set up essentially to serve the needs of corporate capital 
"cannot and does not serve the needs of the preponderance of the population.” He notes the 
prevailing trends in which local media, for example, refuse, or are unable to provide critical 
investigation of local commercial interests in order not to endanger advertising revenue from 
such organisations. He also explores the highly unethical tendencies of commercial media's 
propensity to provide favourable coverage of politicians in tacit or overt exchange for 
favourable media legislation and regulation. In his words, "the corruption of journalistic 
integrity is always bad, but it becomes obscene under conditions of extreme media 
concentration" (McChesney, 1999: xviii). 
McChesney’s critique above, though specific to America and the West, does have relevance 
for the press in Nigeria which has evolved and is largely patterned after the Western model of 
journalism (Sobowale, 1995; Oso, 1991). Moreover, the Nigerian press is also largely 
commercially oriented and the struggles and contradictions associated with the Western press 
are noticeable with it, as will be discussed shortly. It will also be demonstrated that the 
commercial orientation has significant implications for the coverage of ethno-religious 
conflicts. To put this issue in a wider theoretical perspective, the next section discusses the 
issues of critical orientation and critical political economy of media production and their 
relationship to the practice of journalism in Nigeria.  
 
1.7  Critical Orientation in Media Research 
Critical theory refers to approaches to media study that are essentially ideological, that focus 
on the social dimensions of the mass media and the ways they are used by organisations and 
others allegedly to maintain the status quo rather than to enhance equality (May, 2005). 
Unlike positivism and empiricism, this perspective does not merely reflect on the status, but 
engages the questions of the constitution of reality. The researcher does not claim illusory 
detachment, but pays attention to the social context in which he operates. From this 
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perspective, May explains that the production of theory and research are “critical projects” 
which challenge every form of oppression in society.  
In seeking to change the world, critical theory, founded on the work of the Frankfurt School, 
emphasises that the research endeavour must rise beyond fact-finding or neutrality or the 
mere testing of hypotheses. As May (2005: 39) explains, “routes to theory such as these 
become reflections of the status-quo, leaving questions of the constitution of reality, power 
and its effects upon different segments of the population, unexplained.” Therefore, critical 
research argues in line with a Marxist standpoint, that the adequacy of social theory is not its 
ability to discover social facts but its value in informing actions, particularly political actions. 
Indeed, as Harbermas (1996) insists, theory is considered by its ability to diagnose the ills of 
society and form part of the process of understanding and explanation that has implications 
for the transformation of existing relations. For May, therefore, research based on critical 
theory is measured by its ability to reveal the relations of domination which exist in society. 
Harvey’s (1990: 2) summation is apt: 
At the heart of critical research is the idea that knowledge is structured by 
existing sets of social relations. The aim of a critical methodology is to 
provide knowledge which engages the prevailing social structures. These 
social structures are seen by critical social researchers, in one way or another, 
as oppressive structures (in May, 2005: 40). 
 
Kellner (2010) points out that, like the newer, postmodern approaches, critical theory offers a 
multi-disciplinary approach for social theory which combines perspectives drawn from 
political economy, sociology, cultural theory, philosophy, and anthropology. This, he 
explains, enables it to overcome the fragmentation endemic in established academic 
disciplines in order to address issues of broader interest. In this regard, critical theory 
recognises the epistemological and metaphysical problems with abstracting from the inter-
connectedness of phenomena in the world. Such abstractions or divisions, according to 
Kellner, are “one-sided, limited and flawed.” Moreover, in terms of productive social 
enterprise, Kellner argues that critical theory provides a potentially more useful and 
politically relevant alternative to quantitative approaches than postmodernist and 
poststructuralist theory.  Critical theory, he contends, advances the conception of a critical 
and normative theory which is committed to emancipation from all forms of oppression. This 
contrasts sharply to the subjectivism and relativism, often bordering on nihilism, of 
postmodern theory and seeks a connection with empirical analysis of the contemporary world 
and social movements that are attempting to transform society in progressive ways. 
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In a situation where thousands of citizens are being killed regularly and social relations are 
deteriorating in Nigeria, it is important to adopt a research perspective which will stimulate 
proactivity in proposing policy options for the amelioration of these conflicts, apart from 
contribution to knowledge. This informs my theoretical perspective. Critical theory is 
relevant to media research because of the media’s role as sites of cultural production, 
frequently owned by either the state or major corporations and always in the service of capital 
(Bertrand and Hughes, 2005). The approach which is particularly concerned with questions of 
ownership and control of the media is known as critical political economy (Bertrand and 
Hughes, 2005) and I consider that it offers the appropriate analytical framework for 
understanding professional practices of Nigerian journalism particularly with regards to the 
coverage of ethno-religious conflicts. 
Critical political economy, according to Jonathan Hardy (2014), describes a tradition of 
analysis that is concerned with how communication arrangements relate to goals of social 
justice and emancipation. This encompasses studies that consider political and economic 
aspects of communications and which are critical in regard to their concerns with the manner 
in which power relations are sustained and challenged. These concerns, Hardy notes, have 
gained momentum particularly as modern existence is now so vitally dependent on 
communication resources. For him, if there are times when the political and economic aspects 
of communication could be neglected, they are surely not ours. He argues that, although the 
contexts have changed radically, the questions asked by radical scholars in the 20th century 
remain salient: “questions about the control of the media, the impact of commercialization, 
public and private ownership, inequalities and power relations affecting communication” 
(Hardy, 2014: 5). Therefore, in connecting the study of the media to broader patterns of social 
existence and in particular the allocation of resources, critical political economy identifies 
how communication and culture relate to the processes of production and reproduction within 
capitalist society. In this respect, Hardy posits that although political economy shares broadly 
the democratic aspirations of other liberal pluralist accounts of the media in serving citizens, 
“it challenges the ability of corporate owned media to adequately do so, and mounts a critique 
of the capitalist market relations on which liberalism is contingent” (p.8). It insists that a 
more diverse, democratized media system is a precondition for an informed, participatory 
citizenry necessary for true democracy. On this score, it criticizes the capitalist market for its 
failure to deliver economic fairness, social justice or the basis for a democratic polity. 
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Fenton (2012) argues that critical political economy is based upon a concern with the 
structural inequalities of production and the consequences for representation and access to 
consumption. By placing issues of economic distribution at its centre, it prioritises the 
relationship between the economy and forms of democratic politics. Fenton further makes the 
point that a political economy perspective views the media as promoting the dominant 
ideology of the ruling classes. In spite of their liberating potential, the media of modern mass 
communication have contributed to the creation of new levels of social stratification – 
communication classes which in turn engender new forms of domination. The mass media are 
an obstacle to liberation and overwhelm all other forms of non-mass media. 
The political economy of the media was developed in the late 1960s through a concern with 
the increasing role of private businesses in cultural production. Golding and Murdock (2000: 
15) make a distinction between traditional political economy and critical political economic 
approaches to the media by highlighting four key differences: (a) Critical political economy 
sees the economy as interrelated with political, social and cultural life rather than as a 
separate domain. (b) It is historical, paying close attention to long-term changes in the role of 
the state, corporations and the media in culture. (c) Critical political economy is centrally 
concerned with the balance between private enterprise and public intervention. (d) A critical 
approach goes beyond technical issues of efficiency to engage with the basic moral questions 
of justice, equity and the moral good. In essence, critical political economy sets out to show 
how different ways of financing and organising cultural production have traceable 
consequences for the range of discourses and representations in the public domain and for 
audiences’ access to them. 
Fenton (2012) further argues that critical political economy is especially interested in the 
ways that communicative activity is continuously structured by the unequal distribution of 
material and symbolic resources. Classically, theorists adopting this approach point to the fact 
that media production has been increasingly commandeered by large corporations and 
moulded to their interests and strategies. In the west, this is evident in the push towards 
privatization and the declining vitality of publicly funded cultural institutions. Critical 
political economists argue that the nature of the mass media cannot be adequately considered 
apart from more general economic changes, which in turn require a historical perspective that 
will locate changes in the mass media within the general context of the processes of 
industrialization. Part of the debate within critical political economy focuses on issues of 
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ownership and control of the media. Having power in or control over media is argued to 
impact upon the capacity to determine or influence the contents of the media.  
Manning (2001) similarly points out that public information generated by commercial 
organisations is likely to be a “cross-breed commodity” (Statham, 1996 in Manning, 2001: 3). 
This implies that while such information may serve the public purpose of sustaining political 
debate, it would invariably bear the imprint of the commercial interests responsible for its 
production. Political economy therefore studies the ways in which material and symbolic 
resources promote or constrain action and are deployed to secure interests or advantage. In 
this respect, Manning argues that a political economy approach is useful because it reminds 
us that the battle to control information flows is a struggle around resources (material and 
symbolic). Furthermore, the micro-engagements of media organisations occur in the context 
of the larger political-economic environment – market pressures, proprietorial interests, the 
formal and informal regulative capacities of government, etc. For Manning, therefore, a key 
question in contemporary news journalism is the extent to which journalists operating in an 
increasingly market-driven news environment can find ways of providing comprehensive and 
diverse news perspectives. He focuses particular attention on two factors, the ownership of 
news organisations and the positioning of news organisations in competitive markets, factors 
considered as potential threats to the free circulation of ideas (Manning, 2001: 81). This 
emphasises that political and economic criteria cannot be overlooked in the political 
communication process, a phenomenon Habermas terms as “re-feudalisation” of the public 
sphere (Manning, 2001: 5). The re-feudalisation of the public sphere describes a process 
whereby communication and the exchange of ideas grows increasingly dependent upon a new 
group of sponsors and patrons, and upon new structures of authority which pose an increasing 
threat to the rationality of debate and the universalistic criteria by which arguments should be 
evaluated. The practical implication of this is that the selection and representation of 
information in the public domain is undertaken according to commercial or political interests 
rather than “pure” reason and rationality (Manning, 2001: 5). 
Writing within the context of Nigeria, Oso (2013) argues that the dominant theoretical 
approach to mass communication discourse in the country, and which informs constitutional 
and policy direction, is the liberal democratic theory. The libertarian theory views the press as 
the fourth estate of the realm, and has its roots in the western plural/functionalist conception 
of society. This approach centres media analysis primarily on the freedom of speech, freedom 
of the press and the autonomy of the media from state control. The libertarian philosophy 
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broadly sets out three main functions for the media in society: the role of watch dog, 
provision of information and facilitator of the public sphere. As Oso (2013) points out 
however, these expectations of the media have been greatly diminished by the political and 
economic realities within which media production and operations take place. For instance, the 
watch dog function, considered as the most critical, “has been evacuated of its 
effectiveness…by the political and economic interests which undergird media production” 
(Oso, 2013: 15). This is because powerful economic interests have colonised the media, and 
deprived them of their vitality as independent watchdogs. Quoting Waisboard (2006: 6), Oso 
argues that proximity to such powerful interests makes the press unlikely to be interested in 
keeping the same interests at bay. This reality, he argues, “dims the prospects that news 
organisations can effectively sustain vigilant scrutiny of government and centres of power. 
Watch dogs do not bite their owners…nor…do they chomp neighbours with whom they have 
amiable relations.” 
Furthermore, within the prevailing economic realities of Nigeria, only the rich and powerful 
can afford to establish media organisations as the cost of entry is very high. Therefore 
newspaper ownership in Nigeria is increasingly a phenomenon associated with rich and 
influential politicians or business people with links to the political establishment. Oso points 
out that newspapers established in Nigeria recently are owned by serving or former 
governors, some of whom have been investigated or prosecuted for corrupt practices and 
money laundering. Oso also argues that the Nigerian mass media has effectively become 
integrated with capital. Whereas up to the 1970s most of the newspaper organisations were 
single entities run more for their political importance than as industrial concerns,  currently 
most of the newspapers and private broadcast companies are not only owned by wealthy 
businessmen-cum-politicians, but are part of corporate organisations often having roots in 
other sectors of the economy. These newspapers therefore prioritise profit over professional 
considerations. Oso therefore concludes that the democratic credentials of modern media 
systems and their ability to serve public interest have been severely compromised by the 
corporatisation of mass media, commodification of media products, the collapse of the 
boundaries between the public and the private and the increasing interconnectedness between 
political and economic power (Oso, 2013: 15). For him, “recent technological, economic and 
political developments in Nigeria have dealt severe blows on the edifice on which the 
liberalist account of the media is erected and therefore the media cannot fulfil the mandate of 
this western-inspired theory” (p.18). This position tallies with Nyamnjoh’s (2005) argument 
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that it is problematic to evaluate the African media from a liberal democratic perspective 
without giving due regard to the local socio-political realities of the African society. The next 
section explores this issue further with a brief overview of the mediation of conflicts by the 
African press. 
  
1.8  Media and Ethnic Conflicts: an Overview of the Press in Africa  
It is useful at this point to examine the literature on the role of the press in Africa in ethnic 
conflicts as this would serve as a context for exploring the specific situation in Nigeria. The 
media terrain in Africa presents a mixed bag of conquests and contradictions. On the one 
hand, scholars have celebrated the rejuvenation of the mass media, which has happened as an 
integral process of the resurgence of democracy on the continent (Tettey, 2006; Frère, 2007). 
In this respect, some observers have lauded the media for fulfilling the expectations of 
democratic theorists like Milton who hold the view that a free press advances the cause of 
democracy by performing watchdog functions over governments and thus preventing 
excessive acquisition of power and abuse of citizens (Oluyokun, 2004; Hyden, et al., 2002; 
Tettey, 2006).  
However, there is also what Tettey (2006) calls a “critical assessment” of the African media’s 
performance that portrays them less positively and has highlighted attitudes that suggest they 
are irresponsible, unaccountable and a threat to the credibility and sustenance of the 
democratic process. Aspects of the African media, he notes, have exhibited lack of discretion 
in their reportage, presuming that there were no limits to what could be written or aired. 
There have been widespread cases of unsubstantiated allegations and publications of outright 
falsehood capable of creating political unrest. In Ghana, for instance, the Ghana National 
Media Commission laments that many practitioners still had difficulty adhering to the 
principles of ethical and socially responsible press.  
Nyamjoh (2005) also observes that the press in Africa is obsessed with the politics of 
belonging by reporting issues from ethnic and regional perspectives. In his words “the media 
have assumed a partisan, highly politicised, militant role in Africa. They have done so by 
dividing citizens into the righteous and the wicked, depending on their political leanings, 
ideological and regional, cultural or ethnic belonging” (Nyamjoh, 2005: 231). This, according 
to him, has affected the ability of the African media to serve as impartial and honest arbiters, 
and have rather divided the society. Particularly with respect to the private press, Nyamnjoh 
argues that they fuel, rather than curb intolerance, fanaticism and extremism. He cites 
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examples across the continent of newspapers in Senegal, Mali, Niger, Cote d’Ivoire, Kenya, 
Madagascar and Cameroun that have “served as mouthpieces for divisive forces, often 
reproducing calls for murder, destruction and hatred and generally keeping everyone fearful 
of a Rwandan-type situation where Radio Miles Collines proved what the media can do to 
spur ethnic cleansing” (Nyamnjoh, 2005: 56).  
Nyamnjoh also discusses specific instances of journalistic irresponsibility in African 
countries. In Kenya, for instance, he observed that the press appeared more interested to 
promote hate journalism through exaggeration and politicisation of ethnic tensions than to 
engage in accurate and responsible journalism. In South Africa, the tendency has been for 
newsrooms to reproduce “prior metanarratives of social schisms, even when those narratives 
may be radically inappropriate and counter to available evidence” (p57). For him, it is often a 
case of much talking without listening and of an exaggerated sense of self-righteousness on 
the part of journalists who frequently sacrifice truth for a good story. In Sierra Leone, the 
press has been accused of engaging in cheap propaganda rather than reporting issues that 
affect the common citizen. In Mali the press similarly features a lack of professionalism and 
frequently disseminates unverified or partisan news. In most of West Africa, the press 
engages in “journalistic hooliganism”, irresponsibility and recklessness in reportage which 
often brings their states to the brink of civil war.  
A recurrent criticism Nyamnjoh identifies with the private press in many African countries is 
the tendency to rush to publication after hearing only one side of a story. Also for a fee, 
editors and publishers allow their newspapers to be used by individuals or groups for 
blackmail or extortion. In Kenya, for example, the “Gutter Press” can easily be persuaded to 
kill stories for bribes, employ intimidation to extort money from people or allow their pages 
to be used for political vendetta (p. 60). According to Nyamnjoh, journalists in many African 
countries are perceived as the mouth pieces for competing political pressure groups where 
certain writers or publications become the unofficial mouthpieces of particular interests or 
politicians or, worse still, are available to be bribed by any faction for the defamation of their 
rivals.   
Nyamnjoh’s negative evaluation of the African press agrees with the assessment of other 
scholars such as Frère (2007), Hyden and Leslie (2002) and Tettey (2006) who argue that the 
press has not lived up to the ideal of serving as genuine tools for information and education. 
Neither have they provided effective avenues for encounters and dialogue between conflict 
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protagonists or acting as a voice for their populations in the discourse of public issues. 
Rather, they have served mainly ethnic, regional or religious interests. Nyamnjoh blames this 
situation on the contradictions and tensions of the African in which imported western liberal 
democratic values and expectations compete with local cultural norms. For him, the 
prevailing tendency among African journalists and media is indicative partly of their 
predicament as professionals and institutions expected to fulfil liberal democratic functions in 
a context where people are clamouring, as well, for recognition as cultural, religious and 
regional communities. He therefore asserts that such competing claims for their attention 
“explain the apparent contradictions, hypocrisy and double standards when their actions are 
appreciated from the standpoint of liberal democracy” (p. 65). 
Examining another dimension of the African media problem, Tettey considers the various 
mechanisms of media accountability, exploring such critical issues as: to whom are the media 
accountable? Do they serve as a means for pursuing disinterested national agenda? Do they 
serve parochial interests or are they available to diverse constituencies of the polity? The 
answers to these penetrating questions, in the light of foregoing analysis, are obviously 
negative. To redress this situation, Tettey canvasses a strong regulatory environment, based 
primarily on internal self-accounting on the part of the media, arguing that “ethical rectitude” 
was critical if the media are to serve as veritable channels for sustaining and continuing the 
continent’s fledgling democracies. This was important, he points out, because how other 
political institutions and the body politic perceive, interpret and respond to the issue is 
consequential for building media systems that play their watch-dog role effectively. He 
argues further that the extent of accountability within the media is strongly correlated to the 
level of credibility that they earn from the public regarding their professionalism and integrity 
and that such public evaluation either solidifies or diminishes support for the media as 
veritable partners in the democratisation process.  
1.9  Media Effects Debate 
The argument in section 1.8 above on the role of the African press in ethnic conflicts may 
however stir up the issue of the extent to which the media may actually be directly liable for 
conflict. This is the media effects debate which requires a brief explication here. Media 
effects, according to McQuail (2010: 465) are the consequences of what the media do, 
whether intended or not. According to him, the entire study of mass communication is based 
on the assumption that the media have significant effects. However, there is little agreement 
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on the nature and extent of these presumed effects. Therefore, whereas there is widespread 
belief that the mass media are a powerful instrument of influence on opinion and of effects on 
behaviour, there is great difficulty in predicting effects or in proving that they have happened, 
after the event (McQuail, 2010: 456). In this respect, much research and theorising has taken 
place to explain the effect or influence of the media on individuals and the society. The major 
outlines of the debate are indicated below: 
 Direct effects theory (the all-powerful media): this was the earliest of the media 
effects theories and was based on the assumption that audiences were passive 
consumers of media products. Media were therefore credited with considerable power 
to shape opinion and belief, to change habits of life and to mould behaviour in line 
with the will of their controllers (Bauer and Bauer, 1960 quoted in McQuail, 2010: 
458). Direct effects theory, also known as the hypodermic needle approach, is now 
largely discredited as over simplistic and lacking in theoretical depth. It particularly 
ignores audience agency and its capacity to make meanings different from that 
originally intended (Orbe, 2014: 243). 
 Limited or no effects theory: this theoretical perspective assigns a much more modest 
role to the media in causing any planned or unintended effects. Pioneered by scholars 
such as Lazarsfeld, Berelson and Gaudet, this model was supported by research which 
indicated that media consumers selectively exposed themselves to media messages 
that were consistent with their existing beliefs, attitudes, and values (Orbe, 2014: 
243). As explained by McQuail (2010: 459), it was not that the media had been found 
to be without effects or influence; rather there was no direct or one-to-one link to be 
expected between media stimulus and audience response. Instead, media were shown 
to operate within a pre-existing structure of social relationships and cultural contexts 
which are significant in shaping the opinions, attitudes and behaviour of audiences 
including their media choice, attention and response. 
 Uses and gratification theory: this media effects theory acknowledges the capacity of 
the audience as active users of media who are motivated to use different types of 
media to fulfil different needs (Katz, Blumler and Gurevich, 1973 in Orbe, 2014: 
244). The emphasis here is that people are purposeful in their media consumption and 
actively select media to satisfy specific needs (Pearce, 2009: 6).  
 Cumulative effects models: recent studies, based on more complex theoretical 
foundations, recognise a balance between potential media effects and active media 
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consumption. One of the most popular theories in this perspective is the media agenda 
setting function. Scholars in this approach such as McCombs (2004) argue that media 
cannot tell people what to think, but it does tell people what to think about.  
 Critical cultural studies approach: this approach to media effects views the media 
essentially as a tool of society’s most powerful groups to maintain their hold on 
power. The theory particularly focuses on issues of ideology, race, gender, social class 
and other forms of human diversity. A key idea of the critical cultural studies theory is 
that the media plays a key role in maintaining existing power inequalities in society.  
As indicated earlier, some of theories of media effects, particularly the direct effect or no 
effect models have been largely discredited. Others however remain relevant to a holistic 
understanding of the intricate relationship between the media and audiences. My own 
position combines aspects of the cumulative effects and the critical cultural studies 
approaches which recognise both the power of the media and that of the audience. I consider 
this position as a “social constructivist” view (Gamson and Modigliani, 1989 in McQuail, 
2010: 461) which holds that meanings (and thus effects) are created by both the media and 
the receivers (audience). Moreover, critical cultural studies approach emphasises the role of 
the media, within a complex of social dynamics and variables, in shaping public attitudes and 
perceptions of critical issues such as ethno-religious events. This position partly influenced 
my analysis and perspectives of the peace journalism debate discussed later in this chapter 
and in chapter 5.    
1.10 The Nigerian Press and Ethnic Conflict Reportage 
The character of the Nigerian press, particularly the manner by which it covers ethnic 
conflicts, is best understood through an exploration of its historical development. There is a 
fairly comprehensive and well documented body of information on the early history of the 
Nigerian press, particularly its roots in the anti-colonialist struggle (Oyovbaire, 2003; Oso, 
1995; Akinfeleye, 1986; Yusha’u, 2009; Olayiwola, 1991; Babalola, 2000). From its small 
beginnings as a Christian evangelism tool, the press metamorphosed into a major platform for 
the struggle for independence from British colonial hegemony (Olukotun, 2004; Yusha’u, 
2009). Oyeleye (2004) has articulated a clear history of the Nigerian press along three clear 
phases. The first phase, within the early to mid-twentieth century was the cultural-nationalist 
anti-colonial phase when, in his opinion, the newspaper industry was at its best. Influenced 
by the prevailing pan-Africanist movement, the press clearly aimed its anger at the British 
colonial rulers and manifested a strong cultural-nationalist orientation.  
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The second phase identified by Oyeleye began particularly from post-World War Two until 
about the 1980s when the press was less united in its endorsement of a common national 
identity. According to Oyeleye, although some newspapers, such as the West Africa Pilot 
founded by Nnamdi Azikiwe supported the struggle, most eventually succumbed to a more 
narrow-minded conception of nationalism defined within ethnic and geo-political boundaries. 
This sad descent from the lofty heights of pan-Africanism to the abyss of inter-ethnic rivalry 
was fostered by the formation of ethnic-based political associations. Leading the pack of 
these ethnic promoters were the Egbe Omo Oduduwa for the Yoruba in the South-West, the 
Ibo Cultural Union for the Igbo of the South-East and the Jam’iyyar Mutanen Arewa in 
northern Nigeria. The newspapers, then increasingly owned or controlled by these ethnic 
overlords, became the platforms for propagating narrow aspirations and for launching “often 
vitriolic attacks on rival groups” (Oyeleye, 2004: 166). In Oyeleye’s words, “the press 
became not so much a business as it was an essential tool for galvanising nationalist 
sentiments among the small but growing class of literate city dwellers.” This involvement 
with the media, he argues, led to the formation of new caucuses for the venting of ethnic 
nationalist ambitions and sowed the seeds of tribal politics in Nigeria.  
The third and current phase is marked by the commercialisation and expansion of the press. 
However, even though there were characteristics of professionalism found in this stage, the 
press, according to Oyeleye, has not rid itself completely of the primordial nature of the 
previous stage and the political economic impulse to make profit further complicates matters. 
The historical foundation of the Nigerian press as a tool to battle colonial rule has given the 
press its distinctive combative tone and fighting spirit, or, in the words of Olukotun, (2004: 9) 
its "protest motif." Its strident, anti-colonial posturing also led to the development of “a 
militant press genre (which) arose in colonial and early post-colonial history to curb a 
predatory state” (Olukotun, 2004: 16). Thus, while the historical development of the press has 
bequeathed to it a legacy of vibrancy and dynamism, the negative attitude to the colonial 
administration was carried over to the post-independence governments. Sobowale (1995:39-
40) argues that Nigerian journalists have not understood that the environment in which they 
are practising is somewhat different from that in which the pre-independence journalists 
functioned. According to him, “the orientation to build would appear to be weaker than the 
tendency to pull down…the journalist is yet to show sufficient understanding of the 
intricacies and complexities of the environment he is called upon to cover. This accounts for 
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why the Nigerian journalist is so good at pointing out failures and so poor at suggesting 
viable options.”  
Another well documented feature of the Nigerian press is the fact that the press, in contrast to 
the electronic media (radio and television) has been dominated by the private sector right 
from inception whereas the latter was a government monopoly until quite recently (Yusha’u, 
2009). This private ownership has had important implications. While it ensured that the 
newspapers, right from early times, had independence of editorial content, it also meant that 
the newspapers largely acquired the character and ethnic or regional inclinations of their 
respective proprietors. In this respect, Yusha’u (2010) for example has pointed out that 
regionalism and ethnicity are part and parcel of the Nigerian press. He notes that newspapers 
in Nigeria are categorised into “Lagos-Ibadan axis” and “Abuja-Kaduna axis” representing 
the southern and northern parts respectively. This regional and ethnic orientation, he notes, is 
a by-product of Nigeria’s colonial legacy. The position outlined above echoes the views of 
scholars like Oyovbaire (2001) who, in plotting a history of the media in Nigeria, argues that 
“the media is highly rooted in south-western Nigeria or the famous Lagos-Ibadan axis 
which...provides the materialist base for the world-view of the media.”  
Regionalism has remained a prominent trait of the Nigerian press over the decades. In the 
coverage of the 1964/5 elections crisis, for example, Sobowale (1995: 42) asserts that the 
press was “a study in professional partisanship and journalistic debauchery.” The press was 
sharply divided along political lines. He argues that the press made itself available to be used 
“to deceive, to cheat, and fan the embers of hatred, distrust and acrimony” while “truth was 
absolutely disregarded…sheer expediency and transient political gains displaced all known 
journalistic norms and dicta…Absolute falsehood and half-truths were reported as facts.” 
Bitrus (1996) notes that politics based on ethnic cleavages has been a notable feature of the 
Nigerian press right from colonial times and that this was carried through into independence 
such that the battle lines between the regions was crystallised in the media.  
Similarly, Olatunji Dare (1996) laments the failure of the press during this period to 
distinguish between the ruling regional party and the government. He asserts that “the 
situation was such that the media were for all practical purposes party organs financed by the 
tax payer. Through crude and overzealous partisanship, the papers transformed opponents of 
the ruling party into opponents of the government and equated dissent with disloyalty.” 
According to Dare, so polarised had both national politics and the press become on the eve of 
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the 1966 coup that newspapers could not circulate across regional lines. Vendors were killed 
or harmed in some areas for selling certain newspapers and some local government councils 
in the East and West even enacted edicts banning certain newspaper publications from their 
areas of jurisdiction. And in the Second Republic, Dare observes that many a Nigerian 
journalist “sold his soul and his craft to the highest political bidder or indeed to anyone who 
put up a bid.” He notes that without exception, newspapers became organs of whatever 
political party controlled the state in which they were published.  
Another assessment of the press in the coverage of the 1993 presidential elections fiasco 
similarly criticised the press for performing below the ethical line. According to Biakolo 
(1994), “the most debased dispositions of men and women were brought to the fore in that 
poisoned political climate, and the press helped considerably to fan them.” Biakolo insisted 
that in dealing with an enemy, one does not have to act like them. Unah (1995: 33-34) 
however disputes this “puritanical” vision of the press, arguing that a vibrant press was 
required in that instant to confront political rascality. “It may be wise counsel,” he reasons, 
“for the …press not to return evil for evil in a sane atmosphere. But in jungle warfare 
everything is permitted.” In his view, the diversity and variety of the Nigerian press is a 
healthy development, serving every reader, as it were, his/her preference. “If you wanted the 
vulgar and the frivolous you read the soft sells; if you wanted a centrist view, you read the 
moderate newspapers and if you wanted sectionalism, you read the ethno-partisan news 
journals.” This type of argument however presumes a highly literate and discerning audience 
which a large section of the Nigerian readership was not, and still is yet to attain. The main 
point however being stressed here is that the origins of the Nigerian press as a political anti-
colonial weapon and its metamorphosis into a tool for ethnic expansionism, have built into it 
a tendency to partisanship and inflammatory style, and that such a characteristic does not 
promote moderation and sober judgment in the reportage of highly sensitive issues such as 
ethno-religious conflicts, whose coverage this research investigates. 
Yusha’u (2010) asserts that regional dichotomy is reflected in the way Nigerian newspapers 
report issues. Particularly in the mediation of nationally critical conflicts such as the Niger 
Delta Conflict related to oil exploration and environmental degradation, or the Boko Haram 
conflict in north-eastern Nigeria, Yusha’u contends that the press exhibit the signs of “ethnic 
and regional parallelisms” in framing the stories of the conflicts. Yusha’u's regional 
parallelism concept is modelled after the political parallelism theory of Hallin and Mancini 
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(2004) which is a situation in which the philosophy of a newspaper coincides with the 
worldview/philosophy of its proprietors.  
Olukotun (2004: 31, 69) however provides another perspective, when, in his discourse of the 
struggle of the press against state repression during the military dictatorship in Nigeria, he 
cautioned against a "superficial" reading of ethnicity in media positioning. He argues, for 
example, that the "allegedly Yoruba-dominated media largely championed the fall from 
office of Chief Ernest Shonekan, a Yoruba technocrat." According to Olukotun, had ethnicity 
been the driving force behind media agitation in those years, "one would have expected the 
so-called Yoruba media to condone the government of Shonekan. As Olatunji (Dare)
4
 points 
out, the values which impelled media opposition in that instant were those of fairness and 
respect for the rules of the game" (Dare, in Olukotun, 2004: 69) 
As indicated above, a well-known characteristic of the Nigerian press is its reputation for 
vibrancy and fearlessness in critiquing the authorities on affairs of the state and matters of 
public interest. For Oluyokun (2004) “the Nigerian media are imbued with a self-conscious 
tradition of outspokenness, which at the limits sometimes teeters on anarchy.” Similarly, 
Oyeleye (2004) observes that the Nigerian media remains one of the most vibrant in Africa. 
He notes that despite an often difficult operating environment, a small hard-core of 
“committed journalists” has upheld the reputation of Nigerian journalism as a dynamic, 
fearless vanguard of public interest. Malaolu (2004) also contends that from inception, the 
Nigerian press was a militant press: “bellicose in temperament, belligerent in posturing and 
adversarial in language and perception...It was, and still largely is, a fearless, vibrant and 
nationalistic press." 
Oyeleye however confronts the flip side of this acknowledged vibrancy when he observed 
that such commendation was not without qualification “because the activities of a large 
section of the media vitiate against the laudable efforts of this minority and tend to bring the 
media into disrepute in the eyes of the wider public (Oyeleye, 2004: 157). He cited the 
Nigerian Media Rights Agenda which charged the media with corrupt and unethical practices 
that made journalists susceptible to partisanship and non-adherence to the codes of 
                                                          
4
 Olatunji Dare is erroneously spelt as Olatunji Dape in this citation, taken from Olukotun’s book, Repressive 
State and Resurgent Media under Nigeria's Military Dictatorship, 1988-98, published by Nordiska 
Afrikainstitutet, Uppsala (2004) 
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objectivity. The Media Rights Agenda, Oyeleye observed, accused journalists of routinely 
setting aside professional judgment in the performance of their journalistic functions and 
“engaged in over simplification, exaggeration and outright sensationalism, suppression and 
outright distortion of facts, political partisanship, bias and ethnicity. They often failed to 
show religious sensitivity in many of their reports, especially during conflict situations, and 
almost always did not give all the parties to an issue the benefit of responding to charges laid 
against them” (Oyeleye, 2004: 161). Political debates and alignments in the press, according 
to him, reflected divisive considerations, thus weakening the very foundations of the 
democracy the media fought hard to emplace. And despite relentless surveillance and strident 
critique and exposure of powerful and well entrenched corrupt practices, the Media Rights 
Agenda insisted that the press itself was riddled by corruption and unethical practices that 
undermined its image. A key issue in this respect was that of the 'Beat Associations' which 
runs counter to the ethos of professionalism in which journalists operate more as "cartels and 
constantly pressured members of the public to render financial assistance and as well 
routinely gave bogus awards to 'deserving' members of the public who clearly were 
undeserving of such honours" (160). 
A notable feature of the Nigerian press is its commercial orientation, a feature associated with 
it right from the pre-colonial times. Oso (1991) notes that the commercialisation of the press 
was a major factor which shaped its early style and development. The commercialisation of 
the press, he explained, involved changes in the organisation of the press and the production 
of news. Whereas the early editors were also the proprietors and owners of their newspapers, 
and were primarily professionals as doctors, lawyers, engineers, then secondarily journalists, 
the new epoch reversed the order. Now the proprietor concerned himself with capital and 
policy while professional journalists took charge of daily production of the newspapers. 
While the proprietor-editor regarded themselves as politicians, or, more appropriately, as 
anti-colonial crusaders and their newspapers as political organs for the achievement of certain 
political goals, the professional journalists were more likely to see themselves as disinterested 
chroniclers of events (Oso, 1991: 47).  
Oso also observes, following Golding and Elliot (1979) that as professionals, journalists often 
draw on certain values, routines and ideologies “forged in the workshop of a commercial 
press serving historically particular needs and interests…News evolves then in response to a 
range of imperatives in its market situation which become incorporated in the working 
routines and beliefs involved in its production.” An aspect of this market situation, Oso points 
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out, was the demand for larger circulation and the need to satisfy a heterogeneous readership. 
To meet this commercial imperative, the press began to emphasise “objective and neutral 
products.” Quoting Golding and Elliot again, Oso noted that “the search for new and larger 
readerships drew the press away from strident factionalism and towards a more central band 
of opinion, in which a mix of apparent neutrality and detachment makes a paper attractive as 
much as influential.”  
Moreover, the move towards more professional journalism also involved a change in the style 
and presentation of news including the introduction of American style of sensational 
reporting, use of pictures, banner headlines, short sentences and paragraphs, which brought to 
an end “the ponderous political essays, long-winded and high sounding phraseology of the 
‘Black Victorian’ of Lagos.” According to Oso, the model of this “professional journalism” 
in terms of style and philosophy, including the values of ideology such as objectivity and 
neutrality, which informed its practice, was imported from the West. Commercialisation and 
professionalism led to the separation of journalism from direct partisan political involvement 
in order to reach a wider readership and increase circulation. This also engendered 
competition amongst the newspapers in the bid to gain a wider share of the market 
readership. 
The commercialisation of the Nigerian press however did not mean that it completely lost its 
partisan political character, for as Oso (1991) also observes, the separation of politics from 
journalism has remained incomplete in Nigeria. The ghost of the past still walks tall in 
Nigerian newsrooms. For him, although there are no more party owned newspapers, 
journalism is still often seen in terms of attainment of certain defined national goals – 
national unity and development. This, he argues, is contrary to the ideals of professionalism 
with its stress on neutrality, objectivity, disinterestedness and autonomy. Reconciling the 
demands of the two models creates a lot of tension and conflicts. As Golding and Elliot 
(1979:3) have pointed out, ‘the dual allegiance of (Nigerian) journalists to the attainment of 
professional and political goals has created conflicts whose resolutions in daily practice 
underpins much contemporary Nigerian journalism.   
Oso’s position outlined above, while credible, appears to conflate partisanship with politics 
since journalism anywhere, as the fourth estate, is not separate from politics but is at the heart 
of it. The analysis is however useful in drawing attention to the tension and conflict within 
Nigerian journalism and the fact that, as observed by Oyeleye (2004) the press has not 
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completely rid itself of the primordial and partisan character acquired in the early stages of its 
evolution. This conflict, moreover, is complicated, according to Oso, by the nature of the 
Nigerian society which impacts journalism practice, chiefly ethnicity which underpin the tone 
and orientation of national politics and which has resulted in the ethnicisation of the press. He 
further points out that geographical location, ownership and ethnicity are linked together in 
the experience of the Nigerian press.  
Commercialisation of the Nigerian press however brought with it other issues which have 
serious implications for journalistic practice. The often harsh economic operating 
environment, for instance, predispose the press to the phenomenon of “commercialisation of 
news” (Omenugha and Oji, 2008) both at the organisational and individual levels. At the 
organisational level, Oso (2000) has noted how the rise in production costs and dwindling 
circulation encourage media houses to engage in ethically questionable practices all in the 
effort to generate income. In some media organisations, reporters now also function as 
marketing and advertising officers. “For instance, those in charge of specialised pages or 
columns are made to source for adverts or supplements to support ‘their’ pages or the pages 
are dropped and probably with the reporter” (Oso, 2000: 30). Omenugha and Oji (2008) have 
also observed that such commercial imperative had led to sensationalism, and the peddling of 
half-truths in Nigerian newspapers. 
There is also the "brown envelope" syndrome, a situation where journalists demand or are 
offered gratification to publish or suppress a story (Olukotun, 2004). This problem, which has 
been associated with distress in the media industry and a reflection of the social malaise, is 
now a routine and prominent convention of Nigerian journalism and this could be critical in 
providing balanced reportage of conflicts. Owolabi (2004) also notes certain disturbing 
tendencies in the press, such as sensationalism and the “front-page syndrome” in which news 
items considered as most important are “boldly over dramatized on the front page to attract 
attention and patronage.” Such practices, he argues, are informed purely by commercial, 
rather than professional considerations and can distort reality, thus fuelling conflict. Owolabi 
also noted the prevalence of what he termed “cocktail journalism,” a practice whereby 
journalists only seek out opportunities of meeting politicians, personalities or elite, and 
partying. This issue is central to the issue of ethics in Nigerian journalism as well as on the 
matter of news sourcing. He argues that the fierce competition for readership and patronage 
by the Nigerian press plays into the hands of politicians, warlords and private citizens who 
manipulate them “to communicate a considerable amount of deception, lying and political 
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fabrications disguised as facts.” The Nigerian press also features a problem of weak 
infrastructure and poor working environment, in the form of very low and irregular 
remuneration within the industry, coupled with lack of professional training and inadequacy 
of equipment (NPC, 2012; Jose, 1975: 260). These directly impact upon professional ethics 
and media content, particularly in the reportage of contentious and divisive issues like ethnic 
and religious conflicts.  
This mixed characterisation painted above is evident in several studies that have been 
conducted on the Nigerian press. For example, Salawu (2009) explored how the media served 
as the catalyst of ethno-religious conflicts in Nigeria, in the reportage of the Miss World 
Beauty Pageant and the Danish cartoons-induced crises in Nigeria. The Miss World pageant-
induced crisis occurred in response to a newspaper article in This Day of November 16, 2002 
considered as cynical of Prophet Mohammed. The article had insinuated that the Prophet 
would have married one of the beauty queens that were to converge in Nigeria. The Danish 
Cartoon crisis, on the other hand, led to the killing of many Christians in northern Nigeria 
towns by Muslim fanatics who were protesting against allegedly blasphemous cartoons 
published about Prophet Mohammed in a Danish newspaper.
5
 This research was conducted 
against the background of the author’s assertion that the media, as a social institution, are also 
involved in conflicts in society, either as harbinger, channel of information and analysis of 
the conflicts, or as part of their escalation or resolution. Salawu (2009: 89) observed the 
catalytic power of the media in creating an atmosphere of conflict. “The media did not create 
the conflict, but rather provided the climate for the conflict to be triggered,” he argued. 
Aligning himself with scholarship on issues of media effects, Salawu notes that the mass 
media do not have the all-powerful effect in goading people into violence. He explained that 
the multi-step flow in which opinion leaders are very influential can explain how the violence 
came about. He however asserts that the media themselves get involved in this ethnic drama 
in the sense that Nigerian newspapers "narrate ...stories and comment on...conflict based on 
                                                          
5
 The Miss World riots were politically and religiously-motivated riots in Kaduna, Nigeria, in November 2002 
and claimed more than 200 lives (see The Guardian UK, 17 February 2003; Weston, 2002). The hosting of the 
beauty pageant proposed for 7 December 2002 in Abuja, Nigeria’s capital city, had acquired controversy 
primarily due to objections by some Nigerians on religious and moral grounds. The opposition was strident 
particularly in Muslim circles. The opposition also came within the context of the tensions and conflicts 
generated in the polity by the introduction of the Shari’a law in some northern Nigerian states. In the heat of the 
debates and contests over the hosting of the pageant, an article published in This Day newspaper seemed to 
provide the match stick to light the tinder box of frayed nerves.  
The Danish cartoon crisis is explained in detailed by Arsenault, Powers and Kirova (2006).  
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their own ethnic nature" (p.90). Quoting Uduak (2000) and Abati (2000), he observed that the 
ethnic identity of a Nigerian newspaper is determined by the location of its headquarters, the 
ethnic identity of its publishers and the main market it seeks to cultivate. In this regard, he 
asserted that the manner northern-based newspapers narrate and comment on religious riots is 
different from their southern counterparts. With respect to the Miss World Beauty Pageant 
riots, for instance, he noted that while southern newspapers were critical of the reactions of 
the northern Muslims to the This Day newspaper publication which apparently triggered the 
riots, their northern counterparts did not see much wrong in the action of the rioters and were 
rather only largely critical of what they considered to be “irresponsible and insensitive 
journalism” of the offending newspaper publication. This clearly demonstrates the regional 
and religious dichotomy of Nigerian newspapers earlier discussed in this review. 
Salawu cites a southern-based Yoruba news magazine, Alaroye, which he pointed out 
engaged in outright play-up of identity politics. In its story headlined “Mayhem in Kaduna,” 
the following statements were made: 
What this crisis brought to the fore is the difference between the Hausa and 
other tribes in Nigeria. The Hausa are greatly different from us; their conduct 
is not the same as ours...If such a statement angers the Yoruba, what they 
would do is to write a rejoinder, and explain issues to the writer...But the 
Hausa do not do this, in particular their leaders...The religion of this Hausa is 
different from that of the Yoruba (p.80). 
The author quoted further from the editorial opinion of the newspaper: 
We are opposed to the Hausa's crazy fight; we are opposed to their stupid 
conduct. We are equally opposed to the idea of perpetrating evil under the 
guise of Islam...If a Hausa person were to be in power, we know the Hausa 
would not start the Sharia system...there are many people in Hausa land who 
can slaughter their mothers because of politics...there are many Satanic 
children among them. 
Salawu (2009) observed that newspapers published in the north had a different view and 
justified the killings on what they regarded as the insensitivity of the offending newspaper. 
The northern newspaper columnists who did not toe this “hard line” were castigated by their 
fellow columnists. This was the case of a guest columnist in the New Nigerian who lambasted 
northern Muslim columnists “seized by the devil delusion of defending professional 
madness” which to him equates irresponsible journalism (p. 81). Salawu concludes that while 
objectivity as a hallmark of good journalism is relative, the media should be able to balance 
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the tension between primordial feelings and national cohesion; and between freedom and 
responsibility. 
What is evident from the narrative above is the fact that although the Nigerian press is 
vibrant, this vibrancy is also associated with severe derogations which impact significantly on 
professional and ethical practices. The historical development of the press predisposes it to 
ethnic affiliation and political partisanship. Furthermore, the commercial orientation of the 
press, which manifested early in its formation, promotes certain practices that are not only 
unethical but also outright unprofessional. It is necessary to examine and interrogate these 
gaps in ethics and professionalism, to identify their roots and possible remedies. This task is 
accomplished, in the main, in Chapter 6.  
Meanwhile, within the context of conflict reportage, it is also important to explore the debates 
and discourses surrounding the field of media and conflict, particularly the much contested 
issue of the relationship between the journalist and the conflict which he/she is covering. As 
Frère (2007: 5) observes, professional journalism, if it respects the rules of balanced 
information, can help defuse tensions that often arise because of misunderstanding and lack 
of information between players. One critical question, she argues, however stands out: in 
covering conflict, can or even must the journalist go further, by directing his or professional 
practice towards supporting peace initiatives, and if so, does such commitment imply that the 
journalist has renounced his or her role as a neutral and impartial informer? The next section 
of the review considers this issue through exploration of new paradigms in conflict reportage. 
The review focuses particular attention on the concept of peace journalism and conflict 
sensitive reporting.  
1.11  Exploring New Paradigms for Conflict Coverage 
The foregoing review of conflict coverage by the press confirms established knowledge in 
media research on news culture that media representations generally tend to glamorise war, 
violence and propaganda with negative consequences for the resolution of such conflicts. This 
has raised critical concerns about mainstream journalistic practice. Indeed, a main criticism of 
mainstream journalistic practice is its apparent inordinate preoccupation with war and 
violence and a relative lack of interest in processes of non-violent conflict resolution and 
reconciliation (Cottle, 2006:100). Starkey (2007) has observed the “institutional negativity” 
of the media in reporting events arising from the often compelling nature of “bad” news 
which he notes prioritize it over “good” news. Hyde-Clarke (2011: 43) notes the growing 
- 69 - 
 
belief that “the media have sometimes fanned the flames of discord by taking sides, 
reinforcing prejudices, muddling the facts and peddling half-truths.” Ogenga (2012) argues in 
a similar vein that mainstream journalism “has done more to escalate conflicts than to resolve 
them." For Galtung, (1993: xi), the media “amplify the sounds of guns rather than muting 
them.” He laments that not only do the media have a perverse fascination with war and 
violence; they also neglect the forces of peace at work. Galtung attributes the media’s 
inordinate preoccupation with power and violence to naturalized routines which makes 
journalists look “only upward in society, registering the sudden and the negative, not the 
patient, long-term work of thousands, millions of citizens” (Galtung, 1993: 5). Exploring this 
situation further, Galtung (2011) wonders whether "mainstream journalists are as afraid of 
peace as authors are of the human condition of happiness, tearing at it the moment it rears its 
smiling face? Or, even worse, they do not even recognise it when it is there?" 
In response to this criticism, there has emerged a journalistic genre which positions itself 
against established, traditional forms of journalism, challenging foundational news values, 
dominant agendas, privileged elite access and existing professional journalistic practices 
(Cottle, 2006; Lynch, 2005; Seaga, et al., 2011). Imbued with a normative agenda, these new 
genres seek to redress the perceived deficiencies of mainline news representations and better 
align journalism to projects of social responsibility, economic development, political 
participation and cultural democracy (Cottle, 2006). These "corrective journalisms," 
according to Cottle, (2006: 117) share a concern to move beyond traditional news values, 
routinised journalistic practices, elite source dependencies and institutionalised ideals of 
professionalism.  They all seek "to augment the range of views and voices, perspectives and 
problems, discourses and debates finding news representation” (Cottle, 2006: 117). Among 
these new forms of journalism are peace journalism, development journalism, public 
journalism, human rights journalism, alternative journalism on-line, amongst others (Cottle, 
2006; Galtung, 1993; Lynch and McGoldrick, 2005, Seaga, 2011). The epistemological and 
theoretical bases of these new forms of journalism, their conceptual grounds as well as their 
practical operational frameworks have been matters of sustained debate.  
The concept of peace journalism, which this study focuses on, was pioneered in the 1970s by 
Johan Galtung, Norwegian scholar and a founder of peace studies. It emerged as a criticism 
of the preference given by mainstream journalism to war, violence and propaganda, to causes 
promoted by elites and establishments, and to facile and polarized victory/defeat reality 
constructions (Shinar, 2009; Lynch and McGoldrick, 2005). According to Lee (2010: 361), 
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Galtung was critical of the “low road” taken by the news media in pursuing wars and the elite 
involved, and therefore called on journalists to re-route their reporting to a “high road” for 
peace where the news media no longer fixate on a win-lose outcome or simplify the 
disputants into two pugilists slugging it out in a sports arena. Conflict reporting, in Galtung’s 
conception, should be modeled on health journalism rather than sports journalism. The latter, 
he explains, is oriented to win-lose, zero-sum, victory-defeat discourse whereas health 
reporting entails not only reporting about a patient’s struggles with a disease, but also informs 
about the disease’s causes and cures as well as prevention. In this respect, he argues that good 
war or conflict reporting should focus on conflict transformation, “using war to find new 
ways to transform the conflict creatively so that opportunities take the upper hand” (Lee, 
2010: 362). 
In their seminal work, Peace Journalism, Lynch and McGoldrick (2005: 5) define peace 
journalism as “when editors and reporters make choices – of what stories to report and about 
how to report them – that create opportunities for society at large to consider and value non-
violent responses to conflict.” This concept seeks to transform the approach by which 
journalists depict their stories (Peleg, 2007). Elaborating on this definition, Youngblood 
(2012) views peace journalism as when editors and reporters make choices that improve the 
prospects for peace. These choices, he argues, also promote the development of societies 
recovering from conflict. In his words, “these choices – which stories to report, how they are 
reported (framed) and the words that are used – create an atmosphere conducive to peace and 
supportive of peace initiatives and peacemakers, without compromising the principles of 
good journalism” (p.19). 
Lynch (2006) locates peace journalism in critical realist theory about the reporting of 
conflicts. Quoting Wright (1996: 35), he argues that critical realism is  
a way of describing the process of ‘knowing’ that acknowledges the reality of 
the known, as something different from the knower (hence ‘realism’), while 
fully acknowledging that the only access we have to this reality lies along the 
spiraling path of appropriate dialogue or conversation between the knower and 
the thing known (hence ‘critical’). 
He explains that from a critical realist point of view, news is a representation of something 
other than itself – ‘report of the facts’, even though those facts are ready-mediated by the 
time the journalist – and readers/audiences – comes into contact with them. Because there are 
always more facts than can be accommodated in a report, the criteria on which gate-keeping 
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decisions informing the choice of what to include or exclude are made become salient. 
“Salience arises from the time-honoured expectations of journalism as a civic tool in 
democracy, providing a reliable account of what is really going on, to enable informed 
participation and consent, thus legitimising the exercise of political and other forms of 
authority in the public sphere” (p.36). 
In this respect, Lynch and McGoldrick (2005) explain that peace journalism uses the insights 
of conflict analysis and transformation to update the concepts of balance, fairness and 
accuracy in reporting. According to them, reports of conflict can be assessed for their 
accuracy against evidence gathered about conflict by researchers in the overlapping fields of 
conflict and peace research. “They are therefore bound to be an improvement on the 
generally unexamined criteria inscribed in journalistic conventions – conventions which 
incline reports of conflict towards dominant readings of war propaganda and a preponderance 
of war journalism” (ibid).  
Hackett (2007: 75) also observes that peace journalism draws upon the insights of conflict 
analysis to “look beyond the overt violence which is the stuff of news… and calls attention to 
the context, of attitudes, behaviour and contradiction, and the need to identify a range of 
stakeholders broader than the ‘two sides’ engaged in violent confrontation. In his words: 
If war journalism presents conflict as a tug-of-war between two parties in 
which one side’s gain is the other’s loss, peace journalism invites journalists to 
re-frame conflict as a cat’s cradle of relationships between various 
stakeholders. 
This manner of reporting requires journalists to distinguish between stated demands, and 
underlying needs and objectives and to identify and give attention to voices working for 
creative and non-violent solutions; to keep eyes open for ways of transforming and 
transcending the hardened lines of conflict. It further calls attention to expanding our 
understanding of conflict beyond the direct physical violence which is the focus of war 
journalism, to include the structural and cultural violence that may underlie conflict 
situations.  
Similarly, Peleg (2007) presents conflict theory as a major analytical and normative basis for 
peace journalism. Conceiving of the media as “third party, facilitator, mediator and 
arbitrator,” he espouses the view that it can effectively enhance the prospects of conflict 
transformation, resolution and reconciliation. Ogenga (2012: 1) explains that peace 
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journalism develops ways of reporting that support conflict de-escalation and that this 
distinguishes it from “the propagandistic reporting characteristic of war journalism, which 
justifies and legitimizes conflict.”   
Lee (2010: 376) traces the theoretical roots of peace journalism in normative theory “in that 
peace journalism prescribes, through an expression of judgment, what media ought to do and 
outlines the moral obligations of journalists to play a significant and meaningful role to 
promote peace in war and conflict”. He argued that peace journalism is also grounded in 
communitarian philosophy characterized by a commitment to civic participation, the 
understanding of social justice as a moral responsibility, and the notion that the worth of an 
individual is realized only in engagement in and through communities. This position aligns 
with that of Ogenga (2012) which holds that peace journalism is “socially responsible 
journalism.”  
Pursuing the argument of social responsibility, Kempf (2008) cites documents such as the 
UNESCO Media Declaration of 1978 which enjoins the media, not only to contribute to 
peace and international understanding, but also to oppose incitement to war, racism and 
human rights violations. The UNESCO declaration also requires the media to disseminate 
information which makes citizens of all nations more sensitive to the needs of others, to 
secure respect for the rights and dignity of all peoples as well as reduce international tensions 
and further peaceful and equitable settlement of disputes. The International Principles of 
Professional Ethics in Journalism adopted in 1983 calls on journalists to abstain from any 
justification for, or incitement to, wars of aggression and all other forms of violence, hatred 
or discrimination (see Irvan, 2006: 35). In light of this, Kempf insists that the aim of peace 
journalism is to avoid the functionalization of the media for propaganda purposes and to 
promote constructive conflict coverage that helps to implement journalistic quality norm – 
even against the interests of the ruling elite. The relevance of peace journalism therefore lies 
in “its contribution to the effective presentation of issues of global significance to media 
professionals and to the public…adoption of peace journalism can help delineate the potential 
global impact of conflicts, call public attention and opinion to such threats; indicate and 
hopefully satisfy demands for more balanced coverage; and stimulate alternative 
interpretations and critical reflection” (Shinar, 2009: 452). 
Galtung (2002) delineates peace journalism and war journalism as two competing frames in 
the reportage of war and conflict and produced a schema which identifies four characteristics 
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differentiating the two frames (see Appendix 1). From this schema, war journalism is said to 
be violence-oriented, propaganda-oriented, elite-oriented and victory-oriented. Peace 
journalism, on the other hand, is peace/conflict, truth, people and solutions-oriented.  
Expectedly, the concept of peace journalism is not without controversy and some media 
scholars and practitioners have raised serious issues with it, insisting that its ethos constitute 
an assault on the integrity and professional norms of journalism (Lyon, 2007; Hanitzsch, 
2007; Cottle, 2006). Journalism, in its classic norms, require from practitioners, truthfulness, 
fairness, objectivity, neutrality and detachment.  As a form of public communication with 
social expectations, journalism is different from public relations whose major driving force is 
“success,” measured in terms of achieving specific communication aims externally defined 
by a client or stakeholder (Hanitzsch, 2007). Objiofor (2010), considering these issues, posed 
these critical questions: can journalists operate as objective and independent observers and 
reporters and still promote peace journalism? Is it possible for journalists to be detached, 
emotionally and psychologically, when covering and reporting on conflicts?  How does the 
ethos of peace journalism enhance or undermine professional journalism practice? Should 
journalism play different roles in times of war and in times of peace? Critics of peace 
journalism would respond negatively to these posers.  
One of the critics of peace journalism is David Lyon, BBC foreign correspondent who 
canvasses the view that “the opposite of peace journalism is good journalism” (Lyon, 2007). 
He insists that the role of journalists is that of “observers not players.”  It is not the reporter’s 
duty to create peace-making politicians. To the contrary, a “new orthodoxy” tends more to 
narrow than expand the latitude for qualitatively high-value reportage. It can lead to role 
confusion and undermine both the professional integrity of journalists and journalism overall 
because it imposes a duty to achieve a societal effect - whereas their duty is to report all sides 
with professional scepticism. For Lyon, peace journalism is flawed because it incorrectly 
assumes that the world would be a better place if wars were reported differently. Pitching his 
tent with the cherished traditions of journalistic objectivity, he contends that it was important 
that both the reporter and the audience were reassured that “there is no other agenda than 
explaining what is going on.” The solution, Lyon insists, is to improve the employment of 
traditional methods in the effort to determine truth through objectivity, to strive for a 
maximally accurate, agenda-neutral reportage - not a peace journalistic “ethical check-list.” 
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Another critic, Thomas Hanitzsch, a communications scientist, characterizes peace 
journalism as “old wine in new wineskins” (Hanitzsch, 2007).  Although he admits that the 
concept itself is not bad, he however insists that it lacks an epistemological foundation while 
also exaggerating the influence of journalists and the media on political decision-making. 
Epistemologically, he accuses peace journalism of a naively positivist faith in untrammelled 
'truth'. Theoretically, he sees the model as an outdated conception of media effects as 
powerful and linear. Normatively, he says Peace journalism calls for "bad news" to be 
suppressed when it jeopardises peaceful outcomes, and for journalism to take on 
inappropriate advocacy, peacekeeping or campaigning tasks that are better left to political or 
civic actors.  
In reply to these criticisms, Lynch (2007) argues that Lyon’s position shows a lack of critical 
awareness of the structural peculiarities of conflict coverage. Peace journalism, he affirms, 
goes beyond accurate and comprehensive reportage of facts, in so far as it not only calls for a 
critical examination of sources, but also of the consequences of reportage. Contrary to Lyon’s 
representation, sources are not passive, and a journalist who quotes them does not merely 
disclose an already existing reality. To avoid becoming an unintentional accessory of the 
individual interests of the parties involved in conflicts, one must always be aware that sources 
are active, “trying to create a reality that does not yet exist.” In deciding which facts to 
publish therefore, Lynch recommends a critical realist approach to journalists.  
We do not have  to claim that journalism ‘reflects’ a logically prior reality … 
when covering conflicts, we can tread down to find solid ground beneath our 
feet, by studying and applying what is known and has been observed about 
conflict, drawing on the overlapping fields of conflict analysis and peace 
research. We can use this … to identify what is missing from what we are told 
by interested parties. 
From this perspective, Lynch argues that peace journalism makes possible a representation of 
conflict that is more accurate, richer in perspectives, more comprehensive, more critical and 
aware of its responsibility than what conventional war journalism offers.  
Cottle (2006), reflecting on the normative implications of peace journalism, believes that it 
has a herculean struggle if it is to successfully reconfigure established media conventions and 
repopulate it with different values, views and voices. This, he argues, is partly because in 
times of war, the media comes under very severe pressure from politicians and militaries to 
act as conduit for propaganda war. Much of the outcome in such situations depends on the 
degree of elite consensus on the issues at stake and the depth of war or peace culture within 
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the polity. The media, Cottle insists, cannot be wistfully insulated from the wider force field 
of politics and culture or the economic structures and logics that drive its performance. When 
analysing media reportage therefore, he points to the need to do so informed by the 
understanding of the wider socio-political and cultural contexts in which the media operates. 
For him, peace journalism’s normative critique and prescriptions are based on an “overly 
media-centric and insufficiently grounded view” (Cottle, 2006: 105) while its epistemological 
assumptions erroneously presume that “truth” is always self-evident. It further ignores the 
“progressive possibilities” of contemporary news media to contain opportunities for the 
discursive engagement of opposing views and the representation of different histories, 
identities and experiences.  
This position aligns with Hanitzsch’s (2007) view that peace journalism research fails to take 
due cognisance of the institutions and contexts of journalism, and therefore over blaming the 
latter for unnecessarily militarising popular consciousness and state policies. News values, 
according to Hanitzsch (2007), cannot take hold without a purchase in popular culture. In 
addressing the short comings of journalism, proper account therefore needs be taken of 
structural factors, including news routines, media organisations' need for reliable and credible 
flow of news, technology, budgets, relationships with advertisers and the legal framework.  
Valid as these arguments may sound, Lynch et al. (2011: 13) maintain that editors and 
reporters do possess critical agency and are not merely cogs in a machine not of their own 
making. "Structural constraints govern the content of news, but they do not altogether 
determine it," they insist, adding that "pressure from without and renewal from within are not 
mutually exclusive avenues...(and ) may indeed be necessary counterparts." Peleg (2007) also 
argues that peace journalism has enough of novel insights and daring propositions to 
challenge conventional journalism and defy some of its basic tenets.  Contrary to Hanitzsch’s 
(2007) claims, Peleg contends that peace journalism stems from a very clear epistemology, 
which aims at a more balanced and more comprehensive account of conflict, an account 
which conventional journalism, due to structural, psychological and habitual constraints, is 
unable to perform. Consequently, Peleg contends that peace journalism is worthy of being 
considered as a significant development in journalism research and study.  
Kempf (2008) seeks to balance and reconcile these arguments by distinguishing peace 
journalism from advocacy journalism. Kempt acknowledges that some supporters of peace 
journalism appear too inclined to underrate established journalistic values like objectivity, 
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neutrality and detachment and to lump peace journalism together with other names such as 
‘journalism of attachment,’ ‘victim journalism,’ ‘justice journalism’ and ‘engaged 
journalism.’ According to him, disregarding the tools of good journalism, and  understanding 
peace journalism as a form of advocacy journalism, “create a dangerous mix which is prone 
to abuse the noble goal of peace as a legitimation for biased coverage” (Kempf, 2008: 146), 
which amounts to peace propaganda.  For him, “peace propaganda is nothing other than 
propaganda … and a peace journalism that crosses the border to propaganda does not deserve 
to bear the name of journalism”. However, Kempf also emphasises the normative roles 
assigned to journalists in democratic societies.  He argues that journalism and the media do 
play essential role in the societal construction of reality and that can be fulfilled in different 
ways: “through the type of news coverage, they can give an impetus either to escalation or to 
the de-escalation of conflicts.” For him, there is no debate as to whether journalism is an 
active participant in the complex processes that make up a conflict.  “It already is and always 
will be,” he asserts. What peace journalism demands, he insists, is merely for journalism to 
assume responsibility for how it fulfils this role. 
According to Kempf and Jaeger (2005), taking responsibility will result in good journalism. 
This however presupposes specific conflict competencies, and whether journalists possess or 
acquire these competencies should not be left to chance. From this perspective, peace 
journalism can be viewed as the study of the conditions and possibilities under which 
journalists can actually perform their work better, even in war and crisis situations, and to 
provide the necessary competencies. “In order to produce good journalism, journalists need 
knowledge, competencies and qualifications that go beyond traditional journalistic training to 
enable them to counteract the escalation-prone misperceptions of reality…” (Kempf and 
Jaeger, 2005: 151). Acknowledging the social and psychological imperatives of audience 
reception, Kempf and Jaeger recommend that peace journalism should be conceived as a two-
step process. In the first step, during the hot phase of conflict, the focus should be on de-
escalation-oriented conflict coverage. This implies “objective, distanced and respectful 
reportage which is fair to all sides, does not further heat up the conflict, but rather takes a 
critical distance from war supporters of every stripe and makes the public aware of the 
potentially high price of violent solution to the conflict.  It would, in their opinion, be 
inappropriate to propose solutions at this phase, since there is a high risk that such reportage 
would be “unreflectively rejected as unreliable or as hostile propaganda” (p. 155). The 
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second phase, which follows the simmering down of conflict, is solution-oriented coverage 
which actively researches for peaceful alternatives and actors.  
At a practical level, Hyde-Clarke (2011: 53), citing Dente Ross et al. points out that power 
and profit directly influence media practices and routines and that the failure of peace 
journalism to reconcile itself to this reality is one of its major limitations. This concern, 
according to her, will continue to threaten the ability of the model to move from the class 
room to the news room unless there is a serious drive to train journalists and alter institutional 
norms. Hyde-Clarke further argues that peace journalism demands high investment of 
resources at a time media houses and organisations are generally downscaling staff and 
operations. She observes that ensuring that all parties are heard requires time and money. Not 
only are these in short supply, the “increasing juniorisation of the newsroom” involving 
pronounced use of young personnel straight out of tertiary institutions, means that the 
necessary skills, experience and knowledge base for more measured reporting may be 
lacking, thus creating the exact conditions which allow for conflict and ‘othering’ to flourish. 
The issue of necessary skills and experience and knowledge base for more measured 
reporting emphasised by Hyde-Clarke tallies with Kempf’s observation that to perform 
optimally in conflict reportage, journalists need to have certain specific conflict competencies 
which should not be presumed. 
For Africa, engulfed in conflicts and wars (Ogenga, 2012) these issues assume a flair and 
flavour that are pressing and urgent. According to Ogenga (2012), the non-western press may 
have the best chance to employ peace journalism, given its proximity to major conflicts. He 
even asserts that as long as western ideologies of mainstream journalism prevail, it will be 
difficult to realise peace journalism. Thus, for African scholars (Ogenga, 2012; Hyde-Clarke, 
2011; Nasanga, 2007; Onadipe and Lord, 2007), absorbing and living with the bitter realities 
of conflict and its toll on their beloved countries and continent, the question is not whether 
peace journalism is necessary, but rather ways to make it feasible. 
This section has examined the debates around the concept of peace journalism, which, 
according to its proponents, offers a more balanced perspective on war and conflict than that 
provided by mainstream journalism. It is a remedial strategy which attempts to supplement 
dominant news conventions to give peace a chance (Lynch, 2013). One of the main problems 
identified with peace journalism, however, is its apparent rejection of journalistic neutrality 
with a tendency to peace advocacy and peace propaganda. It further tends to overestimate the 
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impact of journalism on society while underplaying the role of other social actors in 
instigating or perpetuating conflict. Apart from the contest over principles, there is also the 
structural problem of implementing peace journalism as a daily newsroom routine. As Jude 
Collins (2013) argues, conflict is at the heart of media reporting, as it is at the heart of 
literature and it is needed to drive the story along. Peace journalism has not yet succeeded in 
offering alternative news values that can compel readership.  
Despite these shortcomings and limitations, I consider that peace journalism merits serious 
research and enquiry. Its emphasis on exploring backgrounds and contexts of conflict 
formation, giving voice to the views of all rival parties and paying attention to peace stories, 
are notable contributions to the task of conflict reporting. As Lynch (2013) points out, such 
skills and emphasis would help reporters ‘negotiate’ their readings of situations, open up 
multiple meanings, equip them to inspect propaganda and other self-serving representations.  
1.12  Peace Journalism or Conflict Sensitive Reporting? 
Another approach to reporting violent conflict, that bears striking resemblance to peace 
journalism, is Howard’s (2009) “conflict sensitive reporting” which he argues is necessary 
for conflict stressed societies. According to Howard, conflict sensitive reporting reflects a 
modernisation of the original values of the news media and is rooted in the belief that the 
media in many societies can be a powerful force to reduce causes of conflict and to enable 
them pursue better conflict resolution. In arguing for this new approach to conflict reportage, 
he identified two contrasting conceptual and ideological views points in the debate over the 
role of the press in conflict. The first view point affirms the traditional principle and 
neutrality of the media. This position, which is the predominant view of western journalists 
and professionals, insists on distance and disengagement in reportage of conflicts. For this 
persuasion, journalists in framing stories must not be overly preoccupied about the outcome 
of their reporting and thus alter their attempted truthful depiction of reality to further any 
outcome they might personally seek, such as peace. 
The other ideological view point on the reportage of violent conflicts is particularly 
associated with journalism in conflict-affected societies. As Howard (2009) points out, 
journalists in conflict-stressed countries are more acutely aware than their professional 
counterparts in democracies of the west that as journalists and citizens, their work may 
appear as insufficient, superficial and possibly even harmful. Marie-Soleil Frère (2007: 5) 
captures the perspectives of African journalists on conflict coverage most aptly: 
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We cover (conflict) simplistically, vividly, incessantly but we do not cover it 
with sophistication. We don’t cover causes, only consequences, and we don’t 
cover solutions. 
The main point in Howard’s analysis is that a routine and merely traditional mind set and 
approach to conflict, as practised by established mainline journalism, is inadequate in the 
conceptualisation of the relationship between modern conflict and the media. In his view, the 
need for new approaches to reporting violent conflict seem clear especially to journalists in 
the most conflict-stressed places. Howard notes that although the global environment of 
conflict is increasingly changing, much of media’s approach to reporting on conflict has not 
changed. Even in the training of journalists, he asserts, conflict is “a curious blind spot” 
which does not make specific room for skill development in conflict analysis and conflict 
reporting. Furthermore, traditional journalism skills development has not included study on 
how best to cover violent conflict, and has ignored any understanding of violent conflict as a 
social process. Consequently, the dynamics of violent conflict are not much understood by 
most journalists nor proficiently reported on. Although the environment of conflict has 
changed over time, many journalists are ill-equipped to address the issue which demands so 
much of their attention and is devastating their community and are therefore accused of being 
part of the problem. 
The Forum for Security (2014) sees conflict sensitivity as the practice of actively seeking to 
avoid potentially conflict-inducing language and framing by the press. This is to ensure that 
while the public is well informed on issues, reporting is not a precursor to, or even instigator 
of potential conflict. Howard however cautions against journalists taking on peace advocacy 
roles, no matter how well intentioned as such a practice would negate and put at risk, those 
“first principles that assure journalism any legitimacy among most citizens.” In this respect, 
he emphasises that it is the independence and the objectivity of the news media that confers 
on journalism its credibility and influence in informing people who must make the changes 
towards peaceful resolution of their conflicts. Therefore, rather than take on more roles, 
Howard argues that journalism in conflict-affected societies should instead “strengthen its 
original roles” as the source of credible news, a forum for public discourse and debate and a 
watch-dog. To accomplish such an objective of covering conflicts more effectively implies a 
greater degree of sophistication and understanding of the nature and process of conflict. He 
emphasises that rather than advocating what should happen, journalists should report “what 
can happen, including peace.” For him, there is the need to make reporting on conflict “more 
insightful, more comprehensive and thus more influential since being comprehensive 
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includes making clearer the possibility of resolving conflict rather than perpetrating it.” Such 
a pattern of conflict coverage Howard terms “conflict sensitive reporting.” Conflict sensitive 
reporting, he explains, reflects a modernisation of the original values of the news media and 
is rooted in the belief that news media in many societies can be a powerful force to reduce 
causes of conflict and to enable a conflict-stressed society to better pursue conflict resolution. 
The central concept of conflict sensitive reporting, according to Howard, is that violent 
conflict attracts intense news media attention that requires greater analytical depth and skills 
to report on without contributing to further violence or overlooking peace building 
opportunities. This is to be achieved through training journalists to better understand conflict 
and the media’s role in it, he argues. That way, journalists can strengthen their reporting to 
avoid stereotypes and narrow perspectives on the causes and process of conflict. Furthermore, 
the media can contribute to a wider dialogue among conflict parties and also explore and 
provide information about opportunities for resolution. At the baseline, however, Howard 
insists that the media must maintain its essential standards of accuracy, fairness and balance 
and responsible conduct. 
Conflict sensitive reporting essentially shares the concerns and objectives of peace journalism 
in the reportage of conflicts. They both stem from a critique of the approach and practices of 
mainstream journalism which predispose the press to negative reporting. They also make 
effort to explore the media’s potential in conflict resolution. This involves at least three clear 
values. The first value is normative, that is, a commitment by journalists to peace or at least 
an awareness of peace, rather than the traditional professional detachment and 
disengagement. This implies peace awareness, rather than peace advocacy. The second value 
is the acquisition of specific skills and competencies in conflict analysis and conflict 
reportage. That means that in addition to being good general practitioners, conflict reporters 
should have training beyond the traditional news gathering techniques and should 
demonstrate capacity in the dynamics of conflict. Thirdly, conflict reporting involves 
reporting responsibly, observing ethical and professional practices of the highest order. 
1.13  Conclusion 
 
This review has attempted to provide a conceptual platform on which to anchor this study 
dealing with the mediation of ethno-religious conflicts by the Nigerian press. In this 
endeavour, it explored three theoretical frameworks: these are ethnic conflicts, ethnicity and 
nation building in Africa; media and ethnic conflicts in Nigeria; and alternative approaches to 
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conflict coverage and conflict reportage. The first part enabled a survey of the socio-
economic and cultural terrain within which the Nigerian press operates, and how this 
impinges on its performance. The review demonstrated, not just the complexities associated 
with Nigeria’s multi-ethnic and highly religious configuration, but more significantly, the 
exploitation and manipulation of these primordial differences by the elite for self-serving 
ends. Driving this misappropriation of ethnic and religious sentiments, the review noted, is 
the political economy because political office guarantees access to state resources for the 
benefit of self and cronies. Prebendal politics and patrimonial rule, which are the hallmarks of 
public service in Nigeria, often push the struggle for public office into a zero-sum game, too 
tempting to ignore and too precious to lose. In the resulting do-or-die battles for office or 
relevance, ethnicity and religion become handy and effective tools for political mobilisation 
and for rallying communities against one another. This accounts largely for the numerous, 
pervasive and intractable conflicts plaguing the country and eroding its cohesiveness.  
The second part of the review takes a critical look at the mediation of these conflicts by the 
Nigerian press, reflecting particularly on the history of the press and how this has shaped its 
worldview and news culture. There is a viewpoint which stresses that the origins of the 
Nigerian press as an anti-colonial weapon has built into its news culture a tendency to 
regionalism, ethnicity, partisanship and a strident style which does not promote moderation or 
sober judgment in the reportage of highly sensitive issues like ethno-religious conflicts. 
Furthermore, it is argued that the commercial orientation of the press promotes practices 
which are not only unprofessional, but capable of exacerbating conflicts which plague the 
society.  
Against the backdrop of this reality, the review, in the third part, explored alternative 
approaches to conflict coverage and conflict reportage. It focused particular attention on the 
concept of peace journalism, an emerging genre of journalism which problematizes media 
narratives of conflicts, and canvasses what it believes to be more balanced coverage in order 
to stimulate alternative interpretations and critical reflection. The concept is concerned for 
journalism to move beyond traditional news values, routinised professional practices, elite 
source dependencies and institutionalised ideals of professionalism. It is also anxious to avoid 
the functionalization of the media for propaganda purposes and to promote constructive 
conflict coverage that helps implement journalistic quality norms. The review also examined 
the critiques of this model, particularly its media-centric tendencies, and the possibilities of it 
eroding cherished values of journalism such as objectivity, neutrality and distance.  It finally 
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explored briefly Howard’s conflict-sensitive reporting which is driven by normative 
expectations similar to those of peace journalism. This approach appears particularly relevant 
to conflict reportage in conflict-affected societies. 
Stemming from the debates and contentions about press reportage of conflicts in Nigeria, one 
of the issues that readily emerges, and which this research focuses on, is the need for a 
critical, systematic and detailed investigation of the role of the media in the ethno-religious 
conflicts of Nigeria. In undertaking this assignment, the research interrogates established 
media conventions and explores critically the relationship between conflict coverage and 
conflict escalation and/or perpetuation. In this respect, the study examines the contextual 
factors which impinge on professionalism and ethical behaviour by the press in the coverage 
of these conflicts. With particular respect to the emerging concepts and alternative strategies 
for conflict reportage, the research investigates the perspectives of Nigerian media 
practitioners and media academics on the principles of peace journalism and explores the 
applicability of its principles to the professional practice of journalism by the Nigerian press. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
METHODOLOGY AND RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
2.1  Introduction 
This chapter describes and justifies the methodological orientation and the design of the 
research and explores the epistemological and functional basis of the methods utilised in the 
study. The chapter first outlines the aim and the research objectives which underlie this study 
followed by a brief explication of the research context which informs my methodological 
orientation. Next I discuss the various research methods employed by the study and how I 
utilised them to corroborate data. The final section dwells on the ethical considerations 
underpinning the research as well as the limitations and health and safety issues associated 
with the enquiry. My methodological orientation combines quantitative and qualitative 
analysis, a strategy employed to enable extensive and rigorous exploration of data. 
2.2  Aim of the Study 
As stated in the Introduction, the overarching objective of this research is to explore the 
reportage of ethno-religious conflicts by the Nigerian press and to evaluate the implications 
of this for journalism practice within a democratic setting. In this endeavour, the study aims 
to critically analyse the mediation of ethno-religious conflicts by the press and to assess their 
potential for escalating or minimising such conflicts. Violent conflicts have been witnessed in 
virtually all parts of Nigeria since the transition from military to democratic rule in 1999. The 
conflicts have been prevalent in the northern parts, particularly north central Nigeria, an area 
in which large populations of ethnic minorities co-exist with people from other parts of the 
country. Scholars, such as Alubo (2011), Paden (2005) and Imobighe (2003) have expressed 
the view that ethno-religious conflicts pose a serious threat, both to Nigeria’s fledgling 
democratic experiment as well as to the realisation of the development objectives of the 
country. As an important social actor with the constitutional requirement to “hold 
government accountable to the electorate,” it is important to study the role of the media in 
covering these conflicts.  
To achieve this aim, the research is organised around exploring the overarching research 
question: How has the Nigerian press reported ethno-religious conflicts in the country and 
what are the implications of this for journalism practice in a democratic setting?  
Specifically, the study seeks to answer the following inter-related research questions: 
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1.1 How has the Nigerian press reported ethno-religious conflicts in the country and what 
pictures emerge from this coverage that might indicate tendencies to escalate or to 
minimise such conflicts? 
1.2 What media frames and representations of ethno-religious conflicts are discernible 
from the press in Nigeria and what insights could these provide into our understanding of 
such conflicts? 
2. What practical lessons could the peace journalism model offer the Nigerian press in 
conflict reporting and what are the perceptions of Nigerian journalists and journalism 
educators of this model? 
3. What trends are observable in journalism training and professionalism in Nigeria and 
what are the implications of these for conflict coverage and general news culture? 
4. What are the implications of the Freedom of Information Act for the practice of 
investigative journalism in Nigeria and in particular the reportage of ethno-religious 
conflicts? 
The objectives of this study are as follows: 
1. (a) To analyse the reportage of ethno-religious conflicts by the Nigerian press in terms 
of professional and normative values of the press and to explore the tendencies to 
escalate or minimise the conflicts.  
1. (b) To identify and evaluate the dominant media frames and representations of ethno-
religious conflicts in Nigeria. 
2. To explore the concept of peace journalism as an emerging tool in conflict reportage 
and examine its applicability to media practice in conflict reportage in Nigeria. 
3. To explore the inter-relationship between the professional and commercial 
environment of news production in Nigeria and how these bear upon the training of 
journalists and the resulting news culture. 
4. To investigate the regulatory environment of media practice in Nigeria and examine 
in particular the implications of the Freedom of Information Act for investigative 
journalism and the reportage of ethno-religious conflicts. 
2.3  Scope of Study 
The study is centred on violent ethnic and religious conflicts in Jos, the capital city of Plateau 
State, Nigeria. The focus on Jos, Plateau State, is informed both by the strategic location of 
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Jos City, as a centre of the Middle Belt and as a highly contested territory by protagonists in 
the conflicts (Best, 2007). The choice is also based on the intensity and frequency of ethno-
religious conflicts in the city since the end of military rule in 1999 and the wide coverage the 
conflicts have received by the Nigerian press. The time frame for this research, 2001 to 2011, 
is a ten-year period coinciding roughly with a little over the first decade of democratisation in 
Nigeria’s Fourth Republic. Specifically, it is the ten-year period from the first major episode 
of ethno-religious conflict in 2001 within this dispensation when Jos, described as “home of 
peace and tourism” erupted and has never been the same ever since (Best, 2007; Krause, 
2011). As Krause (2011) observes, tensions between ethnic groups rooted in allocation of 
resources, electoral competition, fears of religious domination and contested land rights 
amalgamated into an explosive mix. The research focuses on the coverage of selected 
incidents of violent conflicts by Nigerian newspapers within the period as outlined on Table 
2.1 below.  
2.4 Context  
The upsurge of ethnically-based conflicts in recent times, the complexities of such conflicts 
and their devastating impact, has provoked diverse discourses and enquiry into the role and 
mediation of the conflicts by the media (Allen and Seaton, 1999). This is particularly so in 
Africa, which in the recent past has witnessed a lot of wars, violence and political turmoil 
(Irobi, 2001). Parallel to this grim dynamic, however, has been the phenomenal growth of 
democratisation on the continent, and along with it, an upsurge in the growth of the mass 
media (Tettey, 2006). Therefore, the contributions of the media, in escalating or minimising 
these conflicts have been serious subjects of research and focus (Frere, 2007; Mbayo, 
Onwumechili and Musa, 2009; Mutere, 2006; Atkinson, 1999).  
 
The media, according to Manoff (2005: 15) constitute a major human resource “whose 
potential to help prevent and moderate social violence begs to be discussed, evaluated, and 
where appropriate, mobilised.” For Greenslade (2005, ix) reporting on war and violence is 
about the most important task for journalists, “the litmus test of journalism” which compels 
reporters and editors “to confront a host of ethical dilemmas and to question the nature of 
their occupation.”  Greenslade observes that war reporting raises critical questions about 
journalism such as: “how do they report fairly, accurately and compassionately? How do they 
place isolated events in an historical context? What efforts do they make to try to tell the 
truth? What is truth anyway?” These difficulties, he explains, are further complicated by “the 
fact that most modern wars are fought as much through the media as they are on the ground” 
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and the theatre of war now includes “newspaper offices as well as military headquarters, 
television stations as well as trenches.” 
It is within this broad framework of “media and conflicts” (Lynch and McGoldrick, 2005: 34) 
that my research is located. The specific focus of this research enquiry is Nigeria, Africa’s 
most populous nation which has been embroiled in ethnic and religious conflicts for quite 
some time. As noted earlier, the incidence of violent communal conflicts with ethnic and 
religious undertones has increased dramatically since Nigeria’s transition to democratic rule 
in 1999, a development with negative national and regional implications (Paden, 2005; Ikpe, 
2009).  
These conflicts pose critical questions on the depth, quality and direction of Nigeria’s 
democracy and its capacity to attain national socio-economic objectives. As Salawu (2010: 
345) has argued, the violent nature of ethno-religious conflicts which often take the form of 
riots, sabotage, guerrilla warfare and secessionist moves in Nigeria have implications for the 
political and economic development of the country which makes it an important issue for 
investigation. The situation also raises questions about the role of the media in these conflicts 
in terms of their potential for escalating or minimising the conflicts that warrant research 
attention. This is what this research sets out to investigate.  
2.5  Research Methods 
In order to implement the objectives of this research, the study has utilised a repertoire of 
quantitative and qualitative methods in generating and analysing data. These include: Content 
Analysis, Critical Discourse Analysis, Framing Analysis and Semi-Structured Interviews. In 
making these choices, I am influenced by the position of Bertrand and Hughes (2005:13) that 
there is no need for rigidity in the choice of methodology as between quantitative and 
qualitative methods in media research. According to them, “once you have decided what your 
question or hypothesis is, any method which is appropriate is acceptable.” Noting the 
growing inter-disciplinarity of media research, the authors argue that the critical theorist may 
utilise any method “provided the results of the research can be directed towards improving 
the social world” (215). The data generated through these methods will be converged through 
triangulation, which is the application and combination of multiple methods in the study of 
the same phenomenon (Teddlie and Tashakkori, 2003a: 7). 
The methodology adopted for the research not only features a diversity of methods, but also a 
mix of orientations in the sense that it combines both quantitative and qualitative analytical 
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tools in generating and analyzing data. Wisker (2007: 75) argues for combining both methods 
for maximizing the strengths of the quantitative and qualitative data while minimizing their 
weaknesses. The methods selected for this study signpost the need to gather a variety of data 
to address fully the objectives of the research.  
  
2.5.1 Quantitative Research using Content Analysis 
The first research question in this study is: “How has the Nigerian press reported ethno-
religious conflicts in the country and what pictures emerge from this coverage that might 
indicate tendencies to escalate or to minimise such conflicts?” This question seeks to 
understand the patterns of reportage as well as press practices and culture. To achieve this 
objective, it is necessary to have a global and holistic overview of press coverage, featuring 
the study of a number of newspapers and involving the analysis of substantial volume of data 
from the newspapers. Quantitative content analysis, which enables access to, and analysis of 
large volumes of textual material, is suitable for such task. The method is also suitable for 
generating and analyzing data with respect to the third research question which explores the 
viability of “peace journalism” as an alternative model for reportage of ethno-religious 
conflicts by the Nigerian press. Furthermore, frequency counts generated through quantitative 
analysis would be utilized for the second research question which probes for the frames and 
representation of ethno-religious conflicts discernible from the press.  
Content Analysis is an approach to the analysis of documents and texts that seeks to quantify 
content in terms of predetermined categories in a systematic and replicable manner (Bryan, 
2004; Berelson, 1952). It is a research technique for making replicable and valid inferences 
from texts to the context of their use (Krippendorff, 2012). It enables the compression of 
many words of text into fewer content categories based on explicit rules of coding (Stemler, 
2014). In Holsti’s (1969: 14) words, it is “any technique for making inferences by objectively 
and systematically identifying specified characteristics of messages.” This method is 
empirically grounded, exploratory in process and predictive or inferential in intent 
(Krippendorff, 2012). It enables a systematic reading of texts, images and symbols, though 
not necessarily from an author’s or user’s perspective. As a method specifically intended for 
the study of messages, content analysis is fundamental to mass communication research 
(Lomard, Synder-Duch and Bracken, 2006).  
This method has been widely used in media research and Krippendorff (2004, 2012) 
considers it as potentially one of the most significant techniques in the social sciences. It is 
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the analysis of texts in the context of their uses. Such analysis, Krippendorff contends, takes 
into consideration the fact that texts are not just abstract phenomena, but are created to be 
seen, read, interpreted and acted upon for their meanings. According to him, texts are 
considered to have implications for human communication, how people co-ordinate their 
lives, the commitments they make to each other and to the conceptions of society they aspire 
to, what they know and how they act. This contrasts sharply with natural science methods 
that rely on detached observations and objective measurement. Krippendorff (2012: 2) 
explains that although content analysis is not the only research method that takes meaning 
seriously, “it is a method that is both powerful and unobtrusive. It makes sense of what is 
mediated between people – textual matter…without perturbing or affecting those who handle 
that textual matter.” 
Krippendorff (2012) argues that unlike researchers who employ other empirical techniques, 
content analysts examine texts in order to understand what they mean to people, what they 
enable or prevent, and what the information conveyed to them does. This, he said, are 
questions for which natural scientists have no answers and for which their methods are 
generally insensitive. 
In its formative years, content analysts focused mainly on the “popular and simplistic” notion 
of content (Krippendorff, 2012: 4), that is, questions about “who says what, through which 
channels, to whom, and with what effects” (Lasswell, 1960). This notion viewed content, the 
what of communication, as an entity that authors think they enter into messages and ship to 
remote receivers, who remove it for what it is and henceforth share it among others. 
According to Krippendorff, this “bizarre notion leads to authors as authorities of what they 
put into messages and to the conception of content analysts as experts who provide objective 
accounts of what messages were intended to convey or actually contain.” Modern 
communication, Krippendorff insists, renders such “container metaphor” as useless and calls 
for a redefinition of content analysis, “one that aligns content with how contemporary society 
operates and understands itself through texts.” In this respect, he explained that contemporary 
content analysis has been constrained to develop a methodology of its own, one that enables 
researchers to plan, execute, communicate, reproduce and critically evaluate their analysis. 
This therefore goes beyond a mechanical task and requires “creativity and competence” and 
procedural logic justified through the use of socially acceptable criteria. 
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Riffe, Lacy and Fico (2014: 7) make a persuasive case for utilizing quantitative content 
analysis in communications research. For them, “the only way to logically assess 
communication content is through quantitative content analysis…only this information-
gathering technique enables us to illuminate patterns in communication content reliably and 
validly. And only through the reliable and valid illumination of such patterns can we hope to 
illuminate content causes or predict content effects.” For them, content analysis emphasises 
“direct and objective observation and measurement” which contrasts with reasoning, 
intuition, faith, ideology or conviction. Such a position amplifies age-old epistemological 
debates between idealism and empiricism, with quantitative content analysis assuming an 
empirical approach. This argument should however be moderated by the fact that even in 
quantitative analysis, elements of the qualitative emerge, prompting Krippendorff (2012: 22, 
28) to even question the validity and usefulness of the attempts to construct water-tight 
distinctions between quantitative and qualitative analysis. As observed by him, content 
analysis has moved on from its initial fixation on analysis of the physicality of text and is 
now engaged in examining how individuals use various texts in their respective worlds. This 
is based on the realisation that texts have no inherent, reader-independent qualities outside of 
the meanings readers bring to it. Scott (2001: 193) also argues that the content analyst must 
engage in an act of qualitative synthesis when attempting to summarise the overall meaning 
of the text and its impact on the reader. Graneheim and Lundman (2004: 105) further point 
out that even though at its initial stages, content analysis emphasised quantitative approach, 
over time it has expanded to also include interpretations of latent content. What all of this 
suggests is that there have been moves to reposition content analysis as not only quantitative, 
but also qualitative analysis. I am embracing this principle, as this increasingly blurred 
boundary between the quantitative and qualitative in content analysis will be noticed in my 
analysis in chapter three where I employ statistical inferences to analyse the patterns of press 
reportage of ethno-religious conflicts but also devote copious space to what might appear as 
qualitative descriptions.  
Krippendorff (1980) lists six questions which must be addressed in content analysis. They 
include: 
 Which data are to be analysed? 
 How are such data defined? 
 From what population are the data being drawn? 
 What is the context relative to which the data are analysed? 
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 What are the boundaries of the analysis? 
 What is the target of the inferences? 
The content analyst could count, among major elements, words or terms, themes, characters, 
paragraphs, items, concepts and semantics (Stemler, 2014) but generally research would 
involve a combination of several content analytical elements. In practical terms, doing 
quantitative content analysis generally involves drawing representative samples of content, 
training coders to use category rules developed to measure or reflect differences in content, 
and measuring reliability. The data collected are then analysed to describe typical patterns or 
characteristics or to identify important relationships among the content qualities examined 
(Riffe, Lacy and Fico, 2014).  As explained by Tim May (2001: 191-192), this endeavour 
comprises three stages: stating the research problem; retrieving the text and employing 
sampling methods; and, interpretation and analysis. The method considers the frequency with 
which certain words and phrases occur in the text as a means of identifying its characteristics. 
According to him, the quantitative analyst seeks to derive categories from the data so it can 
be compared. This involves transforming words or phrases in the document into numbers. 
The frequency with which a word or phrase appears in the text is assumed to measure its 
significance. This strategy is also assumed to enhance the reliability and validity of the 
classified data. 
2.5.1.1  Choice of Newspapers for the Research 
The choice of newspapers for this research was premised on several factors, not least the ease 
of access to textual matter covering a period of ten years. More fundamentally, newspapers in 
Nigeria are generally associated with much more critical and problematic content than the 
broadcast media. This is accounted for partly because until recently, radio and television were 
the exclusive monopoly of the state (Yusha’u, 2010) thus limiting their independence of 
scope and content. On the other hand, Nigerian newspapers not only have been mostly 
privately owned commercial concerns, but also had the historical legacy of championing the 
anti-colonialist struggle. The “protest motif” (Olukotun, 2004: 9) which developed from this 
legacy, associates Nigerian newspapers with vibrant and highly critical, even “anarchical” 
(Oluyokun, 2004) coverage of events, the publish-and-be damned tradition which this study 
seeks to problematize. With a reputation for vibrancy and fearlessness, newspapers provide 
rich sources for critical coverage and reportage of issues in the polity and are more trusted by 
the public to convey trustworthy information than the electronic media.  And even though the 
literacy rate in northern Nigeria (the general area my study covers) is relatively lower than 
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the southern parts, news and opinion carried by newspapers are influential amongst the elite 
who manipulate ethnic and religious sentiments for political gains (Ikpe, 2007). The growing 
use of the internet and mobile devices also implies that an increasing number of people have 
access to newspapers many of which now have on-line editions which can be accessed for 
free. All these informed the decision to choose newspapers as the media that would yield the 
most diverse and most critical textual data for this research.  
From a comprehensive compilation of newspapers currently published in Nigeria,
6
 I selected 
four national newspapers based on editorial, ownership and regional considerations for 
analysis. The four newspapers are: Daily Trust, Nigerian Tribune, The Guardian and This 
Day. The newspapers were selected on the following criteria: (a) all the newspapers are 
national in circulation and coverage; (b) all the newspapers were in active circulation 
throughout the ten-year period of the study; (c) two of the newspapers have regional biases 
coinciding with the north-south geo-political and religious divide of Nigeria: Daily Trust is 
northern-based and northern/Islamic biased; Nigerian Tribune is south-west based and is 
biased towards the south and the Christian view point; (d) The Guardian and This Day 
newspapers are based in Lagos, the economic power base of Nigeria, and are considered as 
among the top class national dailies reflecting a national outlook. The Guardian, particularly, 
is an influential newspaper with an intellectual appeal. Both The Guardian and This Day 
newspapers are also regarded as among the leading newspapers of record in Nigeria 
(Obijiofor, 2009: 187). 
The choice of the four newspapers is justified on the need to reflect all shades of opinion in 
the study for balance and fairness and to ensure that the data obtained from the newspapers 
truly represents the cream of Nigerian journalism. All four newspapers currently have online 
versions and three of them are listed among the ten most popular online newspapers in 
Nigeria based on Alexa, a web information company (AABNig: http://www.aabnigeria.com). 
                                                          
6
 Determining the number of newspapers in Nigeria is not an easy task. Though a generally vibrant industry, 
attrition rate of newspapers is high, in direct response to the vicissitudes of the harsh and unstable 
macroeconomic and regulatory environment. The late 1980s and early 1990s particularly witnessed a 
mushrooming of the newspaper and magazine industry. But by the close of that decade, many of the titles had 
died. Olukotun, (2004: 23) for example reports that over 32 newspaper publications collapsed between 1994 and 
1997, due in part to the harsh economics of production as well as political persecution of the private media by 
the military administration. 
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(See Appendix 6 for a comprehensive list of newspapers currently in circulation in Nigeria). 
The weekday and weekend editions of the newspapers were all included in the study and the 
names of the papers as used here refer generically to all the English language staples 
produced by each of the newspaper organisations. For example, Daily Trust includes the 
daily edition of the newspaper and weekend editions called Weekly Trust (published on 
Saturdays) and Sunday Trust. 
 
2.5.1.2    Pilot Study 
Krippendorff (2012) has advised on the need to trial smaller samples of content analysis 
method before embarking on a large scale project. In this respect, I undertook a pilot study of 
two of the national newspapers identified above in the form of quantitative content analysis 
of the coverage of the incident of ethno-religious conflicts in September 2001. The analysis 
covered a period of 30 days, one week before the incident, and three weeks after the riots, 
that is, September 1-30, 2001. The newspapers content analysed in the pilot study are Daily 
Trust and Nigerian Tribune. The former is published in Abuja and has a northern orientation 
while the Nigerian Tribune is published in Ibadan, southern Nigeria, and has a southern 
editorial orientation. 
Flowing from my research questions, I prepared a prior coding frame outlining the themes 
and issues involved in the research. The coding frame was divided into five major sections: 
the Initial section (Story ID); Part 1: Preliminary Information; Part 2: General Coverage; Part 
3: Media Frames and Part 4: Peace Journalism Criteria. The Story ID created a unique and 
exclusive identity for each coded item to enable easy identification and measurement. I also 
captured the key words in the headline for use later in qualitative analysis.  
 
Part 1 (Preliminary Information) sought to capture the following facts: incident of the conflict 
being reported; story type; by-line or identity of the writer, if indicated; regional identity of 
the reporter/writer; gender of the reporter/writer. Part 2 (General Coverage) coded elements 
of each story in terms of: Prominence, source of story, balance in the story, back 
grounding/contextualizing, language and tone. Part 3 (Media Frames) categorised stories 
based on the dominant emphasis expressed as the cause(s)/solution(s) of ethno-religious 
conflicts. Part 4 coded stories on the Peace Journalism Criteria. 
 
My first task was to source editions of the two newspapers published for the 10-year period, 
September 2001- August 2011. In view of the fact that there were not yet reliable and 
consistent online databases of past editions of all Nigerian newspapers, I had to source for, 
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and utilise print editions for the research. My first journey in the search for the newspapers 
was to the National Library of Nigeria, Jos branch. I however discovered that the library was 
undergoing major renovation and was therefore not open for public use at the time I visited. I 
therefore proceeded to the University of Jos Library. Here, I obtained some of the copies of 
the newspapers.  
I however encountered some challenges, the first of which was that the Documents and 
Archival section of the University of Jos Library, where back editions of newspapers are 
stored, is located at the satellite campus of the University to which electricity power had been 
disconnected for a long period due to what desk staff described as “certain technical reasons.” 
The library therefore had no supply of electricity and users had to utilise the natural light of 
day supplemented by personal lightening devises allowed into the library. Another challenge 
was that of access to reliable photocopying facilities with which to make copies of relevant 
pages of the newspapers. As the University Library had no photocopying facilities at that 
branch, I had to rely on street side vendors, making the work much more tedious, slower and 
expensive.  
The experience at the university library prepared me for the task of sourcing manually the 
editions of all the newspapers required for the full study. Because most of the newspaper 
editions for the period of study were not available in the University of Jos Library, however, I 
had to utilise other libraries, primarily the National Library in Garki, Abuja and the Library 
services of the National Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies, Kuru, Jos. I also paid a visit 
to the National Library, Iganmu, Lagos, and the Lagos State Library at Western Avenue, 
Lagos. Despite these trips, there were still critical gaps which necessitated my visit to the 
head offices of some of the newspapers in Abuja to obtain the editions I could not lay hands 
on from any of the library archives. This was the case particularly with Daily Trust and This 
Day newspapers. At the Daily Trust head office, I was graciously granted access to their 
library and permitted to take out relevant editions to photocopy. The trip to This Day 
involved searching through piles of newspaper editions in store rooms. As the editions were 
held together by strings on monthly basis, I therefore had to first search through relevant 
bundles, untie the strings, photocopy relevant pages, and then re-assemble and tie back the 
bundles. Needless to say, these were tedious, though absolutely necessary, tasks in the 
process of securing complete data.  
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I should note here the almost completely analogue state of the National Library of Nigeria 
with respect to handling of newspapers, leading to the possibility, as my experience shows, 
that valuable information which should be stored for posterity could easily be lost, thus 
creating gaps in knowledge.  
2.5.1.3  Coding Protocol 
The pilot study was useful in helping to refine my coding protocol. For example, I reduced 
the analysis period from 30 days to 21 days as a result of the pilot study because I discovered 
that I had enough information for the analysis within that time frame and there was no need 
to produce a data set that could become unwieldy. Also, I initially did not code for back page 
of the newspapers in my pilot study on assumption that the back cover would be devoted 
exclusively to sports stories. However, I discovered during my pilot study that Nigerian 
newspapers utilise the back page both for sports and important stories and opinion 
pieces/columns. 
This study covered a 10-year period, 2001-2011. Five major episodes of ethno-religious 
conflicts were selected as case studies for the research as indicated on Table 2.1. For each 
conflict episode, the analysis covered a three week period. Also as earlier detailed, the 
newspapers were manually accessed through the National Library of Nigeria in Abuja and 
Lagos, supplemented by visits to the University of Jos Library and that of the National 
Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies, Kuru, Jos. The researcher also visited the head 
office of Daily Trust in Abuja and the Abuja office of This Day newspaper to access copies 
not found in any of the libraries.  
Coding of all items on the conflict episodes was conducted for all the issues of the four 
newspapers published within the crisis periods as follows: 
 September 2001 Episode: September 1-21, 2001 
 November 2008 episode: November 22- Dec 12,2008 
 January/March 2010 Episode: January 12-31 and March 02-21,2010 
 December 2010 Episode: Dec 20,2010-Jan 11,2011 
 August 2011 Episode: August 23-Sept 15,2011 
The details are reflected in Table 2.1 below.  
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A total of 617 items were coded and analysed from the four newspapers as follows: 
Daily Trust   197 items 
Nigerian Tribune   150 items 
The Guardian   136 items 
This Day    134 items 
Table 2.1: Incidents of Ethno-Religious Conflicts 
 
Incidents of Ethno-Religious Conflicts 
Incident Description 
Date of 
commencement 
Analysis period 
September 2001 
Ethno-religious 
conflicts in Jos and 
Bukuru Metropolis 
September 07 2001 September 1-21 2001 
November 2008 
Jos North Local 
Government 
elections violence 
November 28 2008 
November 22- December 
12 2008 
January/March 2010 
Incidents of ethno-
religious conflicts in 
Jos North and Maza 
village of Jos South 
January17 2010 and 
March 07 2010 
January 12-31 2010 and 
March 02-21 2010 
Christmas Eve 2010 
Incidents of bomb 
blasts in Jos city 
December 24 2010 
December 18-January 11, 
2011 
Eid-el Fitr (Sallah) 
2011 
Incidents of ethno-
religious conflicts in 
Jos and Bukuru 
metropolis 
August 29 2011 
August 23-September 15 
2011 
 
In line with Lee (2010: 368), the unit of analysis is the individual story, a definition that 
includes “hard news stories, features and opinion pieces.” Coding was undertaken solely by 
the researcher and there was therefore no inter-coder reliability test required. Each item was 
carefully coded in line with the prepared coding schedule and read critically to identify the 
various themes represented on the schedule.  
2.5.2  Qualitative Research using Framing Analysis and Critical Discourse Analysis 
One of the features of this research, as highlighted earlier, is that it utilises a mix of 
quantitative and qualitative methods in data gathering and analysis. It is well recognised that 
using a combination of quantitative and qualitative data can improve an evaluation by 
ensuring that the limitations of one type of data are balanced by the strengths of another. 
Whereas in quantitative content analysis, mathematical and statistical figures can describe the 
nature of content, this method is limited in terms of the deeper exploration of the latent 
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content of textual matter, but which might be equally important in understanding and 
contextualising meaning. Thus, engaging the more interpretive and qualitative methods 
would illuminate aspects of research not covered by quantitative analysis. 
McQuail (2005) notes that quantitative content analysis has significant draw backs, 
particularly as concealed or latent meanings of text are not always visible in the numeric data 
generated by quantitative analysis. For May (2001: 192), the method considers product and 
says little of process since “it deals mainly with what has been produced, not with the 
decisions which informed its production which tell us so much about its received and 
intended meanings.” This, he argues, raises an empiricist problem because it deals only with 
information that can be measured and standardised or simplified into categories. In this 
preoccupation, it reproduces meanings used by authors in the first instance, as opposed to 
subjecting them to critical analysis in terms of the political, social and economic context of 
their production. Also, it might tend to ignore or underplay audience agency in their capacity 
for interpreting messages differently from the analyst. This could then become a “crude 
stimulus-response model of human behaviour – that is, what people read is what they think” 
(p.192). Significantly, May points out that the frequency with which words or phrases occur 
in a text (a quantitative emphasis) may say nothing about their “significance” within the 
document ( a qualitative emphasis). And as Scott (1990: 32) aptly points out, it may be that a 
single striking word or phrase conveys a meaning out of all proportion to its frequency and a 
non-quantitative approach would be better able to grasp the significance of such isolated 
references. Therefore interpretive approaches utilising qualitative methods are now employed 
alongside quantitative content analysis to deepen analysis and obtain best results from a 
research enquiry (McQuail, 2005; May, 2001).  
It is important to note, following Denzin and Lincoln (2011) that qualitative research, as a 
field of inquiry, crosscuts disciplines, fields and subject matter and is surrounded by a 
complex, interconnected family of terms, concepts and assumptions. Some of the concepts, 
according to them, include traditions associated with foundationalism, positivism, post 
foundationalism, post-positivism, post-culturalism, post-modernism, post-humanism and the 
many qualitative research perspectives and methods connected to cultural and interpretive 
studies. Denzin and Lincoln list some of the methods that fall under the category of 
qualitative research to include case study, politics and ethics, participatory inquiry, 
interviewing, participant observation, visual methods and interpretive analysis.  
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Denzin and Lincoln (2011) further point out that as a set of interpretive activities, qualitative 
research privileges no single methodological practice over another. In this regard, they point 
out that it is not only difficult to define precisely, but it also has no theory or paradigm that is 
distinctly its own. “Multiple theoretical paradigms claim use of qualitative research methods 
and strategies, from constructivism to cultural studies, feminism, Marxism, and ethnic models 
of study. Nor does qualitative research have a distinct set of methods or practices exclusively 
its own. Researchers in this field use semiotics, narrative, content, discourse, archival and 
phonemic analysis – even statistics, tables, graphs and numbers.”  
Seale (1999: 465) agrees with this position in addressing and explicating the debate regarding 
which philosophical foundation is most appropriate to qualitative research. According to him, 
any method of social enquiry is a useful tool for research as long as there is clear cut 
explanation and procedure that can withstand the demands of scientific investigation. In 
Seale’s opinion, research is a “craft skill” used by researchers in carrying out investigations. 
This skill, he emphasises, should be autonomous from the need to resolve philosophical 
disputes and can be acquired from exposure to almost any intelligent methodological 
discussion, whether from positivists, constructivists or postmodern paradigms, as well as 
from careful consideration of research studies done by others. Therefore, while not unmindful 
of philosophical foundations, Seale believes social science researchers should work 
independently without being bogged down by “distractions.” The argument above informed 
my decision to adopt a mixed methodological framework in which I utilised both quantitative 
and qualitative analysis, a strategy which enabled me to explore data extensively and 
rigorously. 
In view of its flexibility and multiple uses, qualitative research is growing in popularity 
amongst social scientists as it gives opportunity for the researcher to be a participant in data 
gathering and to use the process of social interaction in enriching data (Yusha’u, 2009: 104). 
This discussion gives a clear background to the qualitative methods I have utilised in my 
research, including Framing Analysis, Critical Discourse Analysis and Semi-Structured 
Interviews. 
2.5.2.1    Framing Analysis 
It is recognised that the manner in which the media frame news events is an important 
variable in the perception of such events by the public (Entman, 1991, 1993). According to 
Lee (2010: 364), framing is a process of organizing a news story, thematically, stylistically, 
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and factually to convey a specific storyline. For McCombs (2004) a frame is the central 
organizing idea for news content that supplies a context and suggests what the main point is 
through the use of selection, emphasis, exclusion and elaboration.  In Entman’s famous 
words: 
 
To frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more 
salient in a communication text, in such a way as to promote a particular 
problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation and/or treatment 
recommendation for the item described (Entman, 1993:52) 
 
In other words, it is “the selection of – and emphasis upon – particular attributes for the 
media’s agenda” (McCombs, 2004). How an event is framed by the news media depends on 
what is included or excluded in the communication text and what is highlighted, hidden or 
suppressed in the text (Obijiofor, 2010). The essence of framing, according to Entman 
(1991), is sizing – magnifying or shrinking elements of the depicted reality to make them 
more or less salient. As characteristics of the news text, frames reside in the specific 
properties of the news narrative that encourage those perceiving and thinking about events to 
develop particular understanding of them. This relates in particular to the keywords, 
metaphors, concepts, symbols and visual images emphasized in a news narrative. The essence 
of framing however is sizing: “magnifying or shrinking elements of the depicted reality to 
make them more or less salient” (Entman, 1991: 8-9). The most critical sizing choices 
involve the overall salience of the event, which determine how much material on the event is 
available and how prominently it is displayed. According to Entman, the frame of a news 
portrait can be enlarged so that media reports may penetrate the consciousness of a mass 
public or it can be shrunk to miniaturize an event, diminishing the amount, prominence and 
duration of coverage, and thus mass awareness. In this way, the frame contributes to 
determining the political importance of a news event. 
Entman (1991) further argues that news frames exist at two levels: as mentally stored 
principles for information processing and as characteristics of the news text. As news 
characteristics, frames are constructed from and embodied in keywords, metaphors, concepts, 
symbols and visual images emphasized in a news narrative. Such frames can be detected by 
probing for particular words and visual images that consistently appear in a narrative and 
convey thematically consonant meanings across media and time. In Entman’s words, “by 
providing, repeating, and thereby reinforcing words and visual images that reference some 
ideas but not others, frames work to make some ideas more salient in the text, others less so – 
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and others entirely invisible…through repetition, placement and reinforcing associations with 
each other, the words and images that comprise the frame render one basic interpretation 
more readily discernible, comprehensible and memorable than others.”  
My research attempts to find out the framing of ethno-religious conflicts by the Nigerian 
press in order to understand the perspectives that are highlighted or emphasized and those 
that are suppressed or underplayed and how these contribute to, or detract from, a logical 
understanding of the conflicts and thus their resolution. In approaching framing analysis, 
Reese (2014) believes that an interpretive, qualitative approach, rather than quantitative 
codification, gives greater emphasis to political content of news and how they draw upon a 
shared store of social meanings. This informs the approach adopted by this study, which is 
qualitative rather than quantitative.  
Framing analysis was operationalized mainly through the examination of the sources and the 
styles of reporting of the conflict in the press. In constructing the categories for the frame 
analysis, the research adapted the framing scheme used by Kothari (2010) in which categories 
were identified to deconstruct each story, particularly the focus of the story, background 
information provided by the story and the discussion of the underlying problems and 
solutions proposed. Based on scholarship and previous studies on ethnic and religious 
conflicts in Nigeria (Imobighe, 2003; Ikpe, 2007; Alemika, 2002; Egwu, 2004), the stories 
were categorized on the basis of what each emphasized as the cause(s)/solution(s) of ethno-
religious conflicts. 
Using the story as the unit of analysis, six frames were identified as follows: a story which 
attributes the conflict to rivalry between ethnic groups was treated as “ethnic conflict”; a 
story which sees the conflict as war or struggle between Christians and Muslims or as 
manifestation of Islamic fundamentalism or Jihad was treated as “religious conflict”. Where a 
story attributes the conflict to poverty, illiteracy, struggle over land or economic resources, 
the story was constructed as “socio-economic conflict.” If the focus of the story is on intra or 
inter-party political rivalry or political struggle for offices or advantage, it was classified as 
“politics/political manipulation” frame. A story attributing the conflict to break down of law 
and order, criminality, impunity, failure of security or failure or inability by government to 
protect lives and property was framed as “security/law and order.” Finally, a story which 
interprets the conflicts as essentially the citizenship question in Nigeria was framed as 
“citizenship question.”  
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The four newspapers identified in the discussions of quantitative analysis were used for the 
framing analysis and also covered the 10-year period of the study. The unit of analysis is the 
story whether news, feature or opinion (Lee, 2010).  Coding was conducted solely by the 
researcher and frequency tables were obtained to determine the dominant frame in each story. 
To accomplish this objective, I utilized the values on frames obtained from the quantitative 
categories as basis for discussions and evaluation of the framing practices of Nigerian 
newspapers in reportage of ethno-religious conflicts.  
2.5.2.2 Critical Discourse Analysis 
Critical discourse analysis (CDA) is a theory and a method of analysing the way that 
individuals and institutions use language (Richardson, 2007:1). It emphasizes the use of 
language as a social practice (Fairclough and Wodak, 1997). Critical discourse analysts note 
that language is not used in a vacuum or in isolation but is grounded within a complex frame 
of social and cultural practices. In linking linguistic analysis with social analysis, CDA 
considers language beyond the sentence and attempts to unwrap ideological and other 
meanings hidden in texts but which have implications for power, dominance and 
relationships within the polity.  
The term “discourse” admits of several meanings, some even contradictory and mutually 
exclusive (Titscher, et.al, 2000: 24). In an abstract sense, it is conceived of as a category 
which describes the vast array of meaning-making resources available to people (Fairclough, 
et. al 2011: 357). In this sense, it may be labelled by an alternative term, “semiosis” having to 
do with words, pictures, symbols, design etc. This distinguishes it from the other common 
sense of ‘discourse’ as a category for identifying particular ways of representing some aspect 
of social life. Within CDA however, discourse is generally viewed as language in use in 
speech and writing and emphasizes the idea of discourse as constitutive of reality 
(Fairclough, 2011: 26-27). Discourse, in this sense, considers ‘language above the sentence’ 
to its active functions and particularly to the relationship between language and power. CDA 
is therefore a strand of discourse analysis focused on the critique of ideology and power, and 
the analysis of the manifestation and reproduction of social and political inequalities (Aliyu 
and Ferguson, 2015: 9).  
 
According to Wodak (1996: 15), describing discourse as a social practice implies a dialectical 
relationship between a particular discursive event and situations, institutions and structures 
which frame it: the discursive event is shaped by them, but it also shapes them. For her, 
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discourse is socially constituted, as well as socially conditioned – it constitutes situations, 
objects of knowledge, and the social identities of and relationships between people and 
groups of people. It is constitutive both in the sense that it helps sustain and reproduce the 
social status-quo, and in the sense that it contributes to transforming it. Wodak goes on to 
argue that because discourse is so socially consequential, it gives rise to important issues of 
power. For her, discursive practices have major ideological effects since “they can help 
produce and reproduce unequal power relations in the manner they represent things and 
position people” (Wodak, 1996: 15). 
In conceptualizing language as a form of social practice, CDA attempts to make people aware 
of the reciprocal influences of language and social structure of which they may not normally 
be aware (Fairclough, 1993). It contends that the power of language is dependent on the use 
to which it is put and therefore should be critically studied (Wodak, 2001). In this respect, 
CDA is “politically involved research with an emancipatory requirement: it seeks to have an 
effect on social practice and social relationships, for example in teacher development, in the 
elaboration of guidelines for non-sexist language use or in the proposals to increase the 
intelligibility of news and legal texts” (Titscher, et. al, 2000: 247).  
Fairclough (2010) emphasizes this view when he explains that the broad objective of CDA is 
to develop ways of analysing language which address its involvement in the workings of 
contemporary capitalist society. For him, CDA is concerned with the investigation of the 
tension between two assumptions about language use: that language is both socially 
constitutive and socially determined. He identifies two ways in which language is socially 
constitutive – conventional and creative ways. In the conventional sense, language 
reproduces existing identities, relationships and knowledge forms. Creativity implies the 
opposite, in that it is through language that social change takes place. Thus, language use can 
be both reproductive and transforming, depending on the prevailing circumstances (Titscher, 
et.al 2000). With respect to language being socially determined, the focus here is on the 
“orders of discourse,” that is the totality of discourse types and the relationships between 
them in a particular social domain.  
In sum, CDA can be considered as the analysis of relationships between concrete language 
use and the wider social and cultural structures. It is particularly concerned with social 
problems and the effects of power relations and inequalities in producing social wrongs 
(Fairclough, 2010: 8). As an interdisciplinary method, CDA is interpretative and explanatory. 
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It aims to produce interpretations and explanations of areas of social life which both identify 
causes of social wrongs and produce knowledge which could contribute to righting or 
mitigating them (Fairclough, 2010). It thus emphasises a systematic methodology and a 
relationship between the text and its social conditions, ideologies and power relations 
(Titscher, 2006: 146). 
Fairclough (2010) has identified three properties of CDA. According to him, CDA is 
relational, dialectical and transdisciplinary. In his view, it is relational in so far as its primary 
focus is not on individuals but on social relations which are complex and layered. Discourse 
brings to the complexity of social life “meaning and making meaning” (ibid, 3). Fairclough 
also points out that the relationship between discourse and the complex social relations it 
engages with is dialectical. Dialectical relations, he explains, are relations between objects 
which are different from one another but not discrete or unconnected. Thus the different 
elements or “moments” in the social process cannot be analysed in isolation but in terms of 
their dialectical or inseparable relationships. In this respect, CDA is not analysis of discourse 
in itself but analysis of dialectical relations between discourse and other objects as well as the 
analysis of the “internal relations” of discourse. And in so far as the analyses of such relations 
cut across conventional boundaries between disciplines, CDA is therefore transdisciplinary 
and its approach is that of critical realism whose central concern is the socially constructive 
effects of discourse. 
CDA has its origins in critical linguistics of the 1970s when authors such as Fowler, Hodge, 
Krees and Trew attempted to show that language was used as an instrument of ideology 
(Machin and Mayr, 2012). In doing this, texts were studied for the ways they categorized 
people, events, places and actions to demonstrate that language was part of the way people 
seek to promote and naturalize particular views of the world. CDA has built upon this by 
developing methods and theories that could better capture the inter relationship between 
language, power and ideology and is distinguished by its open commitment to political 
intervention and social change.  
CDA’s focus on social problems, particularly its role in the production and reproduction of 
power, abuse or domination, has been a subject of academic enquiry (Van Dijk, 2001; 
Horvath, 2012; Fairclough, 2010). For Horvath (2012) the relatedness of the complex 
mechanism of discursive practice and their social function is often deliberately left opaque, 
especially when the need occurs to create and maintain differences in power relations. CDA 
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seeks to create a framework for decreasing such opacity. This agrees with Fairclough (2010) 
who conceives of CDA as discourse analysis which aims to systematically explore often 
opaque relationships of causality and determination between discursive practice, events and 
texts, and wider social and cultural structures, relations and processes. It investigates how 
such practices, events and texts arise out of and are ideologically shaped by relations of 
power and struggles over power; and it explores how the opacity of these relationships 
between discourse and society is itself a factor securing power and hegemony. 
Roger Fowler (1991: 9), while examining the critical role of language in mediating reality, 
focuses particular attention on the news media. Newspaper coverage of events, he notes, is 
usually presented as the unbiased recording of “hard facts.” Fowler however challenges this 
perception, arguing that news is a practice, a product of the social and political world on 
which it reports. Fowler identifies three characteristics of news reports which are of particular 
significance to my research. The first characteristic is that news is socially constructed; the 
events reported are not necessarily a reflection of their intrinsic importance but reveal the 
operation of a complex and artificial set of selection criteria. The second characteristic is that 
news is a practice, a discourse which, far from neutrally reflecting social reality and empirical 
facts, intervenes through the social construction of reality. Lastly, news is a representation of 
the world in language. Because language is a semiotic code, it imposes a structure of values, 
social and economic in origin, on whatever is represented. Therefore, news, like every 
discourse, constructively patterns that of which it speaks. It is therefore clear that news is not 
a value-free reflection of ‘facts.’ 
In explaining the social construction of news, Fowler (1991: 10) argues that news is always 
reported from a particular angle. According to him, “because the institutions of news 
reporting and presentation are socially, economically and politically situated, all news is 
always reported from some particular angle.” This claim, he notes, is not limited to news as it 
can be applied to any representational discourse. For Fowler, anything said or written about 
the world is articulated from a particular ideological position. “Language,” he insists, “is not 
a clear window but a refracting, structuring medium” (p.11). 
In news reporting by the press, this fact is complicated by news selection criteria. Fowler 
reiterates that although it is commonly assumed that news reports are the accounts of “the 
real world,” of what happened out there, the reality is a little more sophisticated as events are 
subjected to conventional processes of selection. In this respect, he points out that events are 
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not intrinsically news worthy in themselves but become “news” only when selected for 
inclusion in news reports. He notes that the vast majority of events are not mentioned, and so 
selection immediately gives a partial view of the world. This, he said, is reinforced by the fact 
that different media and newspapers treat events differently both in content and presentation. 
In Fowler’s opinion therefore, “the world of the press is not the real world, but a world 
skewed and judged” (p. 11). 
Paul Manning (2001: 50), writing a decade later, affirmed Fowler’s position in his assertion 
that far from merely mirrowing what happens in the world, the practice of journalism 
involves “a process of manufacture and fabrication.” This, he explains, does not necessarily 
mean that journalists deliberately fabricate or lie but emphasises the fact that the production 
of news involves the routine gathering and assembling of certain constituent elements which 
are then fashioned to construct or fabricate an account of the particular news events. For him, 
“newspaper representations of reality are imperfect distortions rather than perfect reflections 
of reality.” 
News selection itself is determined by “news values,” the criteria by which the media 
determine events for reporting and/or presentation. As explained above, news is not simply 
what happens, but that which can be regarded and presented as newsworthy. Fowler notes 
that these criteria are usually undertaken unconsciously in editorial practice and they perform 
a “gate-keeping” role, filtering and restricting news input and output. Hull (1991) captures it 
very aptly: 
The media do not simply and transparently report events which are “naturally” 
newsworthy in themselves. “News” is the end-product of a complex process 
which begins with a systematic sorting and selecting of events and topics 
according to a socially constructed set of categories. 
 
Philo (1989) similarly explains that news is not so much gathered or found as much as it is 
made. News, in his perspective, is a creation of a journalistic process, and can even be 
considered as an artefact or a commodity. The more newsworthiness criteria an item fulfils, 
the more likely it is to be reported. Negativity is a top news criterion and that explains why 
negative events usually receive massive coverage.  
An important factor affecting the content and presentation of news relates to production 
schedules and conventions for access to sources. According to Stuart Hall (1973), 
newsgathering strategies, while ensuring economy of time and effort, are however very 
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selective, implying that only certain sources and voices are heard. For Fowler, imbalance of 
access results in partiality, not only in what assertions and attitudes are reported (content) but 
also in how they are reported (style and form) and therefore the world view or ideology 
portrayed. “Specific powerful institutions, frequently accessed (with neglect of other sections 
of the population and other organisations) provide the newspapers with modes of discourse 
which already encode the attitudes of powerful elite. Newspapers in part adopt this language 
for their own and, in deploying it, reproduce the attitudes of the powerful. This reproduction 
happens to be in the favour of the newspaper industry, which is part of the interests of an 
industrial-capitalist society, with an authoritarian, conservative government, and appropriate 
ideological and repressive agencies (Fowler, 1991: 15).” 
Richardson (2007) identifies three characteristics of journalistic discourse which he argues 
are clearly inter related and sometimes difficult to disentangle. These characteristics are the 
language of journalism, its production and consumption and the relationship of journalism to 
social institutions. In this respect, Richardson points out that sourcing and construction of 
news is intimately linked with the actions and opinions of social groups. He argues also that it 
is impossible to construct news without a conception of the target audience. And while it is 
possible, he insists that it is flawed to consider issues such as contemporary democratic 
politics, social values and the continuing existence of prejudice and social inequalities 
“without reference to the formative influence of journalism.” These perspectives are critical 
to my research which is on representation of ethno-religious conflicts by newspapers. Critical 
discourse analysis of the newspapers will provide a deeper understanding of how the press 
has handled these conflicts within the context of the social realities in which the journalists 
and newspapers operate.  
With respect to the practical steps of undertaking CDA, Fairclough (1989) gives three levels 
of discourse and corresponding three stages of critical discourse analysis. The three 
discoursal levels are (a) the text which examines the content of the particular text under 
examination and the interpretations which this may yield; (b) the process of production and 
interpretation, relating to the manner of textual production and its effect on interpretation; 
and (c) social conditions of production and interpretation which deals with the social factors 
that resulted in or contributed to the origination of the text and how these influence 
interpretation. Flowing from these three analytical processes are corresponding three stages 
of critical discourse analysis including (a) Description: the stage concerned with the formal 
properties of the text; (b) Interpretation: the stage which examines the relationship between 
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text and interaction, viewing the text as a product of a process, and a resource in the process 
of production; and (c) Explanation which deals with the relationship between interaction and 
social context – with the social determination of the processes of production and 
interpretation and their social effects. This research employs Fairclough’s three-stage process 
of discourse analysis outlined above, that is, the text, the discourse practice and social 
practice. These three stages of analysis correspond to what others have labelled as the micro, 
meso and macro levels of analysis.  
The analysis is based on the reportage of the January/March 2010 conflicts which witnessed 
the largest volume of coverage as earlier identified in chapter three. The unit of analysis is the 
story, including hard news, feature and opinion pieces. For each newspaper, there is a 
detailed analysis of one carefully selected feature/opinion article and a general examination 
of other items of coverage within the study period in the light of that opinion piece. I elected 
to lead the analysis with opinion articles because the discourse in such articles “problematizes 
the world by taking up the normative dimension of issues and events” within the overall 
discursive strategy of the news narrative (Greenberg, 2000). Such opinion discourses assume 
“important communicative function by offering readers a distinctive and authoritative voice 
that will speak to them directly, in the face of troubling and problematic circumstances” 
(Greenberg, 2000). That the conflicts examined in this study constitute “troubling and 
problematic circumstances” for the Nigerian citizen and nation is attested to by the number of 
casualties and the frequency of occurrence. This research attempts to locate the press within 
these conflicts and inquires as to whether they are part of the problem or part of the solution. 
According to Greenberg, “opinion discourse addresses news readers embraced in a 
consensual relationship by taking a particular stance in relation to the persons and topics 
referred.” He argues that despite its communicative importance, this news genre has received 
less sustained theoretical and empirical attention from scholars than “hard” news.  Therefore, 
while it is more routine to analyse “hard” news, a direct focus on opinion articles gets to the 
heart of a newspaper’s overarching editorial posturing and provides a useful “ basis for 
scrutinizing and challenging conventional journalistic standards of balance, fairness and 
objectivity” (Greenberg, 2000). Also, the analyses of the opinion articles surveyed in this 
study are cross-referenced to the “hard” news reportage in discovering the representational 
strategy of the press in the production and dissemination of the “order” in news discourse.  
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2.5.3 Interviews  
According to Tim May (2001: 120), interviewing as a method involves maintaining and 
generating conversations with people on a topic or range of topics and the interpretations 
which social researchers make of the resultant data. May (2001) has identified four broad 
types of interviews in social research: structured interview, semi-structured interview, the 
unstructured or focused interview and the group interview. Structured interview is mainly 
associated with survey research and relies upon the use of questionnaire as the data collection 
instrument. Fontana and Frey (1994) explain that emphasis of structured interview is on 
standardization of explanations; eliciting only the responses of the interviewee; not 
prompting or providing a personal view; not interpreting meanings and simply repeating the 
questions and finally, not improvising. This method is popular in telephone interviews for 
marketing purposes. 
Semi-structured interview, as the name suggests, is a mid-way between the techniques of the 
structured interview and the focused or unstructured interview. Although questions are 
normally specified, the interviewer is also at liberty to probe beyond the answers in a manner 
which would appear prejudicial to the aims of standardization and comparability (May, 2001: 
123). In semi-structured interview, the interviewer can seek both clarification and elaboration 
on responses as well as probe the answers, thus permitting “dialogue” with the respondent. 
Semi-structured interviews are useful for their flexibility in allowing partially prepared 
questions which can be elaborated by the interviewee (Clifford, 2003; Arksey and Knight, 
1999). This enables the interviewer to maintain focus while allowing the respondent to go off 
the script, where necessary, to elaborate and discuss issues that are germane to the topic 
under discussion. Being an aspect of the qualitative research, Arksey and Knight rightly 
recommend that fewer interviewees are better than too many. According to May, these types 
of interviews enable people to answer more “on their own terms while providing a greater 
structure for comparability over that of the focused interview” (p. 124). The focus is provided 
by the researcher and the primary objective is to seek understanding rather than 
generalizations about phenomena (sociology.org.uk/methfi.pdf). Use of open-ended questions 
allows for deep conversation and enables complex issues to be discussed or clarified. The 
technique has validity as respondents can answer issues in details (ibid.). 
Unstructured or focused interview is open-ended and particularly suitable for life-histories, 
biographical and oral interviews. It is at the “qualitative end” of the research spectrum and 
emphasizes flexibility and discovery of meaning rather than standardization. Group interview 
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involves several respondents participating simultaneously in an interview situation. It allows 
researchers to explore group norms and dynamics around issues and topics under 
investigation. A group interview, according to May (2001: 125) could involve eight to ten 
people discussing from between one to two and half hours, guided by an interviewer. Group 
interviews can provide insights into both “social relations in general and the examination of 
processes and social dynamics in general” (126).  
May recommends the use of the semi-structured interview in situations where a researcher is 
utilizing interviews “within a range of other methods” in a study. This makes the method 
quite suitable for my research as it is one of several qualitative methods I am employing to 
deepen data collection and analysis of the issues raised by my enquiry. Semi-structured 
interview not only gives great latitude, but also offers opportunity to understand the context 
and content of the interview and is best conducted by the researcher themselves (May, 2001: 
125). This is a main reason I conducted the interviews myself. 
To conduct a successful interview, it is important that the issues being investigated are clearly 
understood by the respondent and that they consent and feel comfortable in the whole 
process. Moser and Kalton (1983) in May (2001) particularly emphasize accessibility, 
cognition and motivation on the part of the respondent. Accessibility has to do with 
respondent’s capacity to provide the information required while cognition relates to their 
understanding of what is expected of them and if they are comfortable with the interview 
exercise. Motivation is winning the confidence of the respondent and making them feel that 
their input is valuable, thus securing their active cooperation and participation. To achieve 
this goal, I ensured that my questionnaire framework outlines clearly the aims of the 
investigation and that the guide questions are clear and concise (see appendix). Most of the 
interviews were conducted face-to-face with only one being done through the telephone. The 
different scenarios tasked the interviewing skills of the researcher. For example, ability to 
recognize emotions through listening in a telephone interview; ability to keep the interest of 
respondents during the interviews, most of which lasted an average of 45 minutes; the 
balance between obtaining adequate responses over the telephone and huge mobile bill as 
Nigeria has no landline facilities, etc.  
Following the initial quantitative and qualitative analyses, I was able to structure the 
interview questions in order to study the context of media production in Nigeria. The themes 
and issues explored in the interview include: conflict reportage by the Nigerian press with 
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particular reference to ethno-religious conflicts; standards and quality of journalism practice 
in Nigeria; peace journalism as an alternative practice framework in conflict reportage; 
journalism training in Nigeria and Freedom of Information Act. A guide questionnaire was 
sent to prospective respondents ahead of the interview appointments, with clear wordings of 
assurance of anonymity, confidentiality and professional handling of all opinions and 
information gathered in line with ethical requirements.  
A combination of purposive and snowball sampling techniques were employed to select 
participants and key informants for this research (May, 2001:95). The effort was to obtain 
opinions of key informants as well as those of a representative cross view of media 
practitioners and academics on the issues being discussed. A total of seventeen people were 
interviewed, ranging from university professors and lecturers to media managers and media 
practitioners (see Table 2.2). In line with the Birmingham City University’s ethical guidelines 
which require anonymity for participants/interviewees, respondents are not identified by 
names. They are however listed by their organisations and/or job titles to indicate the variety 
and scope of responses. 
The interviews were analyzed using grounded theory which is “the discovery of theory from 
data systematically obtained from social research” (Glaser and Strauss, 1967: 2). Grounded 
theory is the notion of “generating new theory from data, as opposed to testing existing 
theory” (Birks and Mills, 2010: 2).  Charmaz (2014) points out that grounded theory methods 
can complement other approaches to qualitative analysis, rather than stand in opposition to 
them. She views grounded theory as “a set of principles and practices, not as prescriptions or 
packages” and that they provide “flexible guidelines,” not “methodological rules, recipes and 
requirements.” Similarly, Birks and Mills (2012) argue that grounded theory could be used to 
provide insightful and incisive analysis whether one is pursuing ethnographic stories, 
biographical narratives or qualitative interviews. And Charmaz (2014) insists that diverse 
researchers can use basic grounded theory strategies such as coding, memo writing, and 
sampling for theory development with comparative methods “because the strategies are, in 
many ways, transportable across epistemological and ontological gulfs.” Even where a 
researcher is not interested in theory construction, but aims primarily for “cogent synthesis of 
…data,” grounded theory helps achieve such goals expeditiously (Charmaz, 2014). 
According to Charmaz, “the immense effectiveness and efficiency of grounded theory 
strategies also are useful to professionals who write essays, policies, reviews and reports. 
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They benefit from using grounded theory strategies such as coding and memo writing” as 
these increase the analytic import of any work and speed up completion. 
Grounded theory provides detailed, rigorous and systematic criteria for analysing qualitative 
data. Analysis using grounded theory involves basically three levels of coding: Open, axial 
and theoretical coding. These three stages, according to Jones and Alony (2011), are 
sequential and consecutive rather than iterative.  
Open coding, the first level of coding, involves the examination of raw data (interview 
transcripts) and coding through a process “which fractures the interview into discrete threads 
of datum” (Jones and Alony, 2011) which are then collated to form categories of similar 
phenomena. At this stage, the researcher closely and minutely analyses data line-by-line, 
word-by-word in order to produce concepts and categories that fit the data (Strauss, 1987). 
Through this process, the researcher is able to identify a list of emerging themes and codes. 
The second level of coding is the axial or selective coding and involves grouping similar 
categories and themes together in line with the emerging concepts. The final stage is 
theoretical coding when core categories have become saturated and involves the analysis of 
concepts according to the main areas of investigation. 
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Table 2.2:   List of Interview Participants 
Participant 1  - Research Professor/Media Academic, NIPSS 
Participant 2  - Lecturer in Mass Communication, University of Jos 
Participant 3  - Professor of Mass Communication, Bayero  
University, Kano 
Participant 4  - Lecturer in Mass Communication, Ahmadu Bello  
University 
Participant 5  - Lecturer in Journalism, University of Jos 
Participant 6  - Media Executive/Media Adviser to State Governor 
Participant 7  - Managing Director, Newspaper 
Participant 8  - Political Editor, national newspaper 
Participant 9  - Senior Editor/Reporter, national newspaper 
Participant 10   -  Former State Correspondent, national newspaper 
Participant 11  - Abuja Chief Correspondent, Foreign Radio Station 
Participant 12  - Features Editor, State Government-owned Newspaper 
Participant 13  - State Chairman, Nigerian Union of Journalists 
Participant 14  - Prominent woman Journalist and Health Correspondent 
Participant 15  - National Secretary, Nigerian Union of Journalists 
Participant 16  - Director, Nigerian Press Council 
Participant 17   –  Professor of Mass Communication, Lagos State University 
 
2.5.3.1   Emerging Themes and Concepts from the Interviews 
Following the transcription of each interview, an initial analysis was undertaken which 
involved bringing out in bullet points the main issues emerging from the interview. 
Transcriptions and analyses were done in the sequence of the interviews. Therefore each 
analysis was compared with previous and subsequent ones. This process helped to focus the 
interviews as the issues were progressively distilled and analysed.  
Several words and concepts stood out from the interviews. Words such as ethics, freedom, 
professionalism, corruption, ownership, training, investigation were a common refrain cutting 
through the scripts. Indeed, after I had conducted eight of the interviews, it appeared that 
subsequent encounters merely clarified or substantiated earlier issues, but hardly added 
dramatically fresh perspectives to the discourse. Of course, each interview encounter 
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constituted a unique experience, providing a different flavour to the discourse, and enriching 
the researcher’s perspective on the complex issues under investigation. 
Comparing the individual analyses enabled me to produce tables featuring concepts common 
to the various issues canvassed during the interviews. From these tables, I then produced a 
synthesis of emerging themes and codes to guide further analysis and discussion (See 
Appendices 7 and 8). A careful analysis of these themes and concepts would disclose the 
following nine themes which flow from the responses: ethno-religious bias/partisanship; poor 
work conditions; ethical concerns; ownership issues/influence; commercialisation; 
training/capacity; audience expectations; investigative journalism; sources. Having regard to 
the inter-related nature of these themes and following careful evaluation, I collapsed them 
into five categories as here indicated: partisanship/ethno-religious bias; work conditions; 
ethics and accountability; ownership/commercialisation; training/capacity building. 
 
In order to provide scope and context for the treatment of these codes, they are discussed and 
analysed under three broad thematic categories related to my main areas of investigation. The 
thematic categories which anchor the analysis of the interviews and the issues identified are: 
Professionalism and Media Ethics; Peace Journalism and Conflict Reportage and Press 
Freedom and Accountability. The analysis follows the Charmazian interpretivist grounded 
theory approach which “seeks to define conditional statements that interpret how subjects 
construct their realities… to produce local truths” (Fox, 2014). 
 
2.6  Ethical Considerations 
Some ethical issues arise from the application of the research methods outlined above, 
particularly with the sourcing and handling of information. In social research, ethical 
decisions are defined in terms, not just of what is right or just in the interests of the research 
project, its sponsors or workers, but critically, about the interests and welfare of the 
participants in the research (May, 2001: 60). Knowledge is not a politically neutral product, 
contrary to positivism and empiricism (May, 2001: 60). Thus, social researchers need to be 
aware of ethical issues implicated by their inquiry and must ensure that their decisions and 
methods are morally and legally above board. Among the basic principles that govern data 
collection are consent by participants, right to privacy and security for respondents and 
treatment of participants with respect and as autonomous agents (Frankel and Siang, 1999; 
Oppenheim, 1993).  
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Birmingham City University’s ethical guidelines (paragraph 3.5) places informed consent at 
the heart of ethical research. This is also in line with the guidelines of the  British 
Sociological Association, sections 16-18,  which require researchers to explain to participants 
fully the nature and purpose of the study and that they can withdraw from the research at any 
time (BSA, 2002). In this regard I ensured that data collection instruments explained clearly 
the research rationale in order to win the confidence and expressed consent of participants 
and institutions, particularly those who were interviewed.  
Having regard to the sensitive and emotive nature of my subject of inquiry, I was aware of 
the need to protect participants and sources from physical and/or emotional harm or distress 
by complying particularly with the ethical principles of confidentiality of information, 
security and well-being of participants and anonymity of participants (BCU, 5.4). I 
accomplished this by ensuring that information obtained is stored and handled with integrity 
and professionalism and in line with provisions of the Data Protection Act 1998. In view of 
the ethnic and religious diversity of the Nigerian society, I ensured that all shades of opinion 
were reflected in data collection and analysis in a fair and balanced manner. This I did in the 
choice of newspapers for analysis and also in the choice of interviewees. 
Despite these general principles, May (2001: 60) notes that knowledge is not a politically 
neutral product and that ethical decisions partly depend on the values of the researchers and 
their communities. This introduces some complications in the relationship between ethics and 
social research and two possible approaches: (i) a deontological approach which conceives of 
research ethics as universal rules applicable inflexibly to all places and at all times, and (ii) 
consequentialism which places emphasis on the context of research. For May (2001: 61), 
neither extreme is healthy. What is productive, he reasons, is reflexivity on the part of the 
researcher which enables a recognition of basic ethical standards and avoidance of rigidity 
and inflexibility which could dull sensitivity to the context of research (May, 2001: 61-62). 
For this reason, the British Sociological Association code of ethics requires, for example, that 
“guarantees of confidentiality and anonymity given to research participants must be 
honoured, unless there are clear and overriding reasons to do otherwise” (in May, 2001: 61). 
 
The value of this discussion to my dissertation is that it enabled me to focus critical attention 
on my own positionality in relation to the subject of enquiry - as a Nigerian and a Christian 
minority from the region in which the ethno-religious conflicts that are the focus of my 
investigation, have taken place. I am also a resident of Jos and a first-hand witness to several 
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of the conflicts described in this study. As a journalist, all these factors imply that I am very 
close to the subject of enquiry. This awareness enabled me to guard against emotional 
attachment and to ensure that the gathering and interpretation of data complied with the 
highest standards of professionalism and that my personal beliefs and religious convictions 
have not obstructed or unduly coloured my judgment or analysis. On a positive note, I should 
draw attention to the fact that my employment as editor at Nigeria’s prestigious National 
Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies facilitated access to all levels of interviewees and 
documents. This has served me in good stead in the conduct of this study. 
 
With respect to health and safety, I carefully assessed the risks associated with my research, 
primarily, concerns over safety in travel around Nigeria, particularly when I needed to 
interview participants in risk-prone areas. I ensured that I travelled only through appropriate 
public or private means of transportation and that I was well advised before setting out on 
trips about security situations in my destination. Furthermore, I have maintained the 
confidentiality of opinions expressed by interviewees in order to protect their integrity 
particularly on contentious issues.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
TRENDS AND PATTERNS OF REPORTAGE OF ETHNO-RELIGIOUS 
CONFLICTS BY THE NIGERIAN PRESS 
A Quantitative Content Analysis of Nigerian Newspapers 
3.1      Introduction: A Brief Overview of the Analytical Chapters 
This chapter is the first of four empirical chapters of the dissertation. Based on 
quantitative analysis, it provides a foundation for the three other analytical chapters which 
mainly utilise qualitative methods. The chapter explores research question one, which 
seeks to establish the patterns of reportage of ethno-religious conflicts by the Nigerian 
press and the implications of this for escalating or minimising the conflicts. Chapter four, 
which follows, explores in greater depth the issues observed in this chapter, utilising 
qualitative methods in order to ground analysis and understanding. It enquires particularly 
on the framing and representation of ethno-religious conflicts and how this clarifies or 
obfuscates the underlying issues in such conflicts.  
Chapter five examines the practices of the Nigerian press within the context of emerging 
alternative frameworks for conflict reportage. Specifically, it utilises content analysis and 
semi-structured interviews to explore the principles of peace journalism as a basis for 
interrogating established practices and news culture. This is with the aim of identifying 
lessons that might emerge for the journalism profession in Nigeria in respect of conflict 
coverage. The last chapter explores the context of journalism practice in Nigeria through 
a consideration of the political and economic factors which underpin news production as 
well as the training of journalists. Semi-structured interviews are employed to accomplish 
this task which provides opportunity for critical engagement with media practitioners and 
media educators on the issues highlighted in the earlier chapters.  
3.2      General Reportorial Trends 
This chapter aims to explore and analyse the trends and the practices of Nigerian 
newspapers in the reportage of ethno-religious conflicts. The objective is to produce and 
delineate a robust understanding of the character and style of the Nigerian press in the 
mediation of ethno-religious conflicts and to provide a basis for engaging with the issues 
that arise from these trends. As stated in chapter two, the specific research question the 
chapter attempts to answer is:  
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How has the Nigerian press reported ethno-religious conflicts in the country and 
what pictures emerge from this coverage that might indicate tendencies to escalate 
or minimise such conflicts? 
To accomplish this objective, the chapter employs quantitative content analysis to explore 
the issues in two broad sections. The first section dwells on what I term general 
reportorial trends and is related to vital indices like sources of stories, gender and ethnic 
profile of correspondents and the prominence given to stories. The second section focuses 
on the quality of reportage, and explores complex and problematic issues such as balance 
and bias in news reportage, language and tone in presentation and contextualisation of 
issues. Frequency tables and charts are utilised in the discussion to enrich the analysis. I 
argue that the general quality of reportage is more likely to exacerbate ethno-religious 
conflicts in the country. 
3.2.1   Story Types  
A total of 617 items were coded and analysed covering news reports, features, editorial 
pieces and others such as letters to the editor and advertorials. The distribution of these 
items over the various story types are as follows: news reports: 393 items (63.7%); 
features/opinion pieces: 152 items (24.6%); editorial opinions: 21 items (3.4%); “others” 
(letters to the editor, reader responses, advertorials and paid press statements/releases, 
etc.): 51 items (8.1%) (See Table 3.1) 
Table 3.2 shows the distribution of these stories amongst the four newspapers content 
analysed. The table shows a fairly balanced distribution of coverage amongst the 
newspapers in all the story types. It is however observed that about 32% of all the stories 
were published by the Daily Trust whereas all the other newspapers each had between 
21% - 24%. The preponderance of Daily Trust’s coverage could be explained by the fact 
of geographical and ideological proximity. The Daily Trust is a northern-based newspaper 
with headquarters in Abuja whereas the other three papers are published in Lagos and 
Ibadan even though they all have regional offices in Abuja.  Therefore the Daily Trust is 
the closest to Jos in geographic terms. More than geographical proximity, the paper is 
also closest to the conflict in political and ideological terms and will therefore devote 
strident attention to the conflicts. As was earlier noted in chapter one, the issues in the Jos 
conflict relate primarily to contestations over ownership of the tin city between those who 
regard themselves as the aboriginal founders and the Hausa/Fulani who are regarded as 
settlers. The former are predominantly Christian, while the Hausa/Fulani are mainly 
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Muslim. The Daily Trust’s ideological orientation towards northern and Islamic interests 
(Galadima, 2010: 48) therefore explains its sustained coverage of the conflicts in Jos. 
This confirms Shinar’s position that “geographical distance might influence coverage in 
that the more a society is involved in the conflict itself and the closer it is to the conflict 
region (in historical, political, economic or ideological terms), distortions of the conflict 
perception will be stronger” (Shinar, 2009: 456). This then explains why the Daily Trust 
devoted more space to the issue than others newspapers in the sample. Thus, unlike what 
Obijiofor (2010) found in the coverage of the Niger Delta conflict, proximity clearly has 
an influence in the reportage of ethno-religious conflicts by Nigerian newspapers.   
Table 3.1: Story Type 
Story Type 
S/N Type of Story Total Frequency Total % 
1 News Story 393 63.7 
2 Editorial 21 3.4 
3 Features/Opinion 152 24.6 
4 
Others (Letters, reader responses, advertorials, 
paid press statements, etc.) 51 8.3 
 
Total 617 100.0 
 
Table 3.2: Story Type by Newspaper 
Story Type by Newspapers 
S/N Newspaper 
News 
Story Editorial  Features/Opinion Others 
Total 
Frequency 
Total 
% 
1 Daily Trust 114 6 51 25 197 31.8 
2 
Nigeria 
Tribune 99 5 34 12 150 24.3 
3 The Guardian 93 7 33 3 136 22.0 
4 This Day 87 3 34 10 134 21.7 
 
Total 393 21 152 50 617 100.0 
 
3.2.2    Regional Profile of Reporters 
An observable feature of the coverage is that 78% of all the stories filed on the conflicts were 
by reporters and correspondents of the various newspapers. Guest writers and syndicated 
columnists make up 6.5% (See Appendix 7). This indicates the importance the newspapers 
attach to the issue under consideration as they all have resident correspondents in the conflict 
city and devote a lot of space and attention to the conflicts.  
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A closer look at the correspondents and writers of these stories shows that 43% are from the 
northern region including the middle belt which, geographically and geopolitically, is a part 
of the northern region. Southern correspondents and writers make up 41% (Table 3.3). By 
way of explanation, I was able to identify the regional profile of reporters/correspondents 
mostly by their names. Names are distinct identity markers in Nigerian culture and Nigerian 
names can easily be traced to their regional and/or ethnic origin. In this respect, I have the 
added advantage of early exposure to people from all parts of the country, having attended a 
Federal unity school for my secondary education. This exposure stood me in good stead in 
recognising/determining the regional identity of most of the newspapers 
writers/correspondents on this issue. I recognise the limitations in this method of identifying 
people, as factors such as inter-ethnic or inter-racial marriages or other variables may 
interfere with this principle. I therefore devised other measures to crosscheck the identity of 
reporters. First, I know some of the correspondents personally, having worked in the 
newspaper industry at some point. I also contacted reliable sources to verify the backgrounds 
of reporters in a few cases I had doubts. I did not code for the religious affiliation of 
reporters/correspondents as this would be even more difficult to determine from just the 
name. Furthermore, other indices, such as the educational or professional 
qualification/experience of correspondents, which could also impact content, were not coded 
as primary attention is on ethnicity in line with the subject of enquiry. 
The data above shows an even distribution of correspondents in terms of regional identity 
across the four newspapers which I find interesting, considering the fact that three of the 
newspapers are published in the southern cities of Lagos and Ibadan. A comparative analysis 
of correspondents across the newspapers however paints a slightly different picture. As is 
evident from Table 3.4, 76% of correspondents/writers on this issue for the Daily Trust are of 
northern extraction while 78% of those of the Nigerian Tribune are from the south. As 
explained in chapter two, these two newspapers are regionally inclined, the Daily Trust 
towards the northern region, championing northern/Islam issues and the Nigerian Tribune 
being the counter-poise, focusing on southern/Christian interests. The other two newspapers, 
The Guardian and This Day, have a more even correspondents profile. The Guardian has an 
almost equal percentage of writers on this issue (45% south, 42% north) while This Day is 
south 50% and 34% north. These facts are important for this research as some studies, such as 
Yusha’u (2009) and Galadima (2010), suggest that there is a relationship between the 
regional profile of Nigerian media personnel and the type and nature of stories they report in 
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the coverage of national issues. While this assertion may hold some truth, it is however 
problematic as would be demonstrated in a fuller discussion of the issue while considering 
balance and language use below. 
Table 3.3: Regional Identity of Writers  
S/N Regional Identity  Frequency Total % 
1 North 168 23.2 
2 Middle Belt 149 20.6 
3 South 298 41.3 
4 Not Clear/Not Applicable 108 14.9 
 Total 723 100.0 
 
Table 3.4: Comparative Analysis of Regional Identity of Correspondents/Writers 
Comparative Analysis of Regional Identity of Writers 
S/N Newspaper North South Middle 
Belt 
Others/Not 
Clear 
Total 
Frequency 
Total 
% 
1 Daily Trust 137 17 36 39 229 31.7 
2 
Nigeria 
Tribune 9 119 5 20 153 21.2 
3 Guardian 10 82 66 23 181 25.0 
4 This Day 12 80 42 26 160 22.1 
 
Total 168 298 149 108 723 100.0 
 
3.2.3   Gender Profile of Correspondents/Writers 
 
An interesting profile in the make-up of the reporters and correspondents of ethno-religions 
conflicts in Nigeria is that it is an almost exclusively masculine territory.  Only 2.5% of the 
reports and opinion pieces were authored by women, while 85% were contributed directly by 
male authors.  This gender ratio is significant when it is observed that, ironically, women and 
children are usually the most adversely affected by ethno-religious conflicts (Daily Trust, 12 
September, 2001).  The voice of the victim, as it were, is silent in everyday media discourse 
and representation of ethno-religious conflicts.   
This issue provokes deeper reflections as it indicates the gender ratio of male-female 
journalists in Nigeria and this has implications for content. Scholars such as Strong and 
Hannis (2007), Lavie and Lehman-Wilzig (2003), and Lafky (1983) argue that a male 
dominated newsroom may produce stories that emphasise male sources and male attributes 
such as triumph, controversy or dispute. An analysis of the incidence of by-lines in 
- 120 - 
 
newspapers around the world by Global Media Monitoring Project (2005) found that 
globally, female journalists overall accounted for only 29% of headlines. Among the reasons 
advanced for the under representation of women in the news media are family commitments 
which prevent women from working the inflexible hours required of journalists, and outright 
sexism (Strong and Hannis, 2007). 
Anyanwu (2001) argues that the dominant orientation of Nigerian mainstream media is that 
women are largely seen and not heard. According to her, “their faces adorn newspapers. 
However on important national and international issues, they fade out. Even when the news is 
about them, the story only gains prominence if there is a male authority figure or newsmaker 
on the scene.” Anyanwu explains this situation in terms of historical tradition of male 
dominance of the local media. She cites a survey by the Independent Journalism Centre (ICJ) 
in Lagos and the Centre for War, Peace and the News Media in New York which found that 
80% of journalists in Nigeria are male. This, she explains, has led to a domination of the 
news media by men and a preponderance of male perspectives in the reporting of news. 
In the opinion of some scholars such as Gallagher (1981) and Strong and Hannis (2007), if 
women dominated the newsroom, not only would more stories about women be told, but 
news stories would increasingly reflect female characteristics of harmony and cooperation. 
This issue has important implications for the coverage of ethno-religious conflicts by the 
Nigerian press as the voice of the woman reporter, if properly harnessed, could well make a 
difference in the tone, orientation and content of the media towards resolution, rather than 
exacerbation of the conflicts.  
Table 3.5: Gender Profile of Correspondents/Writers 
S/N Gender Total Frequency Total % 
1 Male 522 84.6 
2 Female 15 2.4 
3 Not Clear 38 6.2 
4 Not Applicable 42 6.8 
 Total 617 100.0 
 
3.2.4   Prominence and Extent of Coverage 
 
The data at Table 3.6 show that ethno-religious conflicts receive a lot of prominence in the 
Nigerian Press.  The four newspapers content analysed featured 35% of the stories on the 
front and back pages and one-third of these were front page lead stories. Within the first two 
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weeks of each of the incidents, the newspapers featured the issue on a daily basis, suggesting 
the importance with which the issue was perceived. Each of the newspapers produced 
editorial comments in at least three of the conflict episodes and, in several cases, two 
editorials in the space of one week. Daily Trust, Nigerian Tribune and The Guardian each 
had an editorial on the 2001 conflict episode; for 2008, The Guardian and the Nigerian 
Tribune each had two editorial pieces while Daily Trust had one. In the January/March 2010 
conflict episodes, both Daily Trust and The Guardian published three editorial opinions on 
the issue and This Day had one. In August 2011, Daily Trust, Tribune and This Day each 
published an editorial piece. This suggests the seriousness and sustained attention paid the 
issue by the Nigerian press and confirms previous evidence that the Nigerian press is 
proactive in the coverage of burning national issues (Olukotun, 2004). 
An element of proactivity in the coverage of the conflicts relates to the capacity of the 
newspapers to scan and foresee or forecast conflicts. In this research, several of the 
newspapers reported on the impending crisis in Jos just before the September 2001 conflict. 
Nigerian Tribune accurately predicted on 6 September 2001 that trouble was brewing in Jos. 
In a news report headlined: “Tension mounts in Jos over council’s status,” the paper warned 
that the prevailing peace in Jos, the Plateau State capital, “might be punctured as the 
Hausa/Fulani community under the aegis of Jasawa Development Association and Plateau 
State Youth Council, are set for a show down over the indigenous right of Jos North local 
government area of the state.” 
Similarly, This Day newspaper on 5
th
 September 2001 ominously had a story captioned, 
“Religious Crisis Brews in Jos.” The report asserted that the relative peace being enjoyed by 
residents of Jos might evaporate “if urgent actions are not taken by relevant authorities to 
avert imminent showdown between Christian indigenes of the area and the Hausa-Fulanis, 
who are mainly Muslim.” Also the newspaper had been addressing some of the issues 
underlining the conflict. For example on September 1, 2001, it had an article titled: “One 
North, Different People” in which the writer explored the “centrifugal forces” plaguing the 
politics of the region, primarily ethnic and religious conflicts. 
Such proactivity should ordinarily be a positive factor in containing the crises if decision 
makers creatively utilise information available from the press and other credible sources to 
guide public policy. This does not seem to be the case in this respect and the question remains 
how the press could pick up early signals of conflict, while government officials appear 
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completely ignorant of such dangers? In the case of the 2001 conflict in Jos, while the press 
was warning of impending trouble, the state governor was heading out of the country for 
foreign vacation, and had to hurry back when the crisis had broken out. 
In comparative terms, the coverage appears to be even across the incidents. However, 
January/March 2010 incident is double the average number (223 stories) and this is explained 
by the fact that six weeks, rather than three, were effectively analysed (three weeks in 
January and three in March 2010).  This is based on the fact that, according to the Nigeria 
Police, the March 2010 incident was a direct retaliation by one of the parties to the injuries 
suffered the previous incident in the month of January 2010. For this reason, I treated the two 
incidents as one, and this explains the increase in the number of stories coded.  
Table 3.6: Prominence 
Prominence 
S/N Placement of Story 
Total 
Frequency Total % 
1 Front Page Lead 80 13.0 
2 Front Page 96 15.6 
3 Back Page 32 5.2 
4 Inside Page Multiple Pages 18 2.9 
5 Inside Page 391 63.4 
 
Total 617 100.0 
 
3.2.5   Sources of News Reports  
Table 3.7 gives an indication of the sources relied upon by the press in the reportage of ethno-
religious conflicts. From the list, I have identified four major sources of press information: 
These are: 
 Official sources (including security agencies, federal and state organs and 
institutions). 
 Religious organisations, that is, Christian and Muslim faith leaders and 
institutions. 
 Civil society including non-governmental organisations, community-based 
organisations and prominent individuals. 
 Newspaper investigations 
These four sources account for news and information on ethno-religious conflicts in the 
following proportions: official sources: 39%; religious organizations: 17%; civil Society: 
18%; and newspaper investigations: 17%. Of lesser significance is wire service and news 
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agencies which account for 2% while quite a sizeable 7% is unattributed.  This last finding 
corroborates research evidence that Nigerian newspapers often do not reveal their news 
sources (Obijiofor, 2010.) 
The evidence here agrees essentially with what is already known about the Nigerian press, 
which is that it relies principally on official sources in reporting conflicts (Obijiofor, 2010; 
Galadima, 2010). This is attributable to the media’s habitual reliance on elite sources. This 
practice is reinforced in conflict situations due partly to problems of access during violent 
stages of such conflicts (Kothari, 2010). This  culture of elite-dependence results in devoting 
undue media focus and resources to coverage of the actions of officials, and not enough 
attention to investigating the underlying causes of the conflicts, part of which are structural 
problems resulting from the policies and actions of such officials.    
It is notable that religious leaders and religious institutions are high on the list of news 
sources on ethno-religious conflicts. Relaying the views and opinions of religious antagonists 
in a volatile conflict situation immediately poses its peculiar dangers for potentially 
escalating such conflicts. Abiodun (2009) has already noted that in incidents of religious 
violence in Nigeria, “the religious leaders and other elites have always been the propelling 
force.” Musa (1994: 5) similarly argues that there is a tendency by the Nigerian media to 
“open partisanship that follows the line of thought of their proprietors and that characterises 
his (sic) politics especially in times of crises…” 
This point is significant as academic literature demonstrates that news sources play an 
important role in perpetuating political and economic hierarchies (McQuail, 2003). In an 
extensive study of media content, producers and audiences, Philo and Berry (2004) found that 
journalists covering the Israeli-Palestinian conflict not only report a source’s view, but also 
directly endorse it depending on the source’s status. The authors explain that the motives of 
sources and journalists’ endorsement of them can shape how diverse perspectives and 
explanations are selected for stories. Ammina Kothari (2010,) in a study of the Dafur conflict, 
also argues that the news production process is complicated by how sources will report the 
event depending on the audience. According to her, “outright lies or biased perceptions can 
be communicated by sources which reporters or audiences might not always be able to 
distinguish” (Kothari 2010: 211). Following Strentz (1989), Kothari maintains that “the 
direction and the facts of news (are) shaped by how, what and who defines the story, giving 
sources greater power in framing the information” (p. 211). She argues further that sources 
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are not neutral, but have their agenda for information sharing (p.222). Manning (2001: 55) 
also argues that the pressure of news deadlines and the importance of obtaining information 
rich in news values, encourages dependency upon official sources, whether they be 
government departments, sources associated with parliaments and the formal policy-making 
process, the police or the other state social control agencies. These institutions, he points out, 
are likely to be newsworthy because they are powerful and affect the daily lives of audiences. 
As a result, this may privilege the powerful in a routine and systematic manner with regards 
to the stuggle over news agenda. As I noted in chapter 1, religious institutions are powerful in 
Nigeria and by relying so closely on them as primary sources of information in the reportage 
of ethno-religious conflicts, the Nigerian press is in danger of unwittingly communicating 
“biased perception” or “outright lies” and thus further obscuring the issues underlying the 
conflicts.  
Table 3.7: Sources of News/Reports 
Sources of News/Reports 
S/N Source Total Frequency Total % 
1 Official Sources 354 39.1 
2 Religious Organizations 150 16.6 
3 Civil Society 163 18.0 
4 Newspaper 157 17.3 
5 Wire Service/News Agencies 20 2.2 
6 Unattributed/Other 62 6.8 
Total 906 100.0 
 
3.3  Quality of Reportage 
The discussion above has focused attention on issues that directly or indirectly impact 
coverage and have implications for textual content. Of particular interest are the indices 
associated with the ethnic and gender profile of reporters, sources of story, and prominence 
given to stories. I will now focus on the quality of reportage and explore the issue of 
partisanship and bias in reportage, language and tone of presentation and the 
contextualisation of issues and the implications of these for content.  
3.3.1   Partisanship and Bias in Reportage 
 
According to Lee and Maslog (2005: 370), partisanship is bias for one party in a conflict. Peh 
and Melkote (1991: 60) see bias as the unbalanced presentation of facts and opinions. This, 
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they explain, manifests in different ways, such as source bias, unbalanced presentation of 
controversial issues, emphasis on the exceptional event rather than the process or context, the 
frequent use of packaged formula, selection and omission of information and frequent 
reliance on partisan sources such as official communiques, press releases, speeches and 
interviews with leaders. I have coded for four of the features of news bias outlined by Peh 
and Melkote, including unbalanced presentation of issues; source-bias and reliance on 
partisan sources, and emphasis on the exceptional rather than the process or context.  
Table 3.8 shows that 40% of all stories published by the four newspapers on the conflict were 
reported or written from a partisan standpoint. A comparative analysis of the newspapers on 
this score however reveals some striking differences.  As is evident from Table 3.9 Daily 
Trust and Nigerian Tribune, the two regionally-oriented newspapers, have a much higher 
percentage of partisan stories than the two nationally-oriented papers. Up to 55% of Daily 
Trust’s reports are partisan while Nigerian Tribune has 41% partisan reports.  This compares 
sharply with The Guardian where only 22% of reports are adjudged partisan and This Day 
which has 37%. 
An issue that I investigated was whether there was any relationship between story type and 
balance.  Appendix 10 shows that out of 393 news stories, 136 or 35% were partisan, while 
38% of 21 editorials were partisan. For features it is 47% while ‘others’ is 66%.  From this 
analysis, it can be deduced that there is no marked difference between the major categories. It 
is not surprising if features and editorials are biased or partisan, but more difficult to explain 
is why such a relatively large percentage of news reports are partisan. Again, it is to be 
observed that news stories and editorials have similar balance profile, suggesting that the 
editorial posturing of a newspaper greatly shapes news content. This calls to question the 
notions of objectivity in news reportage.  
The category “other” has the highest partisanship profile of 66% (Table 19) which is 
explained by the fact that this category of reports is made up mainly of advertorials/paid press 
statements and of letters to the editor. While publication of letters to the editor is at the 
discretion of the newspaper, there is a contractual obligation to publish advertorials as they 
are paid for. Therefore I consider it important to discuss this feature of newspapers in some 
depth. I observed that advertorials on ethno-religious conflicts are usually placed by 
interested persons and organizations who, in several cases, take extremist and/or emotional 
positions on issues in the conflicts. Advertorials are a prominent feature of Nigerian 
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newspapers and are often used by protagonists in ethno-religious conflicts to put forward 
their points of view unedited. A few examples below will illustrate this point.  
On December 19, 2008, an advertorial was published on page 36 of Daily Trust thus: 
Re: The position of Pentecostal Fellowship of Nigeria Plateau State Chapter 
on the recent political ethnic/religious crisis in Jos – Putting the records 
straight (Daily Trust, 19/12/2008). 
This full page advertorial was sponsored by a Muslim organisation as a rejoinder to certain 
issues addressed in an earlier advertorial by one of the major Christian groups in Nigeria, the 
Pentecostal Fellowship of Nigeria, with respect to the November 2008 crisis in Jos. This 
rejoinder accused the earlier write up as being “biased and malicious trite” and “a calculated 
attempt to divert attention from the second attempted genocide on the Hausa/Fulani of Jos”. 
A similar full page advertorial was sponsored by the Muslim Students Society of Nigeria 
(MSSN) in Daily Trust of 5 January 2011 with the title: “YOWICAN AND THE 
CHALLENGE OF PEACE IN NIGERIA” (see Appendix 16 for the full text). This 
advertorial was said to be a response by the Muslim students to a news report credited to the 
youth wing of the Christian Association of Nigeria in Plateau State on the worsening security 
situation in Jos. The Muslim youth, in the advertorial, expressed consternation at the 
“unsubstantiated cum dangerous allegations by various Christian groups against Nigerian 
Muslims.” The organisation said it had hitherto kept mute “in the belief that silence is usually 
the best answer to those groundless claims.” It said however that, “given the sensitivity of 
some of the allegations made by Youth Wing of the Christian Association of Nigeria 
(YOWICAN), we deem it necessary to clarify some issues for the avoidance of doubt and in 
the interest of peace and harmonious co-existence in our dear nation.” The advertorial 
accused the Christian youth of being disrespectful to the leader of Nigerian Muslims. It 
claimed further that the Christians, by their assertions exhibited a “combination of shallow-
mindedness, intellectual immaturity as well as religious extremism and unwarranted 
chauvinism”. They were a gang of youth “with a staunch hatred and prejudice against 
Muslims and Islam.”  
Drawing from my own experience in newspaper journalism in Nigeria, I know that the tone 
and wordings of these advertorials, if submitted as news or press releases, would have been 
moderated and edited. However, they escaped such gate-keeping and professional moderation 
by being published unedited as advertorials. This is because, as essentially marketing 
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products, advertorials do not necessarily come to the attention of the editors but secure the 
rite of passage to the public sphere through the commercial route. 
On December 10, 2008, an advertorial was published in This Day newspaper being the text of 
a press conference addressed by a member of the Nigerian Federal Legislature representing 
Jos South/Jos East Constituency in the House of Representatives. The full page advertorial 
was a response to what the writer described as a “biased, provocative and vexatious editorial” 
opinion published by Daily Trust newspaper on the November 2008 Jos crisis. According to 
the advertorial, the editorial opinion fell below the professional standards and should have 
been titled, “Jos sectarian crisis: the Hausa Muslim community view.” The advertorial 
challenged all the claims made by Daily Trust newspaper in the editorial  and further raised 
issues regarding what was perceived in some circles as a partisan response by the Presidency 
to the crisis in Jos: 
If the Berom/Christian community is backed by the Plateau State Government, 
who then is backing the Hausa/Muslim Community? Is it the Local or Federal 
Government? Does this explain the frightening media report that a sitting 
governor is refused audience by Mr. Rule of Law?
7
  
There are many other advertorials levelling and trading accusations against one group or the 
other or written as rejoinder to previously published articles in any newspaper. Two examples 
cited below are apt: 
On Friday 26 August 2011, an organisation owned by a Hausa/Fulani put out an advertorial 
in Daily Trust newspaper titled:  
Advertorial: Plateau State Government, Berom Traditional Rulers and Some 
Security Agents are behind the Jos crisis (Daily Trust, 26 August 2011, p.52). 
This advertorial alleged that the State governor was taking sides with his Berom ethnic group 
against the Hausa/Fulani Muslims and was partisan in his approach to governance. It cited 
instances in which Hausa/Fulani were attacked or dispossessed of their cows and the state 
government did nothing whereas anytime there was an attack on any Berom community, the 
state governor would personally show up to express sympathy and concern. For this 
                                                          
7
 President Umaru Musa Yar’Adua (2007-2010) made the rule of law a cornerstone of his administration. 
Therefore referring to him in the write-up as “Mr Rule of Law” was a type of sarcasm to challenge what the 
writer perceived as an inconsistency on the part of the President in adhering to rule of law and dealing evenly 
and transparently with all the parties to the conflict. 
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organisation, the problem on the Plateau was traceable to the governor’s biased 
administration and the hatred of his kinsmen against Hausa/Fulani. 
A few days later, on Friday 9 September 2011, another organisation, the Berom Youth 
Movement, predictably issued a rejoinder in the form of an advertorial in another newspaper, 
This Day newspaper (page 50). The advertorial was titled: 
Re: Plateau State Government, Berom Traditional Rulers and some Security 
agents are behind the Jos crisis (This Day, 9 September 2011, p.50). 
As expected, this full-page rejoinder attempted to counter the allegations raised against the 
Berom and Governor Jang in the earlier publication that they were the perpetrators of the 
conflicts. More than that, however, the write-up also tried to establish a wider historical and 
national context to the conflicts in Jos by associating them with the Danfodio Islamic Jihad 
and alleged contemporary religious and territorial hegemony by the Hausa/Fulani. According 
to the advertorial: 
The Jos Plateau…has always been the main target of attacks by the 
Hausa/Fulani due to the serenity of its environment, weather and the desire to 
impose Islam on (the) diverse inhabitants of the Middle Belt on their way to 
southern part of the country for the same purpose… What is more, some 
Southern States of the country have also tasted the bitter pill of the 
Hausa/Fulani aggression. 
Another advertorial by the Jam’atul Nasril Islam, a very powerful Islamic group, in Daily 
Trust (17/01/2011) lamented alleged secret killing and disappearance of over 50 Muslims in 
Jos North and asserted that the state governor was personally responsible:  
The Jam’atul Nasril Islam (JNI) is dismayed by and condemns in no uncertain 
terms these wanton acts of murder and violence. It is our wish to reiterate that 
we hold the Plateau State Government and governor Jonah Jang squarely 
responsible… (Daily Trust, 17 January, 2011).  
On 28 January 2010, a little-known organisation which styled itself as the “Movement for the 
survival of the Plateau (MASSOP)” placed an advertorial in This Day newspaper, raising 
alarm on “Another attack on Jos.” Conversely, on 3 March 2010, a Hausa/Fulani group 
placed an advertorial in Daily Trust titled: Plateau ardos (Fulani chiefs) allege genocide 
against their people by Berom terrorists (Daily Trust, 03 March, 2010).  
A few things are noticeable from the on-going discussions about advertorials in Nigerian 
newspapers on the subject of ethno-religious conflicts. First, is the regular and prominent use 
of advertorials by interest groups in the conflicts in Jos to assert or challenge facts and 
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opinions which constitute the critical issues in the conflicts. For example, within the 
2010/2011 sample frame, 10 advertorials were published within a four week period. 
Secondly, these advertorials are published unedited and size and placement within the 
newspaper are determined strictly by what is paid for. Thirdly, any person or group of 
persons or interest group with financial capacity can buy up space in a newspaper to publish 
their point of view on an issue, no matter how contentious or inflammatory. Fourthly, 
advertorials on the conflicts are published unedited even when the script is poorly written and 
riddled with errors of grammar and tenses as can be seen in a few of them. Fifthly, as can be 
noticed from the examples cited, with a few exceptions, advertorials are usually placed in 
newspapers perceived as either favourable to, or at least not antagonistic of, the cause of 
those canvassing the issues in the write-up. Thus advertorials may serve to reinforce existing 
media narratives and perpetuate partisan perceptions. Finally, the prevalence of advertorials 
on the conflicts suggests the seriousness with which interest groups seek to deploy the 
perceived power of the press in support of their cause. This aligns with findings by Kothari 
(2010: 221) that people in conflict situations struggle to get media attention as a strategy for 
gaining favourable outcomes.  
Perhaps to stem possible excesses associated with advertorials, the management of the Daily 
Trust newspaper issued a “Policy on publication of Advertorials, Petitions and Related 
Materials” (Friday December 31, 2010, p.60) in which the newspaper organisation attempted 
to balance “our desire to give voice to the concerns of the voiceless and to protect public 
officers and institutions from unfair and demoralising attacks.” The newspaper said it took 
“very seriously its responsibility to the public to publish all points of view, including those 
we do not share,” insisting that this was the function of an independent, liberal newspaper 
dedicated to the pursuit of the common good. The paper however asserted that it was also 
aware that “professional agitators” can utilise the pages on newspapers to malign people and 
institutions on “spurious grounds.” On this basis, the  
Table 3.8: Story Balance 
S/N Category Total Frequency Total % 
1 Partisan 246 39.9 
2 Non-Partisan 371 60.1 
 Total 617 100.0 
 
 
- 130 - 
 
Table 3.9: Comparative Analysis of Story Balance 
Comparative analysis of story balance 
S/N Category 
Daily 
Trust 
Nigeria 
Tribune Guardian This Day 
Total 
Frequency Total % 
1 Partisan 107 62 30 49 248 40.2 
2 Non-Partisan 89 88 107 85 369 59.8 
 
Total 196 150 137 134 617 100.0 
 
Total % 31.8 24.3 22.2 21.7 100.0 
 
 
Management of the newspaper issued what it described as “a more stringent policy” for 
placing advertorials and petitions (see Figure 3.1). 
The policy requires that writers of advertorials disclose their full identity, and must also 
“substantiate” any accusations made in their write-ups “with evidence which can stand before 
a court of law.” The company, according to the policy, reserves the right to “reject any piece 
considered to be libellous, containing assertions without supporting facts and figures.” In the 
alternative, however, the company is prepared “to enter into an indemnity agreement” with 
the authors of such advertorials that it may perceive to be baseless, libellous or fictitious, 
“which will put the onus of proof squarely on them.” The newspaper company stressed its 
resolve “not to shy away from publishing fair and balanced criticisms of any government or 
individuals, which is in the nature of free exchange of ideas.”  
The policy on advertorials by the Daily Trust is a creative attempt to curtail the publication of 
frivolous and unsubstantiated materials in the guise of advertorials. However, it has not 
completely addressed the fundamental problem of the possibility that individuals or 
organisations could, through the commercial route, effect the publication of fictitious, 
libellous or inflammatory content on the pages of the newspaper once they indemnify the 
newspaper. 
From a critical political economy perspective, advertorials constitute vital sources of revenue 
for the media. While they provide opportunity for people to air their opinions, they may also 
contradict the principle of free flow of information among citizens by giving wealthy 
individuals or organisations undue advantage in public discourse as they can easily buy up 
space and time to propagate their philosophy and world view. This discussion therefore 
highlights the tight-rope media organisations must navigate between editorial concerns and 
commercial imperatives in the operations of newspapers. 
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This section has discussed bias and partisanship in news reportage in the coverage of ethno-
religious conflicts. The data shows that a high percentage of reports and stories published on 
the incidents were partisan. Partisanship was associated particularly with the newspapers that 
had overt regional inclinations. The study finds no marked difference between story type and 
balance in presentation, raising questions on the issue objectivity in news reportage. Another 
finding is the prominent use of advertorials by conflict protagonists to propagate their 
opinions in Nigerian newspapers.  
3.3.2   Language and Tone 
Sensationalism has been described as “attention-grabbing news” (Anderson and Alan, 2008: 
487), reports published or written in a manner primarily to boost sales rather than reporting 
that informs the readers about the significant issues of the day. Sensationalism places 
emphasis on the wrong elements and misleads the public. And as Anderson and Alan (2008: 
487) observe, “news that misleads the public prevents it from accurately determining which 
course of action to take…Important news can be trivialised and trivial matters given undue 
attention.” This section examines the use of language and considers whether a story is 
couched in sensational or moderate tone. Table 3.10 indicates that almost 50% of all stories 
published by the newspapers on the issue are sensational in nature. Stories are considered as 
sensational if they are one-sided, speculative and/or published without attempts to verify or 
interrogate facts or claims. A comparative analysis of the newspapers’ language use however 
reveals that the Nigerian Tribune and Daily Trust, both regionally-oriented papers, have 
relatively higher proportions of sensational reports.  Nigerian Tribune has 63% while that of 
Daily Trust is 58% as shown on Table 3.12. The Guardian and This Day have fewer incidents 
of sensational stories at 30% and 43% respectively.  
An element of unbalanced presentation of facts and opinions relate to the emphasis on the 
exceptional rather than a focus on context and process. This section therefore discusses 
contextualisation of issues, that is, whether the pattern of coverage pays due attention to root 
causes or is concentrated on immediate events. Table 3.11 reveals that 62% of all the reports 
focused on the immediate events and did not attempt to explain the root causes and context of 
the conflict.  This finding is in line with research evidence that the press, in covering 
conflicts, focuses on events rather than context (Kothari, 2010). Kothari quotes Boykoff and 
Boykoff (2007) who define first order journalistic norms as a preference for the novel and 
dramatic in news stories, personalised to provide a human interest angle. By impacting on 
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news production and the content of the story, these norms lead to the omission of information 
about the context, another element of partisanship. A combination of sensational and event-
focused reporting results in largely superficial reportage lacking in critical analysis and 
reflection.  
3.3.3   Spotlight of partisan and sensational reports 
The analysis of data in this chapter so far indicates that much of the coverage of ethno-
religious conflict by the newspapers in the study is partisan and superficial. I will now 
highlight and discuss a few examples of partisan and superficial reports from the papers. I 
begin with a front page lead story by the Nigerian Tribune of 29 September 2001 which 
reads: 
“Ex-Head of State, Governor behind Jos massacre” (Nigerian Tribune, Sept 
29, 2001, front page lead). 
 
Although a high sounding, authoritative headline, the report itself is speculative with no 
credible investigation by the newspaper. The story is said to emanate from a position paper 
prepared by some unnamed stakeholders called “the larger Jos/Bukuru residents.” In its lead 
paragraph, the story claimed that a former head of state of Nigeria, acting in concert with a 
serving civilian state governor sponsored and provided logistics for the Muslim 
fundamentalists who caused recent mayhem in Jos and Bukuru metropolis. However, the 
report provided no credible evidence to support this assertion. In the third paragraph, the 
report alleged that embattled residents of Jos/Bukuru told the Plateau State chapter of the 
National Orientation Agency (NOA) that the ex-general “was sighted in Jos on Thursday and 
Friday, September 6 and 7, 2001 visiting leaders of the Hausa/Fulani communities to provide 
support in the planned violent clash.” The newspaper presented the report as if these were 
established facts, not mere allegations contained in a report prepared two days after a major 
incident of riots in which many people were killed. Indeed, the report did not use the word 
“alleged” or “allegation” or such other caveats normally employed in reports of this nature to 
create some distance, but chose to be affirmative in the apparent endorsement of the 
“submission.” In paragraph 4, the report accused the (incumbent) governor of providing 
logistics for the movement of selected soldiers from Bauchi to Jos to support the planned 
violent clash between the Muslims and the Christians. 
 
Those who are familiar with Nigerian politics are likely to immediately guess who the “ex-
head of state” and the “incumbent governor” refer to. There was however no attempt by the 
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newspaper to obtain their own side of the story to such sensitive allegations. This is an 
example of sensational reporting based on rumour and unverified or out rightly misleading 
information which would contribute little to explicating the situation. This is capable of 
escalating the conflicts.  
 
On September 6, 2001 (p.4), Nigerian Tribune published a story with the headline: “Tension 
mounts in Jos over council’s status.” This story raised the alarm that the “prevailing peaceful 
atmosphere in Jos, capital of Plateau State, might be punctured as the Hausa/Fulani 
community under the aegis of Jasawa Development Association and Plateau State Youth 
Council, are set for a show down over the indigenous right of Jos North local government 
area.” The narrative of this highly contentious story which was published coincidentally just 
one day before the riots of September 7, 2001 however made attributions to only one of the 
parties, the Plateau Youth Council, and in paragraph 5, apparently takes sides with the party 
making the allegations by stating that they “tendered” documents which “support” 
incitements by the other party without telling readers the source or authenticity of such 
documents. According to the report, “the chairman of the youth council … tendered a ten-
page document to support an inciting material from the Hausa/Fulani community in the 
council.” Also, “exhibits” were tendered including “hand written inscriptions” such as ‘vote 
for Muslim party’ and the Hausa inscription ‘zabi jam’yar Musulumi kada kuzabi krista yayi 
mulkin wanna kassa Nigeria’” (vote only Muslims, don’t vote Christians to govern Nigeria). 
By its manner of reportage, the newspaper appeared, wittingly or unwittingly, to have 
endorsed the authenticity of the documents including the “hand written” ones. Published one 
day before the eruption, this reportage may not have assisted much in clarifying the issues to 
the average reader.   
On December 28, 2010, Daily Trust published a lead story on the front page with the caption, 
“14 Jos clashes victims get mass burial.” The story opened with the lead: “Fourteen people 
killed in Sunday’s ethno-religious clashes in Jos were buried in mass graves yesterday. The 
fourteen, among them a teenage boy, were killed in the attacks triggered by the Christmas 
Eve bombings in the Plateau State capital.” For a lead story on an incident in which both 
Muslims and Christian were killed, and given the volatility of the situation, it is surprising 
that the newspaper used only one source, an Islamic religious organization, making it appear 
as though there were only Muslim casualties. Similarly in paragraph 3, the report quoted the 
officials of Jam’atul Nasril Islam (JNI), which disclosed that several other people were at 
various hospitals receiving treatment for injuries they sustained, ranging from gunshots, 
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machete cuts and fire burns during the Sunday violence. This report indicates bias in 
selection of details featured as it omits information on casualties of other faiths. It also shows 
source-bias in relying on partisan sources for information. This is capable of creating the 
impression that only Muslims were killed in the fracas, thereby raising religious tensions.  
 
Another story from Daily Trust Sunday edition of January 9, 2011, with the banner headline: 
“Jos Erupts Again.” This story evidences elements of source-bias and unbalanced 
presentation of controversial issues. The report, in explaining some security breaches in the 
state capital, quotes only Muslim sources and publishes only names of Muslim casualties. In 
the lead, it said, “Jos the Plateau state capital, erupted again yesterday following a report that 
eight persons who were returning from a wedding ceremony in Mangu Local Government 
Area were killed”. The second paragraph questions the accuracy of this story by providing 
information which suggested that the panic was occasioned by a political rally:  
 
Another version, however, had it that the panic in Jos was as a result of the 
Congress for Progressive Change (CPC) ward congress going on in the state 
and that crisis had started when the venue for the congress was changed. 
 
The report said the police “confirmed both versions” but continued the one-sided narrative 
which attributes the violence to the alleged killings. It named the Muslim casualties but said 
nothing about those who were killed as a result of the burning of the luxurious bus, likely to 
be southerners and Christians. The report quoted the Ulama’a elders Council (an Islamic 
organization), which “corroborated the story,” and lamented the killings, saying the attack on 
Muslims in Jos had assumed an alarming proportion.  
 
 
 
The Guardian front page report of 13 September, 2001 with the caption: “Jos boils again, 
residents take refuge in Army barracks” exhibited source-bias in citing only the leadership of 
the Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN) while leaving out Muslim sources in a conflict 
involving people of all faiths, Christians, Muslims and others. This is more so as the Christian 
body had made serious allegations against Muslim sects. The report which followed “a chat” 
with the Guardian correspondent, quoted the Secretary-General of CAN as “blaming the 
attacks on Nigeria’s continued membership of the Organisation of Islamic Conference 
(OIC).” There were both Christian and Muslim casualties in this incident, but above report 
skews the information in a way that creates the impression as though only Christians were 
affected. The one-sided emphasis slant is inimical to fairness and balance, hallmarks of good 
journalism.  
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Although objectivity is a cardinal value of journalism, it has been found that the individual 
biases and motives of journalists and their sources do impact coverage of conflicts (Kothari, 
2010: 211.) With particular respect to the Nigerian press, scholars like Yusha’u (2009) and 
Galadima (2010) have attempted to establish a relationship between the regional and religions 
identity of reporters and patterns of coverage of national issues such as ethno-religious 
conflicts. I therefore return, at this point, to the issue, to what extent, regional identity may 
have impacted content in the reportage of ethno-religious conflicts under study. What is 
evident from this research, first of all, is that the two regionally oriented newspapers have a 
predominance of reporters and writers from their respective regions. The other two papers, 
with respect to the writers on this issue, have a more balanced staff reportorial team in regard 
to regional mix.  Secondly, I have also observed that the two regionally oriented newspapers 
have a preponderance of partisan and sensational stories.  It would therefore seem to suggest 
some type of relationship between regional identity and reportage.  
 
However I need to point out that the state correspondents of The Guardian and This Day 
newspapers for most of the study period were Muslims from the Middle Belt of the northern 
region.
8
 Again, one of the two state correspondents of Daily Trust for a good period of the 
study period was a Christian, while the other was a Muslim.
9
 These facts do not seem to have 
altered or affected the overall pattern of reportage. I therefore conclude that the regional 
and/or religious identity of reporters alone would be insufficient explanation for editorial 
outcomes in the coverage of ethno-religious conflicts. Other factors, such as ownership, 
editorial philosophy, target audience and market forces as well as the preponderance of 
staffing profile at the headquarters are also very important in determining content. This is 
confirmed by the observation of Salawu (2009) that Nigerian newspapers narrate stories and 
comments based on their ethnic identity which itself is determined by the location of its 
headquarters, the ethnic identity of the publisher and the main market it seeks to cultivate.  
 
 
                                                          
8
 The Plateau State correspondent of the Guardian for the entire study period was Isa Abdulsalami, a Muslim 
from Kogi State while that of This Day for most of the period was Seriki Adinoyi with a similar profile.  
_____________________________________ 
9
 The Plateau State correspondents of Daily Trust between 2010 and 2011 were Andrew Agbese, a Christian 
from Benue State and Mahmod Lalo, a Muslim from the far north. 
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Table 3.10: Language and tone 
Language and Tone 
S/N Category Total 
Frequency 
Total % 
1 Sensational/Inflammatory 307 49.8 
2 Moderate 310 50.2 
 
Total 617 100.0 
 
Table 3.11: Bacground/Context 
Background/Context 
S/N Category Total Frequency Total % 
1 Immediate Focus 381 61.8 
2 Root Causes 236 38.2 
 
Total 617 100.0 
 
Table 3.12: Comparative Analysis of Language and Tone 
Comparative Analysis of Language and Tone 
S/N Category Daily 
Trust 
Nigeria 
Tribune 
Guardian This 
Day 
Total % 
1. Sensational/Inflammatory 113 
58% 
95 
63% 
41 
30% 
58 
43% 
 
49.8 
2. Moderate 83 
52% 
56 
37% 
95 
70% 
76 
57% 
 
50.2 
 Total 196 151 136 134 100.0 
 Total % 100% 100% 100% 100%  
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Figure 3.1: Daily Trust’s Policy on Publication of Advertorials and Petitions 
 
 
 
3.4  Summary  
 
This chapter has explored the trends and patterns of reportage of Nigerian newspapers in the 
coverage of ethno-religious conflicts. Employing quantitative content analysis, it examined 
basic reportorial issues as well as the quality of coverage of the conflicts. Through this, I have 
been able to establish and delineate the practices of the Nigerian press in mediation of 
sectarian conflicts. First amongst these is that ethno-religious conflicts enjoy wide coverage 
by the press. Furthermore, the press is proactive in scanning the environment and forecasting 
important issues in the polity. This confirms what is already known about the Nigeria press, 
that it is vibrant and active in discussing national issues. Another important finding is that in 
reporting conflicts, the press relies mainly on in-house resources in terms of reporters and 
correspondents. Contrary to what has been suggested elsewhere however (Obijiofor, 2009; 
Galadima, 2010), this study finds that the regional identity of reporters is not a major factor in 
the overall pattern of coverage. Other factors, such as ownership and the editorial philosophy 
of the newspaper are important considerations in the overall outcomes of coverage. The 
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chapter further noted that coverage of ethno-religious conflicts is an almost exclusively male 
preserve as female reporters and correspondents are absent or present only in negligible 
numbers. The female voice and perspectives are therefore silent in media discourse of ethno-
religious conflicts. This has important implications for the direction and quality of reportage. 
The chapter also confirms the widespread elite-dependence as sources of news and the 
relative neglect of alternative voices in the narrative of ethno-religious conflicts. In this 
respect, the practice of relying on partisan sources, particularly religious leaders, has serious 
implications for the ability of the press to report in a manner that would assist in identifying 
the root causes of the conflicts and the measures for their resolution. An interesting feature of 
reportage is the prominent use of advertorials by protagonists of conflicts to canvass their 
views or to challenge opinions expressed by opponents. I observe that the nature and 
frequency of advertorials could serve to reinforce existing media narratives and perpetuate 
partisan perceptions and therefore obviate the search for the resolution of conflicts.  
Therefore, the policy of moderating such advertorials in crisis reporting, as initiated by one of 
the newspapers in the survey, is a move to be encouraged. 
With respect to the overall quality of reportage, the chapter observed that a high proportion of 
stories published on the conflicts are partisan and sensational, lacking in depth and critical 
analysis. Partisanship is particularly manifested in bias in selection of sources and omission 
of information about context. Several stories reviewed used one-sided sources and opinions 
or published rumours and unverified or distorted information without any critical 
investigation. These practices would contribute little to explicating or clarifying the situation 
to enable readers better understand the root causes of ethno-religious conflicts and the 
choices before them in resolving such conflicts. I therefore argue that the general quality of 
reportage is more likely to contribute to escalating, rather than minimising the conflicts. 
However, quantitative analysis which the chapter has employed did not provide much scope 
for in-depth textual analysis which would shed greater light on some of the issues highlighted 
by this chapter. This is the task I undertake in the next chapter which employs qualitative 
methods to enable deeper exploration of the latent content of textual matter in order to better 
understand the mediation of ethno-religious conflicts by the Nigerian press.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
FRAMING AND REPRESENTATION OF ETHNO-RELIGIOUS CONFLICTS BY 
THE NIGERIAN PRESS 
4.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter provided a broad overview of the pattern of coverage of ethno-religious 
conflicts by the Nigerian press, accomplished primarily through the examination of numeric 
data from quantitative content analysis. This focused mainly on the physical properties of text 
and the generalisations deducible therefrom. As I pointed out in chapter two however, 
physical properties of text in themselves cannot tell the whole story. There is need to also 
focus on the latent content of textual matter in order to understand and contextualise 
meanings (McQuail, 2005; May, 2001). This chapter therefore examines the detailed 
strategies and styles employed by the newspapers in the reportage of ethno-religious 
conflicts. Two qualitative methods, framing analysis and critical discourse analysis, are 
employed in this regard. The overall objective of the chapter is to answer the second research 
question posed by this study: 
What media frames and representations of ethno-religious conflicts are 
discernible from the press in Nigeria and what insights could these provide 
into our understanding of such conflicts? 
Furthermore, the chapter contributes to the understanding of the mediation of ethno-religious 
conflicts in Nigeria and the role of such mediation in escalating or minimising the conflicts. 
As Richardson (2007: 7-8) argues, journalism, more than any other form of communication, 
has the power to shape our understanding about events, ideas, people and the relationship 
between them.  For this reason, Richardson canvasses the need to investigate, not only the 
function of journalism, but also the form and content of the messages it conveys and the 
discourse processes through which such messages are produced and consumed. This will 
reveal how newspaper texts may be implicated in the production and reproduction of social 
inequalities and provide tools for describing and accounting for language and methods of 
analysis and critique in order to become more critical of newspaper discourse.  
This explanation provides a context for approaching the second research question. I have 
utilised both framing analysis and critical discourse analysis as analytical tools in a two-step 
process. In the first part of the chapter, I outline the sizing and thematic frames and discuss in 
detail the textual or stylistic frames utilised in the coverage. The second part employs critical 
discourse analysis (CDA) to discuss the representation of ethno-religious conflicts by the 
- 140 - 
 
Nigerian press. In this respect, the thematic frames identified in the framing analysis provide 
the major planks around which the CDA is woven. Observations and conclusions are then 
drawn from the analyses to provide greater understanding of the mediation of ethno-religious 
conflicts by the Nigerian press.  
4.2  Framing of Ethno-Religious Conflicts 
Framing addresses the issue of salience in a communication text. It implies the processes in 
which a story is organised to convey a central organising idea or specific story line (Entman, 
1993; Lee, 2010). Through framing, it is possible to discern a newspaper’s definition of a 
particular reality and how it evaluates or treats issues around such reality. In conducting a 
framing analysis of the coverage of ethno-religious conflicts by Nigerian newspapers, I seek 
to understand the central ideas which drive media narrative of these conflicts, what issues 
stand out in the perception of the newspapers, the differences and similarities in such 
perceptions and the implications of these for providing analysis and solutions to the 
problems. I have organised the framing analysis in two parts. The first part considered the 
sizing and thematic aspects of framing, which enabled me to identify the relative importance 
accorded the issue and the frameworks within which it is discussed. The second part dwells 
on the textual or stylistic framing, that is, the detailed editorial and other devices employed to 
convey meaning consistent with the central idea.  
4.2.1 Sizing/thematic Framing 
Frame sizing addresses the overall salience of the event in the flow of news – how much 
material is devoted to the event and how prominently it is displayed (Entman, 1991: 9). 
Consistent with conventional journalistic practice, the most important stories are placed either 
on the front or back pages of Nigerian newspapers. Table 4.1 shows in percentages the 
placement of the stories within the four newspapers being studied, indicating that over a third 
of all the items within the study period were placed on the front and back pages. Table 4.2 
focuses on the frame sizes according to the incidents of ethno-religious conflicts surveyed. 
The 2008 episode had almost 40 percent of the stories on the front and back pages within the 
three week period of analysis. None of the episodes had less than 30 percent of the coverage 
displayed on the front and back covers. All the newspapers devoted almost equal attention to 
the issue, suggesting that it was regarded as a matter of critical importance by the press. The 
volume of coverage may also be explained by the fact that ethno-religious conflicts contain 
what Boykoff and Boykoff (2007) describe as “first order journalistic norms,” that is, a 
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preference for the novel and dramatic in news stories, personalized to provide a human 
interest angle. Ethno-religious conflicts also command serious attention in Nigeria because, 
as earlier explained in chapter one, ethnic and religious boundaries coincide in many parts of 
Nigeria. This makes conflicts with such colouration easily combustible, with a capacity to 
spread across the nation in the form of retaliatory attacks. 
Beyond the frame’s size are the specific messages and explanations adduced by the 
newspapers as responsible for the conflicts. This is what this study refers to as thematic 
framing. Three dominant frames are observable from the table: “religious conflict” (31%) 
“security/law and order” (28%) and “ethnic conflict” (20%). The others are “political 
manipulation” (14%), “socio-economic conflict” (4%) and “citizenship question” (3%). 
These themes will be discussed in detail within the CDA.   
Table 4.1: Placement of Stories within the Newspapers 
Placement of Stories within the Newspapers 
S/N Placement of Story Total Frequency Total % 
1 Front/Back Pages 208 34 
2 Inside Page 409 66 
3 Total 617 100 
 
Table 4.2: Placement of Stories according to Incidents of Ethno-religious Conflicts  
S/No. Placement of 
Story 
Sept. 2001 Nov. 2008 Jan/Mar 
2010 
Christmas 
2010 
Eid-el-Fitr 
2011 
Total 
Frequency 
Total % 
1 Front/Back 
Pages 
38 (37%) 40 (39%) 74 (33%) 31 (30%) 25 (30%) 208 34 
2 Inside page 66 (63%) 63 (61%) 149 (67%) 73 (70%) 58 (70%) 409 66 
 Total 104(100%) 103(100%) 223(100%) 104(100%) 83 (100%) 617 100 
 
4.2.2 Textual Framing 
Textual frames, having to do with the properties of news narratives, considers, amongst other 
things, the key words, metaphors and concepts employed in the various texts. As Entman 
(1993: 7) explains, narrative finally consists of nothing more than words and visual images. 
Therefore, it is possible to detect frames by probing for particular words and visual images 
that appear consistently in a narrative and convey thematically consonant meanings across 
media and time. In detecting textual execution of frames, Entman also makes a case for 
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comparing media narratives of events that could have been reported similarly. This, he 
argues, helps to reveal the critical textual choices that framed the story but which could have 
remained submerged in an undifferentiated text. He insists that unless narratives are 
compared, frames are difficult to detect fully and reliably, because the framing devices can 
appear as natural choices of words or images. Comparison, however, would help to establish 
that such choices are not “inevitable or unproblematic but rather are central to the way the 
news frame helps establish the ‘common sense’ or widespread interpretation” (Entman, 
1993:6). Following Entman, therefore, I engaged in comparative textual analysis of two 
newspapers in the study which mirror the north-south geopolitical trajectory of Nigeria. The 
newspapers are the Daily Trust and the Nigerian Tribune. I also focused on the reportage of 
the November 2008 episode of ethno-religious conflicts which was triggered by elections into 
the Jos North Local Government Area. The results of the elections were disputed, leading to 
protests that degenerated into riots, killings, arson and destruction of property. Over 400 
persons were reported killed in the incident. This analysis utilizes opinion articles as these 
can more directly reveal the editorial posture of the newspapers. (See Appendix 4 – Synopsis 
of Opinion Articles).  
Table 4.3 shows key words and concepts employed by the newspapers in their various write-
ups. In order to create a structure for the analysis, I have grouped these key words and 
concepts under three major headings of Results, Responsibility and Remedy for the conflicts. 
In the first category, words and concepts describing the damage or effects of the conflict are 
categorised under ‘Results of the Conflict.’ The second category are words or concepts 
related to liability or agency, that is, who did it, and these are grouped under ‘Responsibility 
for the Conflicts’ while words and concepts suggesting the way forward to prevent future 
conflicts are classified under ‘Remedy for future conflicts.’ 
4.2.2. (a) Results of the Conflicts 
The first category of key words and concepts are those which describe the destruction and 
damage caused by the conflicts. Daily Trust employs frequently such words as carnage, 
epidemic, mayhem, insanity, cold blooded murder. Nigerian Tribune uses words and 
concepts like barbarians/barbarity, mayhem, orgy of violence, deadly onslaught, dangerous 
weapons, hacked down, tears, slaughter, and murder. The list above suggests a commonality 
of perception that the conflict/riots have inflicted significant and avoidable damage to lives 
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and property. This is not surprising as Alubo (2011) estimates over 500,000 people killed 
within the first few years of democratic rule in Nigeria and likens the situation to a civil war. 
However, a critical reading shows that there are marked differences in the accounts of the 
newspapers regarding the types of persons or property reported or emphasized as affected by 
the riots. The overall textual framing device in Daily Trust’s narrative of the November 2008 
conflict conveys the message that the conflict is carnage targeted at Hausa/Fulani Muslims 
who are the main victims. The narrative also emphasizes the political economy dimensions of 
the conflicts as it focused primarily on issues of economic relationships between the various 
ethnic groups in Jos. A few examples of narratives producing this picture would illustrate the 
point. A story published December 5, 2008, (page 13) with the headline: “Jos Massacre, Our 
Government’s Folly?” dwelt essentially on the losses suffered by the Hausa and the relative 
differences in wealth distribution between the Hausa and the indigenes. According to the 
paper,  
Looking through a report carried on NTA and AIT televisions, the choice or 
selection of the businesses destroyed in Jos leaves no one in doubt as to 
motive and economic warfare waged against the Hausa Muslims…  
The author then admonishes “the natives in Plateau State (to) understand that no Hausa or 
Fulani is responsible for the poverty which spread among them; no Hausa or Fulani is 
responsible for their irresponsible lifestyle of drinking and laziness.” Another story on 
December 11, 2008 (back page) accused the state governor of personal hatred for Hausa/ 
Fulani. It characterised him as “a diminutive ex-military man, who seems to be far too 
consumed with hatred and with a most backward perspective about relationships in a multi-
ethnic community. If Jang had been born in Rwanda, he almost certainly would have been 
described as a ‘genocidiare.’ (Jos killings: failure of politics and leadership, Daily Trust 
December 11, 2008, back page). 
The Daily Trust also challenged the narrative of other newspapers which it claimed focused 
undue attention to casualties from a particular ethnicity or were acting on stereotypes. Writing 
on December 12, 2008 (page 13) a columnist alleged that the press was “always sloppy in 
covering such riots, married to its stereotypes and being of the same mindset.”  
The Nigerian Tribune narrative of results of the conflict, although more diffused, is 
nevertheless skewed to emphasise victims and interests from the southern parts of Nigeria, 
particularly the south-west Yoruba region. For example, six of the 14 articles analysed 
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focused on, or made several references to the three national youth service corps men killed 
during the riots, with an emphasis that all were Yoruba killed by Hausas. Such reports, 
including an editorial opinion, gave vivid accounts of the killings and also details of the home 
towns, family and educational backgrounds of these three victims. In such reports, as “Jos 
Mayhem: How these corps members were slain”; “Jos: the slain corps members” and “Leke’s 
parents to NYSC: you have replaced my son with paper,” the newspaper devoted detailed 
attention and generous space to narratives affecting people of the south-west.    
What this suggests is that even in the reportage of casualties and damages, ethno-centrism 
takes centre stage. Newspapers may have their editorial focus but this would not justify a 
complete blind spot for reportage on casualties from particular groups in a national tragedy 
by a national newspaper. For example, the Daily Trust never reported the killings of the three 
national youth corps members during the riots, a story which was covered by most other 
newspapers. Similarly, the Nigerian Tribune did not carry reports about children killed in 
some Islamic schools during the riots in Jos and indeed only Daily Trust, amongst the 
newspapers in the study, focused on this story. These selective omissions suggest that in 
media narratives of ethno-religious conflicts, citizens are valued based on ethnic, regional or 
religious affiliations. This framing pattern is capable of perpetuating existing cleavages, and 
as a corollary, exacerbating ethno-religious conflicts. 
4.2.2. (b) Responsibility for the Conflicts 
The second category of concepts and key words from the narratives relate to agency or 
responsibility for the conflicts, that is, who or what caused the riots? A critical examination 
of the concepts here discloses sharply contrasting perceptions of liability or responsibility for 
the riots. For Daily Trust, the key concept around which the whole narrative is woven is 
genocide. In the newspaper’s perception, the 2008 conflicts were genocidal attacks motivated 
by deep hatred for Hausa/Fulani Muslim “settlers” of Jos by the “indigenes.” What took 
place, it insists, was mass murder and ethnic cleansing hatched and executed by the State’s 
Governor, Jonah David Jang, who is therefore personally liable. The newspaper also accuses 
the mainstream Nigerian press of being partisan, sloppy and stereotypical in its perception 
and reportage of the conflict and the issues flowing from it, and of the Hausa/Fulani in 
general. This stereotype, it believes, fostered the atmosphere for the genocide and made the 
press to also downplay it. The Nigerian Tribune, on the other hand, does not suggest anything 
near genocide in its framing, but locates responsibility for the conflicts in such issues as 
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religious intolerance, introduction of sharia, culture of impunity and criminality targeted 
against southerners and non-Muslims. For the Nigerian Tribune, responsibility is hinged on 
the concept of butchery: that the riots were perpetrated by hoodlums sponsored by political 
hegemonists.  
The use of the word ‘genocide’ by the Daily Trust serves to portray the “indigenes” and their 
leaders as ruthless, brutal and dangerous. Likewise, Nigerian Tribune’s choice of the 
emotion-laden word ‘butchery’ might also depict the Hausa/Fulani “settlers” as savages, who 
are blood thirsty, and unfeeling. Although these are highly contentious and emotive views, 
what the narratives suggest is that in the relationships between citizens and the various inter-
ethnic and religious communities in Jos, there is troubling inhumanity and disregard for the 
sanctity of life. And media narratives are not providing fresh vistas in tackling this 
inhumanity. One thing both papers are agreed on however is that election rigging and 
electoral malpractices are major contributors to social disharmony. 
4.2.2 (c) Remedy for the Conflicts 
 
The last set of concepts/key words relate to the solutions or remedies suggested as antidote 
for the conflicts. In this respect, both papers recommend punishment of alleged perpetrators 
of the riots, but there are different emphases on who is to be so penalised. For Daily Trust, 
the main offenders, Governor Jang and his “gang” of elites, should be charged with genocide 
and visited with the full wrath of the law. Nigerian Tribune calls for stiff punishment for the 
rioters and their sponsors whom it believes are well known to the authorities. The 
“barbarians,” the paper said, should be behind bars. One of the writers even recommends 
self-defence by northern Christians as a permanent solution to being attacked by Muslims. 
Both papers canvass free elections as panacea for conflict and as a way of ensuring the 
emergence of the right leadership.  
Daily Trust also canvasses implementation of constitutional provisions for full rights of 
citizenship, and to de-emphasize the indigene-settler dichotomy. Finally, Daily Trust insists 
on what it terms more balanced and fairer reportage of events by the Nigerian press. Nigerian 
Tribune calls for the scrapping of the National Youth service Corps scheme or a radical 
restructuring of the scheme to guarantee safety and security of participants. 
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Table 4.3: Key Words and Concepts 
DAILY TRUST NIGERIAN TRIBUNE 
Results of conflicts Results of conflicts 
Carnage 
High crimes 
Lack of relief 
Ouster of community 
Denial of rights 
Children killed 
Hausa/Fulani trapped 
Muslims killed/buried 
Muslims killed in cold blood 
Victims exclusively Muslim 
Victims of bad governance 
Cold blooded murder 
Jungle justice 
Despicable sectarian crisis 
Islamic school burnt 
Arson 
Vehicles burnt down 
 
Deadly onslaught 
Dangerous weapons 
Days of fury 
Orgy of violence 
Colossal loss 
Tears 
Mayhem  
Slaughter 
Mercenaries 
Destruction 
 
Responsibility for conflicts Responsibility for conflicts 
Genocide 
Genocidal elite 
Mass murder 
Ethnic cleansing 
Jang and gang 
Deep hatred 
Media bias/partisan 
Security failure 
Leadership failure 
State sponsored terror 
 
Barbarians 
Barbaric 
Butchery/butchers 
Mercenaries 
Premeditation 
Hausa/Fulani 
Jihad 
Islamic intolerance 
 
Remedy for future conflicts Remedy for future conflicts 
Punishment/full weight of law 
Punish Jang  
Remove Jang/state of emergency 
Guarantee full rights of citizens 
Remove indigene-settler dichotomy 
Ensure credible elections 
Press reformation 
Punishment/imprisonment of offenders 
Tackle issues in the crisis 
Scrap or modify NYSC 
National dialogue 
Self-defence  
Credible elections 
 
 
4.3  Summary of Framing Choices 
Discussions in this section show that ethno-religious conflicts are framed prominently by the 
press. The analysis also shows that certain thematic frames are common, notably, ethno-
religious conflict and security, law and order frames. However, a close examination of the 
texts reveals that the newspapers are preoccupied with different concerns and perceive 
problems in vastly dissimilar manner. Nigerian Tribune emphasizes casualties from the 
south-west while Daily Trust is preoccupied with Hausa/Fulani and Muslim losses. Thus 
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there is a disparity in the details of what is being emphasized or displayed by the different 
newspapers. The contrasting emphases and narratives confirm earlier findings that regional 
biases are important in the perceptions, interpretations and evaluation of issues by the 
Nigerian press. Even in the reportage of factual phenomena such as the nature and number of 
casualties, the judgment of significance or even occurrence, was perceived from a regional 
prism.  
4.4 Critical Discourse Analysis of the Representation of Ethno-Religious Conflicts by 
the Nigerian Press 
Having examined the framing strategies utilised by the newspapers, this section employs 
critical discourse analysis (CDA) to discuss the representation of ethno-religious conflicts by 
the Nigerian press. This analysis is based on the reportage of the January/March 2010 
conflicts which witnessed the largest volume of coverage as earlier identified in the 
quantitative content analysis. The unit of analysis is the story, including hard news, feature 
and opinion pieces. For each newspaper, there is a detailed analysis of one carefully selected 
feature/opinion article and a general examination of other items of coverage within the study 
period in the light of that opinion piece. I elected to lead the analysis with opinion articles 
because the discourse in such articles “problematizes the world by taking up the normative 
dimension of issues and events” within the overall discursive strategy of the news narrative 
(Greenberg, 2000: 519). Such opinion discourses assume “important communicative function 
by offering readers a distinctive and authoritative voice that will speak to them directly, in the 
face of troubling and problematic circumstances” (Greenberg, ibid). That the conflicts 
examined in this study constitute “troubling and problematic circumstances” for the Nigerian 
citizen and nation is attested to by the number of casualties and the frequency of occurrence. 
This research attempts to locate the press within these conflicts and inquires as to whether 
they are part of the problem or part of the solution. According to Greenberg, “opinion 
discourse addresses news readers embraced in a consensual relationship by taking a particular 
stance in relation to the persons and topics referred” (Greenberg, 2000: 520). Moreover, even 
though such articles are subjective accounts, in reality, they are often perceived by the 
average reader to carry an objective-like status, associated with the opinions of the newspaper 
as an elite institution. Furthermore, the opinions expressed are usually perceived to be 
consistent with the world view point of the newspaper as an organisation with the capacity 
for opinion formation (p. 520). He argues that despite its communicative importance, this 
news genre has received less sustained theoretical and empirical attention from scholars than 
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“hard” news.  Therefore, while it is more routine to analyse hard news, a direct focus on 
opinion articles gets to the heart of a newspaper’s overarching editorial posturing and 
provides a useful “ basis for scrutinizing and challenging conventional journalistic standards 
of balance, fairness and objectivity” (Greenberg, ibid). Also, the analyses of the opinion 
articles surveyed in this study are cross-referenced to the “hard” news reportage in 
discovering the representational strategy of the press in the production and dissemination of 
the “other” in news discourse.  
4.4.1  Critical Discourse Analysis of Daily Trust coverage of ethno-religious conflicts 
From the content analysis undertaken earlier, it was noticed that Daily Trust, amongst the 
newspapers studied, gave this incident the widest and most prominent coverage. The feature 
article I have chosen to analyse is titled: 
“Jang, the media and the genocide in Jos this time” (Daily Trust, 
20/01/2010: back page). (See Appendix 5 for full text of article.) 
CDA is the analysis of the linguistic and semiotic aspects of social processes and problems 
and I chose this article because it is incredibly rich in Nigeria’s discursive challenges and 
illuminates the various conflicts and contradictions within the polity. And, as would be 
demonstrated, its tone and style rhyme with the general reportorial and editorial direction of 
the newspaper in the coverage of the conflicts under study. Critical discourse analysis 
explores not just the grammar or composition of a text, but how the passage communicates a 
message and how this can promote or challenge prejudice, inequality or stereotype. In 
accomplishing this, the discourse analyst undertakes a three-stage analysis focusing on the 
text, the production process and the socio-cultural context. This is the micro, meso and macro 
level analysis and this is the framework within which my analysis would progress.  
The headline of the story is instructive in its ringing declaration: Jang, the media and the 
genocide on the Plateau this time.  
The article has employed very skilful narrative, rhetorical and grammatical devices to put 
across the main theme of the write-up, which is that a Christian state governor has mobilized 
his Christian populace to attack in cold blood a helpless and hapless Muslim minority 
population and that this “genocidal” attack, though clear and evident, has been deliberately 
and systematically ignored or down-played by the Nigerian press which is biased against the 
Hausa/Muslim. 
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The write-up has 19 paragraphs spread over two columns with a central ‘blurb’ and published 
on the back cover of the 20
th
 January 2010 edition of the newspaper. It is the main article on 
the back cover published as a regular “The Wednesday Column.” A key word in this headline 
is genocide which carries a definite article and in introducing the subject, the author 
remarked: 
At this point the reader must be wondering what trying to explain my error last 
week has got to do with the subject of today, namely the genocide that has 
been perpetuated against Muslims in Jos and its environs since Sunday. 
The first sentence introducing the subject matter of the write-up is definitive that there has 
been genocide. McGregor (2003) has argued that language is not used arbitrarily; it is 
purposeful. This aligns with what Fowler (1991) had earlier observed that linguistic 
expressions in a text in the form of words, syntactic choices etc. have ideological implications 
for representation. This is why it is important to examine such usages in the newspaper 
article. In talking about “the genocide that has been perpetuated against Muslims…” the 
author employs presupposition to make the reader assume that there is an established case of 
genocide. This way, the article is able to mask the problematic nature of the usage, and is able 
to proceed with the argument without the need to clarify or define the “genocidal” situation.  
In setting the scene, the article employs a historical analogy (paragraphs 1-6) to draw a 
parallel between the infamous Oklahoma bomber, Timothy McVeigh, and Governor Jonah 
Jang of Plateau State. Timothy McVeigh, according to the article, was motivated in his acts 
by vengeance and the desire to settle scores as narrowly defined by his peculiar sense of 
justice and his deranged personality. In using this analogy, the article implies that vengeance 
and hatred of Hausa/Fulani Muslims motivate government policy in Plateau State and that 
this explains the incidents of violent conflicts in the state.  
This position is spelt out using the active voice: as governor he has openly taken sides with 
his kith and kin and those of (his faith).  According to Fowler (1991), the active voice is 
utilized to help establish a clear picture of the agent performing the action in order to focus 
on responsibility for such action. Other elements of the active voice include the following:  
“He seems to wilfully encourage his kith and kin to declare open season on 
the others” (paragraph 9) 
“They seemed hell bent on finishing what they started on November 28, 2008” 
(paragraph 10). 
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“The willful manner with which the authorities in the state have allowed its 
own citizens and residents to be hunted down, killed and maimed and their 
properties destroyed” (paragraph 13) 
“As usual Jang, the commissioner of police and their accomplices can rely on 
the media to downplay the genocide this time just like they did the last time” 
(paragraph 15) 
Through this device, the article is able to clearly establish agency with regards to whom it 
holds responsible for the alleged genocide. 
Another rhetorical device used is ironic distancing device, “so-called” to identify and contest 
certain terms/words in popular usage. Most paragraphs from paragraph 10 down contain the 
expression “so-called settlers” or “so-called Muslim settlers” and “indigenes.” What this 
portrays, in effect, is that even though these usages are common in the national political 
lexicon, the author considers them as unreal or illegal or unrecognized. Examples of such 
usages and contestations include: 
“As at the time of this writing hundreds of so-called settlers have been 
murdered in cold blood” 
“As usual the so-called settlers have been blamed by the state authorities and 
the preponderance of the media” 
“…the crisis started over an objection by some indigenes to an attempt by a 
so-called settler…to renovate his house” 
“Here it is significant that this wanton killings of so-called settlers and the 
destruction of their property…” 
The frequent usage of this device confronts a very contentious issue in the polity relating to 
citizenship and the rights and privileges flowing therefrom, but this I will discuss in detail 
later in this chapter while considering the representation of the conflicts using critical 
discourse analysis. It however immediately discloses, without equivocation, the position of 
the writer (and the newspaper) on this issue. As noted earlier in chapter one, the indigene-
settler phenomenon is a serious source of conflict in Nigeria and , as Sayne (2012) points out 
in a recent report for the United States Institute of Peace (USIP), the conflicts appear to be 
growing deadlier and more numerous with time. In Sayne’s perception, the distinction 
between citizens who are deemed indigenous and those who arrived more recently is 
contentious because it reinforces and is reinforced by other identity-based divides in Nigeria 
including ethnicity, language, religion, and culture and can be longstanding and deeply felt. 
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This situation is however best understood within the wider contexts and fault lines: a 
population divided between two world religions, multiplicity of ethnic groups, economic 
rivalries between herdsmen and farmers and extreme inequality in wealth distribution. These 
boundaries sometimes coincide, as in Jos where some of the fighting is between Muslim 
Fulani herdsmen and Christian Berom farmers. Thus, in Jos, religion, ethnicity and 
economics are powerfully at play igniting and reinforcing conflicts carefully orchestrated by 
politicians. It is not surprising that the Daily Trust, a northern newspaper, would take a 
position which vigorously disputes the categorization of Hausa as settlers in view of the 
political and economic disadvantages this portends for the group.  
A device used prominently in this write-up is known as “naming.” The name by which an 
author or article identifies a person or phenomenon is critical to the reader’s conception of, 
and to an extent, attitude to, that object. People possess a range of identities, which could be 
used to describe them accurately, but not with the same meaning. The option chosen in a 
particular text might therefore serve specific social or political objectives. Bloomaert 
(2005:11) quoted in Richardson (2007: 49) explains that apart from referential meaning, acts 
of naming also produce indexical meaning. Naming therefore has an ideological implication 
for creating or perpetuating stereotypes and world-views. The descriptions given to people or 
things also influence the picture or imagery that emerges of the person or object so described.  
Employing this device, the article weaves its analysis around the personality of the state 
governor who is identified mainly by his last name, “Jang.” In backgrounding the governor’s 
official titles and paraphernalia, the article probably seeks to focus searchlight on the 
governor’s personality and character, “his humanness,” (Richardson, 2007) since it is 
discussing issues of motive, vengeance and personal liability.  Only once is he referred to as 
“Governor Jang” (paragraph 13) where the author discloses about him meeting with two of 
his (indigenous) predecessors in office, and the outcome of that meeting is the escalation of 
the conflict. This would suggest that Jang, employing his full executive authority, co-opted 
two of his predecessors to orchestrate “this wanton killings of so-called settlers and 
destruction of their properties.” The paragraph reads in part: “Here it is significant that this 
wanton killings of so-called settlers and the destruction of their property only escalated 
AFTER a meeting by Governor Jang and two of his predecessors, Chiefs Solomon Lar and 
Dariye…” (Emphasis added). 
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In an earlier article, titled The Media and the genocide in Jos (December 3, 2008) the author 
had provided context for Governor Jang’s alleged grievance against Hausa/Fulani Muslims 
and therefore revenge mission. According to him, Jang harbours “deep hatred for the 
Hausa/Fulani who are predominantly Muslim” just like other minority Christian leaders 
“from what they regard as historical wrong done their forefathers by a colonial system that 
supported feudal rule in the north.” He continues the argument: 
For Jang, this historical wrong took a personal dimension when he was retired 
in August 1990. This only seemed to have deepened his hatred towards the 
“hegemonists” (Daily Trust, December 3, 2008). 
In paragraph 10 of the current article, the whole incident under focus is described ominously 
as a “finishing” operation: “they (Christian indigenes) seemed hell-bent on finishing what 
they started on November 28, 2008.” This conjures a picture of a carefully planned, 
premeditated operation consistent with the theme of genocide which is the focus of the 
article. Moreover, in this genocidal operation, the governor, the state police commissioner (a 
Christian) and the media are all “accomplices” (11) who either turn a blind eye or down-play 
the weight of this human tragedy.  
The writer is able to create the strong impression about the division in the community 
through continuous usage of including and excluding words and phrases such as: only one-
side…the other side…they seemed hell bent…what they started…their accomplishes…their 
investigative job for them.  
The feature article analysed above is typical of the tone and orientation of the newspaper’s 
coverage of the incidents, both in its news, feature and opinion pages. There is a clear pattern, 
for example, of focusing reports on the personality, rather than the office, of Governor Jang, 
in a way that questions his integrity and capacity. Prominent headlines in this regard include: 
 Imams want Federal Government to remove Jang 
 Jos: when Governor Jang lost control of his domain 
 Fulanis massacred in front of Jang’s house 
 I blame Jang for the Plateau crisis 
 Plateau Fulani Ardo allege genocide against their people by Berom terrorists 
An article published December 5, 2008, titled Jos and Epidemic of Insanity (1) devoted two 
full columns to speculating about Jang’s plans to commit genocide. According to the author, 
an influential columnist of the newspaper, “Jang’s plans for genocide, reportedly hatched 
several months ago, had two recognisable steps.” It alleged that the elections were fixed for a 
- 153 - 
 
Thursday instead of “the usual weekend, so that the announcement of the result of the rigged 
poll would be made the following day, a Friday, the Muslim day of congregational worship, 
and is expected to inflame passions and lead to protest, and, if that happens, the ethnic 
cleansing machine will register maximum casualties.”   
Furthermore, the narrative and reportorial style, which foregrounds one side of the story 
while downplaying competing voices, is evident in prominent reports on the conflict. For 
example, the first story of the 2010 crisis (January 18, 2010) had a front page lead story with 
the headline: “Many killed in Jos violence.” The first paragraph reports that “at least a dozen 
people were killed and many others injured in fresh sectarian violence in Jos, plateau State, 
yesterday…” The paper attributes the information to the police and unnamed “witnesses” 
who “told Daily Trust that the crisis erupted …after an argument on the rebuilding of homes 
destroyed in the November 2008 clashes.” However, in the following paragraph, the report 
quotes the official of an Islamic organisation disclosing that “there were 10 corpses at the 
Central Mosque and 16 people were taken to the hospital with gun-shots wounds.” The 
official also said “they had received a report of over 20 corpses lying at Angwan Duala.”  
The next paragraph quotes Reuters news agency which it said “counted 12 bodies at the Jos 
University Teaching Hospital and at the Central Mosque, and the agency said there were 
reports of as many as 20 dead and several houses destroyed.” The report continues by quoting 
resident and local journalist, Musa Habibu (a Muslim, by the name), who told AFP news 
agency: “I was at the Jos University Teaching Hospital, where I saw nine dead bodies and six 
people injured with machete cuts on admission.” 
What is noticeable in this report is that in the very first news story on the incident, the 
newspaper quoted Muslim sources mainly while casualties were identified as either at the 
Central Mosque or in the hospital, giving the impression that such casualties were all Muslim. 
The use of figures in scattered fashion is probably to convey the picture of confusion and 
magnitude of loss: 10 corpses at the central mosque…16 people taken to hospital…20 
corpses lying at Angwan Duala…12 bodies at the hospital and mosque…20 dead. 
The following day, January 19, 2010, the paper had another lead story: “How Jos crisis 
began, by man on the spot.”  The first paragraph sets the tone for the religious conflict 
discourse: 
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The crisis that engulfed the Plateau state capital of Jos on Sunday started at 
Dutse Uku on the outskirts when Christian youth tried to stop a Muslim man 
from renovating his house that was destroyed in November 2008 riot, 
according to Alhaji Kabir Mohammed, the man at the centre of the storm.” 
The story which runs into 10 paragraphs in two pages is devoted exclusively to narrating the 
conflict from the view point of this one man. On January 20, 2010, the paper had another 
story, “JNI counts 138 bodies.” The first three paragraphs are based exclusively on reports 
obtained from Muslim sources, particularly Jama’atul Nasril Islam (JNI). In the lead, the 
newspaper reported that JNI had counted 138 bodies from the skirmish. It continued the 
narrative: 
Officials of the JNI, Mallam Danjumamai Khalid and Hajiya Khadija Gambo 
Hawaja told our correspondents that people were bringing corpses and the 
wounded to the mosque which serves as collection and first aid centre for 
victims. 
The JNI officials said on Sunday evening, they buried 71 bodies and by 
Monday they had 68 bodies in the mosque. 
This pattern of reporting is replicated in most of the other stories on the incident. 
As stated earlier in chapter one, CDA practitioners generally analyse texts at three levels: 
micro, (or textual) level, meso (or production) level and macro (or social relations) level. The 
discussion so far has sought to examine the textual or micro content, to examine what is 
being said and the linguistic and grammatical devices employed to convey meaning. CDA 
however advocates that texts should also be analysed in their full social and historical 
contexts in order to fully comprehend their meaning (Johnstone, 2008; Richardson, 2007). 
For my study, this type of analysis would enable a better comprehension of the style and 
worldview of the Daily Trust newspaper and its editorial practices.  
It has been already noted in this chapter that in the coverage of the conflicts in this study, 
Daily Trust emphasizes the frames of religious conflict and ethnic conflict. This is not 
surprising for several reasons. Firstly, as a privately-owned newspaper, published in northern 
Nigeria, it has a northern and Islamic orientation in its editorial policy (Yusha’u, 2009; 
Galadima, 2010). Daily Trust is owned by Media Trust, a private Nigerian newspaper 
publishing company based in Abuja. It publishes the English language Daily Trust, Weekly 
Trust and Sunday Trust and the Hausa language Aminiya newspapers. Established in 1998, 
this newspaper is one of the few viable newspapers in northern Nigeria currently, with a 
national circulation base and so it is widely read and consumed by the northern elite who are 
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its primary audience. It is also the largest circulating newspaper currently in northern Nigeria. 
Oso (2005: 13 in Galadima, 2010: 48) asserts that the Daily Trust is perceived, not just as a 
northern ethnic newspaper, but as a religious organ. This perception is probably reinforced by 
the fact that most of its board of directors and its management and editorial teams are 
composed of Muslims
10
. Articulating its own mission statement, the paper had declared when 
it was established that “there is at the moment not a single private daily newspaper north of 
the River Niger, and the people of this vast area are…forced to read about themselves as they 
are seen by others…” Therefore the strident preoccupation of the newspaper with issues of 
concern to northern Nigeria may be understood from this perspective.  
The micro-level analysis shows a pattern in which the narrative focuses attention on the 
personality of the state governor and weaves around this the allegation that the crisis in Jos 
Plateau is a carefully planned genocide against Muslim Hausa/Fulani. The style also 
foregrounds one side of the story and downplays or confronts competing narrations of the 
situation. I argue that the Daily Trust’s preoccupation and style is located partly in its 
editorial philosophy which is skewed in favour of the northern and Islamic interests. This 
reportorial style appears narrowly focused and does not engender alternative problem 
analysis which could offer clearer perspectives on the causes of ethno-religious conflicts and 
their possible solution(s). In the next section, I examine the narrative of the Nigerian Tribune, 
a southern newspaper with a contrasting worldview to that of the Daily Trust.  
4.4.2 Critical Discourse Analysis of the Nigerian Tribune Coverage of Ethno-religious 
Conflicts 
According to Richardson (2007), one of the ways of conducting CDA is to study the 
institutional and editorial differences in newspapers. This prompts the selection and analysis 
of sample articles from the Nigerian Tribune to see how the paper has handled the Jos ethno-
religious conflicts. As pointed out in chapter two, the Nigerian Tribune is a southern-based 
                                                          
10
 According to available record on its website, the board of directors of Media Group, publishers of Daily Trust, 
is composed of an almost entirely Muslim group including Kabir A Yusuf, Chairman/CEO; Ishaq A. Ajibola, 
MD/COO; Manir Dan Ali, Executive Director, Usman Abdullahi, Bello Damagum, Abdullahi Shuaibu and 
Rabiu Garba, directors. The management/editorial team is made up of Kabir Yusuf, Chairman/CEO; Ishaq 
Ajibola, MD/COO; Manir Dan Ali, Executive Director/Editor-in Chief; Mahmud Jega, Deputy Editor-in-Chief; 
Aliu M. Akoshile, Associate Director, Business; Shehu O. Mohammed, General Manager, Management 
Services; Garba Aliyu Abubakar, DGM (IT); Peter Omananyi, AGM (Production); Habeebs Pindinga, Editor 
(Daily Trust); Theophilus Abah, Editor Sunday Trust and Akeem Mustapha, Advert Manager. 
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daily newspaper whose editorial bias is towards southern Nigeria and is “Christian” in 
orientation (Yusha’u, 2009). This contrasts with the Daily Trust. 
The opinion article I have chosen to analyse in detail is titled: “Still on Jos Crisis” (Nigerian 
Tribune, March 8, 2010, p.18: see Appendix 6) and it attempts to explain the conflict within 
its perennial nature and its wider socio-political ramifications. In constructing the title of the 
article as “Still on the Jos Crisis,” the author nominalizes the issue, suggesting that the article 
is not focusing on any particular angle. “Jos crisis” immediately assumes a distinct and 
independent phenomenon. Indeed, a survey of many newspaper stories within this period 
shows that “Jos” has almost become a metaphor for “crisis” and stories are woven around this 
word in ingenious, though mostly sensational, manner. 
Fowler (1991) has emphasized the importance for critical analysts to note, in a discourse 
being studied, the terms that habitually occur, what segments of the society’s world enjoy 
constant discourse attention. This is referred to as the lexical register. In this context, Fowler 
(1991: 85) speaks about “over-lexicalization” which is the existence of an excess of quasi-
synonymous terms for entities or ideas that are a particular preoccupation or problem in the 
culture’s discourse. In this respect, the term “Jos” or associated phrases such as Jos violence, 
Jos carnage, Jos Mayhem, Plateau crisis, Jos massacre etc. have been over-lexicalized in the 
Nigerian press as synonym for violence, instability and religious intolerance. This has 
ideological implications for the perception of the state and its people if such an image 
becomes ingrained in the national lexicon contrary to the state’s perception of itself as “the 
home of peace and tourism.” Even when a conflict or incident occurs in another local council 
far away from Jos town, newspapers still utilise the catchphrase “Jos” in constructing the 
headline or leads, probably to gain attention and patronage. 
The opening paragraph of the story confirms this concern as it laments: “Plateau, a state once 
known for peace, tolerance and harmony – by both ‘indigenes’ and ‘settlers’ has been 
plagued by an orgy of hatred, hostility and bloodshed in recent times.” Like in the Daily 
Trust, this article puts the words “indigenes” and “settlers” in inverted commas to underscore 
the problematic nature of their usage and the discourses around such usages. Unlike the Daily 
Trust, in paragraph 2, the article does not label the conflict as genocide but seeks to 
contextualise and situate it within a wider national controversy. According to the article: 
Many have presented the crisis as an isolated, state-backed cleansing of 
Muslim minority by Christian majority. They have tried to play down on the 
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criminality, violence and carnage of Maitatsine, Boko Haram and other 
jihadist groups in other states of northern Nigeria.  
While the article has attempted to give the conflict scope, it has however not stated 
categorically if, in its opinion, there might actually have been a “state-backed cleansing of 
Muslim minority” and if this was in retaliation for the “criminality, violence and carnage of 
… Boko Haram…in other northern states.” This also raises the worrying question as to 
whether the illegal and criminal activities of a group of fanatics in one part of the country 
justify unprovoked killings in another part of the country and whether it is right for citizens to 
take the laws into their hands in any circumstance. This question should be considered within 
the context of the apparent inability or failure of government to protect citizens in crisis 
times, leading to all sorts of self-help initiatives by communities to defend themselves. It is 
instructive that a writer in the Nigerian Tribune advocated that Christians in northern Nigeria 
should rise to defend themselves as a panacea to incessant attacks from Muslim fanatics. 
 
One of the features of this article is its frequent reliance on vague or indirect sources to make 
serious attributions or generalizations. For example, paragraphs 2, 3, 4, 5, and 7 all begin 
with such phrases as: ‘many people have presented the crisis’; ‘some people have attributed 
the problem to’; ‘many analysts have it look as if’; ‘many analysts have failed to point out’; ‘I 
agree with those who have said that.’ Horvath (2012) points out how the complex mechanism 
of discursive practice and their social function is frequently and willingly left opaque 
especially when the need occurs to create and maintain differences in power relations and that 
CDA seeks to create a framework for decreasing this “opacity” in order to unravel the 
ideological implications of such discourse. In the instance of the article under consideration, 
the repeated use of such vague phrases along with collective nouns such as ‘many analysts’ 
and ‘many people’ enables the writer to legitimize claims and points of view without actually 
showing any rigorous evidence to substantiate such claims.  
 
It is based on such a vague source (“those who said”) that a serious claim like the one quoted 
below was made: “I agree with those who said that the Muslim settlers’ community sustained 
heavy casualties in the latest outbreak of violence.” The author relies on “those who said” to 
assert that there were “heavy casualties” suffered by the Muslim settlers’ community.  It then 
attempts to justify this unsavoury situation on the arguments of another vague source (an 
unnamed “anyone”). “…Anyone who has been following the conflict in Jos and Plateau State 
as a whole would know that the local community, including settlers from other ethnic and 
religious backgrounds has recorded heavy casualties in the past.” 
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The Nigerian Tribune article characterizes the conflict episode as “the Plateau butchery” 
which is a nominalization, both concealing the agency and minimizing the effect (as it is able 
to avoid uncomfortable questions like: who is the butcher? Who was butchered? How was the 
butchery perpetrated?). In concealing the agent, the sentence masks responsibility for the 
action and provides leverage for the politicization of the issue which follows. The situation, 
as it were, is depersonalized and materialized, wherein the focus no longer is on human 
beings being killed, by other human beings, but on religious balancing between Christian and 
Muslim casualties and political calculations between Christian and Muslim politicians. 
 
In terms of the relationship of this article to the general reportorial pattern of the newspaper, 
it would be noticed, for instance, that the reports and articles in the Nigerian Tribune 
frequently use “Jos” as a metaphor for “crisis” and “conflicts.” The use of vague sources and 
generalizations to make serious claims has earlier been noticed in the reportorial style of the 
paper. For example, a headline news story of September 10, 2001 titled: “Ex-Head of State, 
Governor behind Jos massacre” (Nigerian Tribune, Sept 29, 2001, front page lead). This was 
a front page banner headline in which the newspaper alleged that a former head of state and a 
serving state governor were the sponsors and master-minds of the 2001 ethno-religious. The 
report however was based on mere speculations lacking factual proof to support the huge 
assertions and was credited to unnamed stakeholders. Another instance of the use of 
generalizations is associated with the story headlined: “Tension mounts in Jos over council’s 
status” published by the paper on September 6, 2001. Here, the paper relied on one source in 
a rather sensitive story with no attempts to reach the other parties.  
 
The discursive strategy of Nigerian Tribune features mainly the use of generalisations, vague 
sources and nominalisations in the coverage of the conflicts. The result is a style which tends 
towards the superficial treatment of issues. One similarity between the two newspapers is that 
they both seem to contest the indigene-settler dichotomy, although the Tribune does not label 
the conflicts as genocide neither does it focus its narrative on any one personality. I will 
explore these contrasts more fully in the next section which deals with the social context of 
the coverage. 
 
4.5 Exploring the Social Context of the Reportage of Ethno-religious Conflicts 
 
Fairclough, Mulderrig and Wodak (2011) have provided some principles which could inform 
CDA at the level of social analysis. These include utilizing CDA to address social problems; 
unravelling power relations embedded in discourse; determining ideological work in 
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discursive events; revealing historical and contextual relationships in discourse and exploring 
the interpretative and explanatory potentials of discourse.  In line with this, this dissertation 
has utilised the last two principles in relating the textual and discursive analysis to social 
analysis. This is done in conjunction with the conflict frames earlier identified in this chapter.  
One of the analytical principles is the historical context of discourse. According to Van Dijk 
(2008c, in Fairclough et al, 2011) “discourse is not produced without context and cannot be 
understood without taking the context into consideration.” The historical context of discourse 
emphasizes the fact that discourses are connected to other discourses. This also involves 
issues of inter-textuality and cultural knowledge as each discourse is inevitably related to, and 
inter connected with, previous or current and on-going ones. In this dissertation, for example, 
it is evident that there are several allusions within the texts being analysed which “presuppose 
certain worlds of knowledge and particular inter-textual experience” on the part of readers 
(Fairclough, et al, 2011: 372). For example, such words as settler and indigene can only be 
fully appreciated if the reader has a knowledge of the history and politics of inter-ethnic 
relations in Nigeria generally, and in particular the struggles of minority ethnic groups to 
assert themselves within the context of hegemonic Nigerian federalism. Similarly, words like 
maitatsine, sharia, Islamic law, jihad and political Islam require an understanding of their 
historical context to appreciate the weight of the issues being stoked or addressed.  
 
When the article in Daily Trust says: This time, however, they seemed hell bent on finishing 
what they started on November 28, 2008, the reader’s prior knowledge of the events of 
November 2008, and the socio-political dimensions of those events, are immediately called 
forth, including other issues such as elections rigging in Nigeria, security challenges 
confronting the country, the capacity of relevant security and governmental agencies to 
gather and utilize intelligence information in a prompt and effective manner. Here we also 
notice interplay of the themes of ethno-religious conflicts and those of security, law and 
order. In speaking about they, the writer creates a “we-they” categories in which “they” are 
the perpetrators and “we” the victims. But as this study demonstrates, victim is in the eye of 
the beholder. Each side blames the other and the press narratives have not provided much 
clarification in this respect. However, since each group has a store of historical grievances, 
unaddressed and unresolved, the wounds fester and conflicts do not abate. 
The same thing applies with respect to the following sentence from the Nigerian Tribune: 
Since 1999, the imposition and implementation of sharia law by Muslim majority states have 
escalated tensions between Muslims and non-Muslims in northern Nigeria. Here, readers are 
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presumed to be familiar with the year 1999 in which Nigeria transited to civilian democratic 
rule after a long military interregnum; the impact of military rule on the polity; the nature of 
the political transition; issues of the sharia debate in northern Nigeria etc. This issue touches 
on the theme of religious conflict. This is further illustrated in its very critical and 
contemporary manner when the writer asserted: They have tried to play down on the 
criminality, violence and carnage of Maitatsine, Boko Haram and other jihadist groups in 
other states of northern Nigeria.  
The expression: violence and carnage of Maitatsine, Boko Haram and other jihadist groups 
is related to other discourses around the very contentious debates surrounding the activities of 
extremist Islamic organizations and the approaches to dealing with, or resolving such 
problems. It also highlights the contrasting perceptions of the issue of insurgency linked to 
religion, in which the discourse usually follows a simplistic north-south/Christian-Muslim 
divide; and the complexities of the issue in the Middle Belt areas which have mixed 
populations and where ethnicity and religion are many times co-terminus. Boko Haram in this 
passage also brings up the fact that this phenomenon has been a concern in the media and 
some would argue that had government taken more proactive measures over the years, the 
organization would not have grown to assume the national security concern that it is today 
whereby innocent citizens and groups, including schools, churches and public places are 
targeted for destruction and in which innocent children are being kidnapped. 
To illustrate this point, I elaborate on one of the issues here. The debates around the concepts 
of indigenes and settlers have deep constitutional and socio-economic ramifications and are 
at the heart of many communal conflicts in Nigeria. The constitution of Nigeria 1999 in 
section 14 confers citizenship rights on all Nigerians irrespective of ethnicity, religion, place 
of birth, etc. and guarantees the right of abode in any part of the country without 
discrimination. Alubo (2011) has however noted that there is a wide gap between the 
practice, as distinct from the principle, of citizenship in Nigeria, particularly within the 
context of the contests for identity, access to and control over resources and positions. This, 
according to him, is because primordial considerations such as indigene and settler intervene 
to subvert the universal and inclusive principle of citizenship enshrined in the constitution. 
Anyone born outside the “native home” of the ethnic group of his parents is regarded as a 
settler and this status is permanent as there is no road map for a settler to ever become an 
indigene. As Alubo (2011: 44) explains, there are elaborate processes to ensure that inclusive 
citizenship is discounted for the narrower concept of indigeneity. One of such arrangements 
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is the issuance of certificates of indigene to give privilegesg and opportunities (such as 
scholarship and employment) which are denied others. The Federal Government also uses 
indigeneity as the basis for determining federal character, a policy, which among others, 
provides that employment and other opportunities should reflect the diverse origins and, in 
practice, give opportunities to people who may have lower qualifications but are from 
educationally disadvantaged states. 
It is a paradox that the constitution, while espousing inclusive and universalistic principles of 
citizenship, also legitimizes practices which detract from or even contradict these principles. 
A major feature of such practices is the federal character policy which is aimed at fostering 
national unity and promoting a sense of belonging within the Nigerian diversity. Section 14.4 
of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, holds that the composition of 
government agencies at all levels and the conduct of the affairs of government should be 
“carried out in a manner as to recognize the diversity of the people within its area of authority 
and the need to promote a sense of belonging and loyalty among all the people of the 
federation.” And in section 14.3, the Constitution also holds that government business should 
“reflect the federal character of Nigeria and the need to promote national unity, and also to 
command national loyalty, thereby ensuring that there shall be no preponderance of persons 
from a few states or a few ethnic or sectional groups in that government or any of its 
agencies.” The federal character policy is enforced by the Federal Character Commission, an 
agency created specifically for this purpose. The commission also ensures another 
contentious policy known as quota system. In effect, “sections of the Nigerian constitution 
and other legal documents such as certificate of indigenship give legal teeth to the 
‘nativisation’ of citizenship” (Alubo, 2011: 45).  
 
In practice, therefore, the state legitimises ‘nativisation’ and hence the contention that ethnic 
divide and rule is part of nation-building strategy in Nigeria’s post-colonial governments 
(Alubo, 2011: 45). The World Organisation Against Torture (2011) further notes the burden 
that the distinction between “indigenes” and “non-indigenes” places on citizens as the two 
groups effectively have different rights, which results in discrimination and inequality of 
access in critical areas of life. For example, non-indigenes have to pay higher fees to be 
admitted to good public schools and while paying the same taxes, they are discriminated 
against in employment in the civil service. 
- 162 - 
 
These contestations are attenuated in Central Nigeria, particularly Plateau State, where large 
numbers of ethnic minorities live with many others from different parts of the country.  
According to Egwu (2009: 73), conflicts on the Plateau have been facilitated by the rise in 
minority consciousness which has led to the construction of Middle Belt identity. This is 
based on the “perception that the indigenous ethnic minorities have been dominated by the 
Hausa/Fulani community in the control of commerce and politics in which the former had 
been reduced to spectators.” As early as the pre-independence period, the tin mining city of 
Jos witnessed inter-ethnic conflicts and riots. Plotnicov (1971) has given a historical account 
of the 1945 rioting between Hausa and Ibo ethnic groups in Jos and identified three factors 
underlying the riots. The most critical of the factors, in his opinion, is economic competition 
due to increased inter-ethnic contact and competition over trade and land resources. Another 
reason was status insecurity in the sense that “the Ibo were gaining prominence, and the 
Hausa were feeling politically insecure as a result of the activities of the nationalist NCNC 
led by Azikiwe” (Plotnicov, 1971). In more recent times however, the struggle has been 
between Hausa/Fulani and the ethnic groups, particularly the Berom, who insist that they are 
the indigenes of Jos. This relationship with the Hausa Fulani is particularly problematic 
because of the complications religion brings to the fray, since the latter are mostly Muslim 
while the former are Christian in orientation. Therefore conflicts which might be essentially 
ethnic or economic easily assume religious coloration. 
Alubo (2011: 44) therefore concludes that the nature of the violence on the Jos Plateau is 
largely defined by these contestations between the indigenes and settlers. According to him, 
the issues relate to perceived advantages about who is favoured and/or marginalized and how 
each group attempts to attain what it considers as its rights and entitlements. “Central here are 
political appointments with all they portend for creating opportunities,” (p.44) he argued. One 
of the things this analysis demonstrates is that although the press has labelled these conflicts 
as ethnic or religious, other issues actually drive them, and it is important to unravel such 
issues. 
Critical discourse analysis is also interpretative and explanatory. According to Fairclough, et 
al, (2011), discourse can be interpreted in different ways, depending on the context and 
audience. Such interpretation, they explain, can occur through the lens of feelings, beliefs, 
values and knowledge. This point is clearly visible in the different ways the newspapers in 
this study covered the ethno-religious conflicts in Jos. The perceptions and characterization 
of the conflicts by Daily Trust and Nigerian Tribune are radically different in several 
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respects. Whereas Daily Trust sees clear-cut genocide against Muslims, motivated primarily 
by an “ideology of hatred for the so-called Muslim settlers” by a Christian governor and 
populace, the Nigerian Tribune has a different thesis. According to it, the violence on the Jos 
Plateau is a response to “Islamic partisanship that holds sway in most states of northern 
Nigeria.” Militant Islam, it argues, has led to the emergence of militant Christianity. “The 
Islamic partisanship in Muslim majority states has caused the emergence of Christian 
partisanship in Plateau and other Christian majority states,” the paper contends.   
 
To drive this perspective home, the article conclusively takes a position diametrically 
opposed to Daily Trust’s worldview:  
 
The crisis in Plateau is intricately linked to, and caused by, the political and 
jihadist Islam that prevails in northern Nigeria. The Plateau butchery cannot be 
resolved without rooting out militant and political Islam. Muslim politicians 
must stop using elective positions to further Islamic agenda and implement 
Islamic law. Muslim politicians must learn to uphold democracy and universal 
human rights and stop foisting Islamic theocracy on the people. 
 
This confirms Fowler’s position that news reports are not necessarily the accounts of “the real 
world” but are mediated by the social, economic and political environments within which the 
institutions of news reporting, such as newspaper organisations, are situated (Fowler, 1991). 
This is evident also in the perception of Daily Trust newspaper on the general reportorial 
style and editorial position of other Nigerian newspapers on the conflict. Paragraph 15 of the 
article I analysed, for example, claims that 
 
 “the police and their accomplices can rely on the media to downplay the 
genocide just like it did the last time.”  
 
This statement suggests not just frustration with the dominant press narrative of the conflict, 
but also significantly, touches on the history and development of the Nigerian press in which 
media power and ownership pattern are historically skewed in favour of the southern parts 
which control what is popularly known as the “Lagos-Ibadan axis” press (Oyovbaire, 2001). 
As the southern parts of the county are also Christian, it is then argued that the philosophy 
and world-view of the dominant press is Judeo-Christian (Oyovbaire, 2001; Yusha’u, 2009) 
and that this spells an ideological disadvantage in the representation of northern issues and 
interests in the press (Yusha’u, 2009). Daily Trust’s argument therefore seems to be that the 
Nigerian press is ideologically programmed to be anti-Islam and anti-Hausa/Fulani, and that 
this, in its perception, explains why the press subjectively blames every crisis on the Plateau 
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on Muslim Hausa/Fulani. This position is highly contentious and contestable. In so far as it 
has some bearing on content and representation of issues, however, it has critical implications 
for the reportage of such issues, as already demonstrated. The superficial treatment of issues 
by the Nigerian Tribune, on the other hand, is no less disadvantageous to proper and 
informed understanding of these issues and this also has critical implications for 
representation. 
 
For example, the dominant frame used in the coverage by the newspapers is that of “ethno-
religious conflicts.” However, a close reading of most of the stories suggests that this 
description is more of an off-hand label or loose definition of the conflicts reported by the 
newspapers without much analysis or reflection. This pattern of reporting has the potential to 
mask possible deeper issues in these conflicts. For, as has been pointed out by scholars 
(Imobighe, 2003; Alemika, 2002), using ethnicity or religion and associated primordial 
factors to explain conflicts contributes to obscuring societal inadequacies and the individual 
and collective failings of the people. This position rhymes with the assertion by Allen and 
Seaton (1999: 11) that media often use ethnic conflict as “lazy shorthand” to interpret or 
explain complex issues resulting in "muddled and misleading" representation of 
contemporary conflicts. 
 
The complaint by Daily Trust about people of northern Nigeria being unfairly represented by 
the Nigerian press has particular significance for the people of the Middle Belt, where the Jos 
Plateau, my area of study is located. For whereas a newspaper like Daily Trust has become 
well established and champions the cause of Muslims and far northern people (Galadima, 
2010: 48) there is no viable national newspaper which overtly and consistently canvasses 
Middle Belt viewpoints. This led recently to the establishment of an internet discussion forum 
called The Middle Belt Dialogue formed mainly to provide a medium for articulating issues 
affecting the region. The Middle Belt Dialogue is an online discussion forum for members of 
the Middle Belt Forum, a socio-cultural organisation representing the minority populations of 
Nigeria’s middle belt region. This Dialogue, which is a free listserve hosted on Yahoo 
Groups (Ette, 2012)
11
, was born partly as a response to a feeling of underrepresentation and 
misrepresentation of the area in main stream Nigerian and international media, as a 
                                                          
11
 A listserve is an online discussion group which enables people with a common interest to network and interact 
on their shared interest. There are numerous list serves such as those offered by Yahoo Groups or Google. As 
Ette (2012) notes, list serves allow even small ethnic nationalities to become global players by providing 
avenues for members everywhere to keep abreast of developments back home.  
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consequence of which the existing political and economic cleavages and marginalisation of 
the region were being reinforced and perpetuated.  It was felt, particularly, that the Middle 
Belt peoples were often represented in unfavourable or inaccurate light in the media. The 
Dialogue serves as a medium where members could exchange ideas on topical issues within 
the framework of the overarching concerns of the geo-political Middle Belt and its 
relationship to the larger Nigerian polity. Amongst other things, this forum is utilised to 
elaborate or contest mainstream media representation of the middle belt region or persons 
(Tsado, 2013). For example, on December 6, 2012, an article was posted on the Dialogue 
titled: “Northern Nigeria: Different strokes for different people.” This article, whose main 
argument is the alleged discriminatory treatment of northern minorities (Middle Belt peoples) 
by the dominant Hausa/Fulani, had earlier been published in a national daily, and was flagged 
on the Dialogue because, as the author claimed, “it was edited beyond recognition” by the 
newspaper which published it. The original article was then posted on the Dialogue for the 
attention of members. This occasioned many comments which are illustrative of the 
perceptions of the people with respect to media representation of the Middle Belt area. Here 
are examples of such comments by different contributors to the forum: 
i. “We must speak out. They must know that they don’t hold monopoly of the media.” 
ii. We should begin to contribute money to respond to any attack on our people and the 
Middle Belt in the media or otherwise.” 
iii. “I know (the article) was tampered with, but that did not take away the substance. Your 
comments have inspired those of us who have just discovered that our identities have been 
subsumed in a larger political conspiracy.” 
iv. “The Middle Belt Dialogue must create a fund to push for the publication of this kind of 
reasoning for the world to know.” 
v. “Can we publish (the article) in another newspaper?” 
vi “You should know how these things are done. We just have to pay somehow, since we 
don’t have our own newspaper. Imagine how helpless we are. No one newspaper to fall back 
on.” 
vii. “What about creating an online newspaper?” 
In comment (i) above, (We must speak out. They must know that they don’t hold monopoly of 
the media) “they” refers to the Hausa Fulani, who in the perception of this writer are 
monopolising the media at the expense of “we” (the Middle Belt peoples). This perception is 
the theme of the discussion in the other comments, leading to the exasperation: “Imagine how 
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helpless we (the Middle Belt People) are. No one newspaper to fall back on,” meaning, a 
newspaper either from the south or the north, which ‘speaks’ for the Middle Belt. So while 
the north complains of misrepresentation by the southern press, a segment of the north (the 
Middle Belt) complains of marginalisation by both the southern and northern press. The main 
point in all of these is that in its representational pattern, the north feels marginalised or 
misrepresented by the mainstream press which is dominantly owned by southerners and 
based in Lagos or Ibadan. But for the people of the Middle Belt, this is a double jeopardy of 
misrepresentation, first, by the southern press, which the people of the region feel does not 
understand their worldview, and by the northern press which does not sympathise with their 
worldview.   
 
With respect to conflicts in the Middle Belt region, Owojaiye (2013) has asserted that these 
fights are not religious but economic, arguing that corruption and mismanagement by 
successive northern leaderships have left millions of youth in the region unemployed, poor, 
hungry and disaffected, making them susceptible to manipulation and extremism. Nobel 
laureate, Wole Soyinka (2012) arguing in a similar vein, emphasizes the political angle in the 
“current season of violent discontent.” He insists that although economic factors have 
facilitated the mass production of the terrorist fighters, yet those he describes as political 
opportunists and criminal leaders have deliberately bred and nurtured them for their selfish 
goals. In his words, “they have been deliberately bred, nurtured, sheltered, rendered pliant, 
obedient to only one line of command, ready to be unleashed at the rest of society” (Wole 
Soyinka, New York Times, February 2012).  
 
In considering this issue, Tettey (2005) poses this searching question about the African press: 
“does the press exhibit discernment and sophistication in its analysis or does it trudge along 
mindlessly in the political paths plotted by protagonists of crises?” For the Nigerian press, the 
answer to this question, in light of evidence presented above, would suggest the latter. This 
has obvious negative significance for clarifying the nature and depth of the issues driving 
these conflicts and how they may be resolved. 
 
 
4.6 Summary 
This chapter has focused on the framing and representation of ethno-religious conflicts by the 
Nigerian press. Using framing analysis and critical discourse analysis, the chapter has 
established a number of important observations. First, is that most of the stories are framed 
and represented as “ethno-religious conflicts” even though that label is a casual label which 
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has not been thoroughly analysed or scrutinised. This is attributable to sensationalism and 
superficial reportage and lack of investigative reporting. Secondly, although the conflicts 
enjoy a lot of prominence in the press, there are differences in the emphases and narratives on 
the causes and effects of the conflicts. A section of the press alleges genocide while the 
others do not even hint at it. The contrasting emphasis can be located in the regional and 
religious inclinations of the newspapers, a tendency long associated with Nigerian 
journalism. For example, the press was divided along religious lines during the controversy 
surrounding Nigeria’s membership of the Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC) in 1986 
and the sharia riots of the early 2000s (Galadima, 2010: 82). 
The pattern of representation of the conflicts tends to coincide with existing social and 
political cleavages. On the surface the conflicts appear to be driven by identity-laden issues 
like ethnicity and religion. Critical analysis however indicates that other issues are at the root 
of conflicts, chiefly competition for political office and the economic benefits that come with 
it, corruption, poverty and inequality, and elite manipulation of primordial loyalties. By its 
inability to investigate these issues thoroughly, the Nigerian press has failed in its public duty 
and is implicated in the production and reproduction of social inequality. The representation 
of issues, rather than clarify, tends to muddle up issues. This is capable of reinforcing and 
perpetuating prejudices within the polity. The overall pattern of coverage is thus problematic 
and as troubling as the situations producing it. 
These findings confirm established knowledge in media research on news culture that media 
representations generally tend to glamorize war, violence and propaganda with negative 
consequences for the resolution of such conflicts. The question is whether this situation is 
inevitable. This question brings up issues connected with current debates around conflict de-
escalation reportage and systematic thinking about ways to utilize the potentials of the media, 
not to fuel conflicts, but to minimize them (Hyde-Clarke, 2011:43). This “growing field of 
media and conflict” (Lynch and McGoldrick, 2005: 34) proposes that equipping journalists 
with appropriate skills in conflict reportage makes them more effective professionals capable 
of covering conflicts more accurately and taking responsibility for their involvement in the 
events and processes on which they report. How might this apply to Nigerian journalism? It is 
to these issues and questions about conflict de-escalation reportage, and how they might be 
relevant particularly to the Nigerian press scene, that the next chapter turns. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
PEACE JOURNALISM: 
EXPLORING ALTERNATIVE FRAMEWORK FOR CONFLICT COVERAGE AND 
CONFLICT REPORTAGE BY THE NIGERIAN PRESS 
 
5.1 Introduction 
One of the main issues highlighted in chapter four is the tendency of the Nigerian press 
towards negative reportage of ethno-religious conflicts. Both in its framing and 
representational styles, concerns about sensationalism, exaggeration and simplification were 
noted. My findings revealed that there was a lack of rigour in investigation and analysis while 
issues of regionalism and religious biases and their possible impact on reportage were also 
noted. These tendencies, I argue, are capable of escalating, rather than minimizing ethno-
religious conflicts.  
This pattern of reportage is not peculiar to Nigerian journalism, as universally, newsroom 
mentality on the coverage of conflicts and wars generally follows the popular dictum, “if it 
bleeds, it leads” (Hawkins, 2011: 263). This suggests that media often give priority to conflict 
and war at the expense of playing a positive role in the attempts at conflict resolution and 
securing peaceful outcomes. As various studies demonstrate, mainstream journalism is 
dominated by negativity (Lynch, 2006; Starkey, 2007; Hyde-Clarke, 2011; Mogekwu, 2013; 
Sharp, 2013). Hyde-Clarke (2011: 43) notes the growing belief that the media often fan “the 
flames of discord…reinforcing prejudices, muddling the facts and peddling half-truth.” Sharp 
(2013) also argues that journalists, far from being disinterested purveyors of unproblematic 
truths, are implicated in the creation and spread of ideas and images that shape political 
discourses that exacerbate violent conflict.  
These concerns and debates, as noted in chapter one, find voice in new journalistic genres, 
which have emerged as a counterpoise to established, traditional journalistic forms. These 
“challenger paradigms” (Hackett, 2013: 36) seek to redress perceived deficiencies of 
mainline news representations of conventional journalism and to more critically align 
journalism to projects of social responsibility, economic development, political participation 
and cultural democracy (Cottle, 2006). This chapter attempts to explore these new approaches 
to reporting conflicts with specific reference to the concept of peace journalism and its 
possible applicability to the Nigerian press. The first section of the chapter investigates the 
coverage of ethno-religious conflicts through the paradigm of peace journalism. This is 
- 169 - 
 
accomplished through a content analysis of selected newspapers based on criteria established 
by Galtung (1993). The second section discusses the findings from interviews with Nigerian 
media practitioners and media academics on their perspectives of the concept of peace 
journalism. The content analysis delineates the orientation of the Nigerian press while the 
interviews explain and give context to such orientation. The chapter highlights positive 
contributions which the concept could make to the reportage of ethno-religious conflicts but 
also recognizes the practical difficulties to its application in the Nigeria press environment.  
5.2  Brief explication of interview sample and process 
A brief explication of the interview sample and process is necessary at this point. As 
indicated in chapter two, the interview participants were selected using a combination of 
purposive and snowball sampling techniques (May, 2001; Wimmer and Dominick, 2006). 
The first technique involved drawing up a tentative list of interviewees made up of media 
practitioners and media academics from different media organisations and institutions across 
the country. The selection did not attempt any systematic demographic representation of 
categories such as gender, education, ethnic or religious affiliations. What was of critical 
concern, in line with Tremblay (1957), was participants’ capacity to provide informed 
opinion on the issues being canvassed. Such selective sampling, according to Tremblay, 
maximises the chances of identifying knowledgeable key informants who can provide 
relevant information. Snowballing enriched the initial list through obtaining 
recommendations from those already interviewed as well as providing useful guide to locate 
potential interviewees. Of the 17 participants interviewed, 10 are media practitioners while 
six are media academics. One person is a director of the official press regulatory agency, the 
Nigerian Press Council.  
There were five women in my initial sample: a former editor of an influential national 
newspaper and social development activist; two heads of mass communication/media 
departments in universities; one newspaper correspondent and a notable media personality 
who has expressed critical views on press coverage of conflicts. However, the woman editor 
was difficult to track and unfortunately died in a stampede. One of the female heads of 
department declined to be interviewed while the second one appointed a male colleague to 
represent her on account of circumstances beyond her control at the time scheduled for the 
interview. The female correspondent similarly was unavailable. This explains why only one 
woman features on the interview schedule. This fact has however not impaired the quality of 
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views or data obtained from the interviews as all the participants are experienced 
professionals and/or academics, capable of providing informed opinions on the questions 
posed. Two of the media academics, for example, are professors who have headed 
communication departments in universities. Amongst the media practitioners, two have been 
managing editors of newspapers while others are experienced correspondents and writers. 
There are also two officials of the professional body of journalists in Nigeria, the Nigerian 
Union of Journalists (NUJ).  
Boyce and Neale (2006) emphasise the need, in qualitative interviews, to develop interview 
protocols involving the rules that guide the administration and implementation of the 
interviews. These, they explain, are the instructions that are followed for each interview to 
ensure consistency between interviews and thus increase reliability of findings. In line with 
the above, my interview protocol included asking participants for their consent and giving 
assurances of confidentiality in conformity with ethical guidelines. I produced one set of 
questions for all participants, with each interview ranging from 45 minutes to 90 minutes. 
Most of the interviews were conducted using Audio Memos on my iPad with almost limitless 
capacity for recording and storage. This facility also had provision for sharing or emailing 
recorded material, a feature which enabled me to backup copies of interviews in virtual 
storage (Dropbox/Google Drive) for easy access across devices and protection against loss of 
data. 
The issues canvassed in the interviews can be grouped under two broad headings. The first 
has to do with the critique of mainstream media in conflict reportage: what is the general 
perception of media practitioners and media academics on the normative concerns of peace 
journalism? The second area deals with the judgment of respondents about the principles and 
precepts proposed by peace journalism advocates for addressing the deficiencies identified 
with mainstream journalism: what are the perspectives of Nigerian journalists and media 
academics on the approach of peace journalism to conflict reportage vis-a-via traditional 
journalistic values? The issues are discussed in 5.5 below. 
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5.3 Peace Journalism and Ethno-religious Conflicts Reportage in Nigeria 
Peace journalism is a growing field of interest to professionals in both the developed and 
developing countries and to researchers and activists interested in the media-conflict nexus 
(Lynch, Hackett and Shaw, 2011: 8). In challenging mainstream news values in conflict 
coverage, advocates of peace journalism argue that the press, by its style, wittingly or 
unwittingly, entrenches cultural and structural violence capable of escalating conflicts, 
particularly in fragile societies like Nigeria. Opponents of peace journalism, on the other 
hand, insist on the role of journalists, not as arbiters in conflict situations, but as neutral 
agents of information, who serve society by mirroring both its strengths and weaknesses. 
Action to redress such weaknesses, they opine, lies outside the purview of the media (Jimoh, 
2014: 70; Loyn, 2007). These contested positions necessitate further enquiry into these 
issues. This informs my investigation here of the reportage of ethno-religious conflicts by the 
Nigerian press measured against the standards of peace journalism.  
5.3.1 Findings 
From the evidence in Table 5.1 below, the general orientation of the coverage of the conflicts 
tends towards war journalism. For example, the analytical category “expected results of 
conflicts” reveals a firm win-lose orientation (68%) with only 31% predisposed to a win-win 
framing. With respect to social orientation, almost 80% of the stories rely on elite-sources 
while less than 20% are ‘people oriented’ sources. About 57% of stories use 
victimising/demonising language or emotive words.   
The political orientation of the coverage discloses a more variegated picture. Although 
tending towards war journalism generally, several of the variables show some signs of peace 
journalism framing.  The table shows that although partisanship was expected, this is not so 
clear cut as 58% of the stories are non-partisan, while 40% display a partisan characteristic. 
Sixty two per cent of all the stories employ a two-party orientation and 61% label good and 
bad guys.  Also 66% emphasize differences while 32% focus on agreement. Almost 75% of 
the stories relate to “here and now events” while 24% relate to the wider content. With 80% 
of the stories focused on visible effects of conflict, the professional orientation is decidedly 
framed towards war journalism, more so as 88% of the coverage is reactive. Overall 
frequency count shows 67.5% war journalism framing.  
The orientation of the Nigerian press is typical of mainstream media style which emphasises 
violence, blood and destruction, indexed to political and economic factors. Even in developed 
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countries like America, the media, in its handling of such issues as the “war on terror” has 
been accused of acting as willing lapdogs of the military-industrial complex instead of being 
critical watchdogs of society against the excesses of the political establishment (Jimoh, 2014: 
70). In Nigeria, Isola (2010) (cited in Jimoh, 2014: 69) documents instances where “crass 
insensitivity” on the part of the media contributed to stocking political violence in the 
Western Region in 1965 and Ondo State in 1983. This he explains in terms of the political 
and economic factors connected to media ownership, political interests and commercial 
patronage.   
Table 5.1: General Orientation of Coverage 
Analytical 
category 
War Journalism Frequency Peace Journalism Frequency 
Expected 
outcomes 
Winning 
orientation  
 
Win-lose (zero-sum) 
orientation 
 
417 
(67.6%) 
 
Win-win orientation 
 
189 
(30.6%) 
Professional 
orientation 
Visibility of 
effects 
Reactivity 
 
 
Visible effects 
 
Reactive 
 
 
485 
(78.6%) 
543 
(88.0%) 
 
 
Invisible effects  
 
Proactive  
 
 
121 
(19.6%) 
62 (10%) 
 
 
Social 
orientation 
Elite or people 
orientation 
Language 
Elite orientation 
 
 
 
Victimising language 
491 
(78.6%) 
349  
 
(59.6%) 
People-orientation 
 
 
Non-victimising language 
115 
(18.6%) 
255  
 
(41.3%) 
Political 
orientation 
Partisanship 
 
Good and bad 
tagging 
 
Differences 
 
Party orientation 
 
focus 
 
 
 
 
Partisan 
 
Labels good and bad guys 
 
Emphasises differences 
 
Two-party 
 
Here and now events 
 
 
247 (40%) 
 
375 
(60.8%) 
 
409 
(66.3%) 
 
385 
(62.4%) 
 
455 
(73.7%) 
 
Non-partisan 
 
Avoids labels 
 
 
Focuses on agreement 
 
Multi-party 
 
Wider contexts 
 
359 
(58.2%)  
231 
(37.4%) 
 
196 (31.8 
%) 
 
221 
(35.8%) 
 
150 
(24.3%) 
 
 
 
- 173 - 
 
Comparative analysis of war/peace journalism framing 
In order to deepen analysis, I undertook a comparative analysis of the war/peace journalism 
reportage in the four newspapers. The various findings are tabulated below. With respect to 
the social orientation, Table 5.2 indicates that all the newspapers rely overwhelmingly on 
elite sources for their stories. Below is a sampling of headlines from the newspapers showing 
elite sources.  
Table 5.2: Comparative Analysis: Social Orientation (%) 
Source orientation 
 
 
Elite/official sources 
People-oriented sources 
DT 
N=197 
 
91.4 
7.6 
NT 
N=150 
 
86.0 
14.0 
GD 
N=136 
 
74.3 
22.1 
TD 
N=134 
 
80.6 
16.4 
Language 
 
Victimising/demonising language 
Non victimising/non demonising language 
 
 
58.4 
40.6 
 
 
64.7 
34.7 
 
 
47.1 
49.3 
 
 
54.5 
41.8 
 
 Jos crisis latest: Sultan, others call for calm (Daily Trust, 11 September 
2001) 
 NLC cautions on Jos disturbances (Nigerian Tribune, 17 September 2001) 
 Plateau takes stock, blames clash on ethnicity (The Guardian, 11 
September 2001)  
 Religious crisis brews in Jos (This Day, 5 September 2001) 
 Hausas are settlers in Jos – Dan Manjang (Special Assistant to Plateau 
State Governor) (Daily Trust, December 6 2008) 
 Mark blames Jos crisis on political class (Nigerian Tribune, 5 December 
2008) 
The above headlines are attributable to the government, religious institutions, security 
agencies or labour organisations, which define and contextualise the conflicts. Elite sourcing, 
as earlier discussed in chapter three, is a prominent feature of mainline journalism, a practice 
which Hackett and Carroll (206: 131-42) identify as one of the opponents of the “democratic 
ideal” in social communication which currently privileges certain institutions and persons. 
One of peace journalism’s stated goals is to broaden the range of voices accessed in the 
public arena, particularly those of peace builders and the victims of violence in conflict 
situations (Hackett, 2013: 51). By over relying on elite sources in reportage of ethno-religious 
conflicts, the Nigerian press diminishes the opportunity to engage in the critical analysis of 
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social structure “beyond the quotidian spectacles of conventional news” (Hackett, 2011: 51). 
Such analysis could contribute to revealing and minimising the cultural and structural 
violence that underlie and fuel physical violence. In Hackett’s opinion, peace journalism’s 
prescription to broaden the range of sources by consciously searching for the voices and 
options for peaceful resolution can be considered as one of the dimensions of its challenge to 
conventional war reporting (Hackett, 2013: 43).    
In terms of the political orientation of the coverage, the regionally-oriented newspapers 
(Daily Trust and Nigerian Tribune) exhibit more war journalism characteristics than the other 
two newspapers. This is true in all the indices that make up this analytical category. For 
example, 54% of all stories in the Daily Trust and 44% in the Nigerian Tribune are partisan. 
This contrasts with The Guardian and This Day in which only about 23% and 33% of the 
stories are partisan respectively. Still on political orientation, about 71% of items in Nigerian 
Tribune and 63% in Daily Trust use good and bad tagging devices whereas for The Guardian 
and This Day, it is 51% and 57% respectively. Over 70% of all stories in the regionally 
oriented papers emphasise differences while over 65% of all the items in the said newspapers 
frame the conflicts as between two parties in a tug of war. The other two newspapers 
analysed by the research exhibit lesser tendencies in all of these classifications (see Table 5.3 
below). 
Table 5.3: Comparative Analysis: Political Orientation (%) 
Partisanship  
 
Partisan 
Non-partisan  
DT 
N=197 
53.8 
45.2 
NT 
N=150 
44 
56 
GD 
N=136 
22.8 
76.3 
TD 
N=134 
32.8 
66.2 
Good and bad tagging 
Labels good and bad guys 
Avoids labels 
 
62.9 
36 
 
70.7 
29.3 
 
50.7 
45.6 
 
56.7 
40.3 
Differences  
Emphasises differences 
Focuses on agreement 
 
69.5 
29.4 
 
78.7 
21.3 
 
52.2 
43.4 
 
61.9 
35.1 
Party orientation 
Two-party 
Multi-party 
 
65.0 
34.0 
 
73.3 
26.7 
 
50.7 
45.6 
 
58.2 
38.8 
Focus  
Immediate context 
Wider contexts 
 
81.7 
17.3 
 
85.3 
14.7 
 
58.1 
38.2 
 
64.9 
31.3 
 
I discuss below some examples to support the findings of Table 5.3. With respect to two-
party framing, for instance, most of the stories in the newspapers reported the conflicts as 
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between two parties, either Muslims versus Christians or indigenes versus settlers. On 
September 5, 2001, This Day newspaper published a story with the headline: Religious crisis 
brews in Jos. The story, in the first paragraph, raised the alarm that the relative peace being 
enjoyed by residents of Jos in Plateau State may elude them if urgent actions are not taken by 
relevant authorities “to avert imminent show down between Christian indigenes of the area 
and the Hausa-Fulani who are mainly Muslims.” This style of reporting is a typical example 
in which the papers routinely and uncritically grouped disputants/combatants along religious 
and ethnic lines, thus setting the tone for later discourse. On September 9, 2001, The 
Guardian reported that no fewer than 50 persons had been killed in the sectarian crisis that 
was ignited “between Moslems and Christians.” On the 20th day of the same month, the paper 
had a story which defined the conflict as between Hausa and Berom over the ownership of 
Jos. The story asserts: “Jos, if you like it or not, is a Hausa town. It was established by the 
Hausa. It was not established by the Birom (sic). Though it is in Birom territory, but Hausa 
were those who established the town” (The Guardian, 25 September 2001).  
Fixation with two-party framework amounts to simplification and obscures other factors or 
stakeholders driving these conflicts. For example, Blench and Dendo (2013) point out the 
dimensions of the conflict as represented by contests over access rights to farming and 
grazing lands between farmers and pastoral Fulani in the area and how easy access to small 
arms within the feuding communities is driving and deepening such conflicts. There is also 
the issue of cattle rustling and other criminal activities. Simplistic categorizations therefore 
into two-party framework of Muslim-Christian conflict by the press shift focus from the 
deeper issues and is unhelpful to finding solutions to the conflicts.  
There is no marked difference in the professional orientation of the coverage, as all the 
newspapers tended to report preponderantly the visible effects of the conflicts in a reactive 
manner as is evidenced from Table 5.4 below.  
Table 5.4: Comparative Analysis: Professional Orientation (%) 
Visibility of effects 
 
Visible effects 
Invisible effects 
DT 
N=197 
82.1 
17.8 
NT 
N=150 
88 
12 
GD 
N=136 
69.9 
26.5 
TD 
N=134 
73.1 
23.9 
Reactivity  
Reactive  
Proactive  
 
91.4 
7.6 
 
91.3 
8.7 
 
80.9 
14.7 
 
86.6 
10.4 
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Below are headlines from the newspapers as examples of reporting mainly visible effects of 
the conflicts, neglecting the structural and cultural damage: 
 200 killed in Jos villages raid (Daily Trust, 8 March 2010) 
 Fulanis massacred in front of Jang’s house (Daily Trust, 25 January 2010) 
 500 killed, 75 houses burnt in fresh Jos crisis (Nigerian Tribune, 27 
January 2010) 
 300 feared killed in fresh Jos violence (The Guardian, 8 March 2010) 
 Black day in Jos: JNI counts 138 bodies (Daily Trust, 20 January 2010) 
With respect to the expected outcomes of the conflict, it is observed that coverage among all 
the newspapers tend evenly towards war journalism irrespective of regional orientation. Most 
of the papers feature a win-lose coverage frame on the 70% margin, except The Guardian 
which has 55% as is shown on Table 5.5 below.  
Table 5.5: Comparative Analysis: Expected outcomes of the conflicts (%) 
Winning orientation 
 
Win-lose/zero-sum orientation 
Win-win orientation 
DT 
N=197 
69.0 
29.0 
NT 
N=150 
74.7 
25.3 
GD 
N=136 
55.1 
41.2 
TD 
N=134 
70.1 
26.9 
 
 Examples of win-lose orientation: 
Jos Boils again: Federal Government reads riot act – the Federal Government has 
warned that it had the capacity, will and resources to deal squarely with those 
faceless people behind the recurring incidence of religious upheavals in the 
country (Nigerian Tribune, 13 September 2001, back page). 
 
In most parts of the state capital yesterday, church services were not held as 
worshippers stayed at home for fear of being attacked by Moslems (The 
Guardian, 10 September 2001, p.2). 
 
What this comparative analysis suggests is that the Nigerian press framing of ethno-religious 
conflicts tends towards “war journalism.” The Daily Trust and the Nigerian Tribune, both 
with a regional orientation, share this characteristic in a fashion more distinct than the other 
two papers examined. The most notable indices of war journalism include elite orientation, 
two-party orientation in reportage, visibility of effects of conflicts, presentation of issues with 
little context and analysis. I argue that this style, in so far as it contributes to obscuring 
underlying causes, perpetuating structural and cultural violence and privileging certain views 
and opinions, is capable of exacerbating ethno-religious conflicts. 
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5.4 Factors in “War Journalism” Framing  
In explaining the tendency of the Nigerian press towards war journalism, it is useful to 
examine news selection conventions and the factors which influence the framing of conflicts 
by the Nigerian press. As has been noted earlier in chapter one, media conventions generally 
emphasise negative news over positive news. According to Chaudhary (2001), scholars 
examining the third world media news content find that, in line with the western tradition, 
they overplay bad news and dwell on disasters and dramatize and sensationalise things. Third 
world press, he asserts, place undue emphasis on negativism, as much as their western 
counterparts. Contrary to popular expectations, Chaudhary finds no sharp distinctions in the 
news values and news filter criteria between third world journalists and those of the western 
practitioners. The popular news values of interest, proximity, prominence, conflict, novelty, 
human interest and timeliness are applicable to mainstream journalistic practice everywhere. 
Manning (2001: 63) similarly observes that comparative studies of newsrooms in various 
parts of the world confirm that despite differences in culture and social formation, tried and 
tested subjects such as news of political elites and powerful people, sex, crime, law and order 
are common favourites among news editors. It can therefore be argued that news selection 
criteria are similar across nations, with no radical differences between media systems of third 
world and western countries. The Nigerian press news conventions are aligned to this 
universal news format.   
This established news format is not only prevalent in Nigeria, but is amplified by the news 
culture fostered by the circumstances of the historical development of the Nigerian press as a 
tool for the anti-colonialist struggle (Yusha’u, 2009; Oyovbaire, 2003; Olayiwola, 1991; 
Babalola, 2000). This historical foundation of the press as a weapon of battle in the struggle 
for independence against British colonialism gave the Nigerian press its distinctive combative 
character or “protest motif” (Olukotun, 2004: 10). This fighting spirit has been carried over 
into successive independence governments (Olukotun, 2004). Malaolu (2004) contends that 
from inception, the Nigerian press was a militant press: “bellicose in temperament, 
belligerent in posturing and adversarial in language and perception.” The press, largely 
privately owned, has been noted consistently as anti-establishment and highly critical of 
public personalities and institutions (Malaolu, 2004). The historical foundation of the 
Nigerian press, and the combative culture which this has engendered, predispose it to 
tendencies to frame conflicts in contentious terms, contrary to the ethics of peace journalism. 
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The commercial orientation of the Nigerian press, earlier discussed in chapter one, also has 
implications for this discourse. For whilst it guarantees a measure of editorial independence 
from the government, it also dictates a tendency for the newspapers to acquire the character 
and ethnic or regional inclinations of their respective proprietors (Salawu, 2009). 
Furthermore, commercialism promotes what Owolabi (2004) has characterised as the “front-
page syndrome” in which news items considered as the most important are “boldly over 
dramatized on the front page to attract attention and patronage.” Such practices, Owolabi 
insists, are informed purely by commercial, rather than professional considerations and can 
distort reality and fuel conflict. This agrees with Hyde-Clarke’s (2012) position that 
moderation and a tempered approach to news which peace journalism requires, is not 
appealing to commercially-driven media enterprises. Similarly, Mogekwu (2011: 245) points 
out that the economic interests of the media would dictate an emphasis on events over 
process. “Process,” he argues, “is obviously more time-consuming to report than event. Also, 
getting information from official sources is less complex than seeking out possible view 
points from all stakeholders in the conflict, just as dualism is easier to deal with than pursuing 
different groups’ perspectives and interests involved in the conflict.” Furthermore, a 
combination of professional constraints and commercial interests also encourage reactive, 
sectional reporting contrary to sound journalism and this is inimical to communal harmony.  
5.5 Perspectives of Nigerian Journalists and Media Academics on the Concept of 
Peace Journalism 
The previous sections of this chapter have focused critical analysis on the reportage of ethno-
religious conflicts by the Nigerian press based on the criteria of peace journalism. This is in 
pursuit of one of the objectives of this research which is to engage with the controversial 
concept of peace journalism and the differing views on its epistemological validity and the 
practicalities and value of its application in real life contexts. Accomplishing this objective 
has involved problematizing journalistic news culture in order to discern and challenge 
established and naturalised practices which might predispose the press to certain outcomes 
considered as unwholesome to communal peace. Peace journalism as a growing field of 
research provides a set of tools for such an interrogation, even though its own principles and 
approaches are also contested.  
The analysis in section 5.3 above indicates that the general orientation of the Nigerian press is 
towards “war journalism,” a framing pattern which I argue contributes to exacerbating ethno-
religious conflicts. The discourse about peace journalism is an attempt to explore fresh 
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paradigms for conflict reportage and to see if this journalistic genre could add value to 
Nigerian journalism. In this respect, I considered it necessary to obtain and discern the 
perspectives of media practitioners and media academics on the relevance and import of 
peace journalism for the Nigerian press. This is the preoccupation of this section which 
features interviews with Nigerian journalists and journalism educators. As indicated earlier in 
this chapter, the issues canvassed in the interviews have to do, first with the critique of 
mainstream media in conflict reportage, that is, the general perception of media practitioners 
and media academics on the normative concerns of peace journalism. Secondly, the 
interviews also focused on the judgment of respondents about the principles and precepts 
proposed by peace journalism advocates for addressing the deficiencies identified with 
mainstream journalism; that is, the perspectives of Nigerian journalists and media academics 
on the approach of peace journalism to conflict reportage vis-a-via traditional journalistic 
values. These issues are discussed below. 
5.5.1 Mainstream Media and Conflict Reportage 
Most of the respondents share the concerns of peace journalism advocates about mainstream 
journalistic coverage of conflicts. They are particularly concerned about the negative tone of 
the coverage which they argue could contribute to obscuring the nature and cause of the 
conflicts. For Participant 1, this concern is anchored on the “decline of quality journalism, the 
absence of investigative journalism which goes beyond the scandalous dolling out of scare 
and violent messages for the sake of yellowish journalism.” As it is currently, he sees the 
press as incapable of piercing “the veneer of surface reportage which centres on violence, 
incoherence and blood.” He attributes the prevailing style to “commodity interest of 
newspaper production” and welcomes any serious attempts to “take journalism out of this 
mainstream warfare troupe, to a place where journalism mediates the cause of conflict and 
participates in the search for peace, stability and harmony.” Participant 4 similarly attributes 
media negativity in conflict coverage to the ownership pattern of the private press who are 
either politicians or business people linked to government or professionals who are also 
contractors. He reasons that with such an ownership background, sentiments, other than 
professional considerations, can easily creep into coverage.  
Participant 8 shares the same opinion and links sensationalism with the factor of competition 
and drive for profit and market share. According to him, the press in Nigeria makes money 
through “sensational reporting and catchy headlines” reinforcing a fixation with negativity 
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and the possibility of acting the scripts of conflict protagonists. In his opinion, “terrorists live 
on publicity and as long as they can capture the headlines, they will keep in their sinister 
ways.” Participant 6 does not discount the importance of market considerations in the 
operations of newspapers, but argues that profit should not be the only motive; lives and 
relationships should be primary consideration in reportage as this would enable the press to 
be more critical in its analysis. According to him, “people who have lived together for over 
100 years are suddenly on each other’s throats. The political leadership is implicated in such 
issues and the reporter should bring in critical perspectives even for the leader to see.”  
Participant 5 reiterates the conventional definition of news of which conflict is a major value 
and wonders how peacefully one can report violent conflict. He however shares the view that 
journalists should assume responsibility for the consequences of reportage since they are part 
of the society and need peace to practice their profession. The militant approach of the 
Nigerian press, Participant 9 notes, is “a socialisation,” an orientation imbibed by the press as 
an anti-colonial instrument. This approach, he opines however, has active purchase in the 
polity which constitutes its audience. 
The discussions here suggest that participants are generally favourably pre-disposed to the 
idea of peace journalism as they share the concerns about the overly negative approach of 
mainline journalism to conflict coverage. They however see difficulties in its practical 
implementation in terms of the ownership pattern of the newspapers, the serious competition 
in the industry, the ingrained culture of militancy and sensational reporting and the definition 
of conflict as a major news value. The position of Nigerian media practitioners and media 
academics is in contrast to that of western journalists who are generally opposed to the very 
idea of peace journalism (Hanitzsch, 2007; Loyn, 2007). This confirms the assertion by 
scholars such as Hyde-Clarke (2011), Ogenga (2012) and Hackett (2011) that peace 
journalism is likely to find more ready acceptance in societies where the media is perceived 
to have contributed to socially destructive internal conflict or ethnic tensions. In Hackett’s 
(2011: 45) view, the political roles and professional norms of journalism may be more open 
to self-reflexive change in transition societies “than they are in Washington, London or other 
imperial citadels.” 
5.5.2   Peace journalism versus journalistic objectivity 
Journalism is associated with certain principles, one of the most important of which is 
objectivity, the requirement that journalists report facts impartially and dispassionately. 
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Hammond (2007) considers objectivity in terms of three distinct, though inter-related, 
concepts: truthfulness and accuracy, neutrality, and detachment. Journalists are expected to 
be dispassionate and neutral so as not to let their own emotional responses and political 
allegiances get in the way of reporting truthfully. According to Hackett (2011), objectivity 
has positive connotations such as the pursuit of truth without fear or favour. According to 
McQuail (1992) in Hackett (2011: 37) objectivity represents goals that journalists should 
strive for: values concerning journalist’s ability to impart information about the world 
(accuracy, completeness, separation of fact from opinion) and values concerning the stance 
that reporters should take towards the value-laden meanings of news (detachment, neutrality, 
impartiality and independence, and avoiding partisanship, personal biases, ulterior motives or 
outside interests). 
Although a long standing canon of western journalism, scholars have pointed to the short-
comings of existing journalism when measured against the stated ideals of objectivity. In 
problematizing the epistemology of objectivity, Hackett (2011: 41-44) points out that 
journalism inherently involves choices: it is a matter of representation, not of reality-
reflection. Echoing Lynch and McGoldrick (2005a), Hackett argues that despite its acclaimed 
disinterestedness, conventional ‘objective’ journalism enshrines practices that predictably 
favour some outcomes and values over others. For example, based on their previous 
experience of the media, powerful sources do create ‘facts’ that they anticipate will be 
reported and framed in particular ways. Thus every time journalists re-create those frames, 
they influence future actions by sources. By focusing on physical violence divorced from 
context, and on win-lose scenarios, conventional ‘objective’ news unwittingly incentivizes 
conflict escalation. In Hackett’s words, peace journalism “challenges the very 
epistemological basis for a stance of detachment, calling instead for journalists to be self-
reflexive vis-à-vis the institutional biases of their routine practices, the dangers posed by 
certain framing and sourcing choices, the non-passivity of sources, the interventionist nature 
of journalism, and the potential of its becoming an unwitting accomplice to war propaganda” 
(Hackett, 2011: 42). This critique informs the stated goal of peace journalism, that is, to 
report conflicts in ways that would enhance non-violent responses to conflict. The question 
however is whether this goal is ethical and attainable. What indeed is the perspective of 
Nigerian media practitioners and media academics on the approach of peace journalism to 
conflict coverage vis-à-vis traditional journalistic values?  
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The responses to this question show a variety of opinions and perspectives on the issue. The 
majority of the participants perceive no fundamental conflict between traditional journalistic 
values and peace journalism while a few expressed misgivings, anchored, not on conceptual 
opposition to the principles of peace journalism but on the dynamics of its implementation 
within the Nigerian news environment. For Participant 3, peace journalism and mainline 
journalism are “closely related.” According to him, “journalism is also about peace, not for 
war. We are also concerned for development, not destruction.” He however argues that the 
standard principles of peace journalism need to take due cognizance of the peculiarities of the 
African society and should be so contextualised, contending that if social conditions do not 
promote peacefulness, then peace journalism will be futile. According to him, widespread 
poverty, injustice, corruption and weak institutions would obviate the acceptance of peace 
journalism by the media and the audience. This response underscores the point made by 
scholars like Hanitzsch (2007) that resolving conflicts in society go beyond journalistic 
reportage and that a media-centric approach obscures the role of other stakeholders in 
conflict. 
Another respondent, Participant 17, sees a dilemma surrounding journalism and conflict 
reportage in that while journalists are required to be objective, they are also expected to 
assume some responsibility for peace, which he argues is a major factor for development and 
social stability. Some people, he pointed out, have argued that “the journalist is no peace 
maker, just a reporter who reports the way he sees it within his human limitations.” He 
however gives the counter narrative to the objectivity argument by pointing out that 
“journalism is a very powerful instrument in terms of setting agenda, and in terms of 
providing a framework for the people.” In his opinion, what is required in conflict coverage is 
a “middle ground” in which the journalist reports all the sides of an issue rather than 
concentrating on a two-party framework. He explains further: 
There are not just two sides to an issue. There are so many sides and it is our 
duty to look at all these sides. It is when you concentrate on two sides that … 
antagonism becomes the major focus of journalism. But if you consider that 
there are some grey areas on every side, that there are people preaching 
moderation …who may not be very vocal like the protagonists on both sides 
… journalism (should) look for these people and give them a voice in the news 
columns which may change the perceptions of some people on both sides. 
In Participant 17’s opinion, the essence of this “middle ground” approach to covering conflict 
is to report conflicts within contexts, to create understanding that could lead to compromise 
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and reconciliation. For him, this form of reporting is best characterised as “conflict sensitive 
journalism” rather than peace journalism. In being sensitive to conflict, the reporter asks 
critical questions that would highlight issues beyond the stated demands of the vocal conflict 
protagonists, and give voice to other stakeholders marginalised in a two-party narrative.  
Participant 4 explores the theme of conflict sensitivity further by asserting that undue focus 
on conflict highlights a fundamental inability on the part of the Nigerian press to grasp the 
role of journalism in society, which is “to serve as a watchdog of the society, not to destroy 
the society but to watch so that it will be better.” Nigerian journalists, he argues, have not 
been able to balance “public interest with owner interest” which accounts in part for the 
tendency to sensationalism in reportage for the sake of profit. “If you pick Nigerian 
newspapers and look at the headlines, it is as if they are in a negativity competition. And even 
the Nigerian readers have been conditioned to such pattern of reportage so that if they don’t 
see negative stories, they don’t think there’s anything newsworthy.” For him, the tendency by 
Nigerian newspapers to report ethno-religious crises on the surface, laced with exaggerations 
and distortion of figures and casualties, reflects a mind-set conditioned on conflict which 
needs fundamental overhaul. 
This point resonates with other participants who identify routinised journalistic tradition as an 
obstacle in the way of reporting conflicts more creatively and responsibly. According to 
them, there is a tendency among journalists to say ‘this is the way journalism is practised; this 
is the way reporting is done. Therefore all these things you are bringing up are alien to 
journalism.’ Such professional orientation, they argue, is a major obstacle to innovation 
which needs to be overcome to enable journalists appreciate the need to evolve new strategies 
to cope with changing social dynamics. They are however concerned about the general level 
of education in the industry and whether the intellectual and language capacity of the average 
Nigerian journalist is such as to appreciate and practice the principles of peace journalism. 
Some of the respondents, particularly Participants 1, 4, 6 and 17 point to the policy dimension 
of this issue by suggesting that the endemic nature of ethno-religious conflicts in Nigeria 
should prompt the media and policy makers to explore for ways of using the press to tackle 
the problem rather than carry on in routine ways as if all was well. Participant 6 shares this 
point of view on policy, arguing that “because our country is conflict endemic…we need 
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things that will promote and protect peace and communal harmony.”12 Participant 17 calls for 
critical review of news values by incorporating “relevance” as a major criterion for judging 
newsworthiness. Relevance, he explains, relates to the social value of a story. In achieving 
this, he argues that journalists should ask such questions as: “Is this story relevant?” “Will it 
add value to the society or is it just for us to sell our newspaper?” Participant 6 echoes the 
issue of news values when he recommends that “whatever is being reported should have an 
element of benefit for the society.” For him, if a report causes more problems for the nation 
or a community, more killings or destruction, “then ask yourself whether it is worth 
reporting.” He insists: “we should use journalism, not to destroy but to build; not to create 
enemies but to make friends and improve relationships. Be part of reconciliation, not 
antagonism.” 
A review of news values, Participant 17 argues, would address another problem, what he 
characterises as the “clash of values in journalism practice” particularly in Africa. In his 
perception, there is a disconnect between journalism principles and practice, which is a major 
problem particularly for journalists in Africa and the third world. The principles of liberal 
democracy which inform the dominant inherited model of western journalism seem to be at 
variance with the African cultural background. Whereas liberal democracy privileges the 
individual, African culture emphasises the community. Therefore, reporting should be in the 
interest of the community, not the individual. He clarifies further:  
Our responsibility as journalists and media organisations should be, what can 
we do to make the community stable and harmonious? That creates a lot of 
problems: inherited principles which seem to be the dominant model all over 
the world and our own internal cultural dynamics seem to be at conflict, and it 
is a problem. 
The issue discussed above echoes Nyamnjoh’s (2005) concerns about the contradictions and 
tensions in African journalism in which imported liberal democratic values compete with 
                                                          
12
 Participant 6, a former President of the Nigerian Guild of Editors, narrated an experience with a former 
President of Nigeria when at a private audience, he asked the President about his view of Nigerian journalists. 
He continues the narrative: “He said he was unhappy with them because they do not know where to draw the 
line. He said in South Africa when there was an HIV/AIDS pandemic, the press, as a national policy, played it 
low so as not to discourage foreign investment, but Nigerian journalism does not make room for such 
overarching national goal, something all of us agree to, something to protect and defend. Everyday people write 
about disintegration of this country.” Participant 6 asserts that there are editors and journalists who do not 
believe in the unity of Nigeria while there are others whom he said are fixated on anger and hatred. For him, this 
attitude of “thinking backwards into the future” is unproductive. He believes that journalism should help in 
shaping and moulding public perceptions and attitudes more favourable to Nigeria’s national unity. 
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local cultural norms. It also highlights the debate about the philosophy of journalism 
education in Africa and the long-standing argument over issues of relevance – that is, the non-
African basis of the programmes available. There is a perception that the programmes have 
adopted largely western models which reinforce western cultural influences on the African 
mass media and detract from developing indigenous practices most suitable to local needs 
(Sharon and Scotton, 1987). Elaborating on this debate with respect to conflict reportage, 
Lynch (2008: 303) argues that the “modernization” approach, geared towards the implantation 
of western-style precepts and methods for reporting conflicts, does not adequately address the 
local needs of African and third world societies. He therefore espouses the “critical 
pedagogical approach” to journalistic training which, in covering conflicts, will challenge 
mainstream media’s assumptions about who and what is newsworthy and entrench the most 
rigorous journalistic standards. The goal, according to him, is to promote “solutions-oriented 
dialogue.”   
Three respondents (Participants 8, 9, 10), all media practitioners, were more reticent about 
peace journalism. According to Participant 9, the general orientation of the press is towards 
conflict escalation and the idea of peace is alien to many journalists. Correspondents 
generally are concerned about whether a story would be used, if it would attract prominence 
and also generate sales. So the concept of peace journalism is alien to many journalists in this 
country. Participant 8 was more direct in his assessment. Perceiving peace journalism as 
“making people have a bias towards peace instead of war,” he proposes that “this might in a 
way contravene the values of ideal journalism especially if what you are doing is not factual.” 
He also argues however that “even without (peace journalism), there is a way we need to 
report these things in order not to exacerbate issues. We need to exercise care and caution and 
be sensitive to conflict.”  
Participant 10 queries anything which could suggest “burying some truths” but also 
emphasises the need for balance and caution in reporting conflict. “There should be a balance 
in not just looking at the negatives and, as it were, promoting the activities of terror 
organisations. I think we should be discussing conflict sensitiveness, not peaceful 
journalism.” For Participant 15, who is also a national official of the NUJ, there appears to be 
little appetite for this type of journalism currently in Nigeria. In his perception, “very few 
people want to promote this aspect of journalism. Rather, you see people delving into areas 
that are dangerous and that can be detrimental to this country. If you follow the coverage of 
the crises in Jos, for example, you will see that even the international media was noticed 
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counting corpses in worship places, and the moment these things get out, people get agitated 
because of the obvious insinuation of tying corpses to particular religions.”  
5.5.3   The Peace Journalism Debate in Perspective 
The debate in this section about peace journalism suggests a variety of opinions and 
perspectives on the subject. While some participants support the idea, others are more 
reticent, voicing objections that are associated with misgivings in their understanding of the 
concept. Those who raise issues with peace journalism are, amongst other things, concerned 
about its apparent value-laden assumptions and the insinuation that journalists somehow may 
have to “cover-up” some facts in order to “promote” peace. On the practical everyday tasks of 
news gathering, they are also concerned that undue preoccupations with peace journalism 
could cost reporters valuable scoops and potential headline stories which will raise both the 
profile and the professional standing of the journalist, as well as boost newspaper sales, 
important considerations which drive decision-making in the industry. Similarly, peace is not 
a news value yet and what is required, in their estimation, is more accurate and “balanced” 
reporting rather than a new type of journalism.  
It is however also evident from the discourse above, that, even allowing for “the Hawthorne 
effect” (Landsberger, 1985)13 in which participants could possibly answer to please the 
researcher, many of the participants support the idea of peace journalism, but are concerned 
about likely difficulties in its practical implementation. Prominent among such difficulties are 
the lack of education and the low capacity of many Nigerian journalists to understand and 
appreciate fully the concept and principles of peace journalism. In order words, the issue here 
is not about peace journalism but basic aptitude and language capacity for routine journalistic 
work. This feeds back to the issue of training and the inadequacies discussed in the next 
chapter. 
The militant orientation of the Nigerian press and the resulting combative news culture would 
also be a herculean task to surmount. Furthermore, the ownership pattern of the press, linked 
                                                          
13
 “The Hawthorne effect” (Landsberger, 1985) holds that people have a tendency to do things to please the 
researcher, and this can result in artificial results. According to Jones and Alony (2011), researchers should be 
aware of this as a possible source of potential bias. I am conscious of the possibility that my respondents, being 
mostly Nigerians in responsible positions themselves, would want to be seen to be supporting peace and 
therefore respond in a manner they think a researcher on peace journalism would want. To minimise this and to 
obtain participants’ true feeling as much as possible, I ensured that my style of interview and the questions 
posed are such as would tease out their real position on the issues being explored. 
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to the political economy of news production and the fierce competition in the industry are 
other serious obstacles observed. Again, the wider social context of gross inequality, misuse 
and abuse of power and resources, resulting in poverty and unemployment, which predispose 
sections of the polity to anger and protests, are vital issues to be considered in the quest to 
implement peace journalism.  
Nevertheless, there seems to be recognition by most participants that the prevailing 
journalistic style and negativity of conflict news reportage, dominated by partisanship, 
sensationalism, exaggeration and manipulation of information, needs to be addressed. There 
is also the conviction that journalism, within the context of conflict-afflicted societies like 
Nigeria, should contribute consciously to peaceful settlement of disputes. Indeed, I 
discovered during the course of the interviews that there is now in existence a “National 
Association for Peace and Conflict Journalists” established in 2014 to facilitate training and 
practice on how best to report peace, security and conflict issues, and to ensure particularly 
that women are adequately involved in peace processes and decision-making. This 
association was formed following a training workshop for journalists in some northern states 
of Nigeria, supported by the European Union. Among other things, the workshop “examined 
how a paradigm shift could be achieved by reporting from a peace perspective while de-
emphasising on reporting and writing about violence as is being done now.”14 The 
participants also considered measures that could be put in place to encourage more and better 
reportage on peace and security as well as guarantee women’s participation in the process.  
Another point to note is that while there are divergent responses to the label “peace 
journalism,” many participants are comfortable with more neutral descriptions such as 
“conflict sensitivity”, “conflict reporting” or “conflict sensitive journalism” all of which in 
essence incorporate the values of peace journalism.  
5.5.4   Peace Journalism and the issue of Ethno-centrism 
An issue that needs to be further explored relates to ethno-centrism which scholars such as 
Sanem and Ross (2012) and Irvan (2006) present as one of the biggest challenges to the 
practice of peace journalism and which they argue is called up with virulence in conflict 
situations. Discussing peace journalism in the context of international conflict, Sanem and 
                                                          
14
 See Appendix 7: Communique at the end of 2-Day Workshop for Journalists from Project Pilot States of 
Adamawa, Gombe and Plateau held19-20 August, 2014 
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Ross (2012: 8) argue that journalists, who are members of their national communities and 
define their identities in national terms, cannot simply step outside of their nationally 
determined views on conflict. Unlike foreign journalists, they are inside the conflict and 
inevitably affected by it and, therefore, may find it extremely difficult not to take sides. By 
simply calling journalists not to be biased towards one side in the conflict, peace journalism 
fails to provide adequate, effective tools for journalists whose homeland is involved. 
In the context of Nigeria, religious and/or ethnic identity of journalists is the equivalence of 
nationalism as a factor inhibiting the practice of peace journalism in local conflicts involving 
people of opposite religion or ethnicity. As some of the interview respondents pointed out, 
journalists emotionally side with their co-religionists and ethnic compatriots among whom 
they probably live and work and many find it difficult not to take sides. In fact, some 
journalists might even consider it a duty to employ their profession to defend or promote the 
interest of their religion or ethnic group, or may fear reprisals or isolation should they take a 
public stand contrary to the perceived opinion of their “side.” In Nigeria, most people, 
including journalists, are either Muslim or Christian and there is mutual suspicion of “the 
other.”  Peace journalism research must therefore provide tools which address the issue of 
ethnic and religious commitment of journalists in coverage of local conflicts which, in 
Nigeria, is the equivalence of nationalism in international conflicts. This issue extends to the 
audience because, as Hanitzsch (2007: 5) argues, readers are not likely to see any value in 
peace journalism where vital issues bordering on identity or security are at stake. 
5.6  Conclusion: Obstacles and opportunities for Peace Journalism 
This chapter set out to explore practical lessons the concept of peace journalism could offer 
Nigerian journalism in the coverage of ethno-religious conflicts. This investigation was 
undertaken within the context of findings that the press is violence-oriented and that it is 
implicated in the spread and perpetuation of the conflicts. One of the notable observations in 
this exploration is that while Nigerian journalists and media academics appear to be generally 
favourably disposed to the epistemology and philosophy of peace journalism, this is not 
reflected in newspaper content. I therefore argue that there is a gap between precept and 
practice. Based on my findings, I further argue that this gap however offers opportunity for 
creative action in at least three areas. First, at the conceptual level, neutral labels such as 
conflict sensitive reporting appear to be more readily acceptable than “peace journalism” 
which, to some people, connotes a bias. Nomenclature is important in this debate, as the 
interviews have demonstrated. Therefore, I will argue for adoption of a name which 
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incorporates and hybridises peace journalism and conflict sensitivity. Such conflict 
responsive journalism espouses media reform while paying attention to the professional 
values of journalism. I reason that this would address what Irvan (2006) characterises as 
journalistic level obstacle to the very concept of peace journalism and make it more easily 
acceptable to media professionals. 
Secondly, there is need to prioritise conflict reporting in the journalism curriculum, as 
discussed in more details in chapter six. In this respect, the UNESCO manual on conflict 
sensitive reportage developed by Howard (2009) would be a good starting point. Practical 
conflict reporting principles outlined by Lynch and McGoldrick (2005) and Tehranian (2002) 
would also be relevant in this respect. As Kempf and Jarger (2007) point out, reporting 
conflict demands special skills of journalists and the possession of such skills should not be 
presumed but systematically and deliberately acquired. Therefore, equipping journalists and 
media houses with practical tools for reporting conflict in a newsworthy manner would take 
care of media institutional level obstacles (Irvan, 2006) to peace journalism, particularly the 
need to operate profitably. 
Thirdly, practical initiatives such as the formation of the National Association of Peace and 
conflict Journalists discussed above should be encouraged and supported to facilitate training 
and capacity building amongst media practitioners in conflict reportage. There will also be 
need to strengthen the institutions of journalism practice, as discussed in chapter six. 
The discussion in this chapter confirms Lee’s (2010) observation about the challenges posed 
by traditional newswriting on peace journalism, challenges which include fundamentals such 
as the very concept of news values and the inverted pyramid formula for reporting war and 
conflict. This dilemma is further compounded by the fact that current conventions are 
constrained and even dictated by power and profit in often fiercely competitive media 
environment. Commercial interests, the profit motive and sectional and/or local socio-
political interests all come to bear on conflict reportage. As observed by Hyde-Clarke (2012: 
45) existing media structures are influenced by “structural hierarchies that include journalists 
themselves, their training, editorial processes, ownership patterns and pressures by 
advertisers and the public.” This dilemma does not however lessen the “moral culpability” of 
journalists when covering conflict and war but instead clarifies the debate in terms of where 
action lies in the effort to secure better quality conflict reportage. In the opinion of Hackett 
(2011), peace journalism would gain momentum only in the wake of reformation and 
- 190 - 
 
transformation of the media and other socio-economic and political structures which 
influence it. The next chapter addresses issues in the context of media production and 
explores the issues of structure and media reform with particular reference to conflict 
reportage. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
 
EXPLORING THE CONTEXT OF NEWS PRACTICE IN NIGERIA: 
PROFESSIONALISM, TRAINING AND PRESS REGULATION 
 
6.1 Introduction 
Both the quantitative and qualitative analyses earlier carried out in chapters three, four and 
five of this dissertation indicated that a high proportion of news reports and comments by the 
Nigerian press in the coverage of ethno-religious conflicts are partisan and sensational. The 
pattern of coverage of the conflicts suggests that the Nigerian press engages in practices 
which tend to further escalate tensions and exacerbate the conflicts. The representations of 
the conflicts tend to confuse, rather than clarify, the issues, thus reinforcing and perpetuating 
prejudices within the polity. I argue, particularly from the discussions in chapter five, for the 
adoption of journalistic practices that are sensitive to conflict, and for appropriate structures 
in training and advocacy which would support and facilitate such practices. 
These findings raise critical issues about professional practices and how these inter-relate 
with the environment of news production and news content. The situation necessitates an 
investigation into the professional and commercial contexts of newspaper production in 
Nigeria and the implications of this for the prevailing news culture. This entails an 
examination of the context of news production and journalism practice in Nigeria through 
interviews with media practitioners and media scholars in order to explore various issues 
thrown up by the quantitative and qualitative analyses. This includes exploring the inter-
relationship between the professional and commercial environment of news production in 
Nigeria and how these bear upon the training of journalists and the resulting news culture. It 
also seeks to investigate the regulatory environment of media practice in Nigeria and examine 
in particular the implications of the Freedom of Information Act for investigative journalism 
and the reportage of ethno-religious conflicts. In specific terms, the chapter addresses the last 
two research questions as follows:  
 What trends are observable in professionalism and journalism training in Nigeria and 
what are the implications of these for conflict coverage and general news culture? 
 What are the implications of the Freedom of Information Act for the practice of 
investigative journalism in Nigeria and in particular the reportage of ethno-religious 
conflicts? 
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The chapter is organised under three broad thematic categories related to areas of my 
investigation. These thematic categories include professionalism and media ethics; journalism 
training and capacity building and press freedom and media accountability. As indicated in 
chapter two, these themes were explored through semi-structured interviews with media 
practitioners and media academics selected to obtain a wide range of opinions on the issues 
under investigation. From the analysis in this chapter, I affirm the need for the evolution of a 
journalistic paradigm which reports conflicts in manners more productive to social harmony. 
I identify the pivotal role of training and education in this regard and further argue for the 
strengthening of the institutional frameworks for journalism practice to attain this objective.  
6.2  Professionalism and Media Ethics 
The Nigerian press is notable for its vibrancy (Oluyokun, 2004; Malaolu, 2004), a 
characteristic associated with its historic foundations as a weapon for the anti-colonial 
struggle. This characteristic is however qualified by equally notable weaknesses, including 
the tendency for sensational and inflammatory reports of events (Oyeleye, 2004) as 
evidenced by the findings of this research. It is to be noted that no participant in this research 
disagreed with the observation that the press coverage of the ethno-religious conflicts under 
investigation had a negative tone. All respondents, both media academic and practitioner, 
readily agreed that the concerns about the press were well founded.  
The concern, however, transcends professional culture to issues of competent and ethical 
practice. In the opinion of several respondents, Nigerian journalists, particularly in the 
coverage of conflicts, act in ways that obviate responsible practice and contribute to 
aggravating violent conflicts.  Participant 15, a national officer of the Nigerian Union of 
Journalists (NUJ), for example, stated that the use of language by the press and the manner in 
which reports are presented tend to heighten tension and pitch one group against another. 
These concerns align with the observations of scholars like Adaja (2012) that Nigerian 
journalism is in a crisis of credibility where professional norms are routinely violated and 
abused. Omojola (2014: 169-170) emphasises the importance of ethical conduct in the 
practice of socially responsible journalism. For him, an undisciplined journalist is a risk to 
both his employer and audience.  
An important question which arises from this discussion is what might account for this 
pattern of coverage. Among the most recurring explanations for this outcome include 
journalistic partisanship, poor work conditions for journalists and the influence of ownership. 
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As most participants mentioned these three reasons, I consider it important to explore them in 
greater detail in order to obtain the detailed perspectives of Nigerian professionals and 
academics on issues of professionalism and ethics, particularly as they relate to the coverage 
of ethno-religious conflicts in the country. This informs the discussions in this section. 
6.2.1   Partisanship/ethno-religious Bias 
Participants identified two levels of factors as responsible for predisposing the Nigerian press 
to bias and partisanship in the coverage of ethno-religious conflicts. The first level relates to 
factors in the external context of the press and these include ownership of the press, the 
political environment and journalists’ personal prejudices and primordial loyalties. The 
second level of factors has to do with the internal context of the press or what Participant 17 
calls “intra-professional issues” which impact reportage. This refers particularly to the 
practice culture which places conflict high on the news value chain. 
With respect to the external context of the press, Participant 17 argued that ownership and 
control are critical, because historically the Nigerian press has tended to align their coverage 
along the interests or concerns of the dominant political class which invariably own most of 
the newspapers organisations. Even the government-owned press has tended to satisfy the 
dominant political faction in government. This agrees with the widely held perception that 
Nigerian newspapers easily acquire the character and ethnic or regional inclinations of their 
proprietors (Yusha’u, 2009; Adaja, 2012). Therefore, factors other than professional 
considerations of the duty to inform, educate or enlighten interfere with the reporting of 
conflicts. In this regard, Oso’s (2013: 18) observation that only the rich and powerful can 
currently establish newspapers in Nigeria due to the huge capital outlay is important. Not 
only does this give such people preponderant access to the public sphere in propagating their 
views on highly contested issues, the possibility of manipulating the press to distort coverage 
is increased by the factor of ownership and control. Participant 7 agreed with this line of 
reasoning. For him, although the press has the responsibility to educate, enlighten and 
enhance cohesion, in actual operation, “you find that because of the ownership pattern, and 
the goals of the proprietors, the journalism in Nigeria finds itself reporting from certain 
biases, the most predominant being ethnic and religious biases.”  
Another factor in the external environment is Nigeria’s political structure and ethno-regional 
and religious configuration. In the opinion of respondents, Nigeria is a highly fractured 
society with many fault-lines and national institutions, including the media, tend to align with 
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the various cleavages. They therefore argued that the press covers issues along these ethno-
religious lines and this is reflected in both the news and opinion pages. The third external 
factor which predisposes the press to partisanship is the journalists’ own prejudices and 
inability or unwillingness to create distance between personal biases and professional duty. 
Partisanship arises because journalists write from the perspective of protecting or projecting 
Islam or Christianity. Participant 7 asserted that Nigerian journalists have not been able to 
transcend their self-identity or group interest in reporting issues. Commenting on this issue of 
ethnic and religious bias on the part of journalists, a notable Nigerian columnist, Mohammed 
Haruna, argues that it constitutes the most important issue of ethical journalism in the country 
(Haruna, in Yusha’u, 2009: 265). According to him, most Nigerian journalists appear to 
assume the posture of “my kith and kin first, right or wrong,” and this provides room for 
politicians to exploit this weakness of Nigerian journalism by putting an ethnic or religious 
spin on most issues.   
Participants 1 and 4 attributed religious bias and partisanship to the low level of education 
and professional training of journalists which they observed have declined. For Participant 1, 
it is professionalism which makes the journalist a liberalised reporter. In his words, “Because 
there is little professionalism, journalists fall easy prey to uncritical reportage of religious 
perspectives and are therefore unable to give policy direction and strategy, or envision a clear 
approach in finding solutions to the conflicts”. Participant 4 argued that the press which is 
supposed to be the 4
th
 Estate of the Realm is caught up in the national fragmentation along 
ethnic and religious lines. Coupled with this is the fact that there are thousands of people who 
call themselves journalists that are not trained; “so all they do is go to the field, see what 
catches their fancy and then look at it from the prism of their background. This greatly erodes 
ethics,” he concluded. 
Parochial tendencies, which inhibit national cohesion and harmony, explained Participant 6, 
lead journalists to give in to what he called “very vile sentiments” which result in 
“destructive rather than constructive journalism.” He recommended that journalists reporting 
on crisis situations should ask themselves: “is this reportage constructive and will it bring 
peace or will it escalate conflict in the society? This, I think, should be the challenge of 
journalism in a society like ours.” This argument echoes issues discussed in the previous 
chapter, particularly the argument that in covering conflicts, journalists should assume 
responsibility for their coverage, rather than adopt a “neutral disseminator role” (Weaver, 
1998 in Irvan, 2006: 3).  
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With regards to the internal context of the press, the main issue identified by participants 
relates to very definition of news which places conflict as a prominent news value, and which 
they believe predisposes the media to certain predictable outcomes.  This professional 
orientation which privileges conflict, when juxtaposed against the commercial interests of 
media organisations, makes up the internal context that explains the observable pattern of 
press coverage of ethno-religious conflict. Participants opined that in the quest to increase 
circulation, or advertisements, the press tends to play up issues that will attract audience 
attention. This emphasises the “economics of media and cultural production” in this 
discourse. The issue of conflict as a dominant news value is one around which there is 
growing debate, particularly in reformist media circles (Hackett, 2011; Lynch, 2008). Irvan 
(2006) points out that research on news selection processes establish that journalists choose 
those stories which fulfil the basic criteria of newsworthiness. Among those values are a 
focus on the immediate and a search for drama, all of which are features of conflict. For this 
reason, Wolsfeld (2004, in Irvan, 2006: 3) argues that the default mode of the press is to 
cover tension, conflict and violence. This is linked with the commercial interest of the press, 
which leads Wolsfeld (2004: 39) to assert that “the greater the influence of commercialism on 
the news content, the less likely the media can serve as serious and responsible forums for 
public debate.” This therefore calls for further interrogation of this practice.  
Bias and partisanship have been long standing issues associated with Nigerian journalism 
even in pre-colonial and early independence days when newspapers were employed primarily 
as tools for propagating ethnic and regional agendas (Oyeleye, 2004). What these interviews 
disclose is that over 50 years after independence, these phenomena still drive newspaper 
content and they obviate professionalism and ethics. For Oso (2013), “the radical or rather 
voluble and quarrelsome character of the Nigeria press” stems largely from the cantankerous 
nature of Nigerian politicians and the ethnic cleavages within the system. According to him, 
the Nigerian press is perceived as sectional in orientation and coverage of political issues. 
Within the context of volatile communal relationships prone to frequent violent blow-outs, 
this issue has negative implications for the mediation of such conflicts.  
6.2.2   Poor Work Conditions 
The issue of the poor and deplorable conditions under which Nigerian journalists work is one 
that has been much discussed. The Africa Media Barometer in its 2012 survey of Nigeria 
expressed misgivings on “the poor status of the welfare of journalists, with poor pay…” (The 
Press, 2012:17). Participants cited this issue as a critical contributor to the negative character 
- 196 - 
 
of press reportage of ethno-religious conflicts. Participant 1, for example, argued that “the 
personal economy of journalists is poor, so they are available to be commoditised.” 
Participant 3 pointed out the problem of resource constraint and how that fuels unprofessional 
practices. Some media, he disclosed, lack effective correspondents and so depend on 
“doubtful sources including the internet and thus perpetuate the errors from such sources.” He 
further pointed out that some newspaper houses do not pay their correspondents but leave 
them to fend for themselves. This practice of relying on “cheap labour” by newspaper houses 
which do not pay their correspondents, leads to all sorts of malpractices. According to him,  
Journalists take advantage and go about blackmailing people and extorting 
money in the name of journalism. In such a situation you can hardly get 
objective reports. A lot of reports are planted, paid for or somehow influenced 
by other unprofessional notions.  
Participant 13, a state chairman of the Nigerian Union of Journalists and Participant 9, a 
senior reporter with a national newspaper, all corroborated the assertion that newspapers 
employ correspondents whom they do not pay and that work conditions in the journalism 
sector are generally poor. This, they also argued, predisposes some journalists to unethical 
and unprofessional practices as survival strategies. Participant 16, a director with the Nigerian 
Press council, agreed that poor work conditions encourage journalists to “cut corners” but 
relates the issue to the challenges of operating a newspaper business since media owners 
“will tell you they can pay only when they have money.”  
Considering the political economy of media production in Nigeria, Oso (2013: 16) observes 
that the Nigerian press has not benefitted from the expansion in the Nigerian economy. 
Whereas sectors like IT and construction declare huge profits and are expanding, Oso points 
out that the media have instead contracted, with issues like poor staff welfare, poor sales and 
advertising revenue rampant. All these, he notes, have affected capacity and in the circulation 
war, different formulas, including sensationalism, are being tried to attract readership and 
patronage. What is evident from the foregoing section is the fact that not only are journalists 
generally poorly remunerated, the operational environment also predispose media personnel 
to practices that are unethical and unprofessional all of which have negative implications for 
the reportage of ethno-religious conflicts. 
6.2.3   Ethical issues/accountability in Press Reportage of Conflicts 
The issue of ethics and its relationship to professionalism in media practice featured 
prominently amongst the participants of this research. Ethics is fundamental to journalism 
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because mass media practice is based on a set of essentially ethical concepts such as trust, 
objectivity, honesty, privacy and freedom (Odunewu, 1998). Journalism stands or falls by the 
ethical conduct of its members and the respect or otherwise which this confers on the press 
from the public (Tettey, 2006; Nyamnjoh, 2005; Frere, 2007). This explains why ethics was a 
reverberating issue for virtually every participant in the research. Participant 15 identified 
ethics as the major challenge of Nigerian journalism in the coverage of conflicts, insisting 
that many newspapers merely circulate hate language in the name of reports. According to 
him, “some of the reports (on the Jos crisis) were stage-managed by interest groups and the 
journalists, as gullible as they are, fell into this and reported the way those people wanted 
them to report.”  
Ethics is measured against a set of guidelines known to members of an organisation and 
expected by the public or recipients of the services of the said organisation. For Nigerian 
journalists, there is a published Code of Ethics as prescribed by the Nigerian Press 
Organisation made up of the Nigerian Union of Journalists (NUJ), Nigerian Guild of Editors 
(NGE) and the Newspapers Proprietors Association of Nigeria (NPAN). The Code of Ethics, 
composed of 15 sections, relates to issues such as editorial independence, accuracy and 
fairness, privacy, privilege/non-disclosure, decency and discrimination. Other sections deal 
with reward and gratification, violence, children and minors, access to information, national 
interest, social responsibility, plagiarism, copyright and press freedom and responsibility.  
In evaluating the ethical conduct of the press, participants focused particularly on the issue of 
reward and gratification linking it with ownership, the poor wages available in the sector and 
how these all breed corruption, partisanship and mediocrity. Participant 8 asserted that 
“journalists in Nigeria, particularly as they are not well remunerated, write with bias to favour 
one stakeholder or the other.” Participant 5 explored the issue deeper however in his remark 
that although the salary of an average journalist may be small, some of them display lifestyles 
that are disproportionate to their pay, bringing up questions as to how they are bridging the 
gap. For him, this suggests the possibility of unethical practices by some journalists to 
survive or to enrich themselves at the expense of their calling. Such practices include 
receiving payment from sources which they are supposed to monitor and report, bringing up 
issues of divided loyalty. According to him, research has shown that some journalists are on 
the payroll of state governments. He therefore asks: “how won’t there be divided loyalty? 
And how objective will be the reports?” 
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Participant 5 further identified what he described as a dangerous practice whereby journalists 
are paid according to the number of reports they file. He argued that “technically” the 
publishers of such newspapers have no control over them since they are not staff. He also 
spoke about the category of journalists referred to as ‘PCPC’ – Press Centre Press Corps – 
composed of journalists that have no newspapers or organisations they work with but parade 
themselves as media men, interview people, “collect money and move on.” Such faceless 
reporters, in his opinion, get away with unethical practices such as blackmail as they are 
virtually accountable to no one in their daily professional conduct. 
What this discussion suggests is that unethical practices in the Nigerian press are significantly 
dictated by the unwholesome work environment of the press. As Participant 15 observed, “if 
you don’t pay your journalists well, somebody will pay them to do the work. So politicians 
will pay journalists to distort facts or tarnish the image of individuals.” Participant 15 also 
disclosed that the working environment in many media houses is not conducive for efficient 
practice, observing, for example, that “journalists trek long distances to cover assignments; or 
they are given assignments without transport fares to the venue. Many media houses are not 
willing to invest in the safety and training of journalists but are more concerned for the profit 
they can get out of their organisation. Journalists hardly have an insurance cover.” 
The Code of Ethics for Nigerian Journalists is currently under review to update and 
reinvigorate it. The existing code dates back to 1998, during the military era and therefore 
requires amendment to reflect the realities of the democratic dispensation as well as 
developments in the field. For example, even aspects of the language need to be made gender 
sensitive (e.g. sections 3(A) and 5(i)).The existing code is titled: “Code of Ethics for Nigerian 
Journalists.” However, the revised draft code of ethics proposes a new title: ‘Nigerian 
Journalists’ Code of Ethics and Declaration of Rights.’ This title suggests some dynamism 
probably in line with the Freedom of Information (FOI) Act. The preamble of the revised 
code also suggests some dynamism and a clear philosophical direction for Nigerian 
journalism in the debates over media role in conflict. In paragraph 2 of the preamble, for 
example, the revised code defines the social duties of journalists: 
The social duties of journalists in Nigeria include the advancement of the right 
to freedom of expression, access to information, freedom of the press, media 
independence, conflict transformation and peace building. 
It could be argued that in proposing “conflict transformation and peace building” as social 
duties of the journalist, the framers of the code of ethics believe that the press should engage 
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with conflicts in a manner that is both proactive but professional. In Article 11, the proposed 
revised code of ethics states that it is the responsibility of the journalist to work for the 
prevention or reduction of conflict, promotion of reconciliation and advancement of the 
common value of peace without compromising the duty to inform. It requires of journalists to 
“use restrained headlines and images in reporting tensions and conflicts; to keep to the facts 
and avoid blemish or slants in reporting tensions and conflicts; and to be cautious in reporting 
figures and identity of casualties in conflicts.”  
Operationalising these provisions would no doubt raise the debates over issues of objectivity 
and balance in reportage. Nevertheless, these provisions suggest a determination by Nigerian 
journalists to strengthen the foundations for improved professional practice in conflict 
reportage. The provisions further confirm the observation I made in chapter five that Nigerian 
media practitioners are favourably disposed to the innovations in conflict coverage such as are 
being canvassed by the proponents of peace journalism, although they do not use such explicit 
terminology.   
In enforcing the ethical code for journalists, participants identified the potential role of the 
professional body of journalists, particularly the Nigerian Union of Journalists (NUJ) which 
most regarded currently as weak and ineffective. This was attributed to perceived corruption 
within the organisation and inappropriate relationship of the leadership at various levels with 
politicians. According to Participant 17, “the NUJ, to me, exists more or less as an avenue for 
the executives at both the state and national levels to take care of themselves.” Critical issues 
such as training and welfare of journalists were being neglected, in the opinion of 
respondents, while more time was spent visiting government officials. A study for the UNDP 
by Pate, Adeyanju and Yahaya (2012: 44) concluded that the NUJ was not only financially 
weak, but suffers credibility/perception challenge even among the members. Moreover, over-
reliance by the organisation on the government for almost all needs undermines the moral 
basis of its operations as a watchdog.   
Various issues impinging on the capacity of journalists to practice professionally and ethically 
have been discussed in the foregoing section. Ingrained partisanship, stemming from external 
and internal factors, poor work conditions and the prevalence of unethical conduct were cited 
by participants as issues contributing to the low level of professionalism in the press, 
particularly as it affects the reportage of ethno-religious conflicts. The next section focuses on 
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a related issue, that is training and capacity building of journalists and how this relates to the 
coverage of ethno-religious conflicts. 
6.3  Journalism Training/Capacity Building 
The issue of training and capacity building is another factor cited by participants as being 
responsible for poor quality reportage of ethno-religious conflicts. The Nigerian Press 
Council puts the number of journalism training institutions as at mid-2014 at “over 64” most 
of which operate the mass communication curriculum approved by the National Universities 
Commission (NUC) for universities and the National Board for Technical Education (NBTE) 
for polytechnics and monotechnics (The Press, 2014: 4). In the opinion of participants of this 
study, many Nigerian journalists are not thoroughly equipped for their calling. It was argued, 
for example, that poor quality reports on conflicts sometimes stem from lack of requisite 
language skills evident in the low capacity of many graduates of mass communication in 
recent times. Apart from that, participants also pointed out the existence of many “quack 
journalists,” those who have no training or instruction for the work. Pate, Adeyanju and 
Yahaya (2012: 18) noted this when they observed that Nigerian journalism is widely 
infiltrated with unqualified hands but who get employed by proprietors looking for cheap 
labour. They further observed that both the regulatory authorities and the media platforms 
appear weak in enforcing minimum standards in the industry. All these detract from the 
quality of reportage of ethno-religious conflicts.  
Several of the participants observed that many institutions of mass communication and 
journalism are springing up rapidly without requisite staff and equipment. With respect to 
staffing, the senior cadre personnel are said to be particularly few and several of the new 
institutions depend on visiting lecturers. Some of the participants also disclosed that the 
average staff-to-student population was 1:150 instead of the NUC prescribed ratio of 1:40. A 
participant, who is a lecturer in one of the universities, revealed that he teaches classes that 
are up to 300 students and asks, “What serious thing can I do with those students 
individually?” 
There are also concerns about the journalism and mass communication curriculum which 
some of participants believe need restructuring or updating to align with rapid technological 
and social developments. A particular issue respondents focused on relates to the structure of 
the Mass Communication course obtainable in most schools in Nigeria, which participants 
contended needed to be unbundled into its component parts to enable students engage in more 
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focused learning relevant to the specialties in the industry. This aligns with the position of 
scholars like Oso (2012) who express concerns about the reductionist tendency which equates 
communication studies with mass communication. Oso argues that communication is a field, 
not a discipline. Oso further emphasises the inter-disciplinary outlook of communication 
studies which he argues gives the field its dynamism and relevance to contemporary social 
life. Other scholars and practitioners, similarly, emphasise the need to restructure and 
standardise the curriculum to incorporate areas of entrepreneurial and management studies to 
make graduates globally competitive (Odunlami, 2014: 45; Alao, 2010: 1; UNN, 2012). Pate, 
Adeyanju and Yahaya (2012: 44) point out a dimension of deficiency in the journalism 
training programmes in terms of its being overly skills-oriented with little emphasis on the 
political economy and social realities of the Nigerian nation. This results in the institutions 
producing technically skilful professionals who are ignorant of the multicultural and political 
circumstances of Nigeria. This, they explain, is responsible for why the press is inundated 
with shallow reporting lacking in depth and historical relevance. Furthermore, the 
Association of Communication Scholars and Professionals of Nigeria (ACSPN) in a 2014 
communique emphasised the need for institutions to move beyond traditional methods of 
teaching and learning and to re-design the media and communication curriculum. Of 
particular interest to this dissertation is the position of the ACSPN that conflict reporting 
should be included as a central part of the new curriculum.  
The challenge of journalism training in Nigeria includes ensuring that the institutions meet 
the UNESCO’s core competencies for journalism education. These competencies include: 
 Competencies in general knowledge and intellectual ability; 
 Professional techniques of research, writing, editing, design and production; 
 Ability to use the tools of journalism and to adapt to new technologies and 
innovative practices; 
 Professional understandings, including ethics; 
 Knowledge of journalism’s role in society, including journalism’s history, the 
organisation of the news media, the laws circumscribing journalism; and  
 Knowledge of best practices in journalism 
Another concern about journalism education in Nigeria, in the opinion of Participant 17, is 
the inadequate “hands-on experience,” the exposure of students to practical experience in the 
industry. Although an integral part of the course, he observed that the instability in Nigeria’s 
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university system occasioned by frequent strikes by staff and students, often short changes 
the industrial experience. According to him, in some schools instead of three months, it is cut 
down to a few weeks in order to accommodate time lost to strikes. Thus students do not get 
the required level and quality of experience and exposure from the industry. 
Some participants also identified as a weakness the fact that journalism at the moment is not 
being treated as a profession, in the sense of minimum entry qualifications and enforcing the 
code of ethics. For participant 4, “until journalism is chartered, you are not likely to have 
serious change.” Some of the participants discussed the institutional platforms of journalism 
profession including the schools, the regulatory authorities and the professional bodies and 
concluded that they are all weak and compromised and could not currently guarantee ethical 
practice. The issue of professionalism is however contentious, as explained by Participant 16 
from the Nigerian Press Council whose agency has the statutory responsibility to register 
journalists, a function not being performed at the moment.
15
 He noted that there are three 
major elements to being a profession: entry qualifications, code of ethics and effective 
regulations to implement the code. He explained that because journalism is fluid and touches 
all aspects of life, it would be problematic insisting that personnel be drawn only from those 
trained in core journalism. However, he insists that no matter the background, all 
practitioners need to be trained in the basic principles and code of ethics of journalism. 
Participant 7 sees the issue of professionalism as the main problem of Nigerian journalism. 
Professionalism, in his view, is not just the academic knowledge, but must be grounded in 
ethical conduct. According to him,  
                                                          
15
 The Nigerian Press Council established in 1992 by the military has not enjoyed wide acceptability by the 
Nigerian newspaper proprietors because of fears that the Council could be used by government to muzzle the 
press. In 2010, a court described the Nigerian Press Council Decree No. 85 of 1992 as amended by the Nigeria 
Press Council (Amendment) Decree No. 60 of 1999, as “oppressive, overbearing and grossly not compatible 
with the standard of a society.” According to Participant 16 of this research, a director in the Council, the 
controversy surrounding the Council has resulted in refusal of critical stakeholders in the newspaper industry to 
nominate members to the Board of the Council, thereby stalling its operations. The Participant also said that the 
Council has limited funding. Nevertheless, the Council has partnered with organisations like the National 
Universities Commission and the National Board for Technical Education, with support from the UNDP, on 
journalism curriculum development in universities and polytechnics. The Nigerian Press Council has set for 
itself the lofty mission “to serve journalism and its public by facilitating access to information; promoting the 
privileges of journalists and ensuring conformity with the code of ethics; accredit journalism training and carry 
out capacity building, documentation and research on press development, and provide the cheapest and effective 
means of adjudication for complaints between journalists and the public” (The Press, 2014: 42). There is a 
critical need to re-think the operational basis of the Council as a parastatal of government so that it can evolve 
into an independent newspaper ombudsman respected and acceptable to all stakeholders.  
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what destroys journalism today is that whereas we stand on a high pedestal of 
moral platitude, preaching and pontificating about what is right and wrong, we 
ourselves have fallen short because if you talk of brown envelop, you think 
journalists. All these are the things that schools of journalism should address. 
They must bring out thorough professionals. 
The issues discussed so far are inter-related and inter-connected, with each reinforcing the 
other negatively to affect journalism practice in Nigeria. While partisanship fuels uncritical 
and unprofessional reportage, poor conditions of service encourage corruption and unethical 
practices and inadequate training and capacity exacerbate and entrench these patterns. 
Changing the dynamics should contribute to improving the situation in the sense that better 
education of journalists would increase professionalism and reduce partisanship; improved 
conditions of service should enhance ethical practice which in turn will result in higher 
professional standards, particularly in the reportage of ethno-religious conflicts.  
Apart from training and education, another important factor impinging on the reportage of 
ethno-religious conflicts is the regulatory environment of press practice. Exploring the context 
of conflicts, for example, requires thorough investigative work by journalists, a task that could 
be undermined by anti-press laws and regulations such as the official secrets act, all of which 
hinder access to vital public information. These issues constitute the focus of discussion in the 
next section. 
6.4  Press Freedom and Accountability 
The Constitution of Nigeria tasks the media with the role of upholding the responsibility and 
accountability of the government to the people (section 22). A critical determinant of the 
effectiveness or otherwise with which it performs this role is contingent on the regulatory 
environment and structures within which it operates. With particular respect to the coverage 
and reportage of conflicts, the safety and security of the press and adequacy of access to vital 
information are key to any attempts to get at the roots of ethno-religious and communal 
crises. This makes it important to interrogate the regulatory environment of press practice and 
how this impacts on content. This is in line with my last research objective which is to 
investigate the regulatory environment of media practice in Nigeria and to examine the 
implications of the Freedom of Information Act for investigative journalism and the reportage 
of ethno-religious conflicts.  
This task has been accomplished in three steps. The first step involves a brief historical 
overview of press regulation in Nigeria and a survey of aspects of the 1999 Constitution 
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dealing with press freedom. This is undertaken to provide a background for the clamour for 
the Freedom of Information law. The second step analyses the salient provisions of the 
Freedom of Information Act, particularly its potentials for investigating the causes of ethno-
religious conflicts. Finally, I obtain the views of media practitioners and media academics on 
the implementation and impact of the Act. 
6.4.1   From Draconian Laws to Freedom of Information Act: A Brief History of Press  
Regulation in Nigeria 
From its inception, the press in Nigeria, like many parts of Africa, has witnessed unease in its 
relationship with public authorities. Chick (1971) records the British Colonial Governor-
General of Nigeria, in an address delivered to the Legislative Council in 1946, as making 
some trenchant comments on journalistic indiscipline in the territory under his charge: 
Our press is free - free to abuse, to sabotage effort, to kill enthusiasm, to 
impute bad motives and dishonesty, to poison the springs of goodwill and foul 
the well of trust, to impregnate the body politic with envy, hatred and malice – 
in short free to do the Devil’s work. 
 
Chick notes that this complaint was familiar even then, for, as he observes, social divisions 
run deep in Nigeria and any polarisation of opinion around a key issue, or exacerbation of 
mistrust, tends to conjure up the spectre of communal violence. “Those in authority have 
always been uneasily aware of the fragility of civil order and it is not surprising that 
newspapers should be regarded as potentially disruptive in such a situation,” he remarked. 
Acting on assumption that journalists are able to excite latent animosities and to build 
disparate sources of friction into a sense of compelling grievance, Chick observes that the 
colonial administration showed an almost “obsessive concern” with problems of press 
control. This “adversarial” legacy (Oyovbaire, 2001) of the press dictated that it was in 
constant opposition to the political class even when Nigerians took over governance after 
independence. Because of this, Oyovbaire (2001) points out that a section of the Nigerian 
political elite began to dislike the nature of reportage of the Nigerian press, labelling it the 
“Lagos Press.” And because most of the newspapers were actually founded and based in 
Lagos, this created for it an instrument for the propagation of a role, which was nationalistic, 
yet geo-politically partisan. 
Omu (1968) further confirms that at independence, nationalists in the opposition transferred 
their hostility to the new government manned by fellow Nigerians. Thus right from colonial 
times, governments in Nigeria had devised anti-press laws to check-mate what a colonial 
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administrator characterised as “dangerous instruments in the hands of semi-civilised negroes” 
(Omu, 1968:288). The first law of sedition appeared in 1908 with two other policy 
instruments enacted against the press at various times (Omu, 1968). Post-independence 
constitutions of 1963 and 1989 made no specific provisions for press freedom, beyond the 
clause specifying a general freedom of expression for all citizens (Agbaje, 1990). The 
prolonged military rule in Nigeria was characterised by draconian decrees and policies aimed 
at suppressing and gagging the press. The most noticeable of these were the infamous Decree 
No. 4 of 1985 under which journalists were jailed for reporting or publishing information 
considered as classified or improper; and Decrees 43 and 48 of June and July 1993 both 
considered as amongst the most draconian in the annals of the Nigerian press (Bitrus, 1996).  
The 1999 Nigerian Constitution currently in operation has provided specifically for press 
freedom in section 39(1). This section states that Nigerians have the right to freedom of 
expression and freedom to have an opinion and impart same without interference. Section 
39(2) provides for freedom to establish media organisations without interference from 
government or others. The constitution however comes shy of providing specific clauses to 
outlaw press censorship or to guarantee editorial independence or forbid state interference 
with editorial content (Ogbondah, 2003). This gap has important implications for fair 
coverage particularly in terms of state-owned media organisations, and generally for the 
press. Furthermore, the same section 39(2) prohibits individuals or private organisations from 
operating the electronic media except as authorised by the President. This authority vests in 
the Nigerian Broadcasting Commission. 
Importantly, section 39(3) constrains the freedom of expression through provisos which allow 
the government to enact laws: 
 For the purpose of preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, 
maintaining the authority and independence of courts or regulating telephony, 
wireless broadcasting, television or exhibition of cinematograph film; or 
 Imposing restrictions upon persons holding office under the Government of the 
Federation or of a State, members of the Armed Forces of the Federation or members 
of the Nigeria Police Force or other government security services or agencies 
established by law. 
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The 1999 constitution, in section 45(1) further permit laws to be made to restrict information: 
 In the interest of defence, public safety, public order, public morality or public health, 
or 
 For the purpose of protecting the rights and freedom of other persons. 
 
It is therefore noticeable that the freedom of the press in the Constitution comes with 
significant derogations. For example what constitutes “public morality”? Who defines 
“morality”? Such nebulous statements are capable of misuse by overzealous officials against 
the press as witnessed recently when the military authorities seized and destroyed newspaper 
editions of some national newspapers. These loopholes in part account for the molestation 
and attempt to muzzle the press even by the civilian administration of Nigeria. The incidents 
of maltreatment of journalists, such as those involving Isioma Daniel of This Day newspaper, 
Rotimi Durojaiye of the Independent newspaper and Gbenga Arubela of African Independent 
Television (AIT) amongst others (Abone and Kur, 2014) readily come to mind.
16
 Thus even 
after transition to civil rule, the press was still constrained in the performance of its 
responsibilities. According to the international organisation, Reporters Without Borders, 
“Nigeria embodies a paradox. On the one hand, it is a country where freedom of news and 
information is effective so far as the pluralism and vitality of the media are concerned, and on 
the other, it has one of Africa’s worst records for infringements of press freedom and a 
worrying level of danger for journalists” (May 12, 2012).    
This formed the backdrop to the demand for the enactment of the Freedom of Information 
Law in Nigeria. The Freedom of Information Act was signed into law in Nigeria on May 28, 
2011 after 12 years of legislative and executive rigmarole which saw the bill passed twice, 
the first version having been refused assent by the President in 2007 (Mmadu, 2011). Mmadu 
(2011) notes that the passage of the Act was welcomed with excitement, not only by the 
media and civil society organisations, but Nigerians in general. This was because of the cloud 
of secrecy with which government business was shrouded, bolstered by such legislations as 
                                                          
16
 Isioma Daniel was a young Nigerian reporter for This Day newspaper who received death sentence (fatwa) 
from some Islamic organisations and had to flee to exile in Europe over an article in 2002 allegedly 
blasphemous of Prophet Mohammed, and which article sparked widespread Miss World pageant riots in 
Nigeria. 
Rotimi Durojaiye of the Independent and Gbenga Arubela of Africa Independent Television (AIT) were charged 
for sedition in 2006 in connection with materials published on the cost of a presidential jet purchased by the 
Obasanjo administration (see Abone and Kur, 2014). 
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the Official Secrets Act which empowered public officials to withhold vital information from 
the press and citizens. “In such a scenario,” Mmadu explains, “the FOI Act is designed to put 
an end to the pervasive culture of secrecy and usher in a culture of transparency and 
openness.” He argued that the FOI would also have a restraining influence on the endemic 
culture of corruption by exposing wrong doing and mismanagement of government finances 
and transactions, and therefore enhance integrity in public life. Importantly, the FOI should 
encourage political participation by the ordinary citizen, who, alienated by prolonged military 
rule and “unrepresentative civil rule,” had been indifferent to the exercise of power. In 
Mmadu’s words, “the FOI Act is expected to empower a common Nigerian with a capacity to 
take part in the political process as an active citizen with adequate information about issues of 
government and replace the culture of silence with that of activism” (Mmadu, 2014:120-121). 
This last point is particularly important to this research because individuals and communities 
require authentic and timely information to be able to engage rationally with issues in conflict 
so as to resolve tensions and differences in amicable manners. In the reportage of conflicts by 
the press, FOI has the potential to create or facilitate access to credible information which 
would empower citizens to scrutinise and challenge elite policies and actions calculated to 
trigger conflicts and crises for selfish purposes. 
The FOI in clause 2 gives every person a legally enforceable right of access to records, 
documents and information in the custody of public officials and institutions, subject to the 
exemptions specified in the Act. An applicant does not need to demonstrate any specific 
interest in the information being applied for. The Act also entitles applications in clause 3 to 
institute legal action to enforce their right to access in cases of denial. 
Other notable provisions of the Act are as follows: 
 Public institutions are required to proactively publish certain types of information 
through print, electronic and online means and to regularly update the information. 
 Apart from public institutions, the Act covers private entities performing public 
functions, providing public services or utilising public funds. 
 An applicant should receive information being requested within 7 days or 
explanations for refusal. 
 
The Act exempts certain categories of information from the general right of access. In clause 
11(1) the Act states that ‘a public institution may deny an application for any information the 
- 208 - 
 
disclosure of which may be injurious to conduct of international affairs and the defence of the 
Federal Republic of Nigeria. 
 
Scholars, such as Abone and Kur (2014), and Dunu and Ugbo (2014), identify weaknesses in 
some of the provisions of the Act or in the Nigerian environment that could undermine its 
effective implementation. Among these is the possibility of loose definition of “national 
security” or “international affairs” as an exemption clause. The question is what constitutes 
information that is injurious to conduct of international affairs and the defence of the Federal 
Republic of Nigeria? Other possible impediments include: the culture of impunity in Nigeria 
in which court orders are flouted recklessly by powerful interests and government officials; 
litigation time and cost in cases of refusal; existence of contrary laws such as Official Secrets 
Act and the lack of a supervisory body to nurture and enforce the Act. 
Dunu and Ugbo (2014) point out moreover that access to information does not necessarily 
lead to greater citizen participation, state accountability and state responsiveness. This is 
because there are structural and political barriers which hinder both the capacity and 
incentives of governments to produce information, and the ability of citizens to claim their 
right of information and use it to demand better governance and public services (Daruwala 
and Nayak, 2007). In the next section, I examine the implementation of the Freedom of 
Information Act and its impact on press reportage four years after it came into existence. This 
examination is done through interviews with media practitioners and media academics.  
6.4.2  Freedom of Information Act in Practice: What Difference? 
Participants of this research, in evaluating the impact of the FOI after more than three years 
of its enactment, gave low scores to its implementation by the Nigerian press. Most of the 
respondents expressed the opinion that the Act has had minimal impact on Nigerian 
journalism for various reasons, the first of which is that journalists themselves have not 
adequately understood and digested the provisions of the Act. This is attributable, in their 
perception, to a combination of laziness and insufficient depth in Nigeria’s journalism, with 
practitioners who are both intellectually and morally equipped to operate the Act. Therefore, 
the euphoria which attended the passage of the Act and its signing into law about four years 
ago has not been matched by commensurate energy and action to utilise the law.  
Another reason adduced by participants for the low implementation of the Act is corruption, 
both within the media and in the larger social framework. Within the media, participants cited 
unethical practices such as blackmail, non-payment of salaries, and the “brown-envelop” 
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syndrome which they point out diminish the moral clout of the press to hold government to 
account. Associated with this is the lack of capacity by media organisations to undertake 
investigative journalism due to resource constraints and lack of requisite manpower. 
According to Participant 3,  
When cases of blackmail, corruption, non-payment of salaries are rampant 
within the media itself, how can such an institution be a corrective agent? Can 
such an institution have the courage to confront government and insist on the 
release of information? Do we have the moral standing? 
In this respect, a situation arises where the use of the Act is said to be politically motivated, 
that is, when public officials release critical information to the media with the purpose of 
damaging the reputation of some other officials. Some participants cited ownership of the 
press as an obstacle to the implementation of the Act in the sense that some proprietors are 
also politicians or government contractors and therefore will not be enthusiastic to deploy 
their media to investigate issues in which they or their associates may be implicated. 
Outside the media, official bureaucracy is cumbersome and, in the opinion of some 
respondents, still thrives in secrecy despite the existence of the Act. It creates deliberate 
obstacles for even those who attempt to utilise the law, mainly non-governmental 
organisations. By a recent court ruling, the FOI Act is applicable only to federal level affairs, 
and does not affect state and local governments which have not domesticated the law within 
their domains. This, some participants observed, severely limits the operational scope of the 
Act, and is a factor in its low implementation. 
The issue of ownership and resource base as obstacles in the implementation of the FOI Act 
bring up philosophical issues underlying the crusade for the Act and the expectations built 
around it. As Oso (2013: 15) observes, the debate for a constitutional guarantee for freedom 
of information was informed by the liberalist perspective of the media in which the press is 
the fourth estate of the realm which performs watchdog functions over the government. 
However, Oso also points out that this expectation of the liberalists is compromised by 
important structural issues, first among which is that only the rich and powerful can afford to 
establish media organisations in view of the expensive capital outlay. In Nigeria, for example, 
newspapers recently established are owned by either politicians or powerful individuals. The 
implication of this is that the watchdog function of the press is eroded by the political 
economy of media production. Having been colonised by powerful economic interests, the 
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press has lost its vitality as watchdog. Therefore, the high expectation hinged on the press 
through the passage of the FOI Act needs to be moderated by this reality.  
Another issue with the liberal perspective driving the FOI is what Oso (2013: 19) describes as 
the industrialisation of the mass media and the public relationization of political 
communication. The industrialization of the mass media implies that commercial 
considerations have become major deciding factors in media operation. This necessitates cost 
reduction in vital areas of professional operation, particularly personnel and news gathering 
duties, such as investigative journalism. Conversely, there is increased space and attention to 
coverage that could yield revenue from advertisements and circulation. The point here is that 
economic factors, rather than professional considerations, increasingly drive content and this 
has negative implication for the operationalisation of the FOIA. 
Participants 2, 9, 10 highlighted a significant challenge to FOI Act in the refusal of state 
governments to implement the law in their domains, on claims that it is a federal law which 
needs to be “domesticated” by their State Houses of Assembly before it enjoys jurisdiction in 
the states. According to Participant 10, “the battle in Lagos State is instructive. Politicians 17 
do not want to be checked in Nigeria. They may find their way around Independent Corrupt 
Practices Commission (ICPC) and the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC). 
But the media check is what they dread most.”  
In addressing this issue of bureaucratic bottlenecks however, Participant 15 believes that 
journalists themselves need to show more persistence in testing the “resilience of the Act.” 
He insists that when journalists have earned the confidence of the general public, the FOI Act 
will work better. “If journalists would persist, they would easily get willing civil servants 
who will give information. Unfortunately, in a few instances even civil servants who 
volunteered information ended up being victims because a journalist would trade that 
information for money. So people are apprehensive at dealing with journalists on these 
matters.” For Participant 16, whose establishment has already organised some training 
activities on the Act for journalists, the press is still far from really utilising the Act. “Some 
are complaining but have never used it. Some have not even read the Act,” he observed. 
                                                          
17
There was a recent court case in Lagos in which an NGO sued the government for refusing to provide 
information on the utilisation of a foreign loan. The government based its refusal on claims that the FOI Act has 
not been passed by the State Assembly and the court ruled in favour of the state government.  
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Some things stand out clearly from these interviews. First, that in the perception and 
evaluation of media practitioners and media academics, the FOI Act has had no significant 
impact on journalism practice in Nigeria, contrary to initial expectations. Not only is 
implementation weak, but there is a paucity of effective knowledge of the Act by the media, a 
knowledge above the catch-phrase to critical understanding and internalisation of the 
provisions of the law for action. This situation is directly related to both the quality of 
journalism as well as the environment of practice which features poor conditions and weak 
facilities. Bureaucratic bottlenecks anchored in rampant corruption within the public sector 
constitute major obstacles in the implementation of the FOI Act. This is made worse by the 
prevalence of internal corruption within the media itself, both among the proprietors and 
practitioners. These factors, juxtaposed against the apparent lack of training and weak 
professional capacity of many journalists for investigation and practice at the high levels 
envisaged by the Act, are issues which need to be addressed. Press freedom provides the 
atmosphere for effective practice. Accountability and ethical conduct inspires public trust and 
effectiveness of practice.  
6.5 Conclusions  
This chapter has given context to the research on press coverage of ethno-religious conflicts 
by exploring the environment of media practice in Nigeria, the challenges faced by journalists 
and the constraints and opportunities. This was accomplished by examining three broad 
themes: professionalism and media ethics in Nigeria; training and capacity building; and, 
press freedom and media accountability. These themes were explored in interviews with 
media academics and media practitioners carefully selected to obtain a rich diversity of 
opinions and perspectives. Through the interviews and explications in the chapter, I have 
been able to delineate certain issues which explain the pattern of coverage and the nature of 
representation of ethno-religious conflicts in the previous chapters.  
With respect to professionalism and media ethics, the interviews indicated that issues such as 
partisanship, biased coverage, corruption and other unethical practices long associated with 
the Nigerian press appear to be enduring. This is primarily because of the unfavourable work 
environment and weaknesses and inadequacies in the regulatory environment in terms of 
training and professional enforcement of ethics. For example, the institutions of journalism 
training have been multiplying across the country without commensurate increase in facilities 
and staffing. This has negative implications for the quality of products being churned out for 
the industry and a corollary implication for media content. Furthermore, the professional 
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body of journalism, particularly as represented by the Nigerian Union of Journalists, is weak 
and/or compromised in instances. Also, there is no generally acceptable ombudsman for the 
industry as the Nigerian Press Council remains a controversial organisation. There is 
inadequate mechanism for self-regulation in the newspaper industry which would enhance 
the professional integrity of the Nigerian press. All these have negative implications for 
quality reportage and coverage of ethno-religious conflicts. 
Although the regulatory environment appears to have improved with the passage of the 
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), evidence suggests that this has not impacted news 
practice significantly. This is because, amongst other things, FOIA has not resulted in more 
investigative journalism, neither has it made any difference to the manner violent conflict is 
covered or reported. Furthermore, the Act does not seem to have been properly digested and 
understood by stakeholders particularly the media. The FOIA therefore remains a huge 
potential to be explored and utilised by the Nigerian press in deepening professional practice, 
particularly investigative journalism and other duties which contribute to more effectively 
holding government accountable to the people.  
The last four chapters have provided opportunity to analyse in detail the mediation of ethno-
religious conflicts by the Nigerian press. Through these analytical chapters, I have explored 
the pattern of coverage as well as the representation and framing of the conflicts. I have also 
had opportunity to problematize and interrogate established journalistic practices and news 
culture through the lens of new concepts in conflict reportage. Specifically, I explored the 
philosophy of peace journalism and discussed its applicability to the Nigerian press scene. 
Lastly, I considered the context of news production in Nigeria, focusing on the political and 
economic factors which underpin operations in the sector.  
Through these analyses, I have been able to establish the position that the mediation of ethno-
religious conflicts by the Nigerian press tends to escalate, rather than minimise, the conflicts. 
In light of this, and consonant with emerging trends in conflict coverage, I argue for the 
adoption of conflict responsive journalism, a proposal which I discuss more fully in the 
Conclusion. 
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CONCLUSION 
This study has explored the mediation of ethno-religious conflicts by the press and examined 
their potential for minimising or escalating such conflicts. It focused   particular attention on 
the Nigerian press and its coverage of violent incidents of sectarian and communal clashes in 
Jos, Plateau State, an area at the critical fault line of Nigeria’s north-south, Christian-Muslim 
geopolitical dichotomy. It addresses the wider debates around the reporting of war and 
conflict, particularly the contentious issues of the relationship between media and conflict 
and explores the implications of this relationship on the course of violent intra-state sectarian 
conflicts. Using a data collection strategy which featured a combination of quantitative and 
qualitative methods, it attempted to locate the Nigerian press within these conflicts, and 
examined how they may be implicated in the escalation or exacerbation of the conflicts. The 
study finds both the quality of coverage and the representational pattern of issues by the press 
as contentious and problematic. It therefore argued for the adoption of conflict responsive 
journalism, a variant of the peace journalism paradigm, encompassing a set of professional 
and ethical standards which would ensure that the press reports conflicts much more 
sensitively and in a manner that would not aid their escalation. To achieve this, it identified 
training and education as central in equipping and re-orienting journalists towards new 
paradigms of practice in conflict reporting. It further argued for the strengthening of the 
institutional platforms of journalism practice and press regulation in order to secure better 
professional output in media content. 
The role of the media in conflict is a broad and sometimes controversial subject. Research on 
news culture, however, confirms that media representations tend to glamorise war, violence 
and propaganda (Lynch, 2005; Hackett, 2007; Cottle, 2006). This has raised critical questions 
about mainstream journalistic practices in the coverage of conflicts and scholarly arguments 
as to whether journalism is a participant or a detached observer in the conflict cycle. 
Therefore, critical to this dissertation are the debates and contentions inspired by emerging 
alternative concepts to mainstream journalistic treatment of conflicts (Galtung, 2002; Cottle, 
2006; Lynch and McGoldrick, 2009; Hackett, 2011; Blasi, 2004). I examined the trends in 
this debate, exploring the possibilities of the emergence of a new journalistic paradigm which 
can challenge the endemic negativity of the press and the existing “institutionalised 
bystander” approach to conflict reportage by mainstream media (Geelen, 2002).  
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This dissertation makes tangible contributions to the literature on the media-conflict nexus by 
providing empirical data and new perspectives on press coverage of ethno-religious conflicts. 
The study confirms the preponderance of mainstream news values in conflict reportage, 
which it argues contributes to the entrenchment of structural violence capable of escalating 
conflicts. This finding echoes the anxieties and debates about the public role of the news 
media in a democracy, particularly what Manning (2001: 13) has characterised as “the 
politics of news sources” and the differential opportunities granted by the media to contesting 
voices and interests. It confirms Manning’s assertion that journalism does not merely mirror 
events; rather it is a representation of reality shaped by several factors including commercial 
market signals, pressures generated by organisational imperatives and deadlines, the level of 
managerial supervision and interaction with routine sources of news (Manning, 2001: 51-53). 
My research provided evidence which supports the assertion that journalism is unavoidably a 
participant in the conflict cycle, not a detached unobtrusive observer. Similarly, Hackett 
(2007: 2) has noted that in conflicts, media are not mere observers, “but are simultaneously a 
source of intelligence, a combatant, a weapon, a target and a battlefield.”  
In arriving at this position, my research has taken cognisance of the political economy of 
news production, particularly the ownership of news organisations and the positioning of 
news organisations in competitive markets, factors considered as potential threats to the free 
circulation of ideas (Manning, 2001: 81). This emphasises that political and economic criteria 
cannot be overlooked in the political communication process, a phenomenon Habermas terms 
as “re-feudalisation” of the public sphere (Manning, 2001: 5). The re-feudalisation of the 
public sphere describes a process whereby communication and the exchange of ideas grows 
increasingly dependent upon a new group of sponsors and patrons, and upon new structures 
of authority which pose an increasing threat to the rationality of debate and the universalistic 
criteria by which arguments should be evaluated. The practical implication of this is that the 
selection and representation of information in the public domain is undertaken according to 
commercial or political interests rather than “pure” reason and rationality (Manning, 2001: 5). 
While it is possible to overestimate the influence of advertising, commercialism and public 
relations, it is nevertheless true that communication, particularly through the mass media, can 
never entirely escape the effects of the conditions under which it is produced. This has 
serious implications for the reportage of ethno-religious conflicts. 
In carrying out this research, I utilised a methodological approach combining quantitative and 
qualitative analysis, a strategy that enabled me to explore data extensively and rigorously. In 
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order to adequately interrogate the issues and questions thrown up by the enquiry, I employed 
a theoretical framework incorporating ideas from ethnicity, media and ethnic conflicts, 
critical political economy as well as debates about alternative approaches to conflict coverage 
and reportage. This assisted in analysing professional practices of Nigerian journalism and 
their relationship with conflict and to canvass the argument for a re-orientation in style and 
comportment leading to the adoption of a news culture which does not aid conflict escalation. 
In canvassing the adoption of conflict responsive journalism, this study has called attention to 
two critical problem areas of the Nigerian press in the reportage of conflict: the problem of 
orientation and the institutional platforms of journalism practice. On the first problem, the 
negative orientation of the press, imbibed from its pre-colonial days, is an issue which 
requires deconstruction, to enable journalists to appreciate and become better equipped to 
report conflicts in a manner productive to communal harmony, especially in view of the 
endemic nature of conflicts in Nigeria. In this respect, I share the position of Sharp (2013) 
that if journalists are to fashion their narratives in such a way as to avoid driving conflicts 
towards a violent endgame, understanding conflict dynamics or conflict analysis must be the 
first tool of choice for the professional reporter. Such an understanding would also force a re-
think of professional responsibility that “eschews the serial excuse of neutrality and 
acknowledges the material impact of media of communications” (Sharp, 2013: 189). What is 
envisaged is a reportorial style which both mirrors and constructs conflict narratives in a way 
to guarantee, in Geelen’s words, “timely, accurate and responsible information” (Geelen, 
2002). This requires a re-orientation through training in conflict analysis and advocacy to 
create awareness and acceptance of this brand of journalism. This also has implications for 
curriculum development in journalism education and training with respect to conflict 
reportage and action-oriented interventions by relevant stakeholders.  
In chapter five where I explored the concept of peace journalism, I problematised the 
reportage of ethno-religious conflicts through the lens of this concept whose stated goal is to 
make media discourse on conflicts more transparent and balanced in order to stimulate 
alternative interpretations and more critical reflection (Galtung, 1998; Lynch and 
McGoldrick, 2005). It seeks to protect conflict from what Kempf (2007: 1) characterises as 
the “fateful propaganda trap into which traditional war reporting is continually falling.” I 
observed through primary data that the general orientation of Nigerian newspapers is towards 
“war journalism,” that is, the routinised, western-style news conventions which emphasise 
negative news over positive news. This negative orientation of the Nigerian press, I 
- 216 - 
 
suggested, has its roots in the historical foundation of the press as an anti-colonialist tool 
which has given the press a distinctive combative character or “protest motif” (Olukotun, 
2004: 15). The political economy of newspaper production further obviates moderation and a 
tempered approach to news which peace journalism advocates (Mogekwu, 2011; Hyde-
Clarke, 2012). These issues are compounded by findings in chapter 3 which suggest the 
prevalence of unprofessional practices such as exaggeration, simplification and distortion of 
information by the press in the coverage of the conflicts. Chapter 4 similarly disclosed a 
tendency to superficial treatment of issues and inclinations to regional and religious biases in 
reportage. I observed that this pattern of reportage is capable of reinforcing and perpetuating 
prejudices within the polity and obviating what Lee (2000) terms as the ideals of good 
journalism: objectivity, balance, fairness and thoroughness.                                                                                                                                                                                                                
The second problem which my dissertation called attention to relates to the institutional 
contexts within which journalism in Nigeria operates. Through discussions with media 
practitioners and media academics in chapter 6, I demonstrated that these institutional 
contexts, particularly the regulatory and professional bodies, are weak or compromised. This 
is on account of unethical and unprofessional practices or because mechanisms for enforcing 
guiding rules and ethical conduct are non-existent or ineffective. Furthermore, the rapid 
expansion of journalism training in the recent past has not been matched by the development 
or acquisition of commensurate facilities and human resources. Interviewees suggested that 
this has negative impact on the quality of graduates being produced from the training 
institutions and corollary negative implications for ethical and competent practice in the 
reportage of conflicts. Ill-equipped institutions would lack capacity to impart knowledge 
which meets the UNESCO model curricular for journalism education including competence 
in professional standards, journalism and society and knowledge of the world (Odunlami, 
2014: 356-357). Therefore strengthening the institutional context of news production through 
relevant policy review would address significant issues relating to training, ethical conduct 
and professionalism.  
The concept of conflict responsive journalism which I have proposed develops from 
Howard’s (2009: 5) “conflict sensitive reporting” (CSR) whose goal is to “make reporting on 
conflict more insightful, more comprehensive and thus more influential.” Conflict 
responsiveness is therefore a hybrid of Peace Journalism and CSR and connotes alertness, 
competence, proactivity and appropriate professional response to mediation of conflict. As I 
demonstrated in chapters five and six, Nigerian journalists and media educators are positively 
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pre-disposed to the philosophical underpinnings of reformist paradigms like peace 
journalism, which argue that in covering conflicts, journalists should take responsibility for 
the consequences of their reportage. There is, however, a disconnect as such convictions are 
not reflected in newspaper content. Conflict responsive journalism is proposed to provide a 
strategy to bridge this gap by focusing attention on critical aspects of practice including 
institutional structures which perpetuate current news culture. However, in advocating 
conflict responsive journalism, rather than peace journalism, I am aware of the mixed 
reactions to the latter and the apparent ready acceptance of more neutral descriptors that do 
not appear to make journalism practice contingent on overly normative commitments. It also 
demonstrates awareness that “media-oriented peacebuilding” (Frere, 2007) alone, important 
as it is, cannot secure peace. Beyond the individual journalist, institutional structures of 
journalism, political economy, professional norms and other systemic influences must be 
engaged (Fawcett, 2002; Hanitzsch, 2007; Sanem and Ross, 2012). Further academic 
investigation is required to explore the institutional dimensions of this proposal and the 
structures needed to refocus the press for better conflict coverage rather than mere routine 
reportage of violence in manners that could escalate it.  
Limitations and New Directions for Conflict Reportage 
Researching the coverage of ethno-religious conflicts in Nigeria has indicated the need to 
further interrogate established journalistic conventions and news culture, particularly as they 
relate to conflict reportage. New journalistic genres like peace journalism which engage in 
such critique of mainline news practices remain a subject of much debate and conversation 
(Hackett, 2011; Seaga, et.al (2011); Hanitzsch, 2007). However, as I have demonstrated in 
this study, the idea that journalism should play an active role in conflict resolution is one that 
is gaining ground amongst media practitioners, particularly in a country like Nigeria which 
has been conflict-endemic. I do recognise, in line with Hyde-Clarke (2011: 12), that structural 
hierarchies influence media structures and that there could be a tendency to media-centrism 
in this effort. I am however persuaded by the argument of Seaga, et.al (2011) that such 
hierarchies do not in themselves lessen the “moral culpability” of journalists when covering 
conflict but rather clarify the debate in terms of where action lies in the effort to secure better 
quality conflict coverage. Therefore more research is required in this field as it affects 
Nigeria especially due to prevalence of violent communal conflicts and the need to 
understand and minimise them.  
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The focus of this dissertation is on print journalism. I realise from doing the research however 
that it now prompts investigation of other journalism tools, particularly the online 
environment. This is with specific regard to use of new media, encompassing the internet and 
social media platforms such as Twitter and Facebook as well as mobile technology software 
like WhatsApp and Viber. Although these are becoming more and more pervasive as 
channels of mass communication in Nigeria (Obijiofor, 2010; Odunlami, 2014), the need to 
maintain critical focus excluded consideration of these from my research. Similarly, 
investigation is required into the role of the audience in these issues, not just as consumers, 
but also as producers of news. These areas require further investigation in order to obtain 
more rounded perspectives on the role of the media in ethno-religious conflicts.  
This dissertation has studied the mediation of ethno-religious conflicts, endemic features of 
Nigeria’s Fourth Republic since return to democratic governance in 1999. These conflicts 
pose obstacles to national unity and development, and portend dangers to the West African 
sub-region. The study recognises the pivotal role of information providers in conflict, a role 
Onadipe and Lord (1998) argue could be manipulative or constructive. The main focus of my 
research has been on how to engage the press constructively in the mediation of these 
conflicts in order to minimise them and to strengthen peace building. I hope this modest 
contribution will stimulate further discourse towards equipping the Nigerian press to more 
creditably fulfil its social responsibility to report conflicts creatively and competently. 
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APPENDICES 
 
Appendix 1 
Characteristics of Peace and War Journalism 
Peace/conflict journalism War/violence journalism 
Peace/conflict-oriented 
Explore conflict formation,  
                  x parties, y goals, z issues 
general ‘win-win’ orientation 
Open space, open time; 
causes and outcomes anywhere, also 
in history/culture 
Making conflicts transparent 
Giving voice to all parties;  
empathy, understanding 
See conflict/war as problem,  
focus on creating new understanding 
of conflict 
Humanizing all sides; 
the more so the more terrifying the 
weapons 
Proactive: prevention before the violence/war 
break out  
Focus on invisible effects of violence, 
(trauma and glory, damage to 
structure/culture) 
 
War/violence-oriented 
Focus on conflict arena, 
2 parties, 1 goal (win), war general 
‘zero-sum’ orientation 
Closed space, closed time;  
      causes and exits in arena, who threw the 
      first stone 
Making wars opaque/hidden 
‘us-them’ journalism, propaganda, voice 
for ‘us’ 
See ‘them’ as the problem, 
      focus on who prevails in war 
Dehumanizing ‘them’; 
the more so the more terrifying the 
weapons 
Reactive: waiting for violence to erupt before 
reporting 
Focus only on visible effect of violence (killed, 
wounded and material damage) 
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Truth-oriented 
Expose untruths on all sides 
Expose all cover-ups/lies 
Propaganda-oriented 
Expose ‘their’ untruths 
Help protect ‘our’ cover-ups/lies 
People-oriented 
Focus on suffering everywhere; including on 
women, the aged, children, giving voice to the 
voiceless 
Reveal the names of all evil-doers 
Focus on people as peace-makers 
Elite-oriented 
Focus exclusively on ‘our’ suffering; on able-
bodied elite males, being their mouth-piece 
Reveal only the names of ‘their’ evil-doers 
Focus on elite peace-makers 
Solution-oriented 
Peace = non-violence + creativity 
Highlight peace initiatives, 
also to prevent future war 
Focus on structure, culture  
the peaceful society 
Aftermath: resolution, reconstruction, 
reconciliation 
Victory-oriented 
Peace = victory + ceasefire 
Conceal peace initiatives, 
before victory is at hand 
Focus on treaty, institution 
the controlled society 
Moving on to next war,  
return if the old flares up again 
Source: Johan Galtung: Peace/conflict journalism vs. war/violence journalism 
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Appendix 2 
CONTENT ANALYSIS CODING FRAME 
Story ID 
This identifies a particular story from the lot in the sample and consists of 12 digits: 
newspaper code – date – story number (xxx-xxxxxx-xxx) 
Newspaper code: 3 digits (for example, 101) 
Date: 6 digits (for example, September 7, 2001 = 090701) 
Story number: 3 digits (for example, 001 (the number would have been assigned on 
copy of newspaper) 
The ID in this example is: 101-090701-001 
Note: the codes assigned to the newspapers in this study are as follows: 
Daily Trust: 101 
Nigerian Tribune: 102 
The Guardian: 103 
This Day: 104 
Key words in headline:  
(This is required for easy identification of story and for further treatment at later stages of the 
research) 
PART 1 – PRELIMINARY INFORMATION  
 Incidence of Ethno-Religious Conflict 
The study will be investigating five different episodes of ethno-religious conflicts and each of 
the incidents will be identified as indicated below: 
 1. September 2001 
 2. November 2008 
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 3. January/March 2010 
 4. Christmas Eve 2010 (December 2010) 
 5. Eid-el-Fitr (Sallah) 2011 (August 2011) 
  Story Type 
Stories will be categorized according to type to enable us observe and discuss several issues 
later such as: relationship between story type and media frame, comparison of news coverage 
with other items, etc. 
 1. News story 
 2. Editorial 
 3. Feature/Opinion 
 4. Other  
 By-line 
This is the identity of the reporter/columnist or the credit line given to a reporter or columnist 
on a story.  
 1. Correspondent/Staff Reporter/Columnist 
 2. Guest writer/freelance reporter 
 3. Anonymous 
 Regional Identity of Reporter/Correspondent/Columnist 
Indicate whether the writer of the story is identified by name and if so whether from the name 
or other description, their broad regional identity can be inferred.  
 1. North 
 2. Middle Belt 
 3. South 
 4. Other 
 5. Not clear/not indicated 
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Contact  
Indicate whether there is contact information (i.e. telephone number or email address of 
writer in the by-line.)   Among other things, this information might assist in making contacts 
with journalists for the semi-structured interviews stage of the research. 
Gender 
This is the gender of the reporter/correspondent/columnist or writer 
1. Male 
2. Female 
3. Not clear 
4. Not applicable 
PART 2 -GENERAL COVERAGE 
 Prominence 
Here we will categorise stories according to their placement in the newspaper. This will be 
used to discuss issues relating to the amount and quality of coverage given the conflicts, 
issues of sensationalism, etc. 
 1. Front page lead 
 2. Front page 
 3. Back page 
 3. Inside page (double/multiple pages) 
 4. Inside page    
Source of Story 
This is the person or organisation to which the writer has attributed the story. This will enable 
me discuss several issues: which sources do newspapers rely on most in reporting ethno-
religious conflicts? Is the press elite or people-oriented? What is the relationship between 
news sources and the framing of stories? How is source-bias reflected or moderated in 
conflict news reportage?  
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1. Security Agencies: Police/Army/Special Task Force/State Security Service, etc. 
2. Plateau State Government/Other state governments/local governments 
3.  Federal Government/National Assembly 
4. Christian organisation/Church/Christian personality 
5. Muslim organisation/Mosque/Muslim personality 
6. Community based organisation/ethnic associations 
7. Non-governmental organisations/Civil society 
8. Individuals 
9. Newspaper investigations 
10. Wire service/news service 
11.  Other  
12. Unattributed  
 Balance in the Story 
 1. Story is partisan, biased, sensational, exaggerated, reflects only one shade of   
    opinion 
 2. Story is non-partisan, neutral, restrained, reflects all shades of opinion 
 Backgrounding/Contextualizing 
 1. Story focuses on the here and now – no explanation of causes and long term   
   consequences 
 2. Story reports root causes and consequences, provides a historical perspective 
 Language and Tone 
 1. Uses inflammatory, sensational language 
 2. Uses moderate, concise language 
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PART 3 – MEDIA FRAME 
 Frames and Representations of Ethno-Religious Conflicts 
(Here stories are categorized on the basis of what the press is emphasising as the 
cause(s)/solution(s) of ethno-religious conflicts) 
1. Ethnic conflict frame (story attributes conflict to rivalry between ethnic groups 
such as Berom/Hausa, Hausa/Igbo etc) 
2. Religious conflict frame (story attributes conflict to war between Christians and 
Muslims; Islamic fundamentalism or jihad; etc.) 
3. Socio-economic conflict frame (story attributes conflict to poverty, illiteracy, 
socio-economic imbalance, struggle over land and property etc.) 
4. Politics/political manipulation frame (story attributes conflict to intra and inter-
party political struggles between groups and individuals on the Plateau) 
5. Security/law and order frame (story attributes conflicts to break down of law and 
order, criminality, a failure of security agencies to perform effectively, failure of 
government to protect lives and property, inability of government to bring 
perpetrators to justice) 
6. Citizenship question frame (story interprets conflicts as essentially the citizenship 
question) 
PART THREE 4: FRAMING OF STORIES ON THE PEACE JOURNALISM 
CRITERIA 
Reactivity: 
1. Reactive (newspaper waits for conflict to break out or about to break out 
before reporting it.) 
2. Proactive (newspaper anticipates, starts reporting before conflict breaks out.) 
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 Visibility of effects of conflict 
        1. Visible effects: Reports mainly the visible (physical) effects of conflict such as 
             casualties, death toll, damage to property. 
         2. Reports also invisible effects of conflict such as trauma, social and cultural 
             damage. 
Orientation 
         1. Elite oriented: story focuses mainly on officials, leaders and elite as actors  
  and sources of information. 
         2. People oriented: story focuses on common people as actors and sources              
  of information. 
Differences 
       1. Story focuses mainly on differences that led to the conflict/conflict outcomes 
 focused on violent options 
         2. Story also reports areas of agreement that might lead to a solution to the                  
conflict/conflict outcomes focused on negotiation and agreement 
Focus 
         1. Immediate context: story is focused mainly on the ‘here and now.’ 
         2. Wider context: story also provides background and historical perspective  
              giving the root causes and consequences of the conflict. 
 Good and Bad Tagging 
         1. Story dichotomises between good guys and bad guys, victims and villains in 
             the conflict. 
         2. Story avoids labelling of good guys and bad guys and simplistic moral     
              judgments. 
 Party involvement/orientation 
         1. Two-party orientation: story characterizes the conflict as between two  
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parties only in which one party wins and the other party loses 
         2. Multi-party orientation: story adopts a multi-party orientation and gives  
  voice to many parties involved in conflict. 
 Partisanship 
         1. Partisan: biased for one side of the conflict. 
         2. Non-partisan: neutral, not taking sides. 
 Winning Orientation 
         1. Zero-sum orientation: one goal: to win. 
         2. Win-win orientation: many goals and issues, solution oriented. 
 Language  
         1. Victimising language: story uses victimising language (e.g. genocide,  
massacre, vicious, barbaric, savage, fanatic, devastated, pathetic, defenceless.) 
         2. Absence of victimising language: story uses moderate language with  
precise descriptions and reserves strongest language only for gravest situation 
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Appendix 3 
CONTENT ANALYSIS CODE SHEET 
STORY ID: xxx-xxxxxx 
A. Key words in headline 
 
 
B. Incidence of conflict 
□ 1. September 2001 
□ 2. November 2008 
□ 3. January/March 2010 
□ 4. Christmas 2010 (December 2010) 
□ 5. Eid-el-Fitr 2011 (August 2011) 
 
C. Story type 
□ 1. News story 
□ 2. Editorial 
□ 3. Feature/opinion 
□ 4. Other 
D. By-line/Tagline 
□ 1. Correspondent/Reporter/Columnist 
□ 2. Guest writer/freelancer/syndicated 
□ 3. Reader 
□ 4. Anonymous 
E. Regional/Ethnic Identity 
□ 1. North 
□ 2. South 
□ 3. Middle Belt 
□ 4. Not clear/can’t tell 
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F. Contact 
□ 1. yes 
□ 2.  No 
G. Prominence 
□ 1. Front page lead 
□ 2. Front page 
□ 3. Back page 
□ 4. Inside page(double/multiple pages) 
□ 5. Inside page (single sheet)  
H. Source of Story 
□ 1. Security Agencies (Police/Army/Joint Task Force, SSS, etc.) 
□ 2. Plateau State Government/other state governments/local governments 
□ 3. Federal Government/other government agencies/National Assembly 
□ 4. Christian organisation 
□ 5. Muslim organisation 
□ 6. CBOs/Ethnic associations 
□ 7. NGO/civil society 
□ 8. Individuals/ordinary citizens 
□ 9. Newspaper investigations 
□ 10. Wire service/news service 
□ 11. Other 
□ 12. Unattributed 
I. Balance 
□ 1. Partisan 
□ 2. Non-partisan 
J. Background/Context 
□ 1. Immediate focus 
□ 2. Root causes 
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K. Language and Tone 
□ 1. Inflammatory/sensational 
□ 2. Moderate 
L. Media frames 
□ 1. Ethnic conflict 
□ 2. Religious conflict 
□ 3. Socio-economic conflict 
□ 4. Politics/political manipulation 
□ 5. Security/law and order 
□ 6. Citizenship question 
M. Peace Journalism Framing 
Reactivity 
□ 1. Reactive 
□ 2. Proactive  
Visibility of effects 
□ 1. Visible effects 
□ 2. Invisible effects 
Orientation 
□ 1. Elite-orientation (emphasis on elite and official sources) 
□ 2. People orientation (emphasis on ‘people’ sources) 
Differences 
□ 1. Emphasises differences 
□ 2. Focuses on agreement 
Focus 
□ 1. Immediate context (emphasis on ‘here and now’ events) 
□ 2. Wider context (emphasis on longer term processes and aspects) 
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Good and Bad Tagging 
□ 1. Labels good and bad guys 
□ 2. Avoids labels 
Party Orientation 
□ 1. Two party 
□ 2. Multi-party 
Partisanship 
□ 1. Partisan 
□ 2. Non-partisan 
Winning Orientation 
□ 1. Win-lose/zero-sum 
□ 2. Win-win 
Language  
□ 1. Victimising/demonising language/emotive words 
□ 2. Avoids victimising/demonising languages 
          victimising/demonising language 
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Appendix 4 
 Synopsis of opinion articles surveyed in Daily Trust and Nigerian Tribune 
Daily Trust Nigerian Tribune 
Ignoble, condemnable, unspeakable 
(Editorial Comment 3/12/08 front page) 
Blames riots on leadership failure of Gov. 
Jang, elections rigging and inter-ethnic 
rivalry 
The media and the genocide in Jos 
(3/12/08, back page) 
Postulates the conflict as a genocide hatched 
by Gov. Jang and his Berom ethnic group. 
The media is biased and blind in their 
coverage 
Jos massacre: our government’s folly? 
(5/12/08, p.13) 
Labels the crisis as genocide caused by Gov. 
Jonah Jang and Plateau state government and 
illustrates the culture of impunity and 
leadership failure in Nigeria. 
Jos and epidemic of insanity (1) 
(5/12/08, back page) 
A highly critical piece on the person and 
character of Gov. Jang, allegedly the master-
mind of the genocide against Hausa/Fulani 
Muslims. 
Hausas are settlers in Jos 
(6/12/08, p.4) 
An interview addressing the contentious 
indigene/settler issue 
 
Governor Jang’s underbelly 
(4/12/08 p13) 
Editorial speculating about those who 
perpetrated the crisis.{ 
 
The wuthering heights of Jos 
(7/12/08 p11) 
Questions the continued relevance of the 
compulsory National Youth Service Corps 
scheme in light of incessant killings of corps 
members in northern Nigeria 
Blood, blood everywhere 
(7/12/08 p13) 
Decries the scant regard for life in the 
country and laments especially the Yoruba 
victims of the riots. 
 
Jos mayhem: how these corps members 
were butchered 
(7/12/08) 
Paints a graphic narrative of the killings of 
three corps members from the south-west 
region. 
We need national confab now more than 
ever before 
(8/12/08 p35) 
Interview with a notable academic evaluates 
the state of the nation. 
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The Jos macabre: “Government said the 
Plateau State local government elections 
were free and fair. But you will be shocked 
by what we discovered.  
(7/12/08, front page) 
 
Jos killings: failure of politics and 
leadership 
(11/12/08) 
Blames crisis on Gov. Jang and the general 
paucity of credible leadership in Nigeria, 
attenuated by culture of elections rigging. 
 
Still on the media and the genocide in Jos 
(10/12/08) 
Raises critical issues about perceived 
Nigerian press bias against Hausa/Fulani and 
Muslims; questions the objectivity of 
highlighting murder of “Christian” youth but 
blind to the fate of Muslim school children 
killed in same crisis; doubts credibility of 
reports on mercenaries in the crisis. 
 
Jos and epidemic of insanity (111) 
(12/12/08) 
Criticises perceived partisanship of the 
dominant Nigerian press and its alleged 
unprofessional conduct in reporting the 
conflicts. 
 
Jos crisis political, not religious 
(14/12/08) 
Argues that the crisis is purely political and 
Jos: the slain corps members 
(8/12/08 p13) 
Editorial describing in graphic details the 
killings of the three corps members and 
evaluates the state of the NYSC scheme. 
 
Leke’s parents to NYSC: you have 
replaced my son with paper 
 
Graphic narratives on the killings of the three 
youth corps members and comments during 
the funeral of one of them. 
 
Jos killings: matters arising 
(7/12/08 p3) 
Blames elections rigging as root cause of 
riots. Discusses manipulation of religion and 
ethnicity by ruling class. Accuses northern 
Christians of timidity and canvasses self-
defence as panacea to being attacked by 
Hausa Muslims. 
 
 
Jos violence: calling it what it really is 
Challenges assertions and claims of genocide 
by another newspaper and attempts to clarify 
historical issues in the conflicts. 
 
 
 
Jos fracas as wake-up call  
(17/12/08 p12) 
Argues that revolution is inevitable except 
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ethnic, not religious, as Muslims of other 
groups are never fighting Christians like the 
Hausa/Fulani Muslims. 
 
Jos Mayhem 2008: Matters Arising 
(16/12/08) 
Raises issues about the alleged partisan role 
of the Plateau state government and security 
agencies and calls for an independent 
inquiry. 
 
Re- The media and the genocide in Jos 
(19/12/08) 
A rejoinder rebutting the logic and soundness 
of some of the basic assertions in an earlier 
article. 
 
 
 
 
things shape up in the country. 
 
 
 
Still on Jos violence 
(17/12/08 p12) 
Argues that the conflict is provoked by the 
ambition of the Hausa/Fulani Muslims to 
dominate others in Jos and Nigeria. 
 
The butchers of Jos 
(11/12/08 p12) 
Laments the contradictions in Nigeria’s 
federalism and attributes crisis to culture of 
impunity. Records alleged phone 
conversation with murdered corps members. 
The Jos carnage 
(13/12/08 p45) 
Argues that social misery and culture of 
impunity caused the riots. Laments the 
killing of the three youth corps members. 
In the Name of God? No, not in His Name! 
(14/12/08 p12) 
An emotional tribute to the three corps 
members killed in the riots. 
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Appendix 6 
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Appendix 7 
Interview Guide for media academics and media practitioners 
Topic of Research:  
Media, Democratisation and Ethno-Religious Conflicts: The Press and the Dilemma of Peace 
Building in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic (2001-2011) 
General Quality of Reportage 
In my recent analysis of the coverage of the Jos crisis, I noticed that a high proportion of 
news reports and comments tended to be partisan and sensational. The press coverage of the 
conflicts is such that could further escalate tensions and exacerbate the conflicts. What do 
you think might account for this? 
It is observable that very few female reporters and analysts cover, or write on, the Jos crisis. 
It therefore appears that the feminine voice is largely absent from the newspaper discourses 
of ethno-religious conflicts in Nigeria. What concerns do you think this pose? 
What do you consider to be the main challenges facing Nigerian journalists in covering 
ethno-religious conflicts? 
Peace Journalism 
One criticism of mainstream journalism in the coverage of conflicts is that it gives undue 
attention and preference to violence and war while neglecting commensurate attention to 
peaceful settlement of disputes. This criticism has inspired the emergence of new genres of 
journalism which attempt to correct what they perceive as imbalance in the coverage of 
conflicts such as ethno-religious riots. One of these emerging genres is known as ‘peace 
journalism’ whose main goal is to report conflicts in a way that will enhance non-violent 
responses to conflict. 
Do you share the concern expressed about mainstream journalistic coverage of conflicts? 
Are you conversant with the concept of peace journalism? 
If you are conversant with the concept of peace journalism, what do you think of its approach 
to conflict coverage, vis- a-vis core journalistic norms and values such as neutrality and 
objectivity? 
Peace journalism, amongst other things, proposes that journalists should be specially trained 
and equipped with conflict resolution skills which it believes will make them more effective 
professionals in covering conflicts. What is your opinion of this suggestion? 
What do you think might be the main obstacles to implementing peace journalism by the 
Nigerian press? 
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Journalism Training 
The institutions and schools for journalism training have multiplied in recent times. How 
would you assess the state of journalism education in Nigeria? 
What do you see as the main weaknesses of Nigerian journalism vis-à-vis professional 
practices today and how might changes in journalism education address these? 
 
Some scholars have suggested that conflict reporting should be a special course in the 
curriculum of journalism institutions in Nigeria. What is your view on this proposal? 
Freedom of Information Act 
Nigerian journalists, media practitioners and media academics fought hard and long to get the 
Freedom of Information (FOI) Act passed into law.  How do you think the FOI Act has 
impacted on journalism practice in Nigeria?  
How well do you think Nigerian journalists are doing in taking advantage of the FOI Act to 
improve the quality of investigative journalism and to make public officials accountable? 
With particular reference to conflict coverage, in what ways do you think FOI has impacted 
the reportage of ethno-religious conflicts in Nigeria? 
What do you consider to be the practical constraints faced by the press in the implementation 
of the FOI Act?  
Do you think the FOI Act has resulted in more investigative journalism by the Nigerian 
press?  
General  
Do you have any suggestions or recommendations for the Nigerian press in its coverage of 
ethno-religious conflicts?  
What is your assessment of the role of the professional body of journalism practice in Nigeria 
with regards to improving standards, and the overall quality and integrity of Nigerian 
journalism? 
Regardless of ideological differences amongst the Nigerian press what do you see as the main 
issues of professional practice that needs addressing in order to raise the standard of 
journalism in the country? 
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Appendix 8 
Interview Cover Letter 
 
 
Dear Sir/Ma 
I am a postgraduate student of Birmingham City University, Birmingham, United Kingdom. I 
am also the Institute Editor at the National Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies, Kuru, 
Jos, Nigeria. 
I am currently engaged in a PhD research on the topic: Media, Democratisation and Ethno-
Religious Conflicts: The Press and the Dilemma of Peace Building in Nigeria’s Fourth 
Republic (2001-2011). 
The overarching objective of this research is to critically analyse the performance of the 
Nigerian press in the coverage of ethno-religious conflicts and to evaluate their potential for 
escalating or minimising such conflicts.  
As part of my field work, I need to interview selected media practitioners and media 
academics to obtain their views on issues germane to my studies. In this respect, I have the 
honour to request your kind audience to interview you on matters related to my research 
objectives.  
The attached questionnaire will guide our discussions during the interview. Please be assured 
that all responses and information obtained in the course of this exercise will be treated 
professionally and with utmost confidentiality.  
I hope I can count on your cooperation and look forward to your positive response. Thank 
you. 
 
Yours sincerely, 
 
Jacob Tsado 
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Appendix 9 
Open coding of interviews 
 
Quality of reportage 
Ethno-religious bias 
Ethics  
Poor work conditions 
Ownership influence 
Investigative reporting 
Commercialisation 
Inadequate training 
News culture 
Sources 
Audience expectations 
 
Peace Journalism 
Ownership 
Commercial pressures 
Partisanship/ethno-religious bias 
News culture 
Inadequate training/skills 
Ethics 
Audience expectations 
Awareness 
Curriculum development 
Already being taught in few places 
Association of peace journalists 
 
Journalism training 
Rapid expansion 
Grossly inadequate staff/equipment 
Obsolete curriculum 
Disconnect with industry 
Hope 
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FOI Act 
Ignorance of the law 
Implementation weak, ineffective 
Bureaucratic bottlenecks 
Ownership influence 
Rampant corruption within/outside media 
Non-domestication 
Investigative journalism 
Capacity  
Advocacy 
 
Professional bodies 
Issues: ethics/discipline 
Relationship with government –cosy 
Training 
Professionalism 
 
Gender issues 
Patriarchy 
Feminine orientation 
Stereotyping 
Population of female journalists 
Girl-child education issues 
Changing trends 
 
Main challenges of the press 
Professionalism 
Ethics 
Partisanship 
Commercialisation 
Training/capacity 
Working conditions 
Corruption 
Equipment 
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Ownership 
Insurance 
Audience culture 
Weak regulatory environment 
 
Recommendation 
Transcend ethnic boundaries 
Proactive countering of ethno-religious narratives 
Welfare of journalists 
Insurance 
Language training 
Training and updating 
Ethical foundations 
Professionalism 
Strong self-regulatory mechanism 
News culture 
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Appendix 10 
Extracts of different thematic frames 
 
Religious Conflict Frame 
In a front page lead story on September 10, 2001, titled, “calm gradually returns to Jos,” 
Daily Trust writes: 
Normalcy is gradually returning to Jos, the Plateau State capital, after the violent religious 
crisis which rocked the city over the weekend. 
Another story on September 12, 2001, appeals directly to religious adherents: 
The Sultan of Sokoto, Alhaji Muhammadu Maccido, has appealed to Muslims and Christians 
in Jos and all over the country to let peace reign as leaders of both religions asked adherents 
to give peace a chance. 
On September 17, 2001, Daily Trust published a feature story titled, “Jos crisis: aftermath of 
a prolonged rivalry.” This story attempted some back grounding of the crisis, but hinged 
explanations for the conflicts largely on religious rivalry between Christians and Muslims 
which is further complicated by overlapping ethnic differences. Excerpts: 
The violence that erupted between Christians and Muslims in Jos, capital of Plateau State 
last Friday has reportedly claimed over 1000 lives.  
Two weeks before the eruption, tension was said to have heightened over the appointment of 
Alhaji Mohammed Mukhtar Usman (Hausa Muslim individual) as coordinator of the 
National Poverty Eradication Programme in Jos North Local Government Area. 
Again reports indicate that the crisis might have been heightened by a statement purportedly 
issued by the Jasawa Development Association (JDA), a Hausa Muslim group, calling on 
people in the area to vote a Muslim as the council chairman. 
The story then highlights the ethnic dimension:  
Controversy over whether or not Hausas in Jos (are indigenes) has been on for about two 
decades. While most Hausas resident in Jos claim to be natives of the area, the Jarawa and 
Anagutas have always refuted the claims. 
Other newspapers reflected the religious conflict frame variously as excerpted below: 
This Day newspaper 
Tuesday September 5, 2001: the newspaper published a story with the headline: Religious 
crisis brews in Jos. The story then attributed the brewing crisis to conflict between Muslims 
and Christians when it said in the lead:  
The relative religious peace enjoyed by residents of plateau state …may elude them if urgent 
actions are not taken by relevant authorities to avert an imminent showdown between 
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Christian indigenes of the area and the Hausa-Fulani who are mainly Muslims. (This Day, 
September 05, 2001)  
On September 8, the main front page story was headlined: Curfew in Jos as violence erupts. 
The religious conflict frame was obvious in the narrative as it speculated on the immediate 
cause and effects of the eruption: 
The air of gloom that has hovered over Jos, the Plateau State capital was punctured 
yesterday when violence erupted at about 2.30 p.m., after the Muslim Jumat prayers. Though 
the immediate cause of the incident, which resulted in the burning of two churches could not 
be ascertained as at press time, THISDAY investigations however showed that the incident 
may not be unconnected with the rivalry between the Muslim Hausa/Fulanis and Christian 
indigenes in the Jos North Local Government Area… 
The two churches which were razed down in the Kwararafa area were Church of Christ in 
Nigeria and Assemblies of God Church…Unconfirmed report said a mosque was also razed 
down in the Nasarawa area…Hordes of security men were seen mounting security around the 
central mosque to forestall an imminent reprisal from the Christians. 
Also on September 10 was another story headlined: 50 feared dead as Jos violence escalates. 
The narrative continued: 
The religious violence which broke out on Friday between Muslim Hausa Fulani and 
Christian indigenes in Jos… assumed a frightening dimension as more lives and property 
were lost to the crisis…Among the property burnt is the guest house of the Bauchi State 
Governor, Alhaji Adamu Mu’azu…Until his election, Mu’azu was resident in Jos where he 
had a flourishing business. He attended a Christian school in the town and was well 
respected by both Christians and Muslims. (This Day, September 10, 2001, front page lead). 
The Guardian 
Religious conflict frame was featured in some of the stories in The Guardian.  For example 
the story on the front page on September 10, 2001 described the conflicts as “sectarian” The 
headline was: Fresh killings in Jos, religious leaders sue for peace. 
Even with the heavy presence of soldiers on the streets of Jos…the sectarian crisis which 
disrupted its peace at the weekend, is far from being over. Secret killings by religious fanatics 
… are still common place. (The Guardian, September 10, 2001, front page) 
Another story names the parties to conflict as “Christians” and “Moslems”:  
No fewer than 50 persons have been killed in the sectarian crisis which was ignited on Friday 
between Moslems and Christians (Guardian, September 9, 2001, front page lead). 
Nigerian Tribune 
A lead story in the Nigerian Tribune spoke of “violent religious riots.”  
Food crisis hits Jos: Uneasy calm returns: 
Acute food crisis has hit parts of Jos…affected by two days of violent religious riots at the 
weekend. (Nigerian Tribune, September 10, 2001, front page). 
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A news feature in the Nigerian Tribune of 16 September was titled: Religious Riots: Has Jos 
lost its soul, peace? In one of the paragraphs, the report described a scene in which  
Immediately the pandemonium broke…business activities (were) paralysed and Christians 
also descended on Muslims in their midst. 
Ethnic conflict frame 
The ethnic conflict frame attributes the conflict to rivalry between ethnic groups, particularly 
between Beroms and/or other indigenous groups and the Hausa/Fulani. This frame is closely 
related to the religious conflict frame and many times are inter-twined. Some examples are 
cited here: 
Nigerian Tribune 
On September 06 2001, Nigerian Tribune published the following story: 
Tension mounts in Jos over council’s status: The prevailing peaceful atmosphere in Jos, the 
capital of Plateau state, might be punctured as the Hausa/Fulani community under the aegis 
of Jasawa Development Association and Plateau Youth Council are set for a show down over 
the indigenous rights of Jos North local government area. 
Nigeria Tribune reliably learnt that the controversy over the true indigenes of Jos which has 
been raging for a long time was rekindled about a month ago as a result of the appointment 
of one Alhaji Usman Mohammed, a Hausa/Fulani, as the coordinator of the national poverty 
eradication programme for the council. 
The Nigerian Tribune’s ethnic narrative is also obvious in a feature article on 16 September 
2001, “Has Jos lost its soul, peace?” in which the paper recounted that  
A week before the crisis there had been seemingly (sic) tension hovering over the ancient city 
(of Jos) as a result of the appointment of one Alhaji Mukhtar Mohammed, an Hausa/Fulani 
man as the coordinator of the National Poverty Eradication Programme (NAPEP) for Jos 
North Local government, an appointment which did not go down well with the indigenes who 
saw it as a slap on their faces… 
Since his appointment as NAPAE coordinator for the council, offensive and threatening 
posters has (sic) been flying around Jos by both the Hausa/Fulani community under the aegis 
of Jasawa Development Association and the Plateau Youth Council. The Jasawa are 
claiming indigenous right of Jos North Local Government being the first to settle there while 
the indigenous people are saying they are mere settlers. 
Another story in the Tribune titled, “NLC cautions on Jos disturbances” features the religious 
and ethnic frames:  
The Nigeria Labour Congress (NLC) has cautioned warring factions in Jos Plateau State to 
cease fire as the country “cannot afford to be divided by religious (sic) and ethnicity.” 
An Editorial comment by the newspaper labels the conflict as “ethno-religious.” In the 
opening paragraph, the paper stated: 
Jos, the capital of Plateau State and famed haven of tourism and hospitality, erupted in an 
orgy of ethno-religious violence recently…The uprising…first began as a religious 
altercation and gradually assumed the line of an ethnic face-off with the Hausa/Fulani, who 
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are regarded as settlers in the city, confronting the aborigines. Incidentally, the former are 
predominantly Muslim, while the latter are Christians… 
The Nigerian Tribune then gave the issue a wider perspective as a pervasive national problem 
when it pointed out that: 
The eruption in Jos is a sad commentary on the way people from different ethnic stocks 
cohabit in the country today. There is massive distrust, pent up anger and animosity, fear of 
domination and marginalisation, and above all, suspicion of religious repression. 
Nigerian Tribune also highlighted the complicating and highly emotive introduction of 
shari’a law in many of the northern states as a background context:  
Since the sharia swept through parts of the north, many areas not completely dominated by 
Muslims have had to be on guard, to ensure that sharia zealots do not infiltrate their cities 
and impose the code on them. It is therefore a relationship akin to that of the cat and mouse 
between Muslims and non-Muslims. 
Daily Trust 
Daily Trust features the ethnic conflict frame in several articles and reports. For example, a 
feature article titled “Jos Crisis” said: 
…if any section of the Jos community is marginalized, it is the indigenous community which 
is made up of Berom, Anagutas and Afizeres. These are the veritable owners of Jos town from 
prehistory itself. Which is why the appointment of the coordinator of the poverty eradication 
programme from a community other than the indigenous ones aroused the ire of the people 
and is one of the fundamental causes of the conflagration. 
The piece then attempted to put the religious angle in perspective thus: 
Religion and the episode at the mosque which could have been benignly ignored was merely 
a thin and convenient veneer and a weak hook on which to hang an excuse to go on a killing 
spree. 
Daily Trust also focused on this frame in another story: 
Hausa community hosts AD, condemns violence :…( the Hausa chief) appealed to the 
governments to mount a campaign “to enlighten the various tribes and religious zealots that 
we are one irrespective of race, tribe or religion (18 September 2001). 
On September 11, 2001, The Guardian flashed this headline on the front page: 
Plateau takes stock, blames clash on ethnicity 
This Day had earlier produced an article on 05 September 2008 with the title: 
One north, different people 
Reports constructed on the Security/law and order frame 
The security/law and order frame refers to stories attributing the conflict to break down of 
law and order, criminality, impunity, failure of security or failure and/or inability by 
government to protect lives and property. On 13 September, 2001, Daily Trust had this 
story: 
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Jos riots: CLO flays government, police: the civil liberties organization has indicted the 
Plateau State Government and security agencies over what it described as their alleged 
negligence in the handling of the religious crisis that engulfed the state capital in the past 
few days. (This Day, 13 September 2001, front page). 
Another story said: 
Fighting erupts again in Jos: Federal Government warns trouble makers. 
Another round of fighting has erupted in Jos even as the federal government has warned 
that it would deal squarely with those behind it…Reacting to the renewed fighting, the 
Federal Government said it had “the capacity, will and resources” to deal squarely with 
“those faceless people” behind the incidents of ethno-religious upheavals in the country. 
(Daily Trust 13 September 2001, front page). 
The Guardian newspaper also featured this theme in a story titled: Plateau, security outfit 
warn against breach of peace. According to the paper,  
The Plateau State Government and the state joint security forces have warned individuals 
and groups against breaching the peace as such would be severely punished… the 
government and security outfit said they would not fold their hands and watch trouble 
makers disturb the peace (The Guardian 24 September 2001, p.4). 
And the police authorities were reported by This Day newspaper as reassuring citizens that 
the riots would not spill to other towns: 
Riots won’t spill over – Kaduna Police (This Day, 15 September 2001). 
Still on this frame, the Nigerian Tribune reported the concern of the Federal government 
on the breakdown of law and order in one of the prisons following the riots: 
Federal government probes killing of prisoners in Jos crisis.  
The federal government has instituted a judicial commission of inquiry to investigate the 
killing of several prison inmates and the destruction of lives and property at Jos prison 
during the recent mayhem in Jos (Nigerian Tribune). 
The newspaper also lamented the apparent dismal performance of the security agencies 
and the government in nipping the riots in the bud despite reports early warning signals. 
It is condemnable that the carnage in Jos still occurred despite alleged security reports 
which had earlier been furnished the government that some people were planning to 
rupture the peace of the city. With such forewarning, every effort should have been made 
to forestall the event (Nigerian Tribune, 18 September 2001) 
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Appendix 11 
Timeline of Ethno-Religious Conflicts in Jos State 2001-2011 
Date/Event Location Actors Cause 
7 September 2001  
Jos Crisis 
Jos North Local 
Govt./Jos South 
Local Govt. with 
reprisals in some 
other LGAs 
Hausa/Fulani 
Muslims vs 
Indigenous groups 
and Christians  
Immediate cause: 
Appointment of a 
Hausa/Fulani (Alhaji 
Muktar) as NAPEP 
Coordinator for Jos 
North LGA. 
Appointment rejected 
by indigenous groups 
Immediate trigger: 
Altercation between 
a Christian woman 
passer-by and 
Muslim congregation 
during Juma’at 
prayers 
Remote cause 
Contest over 
ownership of Jos; 
indigene-settler 
issue; political 
competition  
 
May 2002 
The Eto-Baba PDP 
Ward Congress 
Crisis 
Jos North, Angwan 
Rukuba, Eto-Baba 
and Nasarawa Gwom 
Indigenous groups vs 
Hausa/Fulani 
Muslims 
Immediate cause 
Pandemonium at 
political party ward 
congress due to 
suspected invasion of 
event by non-
residents perceived 
as mercenaries by the 
indigenes. 
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Remote cause: 
Political competition 
between indigenous 
groups and 
Hausa/Fulani  
November 2008 Jos 
Crisis 
Jos North LGA, Jos 
South LGA and 
environs 
Hausa/Fulani vs 
Indigenous groups 
(Berom, Anaguta and 
Afizere) and 
Christians generally  
Immediate cause 
Allegations of 
rigging  of the Local 
Govt. elections of 27 
Nov. 2007 
Remote cause 
Unresolved issues of 
indigeneity and 
ownership of Jos 
city; political 
competition. 
January 2010 Jos 
Crisis 
Jos North and Jos 
South LGAs 
Indigenous groups 
and Christians in 
general vs 
Hausa/Fulani 
Muslims 
Immediate cause 
Dispute between 
Muslims and 
Christians in 
Nasarawa Gwom 
area 
Remote cause 
Unresolved issue of 
indigeneity and 
ownership of Jos; 
political competition 
March 2010 Dogo 
Nahawa Massacre  
Jos South LGA Hausa/Fulani vs 
Berom ethnic group 
Immediate cause 
Reprisal attack on the 
Berom for January 
2010 attacks on 
Hausa/Fulani 
Remote cause 
Political and 
economic contest 
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between indigenes 
and Hausa/Fulani 
2010 Christmas Eve 
Bombing 
Jos North LGA Islamic 
fundamentalists 
(Boko Haram) vs 
Christians  
Immediate cause 
Revenge by some 
fundamentalists on 
the perception that 
Muslims are targeted 
and killed 
indiscriminately in 
Jos 
Remote cause 
Animosity over 
previous conflicts in 
Jos 
August 2011 Eid-el 
Fitr Sallah Conflicts 
Jos North LGA Indigenes vs 
Hausa/Fulani 
Muslims 
Immediate cause 
Attack on Muslim 
worshippers at the 
Rukuba road eid 
praying ground; 
refusal by some 
Muslim worshippers 
to heed security 
advice not to use the 
prayer ground. 
Remote cause 
Animosity over 
previous conflicts in 
Jos, particularly the 
2010 Christmas Eve 
bombings. 
Source: Adapted from Gofwen, 2011: 49-55 
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Appendix 12 
Ethnic Groups in Nigeria’s 36 States 
Serial No State No of ethnic Groups 
1 Abia 1 
*2 Adamawa 80 
3 Akwa Ibom 7 
4 Anambra 1 
5 Bauchi  51 
6 Bayelsa  4 
*7 Benue 9 
8 Borno 23 
9 Cross River 30 
10 Delta 6 
11 Ebonyi 2 
12 Edo 9 
13 Ekiti 1 
14 Enugu 1 
15 Gombe 17 
16 Imo 1 
17 Jigawa 5 
*18 Kaduna 32 
19 Kano 2 
20 Katsina 2 
21 Kebbi 19 
22 Kogi 13 
*23 Kwara 4 
24 Lagos 3 
*25 Nasarawa 25 
*26 Niger 22 
27 Ogun 1 
28 Ondo 3 
29 Osun 1 
30 Oyo 1 
*31 Plateau 52 
32 Rivers 9 
33 Sokoto 3 
*34 Taraba 39 
35 Yobe 10 
36 Zamfara 3 
37 Federal Capital Territory (FCT) 3 
*Denotes Central Nigeria 
Source: Otite (2002: 10-11) in Alubo, 2011: 12) 
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Appendix 13 
Newspapers currently published in Nigeria 
Newspaper Location Publisher First issued Remarks 
Blueprint 
Newspaper 
Abuja  May 2011  
Business Day Lagos Frank Aigbogun 2005  
Business 
Hallmark 
Lagos Prince Emeka 
Obasi 
  
Compass Abeokuta Gbenga Daniel 2008  
Daily Champion Lagos Emmanuel 
Iwuanyanwu 
  
Daily Times of 
Nigeria  
Lagos Folio 
Communications 
9 June 1925  
Guardian Lagos Guardian 
Newspapers Ltd. 
1983  
Independent Lagos Independent 
Newspapers Ltd. 
2001  
Leadership Abuja Leadership 
Newspapers Group 
1 Oct 2004  
Mirror  Global Media 
Mirror Ltd. 
2006  
Nation Lagos Vintage Press Ltd. 2006  
New Nigerian 
Newspapers 
Kaduna NEWS Nigerian 
Newspapers Ltd. 
1963  
Newswatch Lagos Global Media 
Mirror Group 
28 January 
1985 
This 
magazine 
has stated 
publishing 
a daily 
newspaper 
under the 
same title. 
Next Lagos Timbuktu Media 
Group 
2004  
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Observer Benin City Bendel Newspapers 
Ltd. 
1965  
Osun Defender Osogbo Moremi Publishing 
House 
  
P.M. News Lagos Independent 
Communications 
Network Ltd. 
1994  
Peoples Daily Abuja Peoples Media Ltd. 30 November 
2008 
 
Port Harcourt 
Telegraph 
Port 
Harcourt 
Prince Ogbonna 
Nwuke 
1991  
Premium 
Times 
Abuja Premium Times 
Services Ltd. 
2011  
Punch Lagos Ajibola Ogunsola 1971  
Sun Lagos The Sun Publishing 
Ltd. 
2001  
Tell 
Magazine 
Lagos TELL 
Communications 
Ltd. 
1991 News 
magazine 
The News 
Chronicle 
Abuja Adonis and Abbey 
Publishers 
2013  
This Day Lagos Leaders and 
Company 
1975  
Tribune Ibadan African 
Newspapers of 
Nigeria Ltd. 
1949  
Triumph Kano Triumph 
Publishing 
1980  
Trust Abuja Media Trust 2001  
Vanguard Lagos Vanguard Media 1983  
The News 
Journal 
Ibadan Layipo concepts 2013  
Royal Times Ilorin Royal times of 
Nigeria 
2012  
Source: AABNig: http://www.aabnigeria.com. 
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Appendix 14 
Emerging Themes and Codes 
1 
Quality of 
Reportage 
2 
Gender 
Issues in 
Coverage 
3 
Journalism 
Training 
4 
FOI 
Act 
5 
Professional Bodies 
6 
Peace 
Journalism 
7 
Main Challenges of 
Practice 
Ethno-religious bias 
Poor work conditions 
Ownership influence  
Investigative 
reporting   
Commercialisation 
Inadequate training 
Ethics/Corruption 
Credible sources 
Audience 
expectations 
Patriarchy 
Stereotyping 
Feminine 
Orientation 
Girl-child 
education 
Population of 
women 
Journalists 
 
Rapid Expansion  
Gross inadequacy: 
staff/equipment 
Obsolete curriculum 
Dramatic increase in 
female involvement 
Disconnect between 
classroom/newsroom 
Hope  
Weak 
implementation 
Lack of 
awareness  
Bureaucracy  
Ethics/Corruption 
Investigative 
journalism 
Non-
Domestication by 
state governments 
Ownership 
influence 
Weak institutions 
Weak professional 
bodies 
Ethics/Discipline 
Cosy relationship with 
Government/politicians  
Synergy 
Ownership  
Commercial 
pressures 
News culture 
Social 
values/structures 
Lack of 
capacity/training 
Awareness 
Audience 
expectations 
Professionalism 
Ethics  
Partisanship/ethno-
religious bias 
Commercialisation 
Ownership 
Inadequate 
training/capacity 
Poor work 
conditions 
Corruption 
Insurance/safety and 
security  
Audience culture 
Weak regulatory 
environment  
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‘‘Promoting Women’s Engagement in Peace and Security in Northern 
Nigeria’’, funded by EU. 
COMMUNIQUE AT THE END OF 2- DAY WORKSHOP FOR 
JOURNALISTS FROM PROJECT PILOT STATES OF ADAMAWA, 
GOMBE AND PLATEAU - (19-20/8/14) 
Preamble 
The northern part of Nigeria, its environs, and as a fact, the entire country is witnessing difficult 
security and economic challenges which affect the active and proper involvement of Women in 
governance and nation building. In all these activities, women are key stakeholders whose roles need 
to be understood and integrated for there to be any meaningful peace management. Guidelines from 
the terms of agreement were used to do table-top needs assessment to determine what was needed for 
ensuring the outcome of the interactive session successful and impactful. 
Using UN Security Resolution 1325, excerpts from the programme document as well as goodwill 
messages, the session was interactive and journalist - centred to enable participants to elicit thoughts 
and suggestions on how best to report peace, security and conflict issues in order to ensure that 
women are adequately involved in all peace processes and decisions. 
Historical testimonials throughout history, where journalists have reported on conflict as it affects 
women and peace and can serve as examples for women worldwide were discussed. 
In the course of the workshop participants answered the following questions: 
Q1: What measures can/should be put in place to encourage more and better reportage on peace and 
security as well as guarantee women’s participation in the processes? 
Q2: What examples could they identify of where women’s participation improved a peace process? 
Q3: What can women/ female politicians do to guarantee their seat at the negotiating table? What do 
they believe women can offer in these situations? 
Outcomes: 
 They discussed the legacy of conflict-related violence – cases of violence and insecurity 
which continues or even increases for women, facilitated by large-scale impunity, the absence 
of effective justice systems and an unreformed security sector.  
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 Re-establishing the rule of law as the foundation for women’s security, protection of rights, 
and, ultimately, an equitable peace. 
 Participants looked at UNR 1325, Constitutional Framework and other good practices that 
promote peace as a fundamental right and a mandatory duty and which endorses the 
incorporation of the principles derived from the protection of human rights. In this context, 
those instruments relating to the participation of women in the processes of negotiation, 
consolidation and peacekeeping, post-conflict reconstruction and its contribution to 
development.  
 They looked at strategies of engagement with political decision makers regarded as essential 
for achieving results, followed by real action, between the State and civil society.  
 They also looked at how a paradigm shift can be achieved by reporting from a peace 
perspective while de-emphasising on reporting and writing about violence as it is being done 
and celebrated now. 
 In doing this, participants reiterated the need for a comprehensive policy framework and 
public policy, which makes to cover significant gaps in implementation, as well as 
expressions of discrimination and structural violence against women in public and private 
spaces.  
 They also agreed to delineate areas of activity within the states through peer capacity 
appraisal so that areas of strength and weaknesses could be utilized fully for maximum effect 
and impact. 
 At the end, a plan of action was agreed by participants where certain steps and actions points 
in the appendix were agreed upon.  
PLAN OF ACTION WITH STRATEGY 
- Participants formed a National Association of Peace and Conflict Journalists. Interim 
National officials to coordinate affairs are: Moji Makanjuola MFR (Chairperson), Danjuma 
Abdullahi, Blossom Ubani, Zubairu Jide Atta (member and National Secretary). All State 
NUJ Chairpersons are coordinators. 
- Participants came out with a 5-point action plan in order of priority. They agreed to utilise 
resources at hand and embark on recruiting champions through advocacy visit and 
engagement.  
The step-by-step strategy is expected to ensure community acceptance, optimal use of areas of 
strength for wide spread impact within a short time and for community ownership and 
sustainability. 
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APPENDIX 16 
 
